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Innovation and Entrepreneurship as strategies for success among Cuban-based firms in the late years of the transatlantic slave trade

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Abstract
This article examines how Cuban-based firms and entrepreneurs circumvented ever- increasing risks in the illegal slave trade. The article sheds light to this question by analyzing new qualitative information of 65 Cuban-based firms against the Slavevoyages database. Our findings indicate that Cuban-based firms were entrepreneurial as they exploited the opportunities arising from the volatility of the slave trade by: (a) internalizing networks of agents which allowed the rapid diffusion of information, (b) diversifying trading goods and expanding the number of partnerships to reduce transaction costs and risk, (c) adopting technological innovations that modified the design and use of vessels.

Keywords
Slave trade; Cuban firms; innovation; diversification; entrepreneurship; business agents

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Introduction

Until the early nineteenth century, the slave trade to Cuba was carried out to a large extent by European and American firms and individuals. The abolition of the slave trade in the British colonies and the subsequent policing of the Atlantic from 1808 by the British navy had a profound effect on the slave traders and their *modus operandi*. These changes in the Atlantic basin led Cuban-based entrepreneurs to get directly involved in the transatlantic slave trade. This involvement often came in the form of trade partnerships and the creation of new firms, and was neither easy nor straightforward. This article first examines the operational changes implemented by these Cuban-based entrepreneurs, subsequently focusing on the innovative strategies instigated by them, particularly from the 1830s onwards. Entrepreneurship is defined here as a vital function of economic agents who 'specialize in collecting information that permits them to make judgmental decisions about innovation.'[1] This view recognizes the volatile character of market environments, which constantly produce new business opportunities while simultaneously rendering some previous models obsolete.[2] In environments like these, entrepreneurs as the ones at the center of this study, make decisions about innovation strategies, and exploit the most promising of these new opportunities.[3] Finally, this article argues that it was thanks to the flexibility in their operations, and to their innovative strategies, that Cuban-based entrepreneurs were able to make enormous profits until the very end of the epoch of transatlantic slave trade.

The success of the Cuban-based firms and individuals in the slave trade business during the illegal period was of pivotal importance for the economic growth of Cuba at the time, and it coincided with the rise of the Second Slavery period.[4] Sugar was one of the most demanded trading products in international markets at the time. Based on increasingly larger annual imports of African slaves Cuba became, during the first half of the nineteenth century, the main producer and exporter of sugar at international level.[5] Ultimately, Cuban-based merchants and planters saw the continuation of the slave trade as a *sine qua non* condition for the survival of their business and the economic prosperity of the island. To keep up with the international markets' demands, they did not hesitate in investing heavily in what was by all standards a bourgeoning criminal activity, the transatlantic slave trade.

To date, no systematic archival research exists which addresses the question of how these Cuban-based merchants and planters, without any knowledge and capabilities of the slave trade, managed to catch-up with their European and Brazilian competitors and to overcome the difficulties associated with the illegal nature of the trade, in order to then dominate it.[6] This article builds on archival research carried out in Cuba, Spain, Brazil and Great Britain. It also incorporates theoretical insights from the economics of innovation, entrepreneurship, and diversification literatures to prove that it was due to the creation of a large network of agents, the adoption of diversification and risk-management strategies, and the introduction of technological innovations that Cuban-based firms were able to increase their flexibility, to overcome their lack of know-how, and to be successful in this trade, all this in spite of the illegal character of the transatlantic slave trade in the Spanish Atlantic after 1820.

Although the involvement of Cuban-based firms and individuals in the slave trade was, first and foremost a criminal activity, in this article they are studied as business endeavors, as this approach better reflects their character and nature, and also allows for a more in-depth analysis of their impact. This article avoids taking a moral perspective, but acknowledges that the people and activities presented and discussed in the following pages developed a heinous business that had a deep impact on the societies where they procured their slaves, and on the lives of those men, women, and children they carried out across the Atlantic to satisfy their needs for free labor.

Adapting to changing market conditions: the rise of Cuban-based firms

Until the early 1790s the Cuban slave trade was in the hands of foreign traders, companies, and occasionally governments. The Spanish policy of granting monopolistic privileges to these foreign traders and conglomerates was effective enough to supply Cuban cities and countryside with sufficient numbers of African slaves, until the revolution in the neighboring French colony of Saint Domingue brought about a dramatic change in the trade.[7] The collapse of sugar production in Saint Domingue presented Cuban planters with the unique opportunity of replacing their French competitors as the main producers and exporters of sugar and coffee for the international markets, something they achieved incrementally from the mid-1790s onwards. When the rights granted by the Spanish Crown to the Liverpudlian firm of Baker & Dawson came to an end in 1788, Cuban patrician elites, led by Francisco de Arango y Parreño, started to lobby the King of Spain for new privileges to import slaves from Africa in ever-larger numbers. By 1803, these demands included for the first time a pioneering request for the monarch to authorize them to form a Sociedad Anónima (Limited Company) that would allow them to reduce their dependence on foreign merchants by establishing a transatlantic slave trading business with its epicenter in Havana, and which they thought could lead to a free-market environment.[8]

As David Murray has argued, 'it is generally agreed that Cuban pressure was responsible for the experiment which changed the nature of the slave trade to Spanish America, from a closed commerce operated by monopolies, to a trade open to Spaniards and foreigners alike.'[9] Although already in 1789 they had been authorized to import slaves from Africa by themselves, it was not until the early nineteenth century that their involvement and initiative led to a significant change in the dynamics of this trade to Cuba.[10] The 1803 petition to set up a Limited African Company in Havana for the sole purpose of taking full command of the slave trading operations in the coast of Africa constituted a clear sign that a new age of free trade had dawned.

This proposal, signed by some of the most notorious future slave traders of Havana and by many members of the commercial and political elites of the island, recommended to learn the tricks of the trade from the British. Such an approach was mainly the result of their lack of know-how, as Cuban individuals and firms had very little experience operating in the slave trade. The proposal also suggested sending vessels to two or three appropriate places along the African coast, where they would function as factories that would store and provide the items needed for the trade, and, presumably, the slaves themselves. These 'floating factories' would, according to the subscribers, constitute the 'practical school' where their youth could acquire the necessary knowledge to carry out this trade in the years and decades to come.[11]

Although the proposal for the creation of this African Company was a complete failure, most of those who had bought actions in it were still able to become leading slave merchants in the years to come. For example, the firm of Cuesta Manzanal & Brother continued to import Africans to Cuba until at least the late 1830s, and the González Larrinaga family did something similar. Their fortunes were eventually merged when both families were linked through a marriage in the early part of the century.[12] Their connections to another key slave trading family, the Pérez de Urria, were strengthened in the 1830s, also through marriage.[13] Others would soon join them, and among these emerging new firms and individuals were some of the most notorious Atlantic slave traders of the nineteenth century, including Pedro Forçade, the Zangroniz brothers, Pedro Blanco, and Joaquín Gómez.[14]

Even before 1803, Cuban-based entrepreneurs, including some of those mentioned above, had began to retrieve the actual trade from foreign hands.[15] Already since 1792 they had succeeded in sending slave-trading expeditions to Africa, when the frigate *Cometa*, owned by Sebastian de Lasa, successfully brought 227 African slaves to Havana.[16] Slowly but steadily they started fitting more and more slave vessels and sending them directly to the coast of Africa, effectively breaking down the traditional triangular trade that had been typical during the eighteenth century.[17]

This rise of the Cuban-based firms underlined the early signs of a tentative relationship between the expansion of the slave trade and slavery and the rise of modern capitalism, whereby government-supported monopolies were replaced by an increasing number of entrepreneurial individuals and firms.[18] The cooperative essence of this trade – often developed around family or *paisanaje* bonds – was apparent as early as 1831, when 28 of Havana's slave trading firms and individuals wrote to the King asking for more privileges with regards to the trade. Among the signatories were the houses of Zangroniz Brothers & Co., Pié & Co., Cuesta Manzanal & Brother, and Pablo Samá, Joaquín Madán, and Juan Madrazo, all leading slave traders in the Atlantic at the time.[19] In a letter sent to the Foreign Office four years later, British Consul in Havana Charles Tolmé confirmed the extent of this cooperation within the city, when he commented that both Peninsulares and Creoles were heavily investing in the slave trade, adding that among them were 'planters, merchants, shopkeepers, lawyers, physicians, clerks, mechanics [and] in truth, people of every denomination.'[20]

Operational changes in the characteristics of the slave trade from 1820 onwards

The new environment that was created as a result of British abolitionist pressures across the Atlantic basin constituted the first major challenge to these newly formed Cuban-based firms.[21] Reducing the risks associated with the slave trade required learning the ropes of a new business, which implied – in the first instance – acquiring the know-how of the trade so as to reduce the increased risks.[22] Very dissimilar but intensely interconnected issues and abilities had to be learned and honed at a fast pace. Among them were what provisions were needed for the transatlantic voyage and where they could be found, how the actual operations and negotiations in the coast of Africa were to be conducted, and what items of trade were more likely to be accepted by the slave suppliers there, etc.[23]

Since they had been unable to open offices in London or Liverpool as they had originally planned, their access to financial and trade-related know-how was restricted. Furthermore, and in spite of the increasing complications that the illegal trade brought to their businesses, competition and cooperation intensified as the profits to be made still attracted a considerable number of foreign traders into this commerce.

Simultaneously the main characteristics of the slave trade were significantly modified at various points after 1820, and particularly after 1835. Slave traders changed their *modus operandi* as they had to adapt to the new illicit character of the business. Specifically, while before they traded in open day light and had the necessary time to ensure that their human cargo was in perfect physical condition, now they were forced to implement their trafficking operations whilst often finding ways of hiding away from the anti-slave trade patrols. In Africa, slave factories that were previously open for all to be found with ease were soon moved into the interior. These measures were taken virtually everywhere from the Upper Guinea coast to Angola, in order to avoid being seen by the anti-slave trade patrols. In the cases of the Upper Guinea coast (rivers Pongo, Gallinas, Sestos, etc.), slave-trading agents had their factories inland by these rivers, where the British were often unable to reach them. The same happened in the river Congo, where the river port of Boma (or as it was often referred to, Embomma) gained importance after the British began patrolling of the area in the late 1810s.[24]

The newly formed firms learned rapidly how to operate in this business and how to adjust to change by employing a trial-and-error method. A typical example of acquisition of know-how during this period was given by Theodore Canot, a minor but well-known slave trader who was active in the 1820s and 1830s. In his first journey to Upper Guinea, just before establishing himself there as an agent for Cuban- and Puerto Rican-based merchants, Canot found how terribly mistaken he had been by carrying a large cargo of 'useless tobacco' from Havana as a bartering item to trade for slaves.[25] As a matter of fact, Canot described his adventure in trying to turn his cargo into any sort of item that could be traded for slaves along the coast. Eventually, he was forced to rely on an English businessman who sent his tobacco to Freetown where a 'Hebrew friend' graciously exchanged it for Manchester fabrics, which were readily accepted by those trading human beings at River Pongo.[26]

Conducting business in Africa depended to a large extent on having contacts with local rulers and veteran slave trade agents, but after the mid-1810s was contingent on the abilities of agents and slave shipmasters to avoid falling into the hands of British patrols. These new circumstances led ship owners to instruct the men they put in charge of the transatlantic voyages to follow strict operational routines in order to avoid being spotted and captured by anti-slave trade cruisers.[27] These operational routines were so astute that by 1843 the Mixed Commission judges in Havana wrote to the Earl of Aberdeen noting that these activities were almost impossible to track down. In their own words there was 'so much mystery, and so many devices adopted to cover their designs, that it is impossible for us to learn sufficiently of their proceedings, to enable us satisfactorily to report them.'[28]

After the Anglo-Spanish treaty of 1835 was signed, using foreign flags belonging to countries with which the British had not signed common abolition treaties was another efficient way to avoid capture. Notable among those were the American flag, and for a while in the late 1830s the Portuguese flag. The use of these flags was frequently supported by the American and Portuguese consuls in Havana, Salvador de Bahia, Lisbon, Cádiz, and other ports where the ships could obtain legal papers to undertake their journeys to Africa. The

American consul in Havana, Nicholas P. Trist, was heavily involved in this sort of murky deal especially after 1835, to the point that the US Government was forced to open an enquiry into his actions in Cuba, after a number of American vessel captains met in New York in August 1839 to discuss his inadmissible behavior, and in particular his involvement in the slave trade.[29] Even more notorious was the support lent to the slave trade by the Portuguese consul in Havana, José Miguel Fernández who was himself considered to be one of the most prominent slave traders in the port before his appointment in the mid-1830s.[30]

In addition to this cunning new *modus operandi*, Cuban-based entrepreneurs were quite successful at liaising with the Spanish authorities, who more often than not rushed to cover up their tracks and received substantial cuts from the profits as a reward. One of the Cuban governors of the period, Francisco Dionisio Vives (1823-32) stated in unequivocal terms that he had and would always protect the slave traders, because it was thanks to them that the prosperity of the island, based on the production of sugar and coffee, was possible.[31] Another governor of this period, Miguel Tacón (1834-38) commented years after leaving his post that after 1835 the traffic rather than diminishing, as the British had expected, increased, thanks to the protection that the authorities, including himself, had offered to the slave trading entrepreneurs based on the Cuban capital.[32]

Many other officers, from governors down to local authorities, connived with slave traders until the very end of the slave trade. After Captain General Jerónimo Valdés (1841-43) dared to confront the slave traders upon his arrival in Havana, British Mixed Commission judges James Kennedy and Campbell Dalrymple went as far as denouncing in detail that while he had refused to take any bribes from the traders, his predecessors had traditionally accepted around two hundred doubloons per every landed cargo in the previous decades.[33] Kennedy and Dalrymple also insisted that although Valdés had refused these bribes, minor officers across the island continued to accept payoffs of at least one hundred doubloons per landed cargo.[34] Even as late as in 1859, British consul and Mixed Commission judge Joseph T. Crawford was forced to denounce what he referred to as 'the most glaring corruption of the local authorities' in relation to the many illegal fittings and landing of slave trade expeditions in the island under the neglectful eyes of the island's authorities.[35]

Overall, the end of the legal slave trade constituted a unique opportunity for Cuban-based entrepreneurs to enter this profitable business. However, these newly formed firms were faced with two fundamental challenges: (1) they had to acquire the relevant knowledge and know-how, which was often tacit and protected through secrecy due to the illegal nature of the trade; and (2) they had to rapidly adapt their *modus operandi* so as to maneuver under the new obstacles imposed by the illegal nature of the trade.

Cuban-based firms' strategies

In addition to the operational changes discussed above, Cuban-based firms were entrepreneurial as they were able to exploit the new opportunities arising from the volatility of the slave trade by focusing on three main strategies: (a) the internalization of networks of agents which allowed the rapid diffusion of information; (b) the diversification of trading items and expansion of the number of partnerships to reduce risk; and (c) the adoption of technological innovations in the design and use of new vessels that were more appropriate for the transformed nature of the slave trade, as the years went by and the British introduced their own innovations and modifications to their vessels.

(a) Internalized Network of Agents

Between 1809 and 1815 'the Cuban slave trade became an almost exclusively Iberian trade.'[36] One of their major breakthroughs was to set up factories and agents along the coast of Africa, from Upper Guinea in the North to the Angolan coast in the South. Britain's decision in 1807 to prohibit the trade, coupled with the American and Danish prohibitions, accelerated the structural changes that the Napoleonic wars had forced on the Cuban slave trade. During the 1790s there had been two or three variants of the Cuban slave trade, as Herbert Klein has established: (a) a direct trade, carried out almost exclusively by foreign slave traders, which involved trading slaves directly from Africa to Cuba; (b) an indirect trade, which entailed trading slaves from Africa to a number of Caribbean islands or to an entrepôt like Jamaica from which the slaves were then transshipped to Cuba; and (c) a complex intra-Caribbean trade, which involved the shipment of slaves from one part of the Caribbean to another.[37]

By the second decade of the nineteenth century, Cuban-based slave traders had begun to take full control of the direct African trade to the island, and by 1835 they were noticeably in charge of it. One of the main initial difficulties to overcome was their lack of contacts in the coast of Africa. In order to successfully insert themselves into this new business, they first relied on existing firms and agents that had continued to trade in African slaves even after the British abolition had come into effect. Two of the most notorious agents inherited by Cuban slave traders were John Ormond on the Upper Guinea coast and Francisco Felix de Souza in Whydah.[38] Whilst for many years to come they continued to use the services of de Souza, who had almost total control over the trade in what was one of the main West African slave trading ports, Cuban-based entrepreneurs soon began sending their own men to the coast to learn the trade and often to act as their exclusive agents.

During the legal period of the trade slave, merchants were mainly transacting with unaffiliated agents based in the ports of embarkation and dis-embarkation. Robin Pearson and David Richardson have demonstrated that personalized business networks were in decline in the British slave trade in the 1750-1807 period.[39] Although Pearson's and Richardson's argument is specific to the eighteenth-century British slave trade, and therefore cannot be freely extrapolated and applied to slave trade trends as a whole, a careful scrutinizing of documents located in British, Spanish, Cuban, and Brazilian archives allow us to reveal that personalized networks were once more re-invigorated during the illicit period. After the slave trade became illegal, taking advantage of existing structures and patterns of trade, Cuban-based entrepreneurs personalized transactions and developed a complex and rich network of their own agents, who were on occasion close relatives, friends, or *paisanos*, colleagues of a similar ethnic or national background. This was a result of the fact that the unlawful nature of the trade increased transaction costs, namely the costs of using the markets. Markets for information have inherent failures, and as Arrow's fundamental paradox of information underlines 'its value to the purchaser is not known until he has the information, but then he has in effect acquired it without cost.'[40] This is applicable to the use of independent agents by slave traders during the illegal period. As the risk for these agents increased considerably due to the persecution and prosecution of slave traders, their incentives to behave opportunistically increased as well. In particular, after 1820 transactions between unaffiliated agents and Cuban-based slave traders began to decline, as once the agents would reveal vital information about the location or availability of slaves they held, the value of that information would decline as well as the willingness of the slave trader to pay for it.

Cuban-based firms overcame the above problems by internalizing the market and creating an extensive and complex network of their own agents whenever and wherever possible.[41] Besides reducing transaction costs, this agent network allowed them to build trust and to diffuse information rapidly. Social network theory underlines that when a firm is well-embedded in its social network their performance improves.[42] One reason for the better performance of well-embedded firms is the fact that the social network facilitates the transfer of knowledge and information. Empirical studies regarding social networks show that embedded relations within a network facilitate the circulation of 'thicker information' regarding strategy and know-how.[43] This process of knowledge-sharing thus promotes learning and innovation.[44]

Rapid access to information was vital when the slave trade was prohibited because, among other reasons, it facilitated the selection of the right route for a safe return. The choice of the route was high among the priorities of slave ship owners and masters. As mentioned before, explicit instructions of what routes to follow were often found in the letters confiscated from slave vessels. It was well known that on both sides of the Atlantic British cruisers guarded these routes at least partially, which made the choices of the slave traders even more essential. To ensure a safe return, Cuban-based slave trading firms usually posted agents in strategically important points such as Rocky Key, Crocodile, French Key, and the Isle of Pines to help the arriving expeditions from Africa. Having committed agents in important landing spots was also crucial. Lists with the names of these partners often appear in this correspondence as well.[45]

Archival research reveals the extensive network of agents built by the most important Cuban-based entrepreneurs. For example, the Zangroniz brothers & Co. sent one of their own – Juan José Zangroniz Jr. – to work alongside de Souza in Whydah, and they also endeavored to create an extensive network that included agents Vicente Paulo e Silva in Salvador de Bahia, and Antonio Sanmartí in Lagos, among others.[46] In the Upper Guinea coast, after the suicide of Ormond in 1833, Málaga-born merchant Pedro Blanco and French sailor turned-into-slave dealer Theodore Canot, among others, established themselves as agents of the Cuban-based trading firms in this area. Blanco's company, formed alongside Lino Carballo, became one of the most successful during the period.[47] Equally, Havana business firms like that of Pedro Forçade & Co. had their own agents working in the Congo basin. Forçade was described by Mixed Commission judge Kennedy in 1853 as 'the greatest slave dealer of the present day.'[48] Since the mid-1830s he had had an agent in the river Congo named Alphonse

Meynier, who was said to have been in business there from the late 1820s and, according to Captain John Matson who visited his slave factory, was still active in the late 1840s.[49]

Other agents working for the Cuban-based slave traders at the time were Félix Cosme Madail in Popo, José Cotta and José Mora in Lagos, José H. Álvarez Simidel, Ángel Ximénez, and José María Pérez in Gallinas, a Mr. Gamboa and Jacinto Saavedra in the river Congo, and Xoaquín Franque and Catalonian trader Pedro Manegat in Cabinda. Manegat eventually relocated to Havana, where he became a leading slave merchant in the years to come, taking advantage of the contacts he had left behind in West Central Africa, and joining forces in his enslaving initiatives with another important Catalan merchant resident in Havana, and former slave vessel captain, Jacinto Llobet.[50]

The operations described in this article are but a fraction of a very complex history of entrepreneurial strategies adopted by Cuban-based slave trading firms in the nineteenth century. Once they were able to dispense with former agents and put their own personnel in place, the efficiency of their operations, and by extension their profits, increased significantly, to the point that some of them like Pedro Blanco and Lino Carballo, José Mazorra, Joaquín Gómez, and various members of the Zulueta clan eventually became substantially rich individuals. However, the risk of losing all this wealth was never too far away, as the well-documented case of Blanco & Carballo, whose firm went bankrupt in 1848, demonstrates.[51]

The strategies of the Cuban-based entrepreneurs, when it came to establishing networks of agents did not always follow similar paths. Some of them, notoriously those of Blanco & Carballo, and the Zangroniz brothers sent one of their main shareholders to the African coast to take the business into their own hands. In the case of the Zangroniz brothers, it was precisely one of the two brothers who settled down in Whydah, becoming one of the main traders there, second only to Francisco Felix de Souza.[52] In the case of Blanco &

Carballo, it was Pedro Blanco himself who moved to the river Gallinas setting up one of the most infamous slave trading factories of the period. In other cases, Europeans – and often Spaniards – living already in the African coast were hired to supply the Cuban firms with slaves. Many of the Cuban-based firms opted for this method, including those of the Cuesta Manzanal & Brother, Pedro Martínez & Co., and Abazurza & Azopardo, among others.[53]

Widening their networks, many of these firms were keen to have agents in various key locations across the Atlantic, from Salvador de Bahia in Brazil to Santander, Málaga, and Barcelona. Particularly important was to have recognized agents in various Caribbean sites where impromptu slave landings could take place. Puerto Rico and the island of St Thomas, for example, counted with several men with business links to the Cuban-based slave traders, and along the Cuban coast a large number of planters acted as emergency contacts in case of landings within their jurisdictions.[54]

For many years, particularly in the 1835-45 period, some of these firms had active agents even in Freetown, Sierra Leone, where their duties were mainly related to gathering intelligence about the movements of the West African squadron, and to buying slave vessels adjudicated and auctioned by the Mixed Commission courts there. Blanco & Carballo, for example, had an agent there for these purposes named Vicente Sánchez, who often passed important news along to Pedro Blanco in Gallinas and who also bought some of these vessels to re-engage them in the slave trade.[55] Equally, Pedro Juan de Zulueta counted with the services of British merchant George Alexander Kidd, who was in charge of re-acquiring vessels auctioned by the Mixed Commission courts there.[56]

(b) Diversification and Risk-Management Stratagems

From the very early years of direct Cuban involvement in the slave trade, a phenomenon that was clearly observable was that of the diversification of business operations. This was a process that at least at the beginning went both ways, consequently fueling the rise of the Second Slavery in the island. At that time some important foreign slave traders bought lands, often already established plantations, in the Cuban countryside, while Cuban and Spanish plantation owners invested for the first time in the now promising business of the slave trade.

Diversification may sometimes be inspired by the benefits resulting from economies of scope, which arise when fixed capital is indivisible.[57] In the case of the slave trade, the cost of any given voyage was fixed, as it was independent of the quantity of slaves that would be transported. As the quantity of slaves varied greatly due to the increased uncertainties associated with the unlawful nature of the trade, diversification was a strategy that many Cuban-based entrepreneurs pursued so as to reduce risk. Specifically, Cuban-based firms diversified in trading other products such as palm oil, ivory, hides, and salt. Additionally, they also diversified by investing in human trafficking of Spanish migrants, free laborers from Africa, and Chinese indentured workers, or by resorting to acts of piracy.[58]

Among those involved in the slave trade who diversified their investment and bought Cuban real estate were some notable entrepreneurs like Liverpudlian merchant Patrick Welsh, who owned vast lands in the valley of Guamacaro until his death in the late 1810s, and renowned American slave traders Zachary Atkins and Nat Howland, who settled down and opened financial houses in Matanzas in the first years of the nineteenth century.[59] Equally, among those who signed the 1803 petition to the King to set up a limited Company and to establish slave factories in Africa were some of the most important landowners in Cuba at the time. Chiefly among them were Francisco de Arango y Parreño who owned a number of rural estates including the sugar plantation La Ninfa; Bernabé Martínez de Pinillos, who owned at least two sugar mills west of Havana; and the counts of Jaruco and Casa Bayona, whose families had owned numerous plantations in Cuba since the seventeenth century.[60] Over the following years the fusion of the ownership of plantations and slave vessels grew closer and stronger. In the aforementioned letter sent to the King signed by a large number of Cuban-based slave traders in 1831, many of the signatories were both slave traders and plantation owners.[61]

In the aftermath of the Anglo-Spanish Treaty of 1835, the Palmerston Act of 1839, and the Aberdeen Act of 1845, Cuban-based slave traders – at least for a while – began to harbor real fears that the British intentions to bring the slave trade to an end were more serious than ever. While some of them went out of business altogether, others increasingly focused their energies on new ways of carrying out the trade and on diversifying their business. Among the new strategies adopted after the 1835 treaty came into existence, were the use of separate vessels to send trade goods to Africa. These vessels were normally under the American flag, making it almost impossible for the British cruisers to stop and search them.

Equally, they resorted to risk-management strategies such as part-ownership ventures and expansion in the number of partners, which allowed them to disperse their investment in the slave trade across many different vessels in any given year.[62] Whilst in the late eighteenth century it had been common for merchants, notably London-based Atlantic merchants, to form partnerships with two or three individuals, due to the increased risks associated with the illegal nature of the post-1820 slave trade, Cuban-based entrepreneurs usually established partnerships with up to twenty or more partners.[63] To some extent, their behavior echoed that of the Liverpool merchants in the last years of the legal slave trade, who also endeavored to expand their partnerships, although to a smaller number than Cuban-based entrepreneurs, so as to reduce risks.[64] At the time, many of these business partnerships were open-ended and informal, so that any merchant could be a partner in various different ventures.

In Cuba, these part-ownership ventures had proliferated to such an extent already in the early 1830s, that British officers based in Havana were forced to mention and discuss them in several opportunities. Already in 1830, in what it was a bad season for slave traders due to a combination of effective British patrolling and high mortality in the Middle Passage, they referred to the general state of bankruptcy that had ‘taken place among the shopkeepers of the Havana,’ which they attributed to ‘their obstinate gambling in the slave trade.’[65] A few years later, in 1835, Consul Tolmé went even further by stating that ‘a great many, perhaps the majority of the parties’ investing in slave trading ventures were ‘share holders.’[66] He then went on to describe a routine slave trading operation:

> A clever Captain well known in the Traffic unites with two or three friends to commence an expedition, a ship is bought, her cargo is prepared, meanwhile the number of the interested is increasing and at last, when all is ready there may prove to be twenty partners, some having shares of eight or ten thousand dollars and others of only one thousand dollars.[67]

Finally, a new insurance company, the Compañía de Seguros Marítimos de la Habana, was created in Havana for the specific task of insuring slave expeditions to Africa. Although, insurance companies had been covering slave trade voyages for years, this new company, created in the mid-1830s under the auspices of Basque entrepreneur José Manuel Urzaínqui, was said to have covered several vessels and to have made a profit of a 24 percent in its first few months of existence.[68]

While for some part-ownership ventures and new investment in the palm oil, ivory, hides, and salt trades from West Africa were feasible alternatives that could help soothe the impact of the British policing in the Atlantic, for others human trafficking continued to be at the center of their business models. Poor Spanish migrants, mostly from the Canary Islands and Galicia were considered as like for like replacements for plantation-bound African slaves. Various white colonization projects presented between 1842 and 1845 to the Government by leading Cuban patricians with interests in the slave trade, including those of José María Calvo, Domingo Goicuría, the Count of Jaruco, and the firm of Zulueta & Company, all had this idea at their core.[69]

The need to replace African slaves also led some of these firms and traders to attempt new ingenious avenues to import Africans, this time under the euphemistic labels of free colonists or free laborers. The likes of the Zangroniz brothers, Manuel Basilio Cunha Reis, and José Suárez Argudín, were among the first to promote this new business scheme.[70] Importing 'voluntary' African workers was, obviously, a venture fraught with problems, as the British Mixed Commission judges based in Havana rightly pointed out, not least because their promoters were all adventurers 'connected with the Slave Trade, who perceived thereby a means of moneymaking by carrying on the Traffic.'[71]

Another human trade that blossomed from the late 1840s and that was chiefly carried out by active slave traders was that of Chinese indentured workers. Among those who committed vast amounts of money to this new business were the firms of Zulueta & Company, and that of the Zangroniz brothers. The Zuluetas, Julián and Pedro in particular, became the main importers of Chinese 'voluntary' workers from that moment onward. They were the first ones to bring a shipment of Chinese laborers to Cuba in 1847 working in tandem with the Cuban Real Junta de Fomento. As they had done before with their agents in Africa, Cuban-based Chinese traders started their new Asian venture relying on already existing agents based in Manila and Xiamen, but by the mid-1850s they had replaced them with their own men; a circumstance that allowed them to make even larger profits.[72]

Equally and almost simultaneously, in the 1850s Cuban-based slave traders saw an opportunity in importing colonists from neighboring Yucatán. Many of the leading slavers of the time, including Domingo Goicuría and the Zangroniz brothers, agreed trading contracts with Mexican authorities that went as far as to allow for the import of not only willing laborers but also war prisoners from the Caste Wars that were underway in the Yucatán peninsula at the time.[73]

Above all, however, slave traders diversified by continuing their investments in sugar, as they had done since the 1790s.[74] Already in the mid-nineteenth century many of them had purchased their own sugar plantations. By then Pedro Forçade owned the Porvenir sugar plantation near the town of Colón; Salvador Martiartu owned the Achuri and the Arratia estates; and the Zulueta clan, now blended with another leading slave trading family, the Samá, owned several of the largest and most technologically innovative sugar plantations not only in Cuba, but in the world. Renowned among them were the Álava, the España, and the Vizcaya.[75] By diversifying in so many ways, many of these leading slave trading firms and individuals were also able to survive the end of the slave trade and to consolidate their fortunes by expanding their businesses across the Atlantic world.

(c) *Introduction of Technological Innovations*

By the 1840s the pursuing of slave traders by the Royal Navy in Africa, the Atlantic, and the Caribbean meant that the slave trade had become an increasingly risky commerce. While many slave traders, like the firms of Busto & Inclán, and Blanco & Carballo had gone out of business, those that still managed to carry on with the traffic had to change their strategies yet again.[76] To all the stratagems discussed previously in this article, from the early 1830s to the late 1840s, a new one, based on new technological advances related to shipbuilding was added. According to Schumpeter, shocks give rise to disequilibrium in the markets.[77] Entrepreneurs who exploit these discontinuities through technological innovation destroy the competitive advantage of existing firms and prosper. This creative destruction rather than price competition was a prevalent force in the slave trade after 1820.

From the late 1820s, US-built vessels became extremely popular among Cuban-based slave traders.[78] While large heavily armed ships continued to be used, new small fast-sailing vessels were in high demand.[79] According to the figures presented by the *Slavevoyages* database, in the 1835-1850 period the average tonnage of vessels used in the slave trade was of 152.5 tons; a very different figure from the following period (1851-66) where the average was 234.0 tons and during which larger, merchant-looking ships were used.[80] American ships, usually clippers built in Baltimore, were employed with increasing frequency by the most notorious slave traders of that period, although vessels built in other places like Barcelona and Havana continued to be used as well.[81] These ships were endowed with a series of features that made them attractive to those involved in the illicit trade of human beings across the Atlantic. The design of the now-famous Baltimore clipper was influenced by the demands of the slave traders. This relationship may have pre-dated the epoch in which several of these vessels made their way to Havana to be employed in the slave trade. Ship-builders in Baltimore had been hit hard by the war of 1812, and in its aftermath some appear to have moved to Havana to build slave ships there.[82]

Among the results obtained by the new technological innovations incorporated on the ships that were used for the slave trade from the mid-1830s until the late 1840s, two were particularly important: lightness and speed. In a missive sent by the Havana Mixed Commission judges to British admiral Halkett in late 1836, they commented that:

> (...) the Slave Traders in Havana are now adopting a new system for carrying on their nefarious traffic, by employing Baltimore schooners of from 50 to 120 tons. These vessels are of the lightest possible description of build (…) they are for the most part unarmed, their intention being now to trust entirely to speed[83]

The first new feature, lightness, was directly related to the new conditions in which the slave trade was being carried out on both sides of the Atlantic. Light vessels were able to penetrate deeper into the interior of the African rivers and waterways, thus allowing them to conduct their business away from the coast where anti-slave trade cruisers lurked constantly. On the Cuban side of the ocean, light ships could get closer to specific points of landing, that were frequently located in shallow waters (i.e. the infamously popular landing spots of Canímar and Majana in the gulf of Batabanó were two clear examples). All in all, lighter, smaller vessels were also less likely to be spotted by the anti-slave trade patrols. As Captain Matson himself pointed out in the mid-1840s, small vessels had smaller topsails, and were more likely to spot the British cruisers' topsails before they could see them, thus facilitating their escape.[84] According to British commissioners Edward Schenley and Richard Robert Madden, the main reason behind the adoption of smaller vessels was a new strategy devised by the slave traders to leave the coast of Africa in squadrons of three or four ships, so that if they were to encounter 'a man-of-war, one is to be sacrificed to secure the safety of the others.'[85]

The other main characteristic of these Baltimore-built clippers was speed. In order to build tailor-made ships for the slave trade, such as the ones requested by the Cuban-based entrepreneurs, a number of modifications were made to these new vessels. Chief among them was the aforementioned lowering of the height of their topsails, as well as a redistribution of the weight towards the front of the ship. Weapons were dispensed of, since now slave trade captains would rely mostly on speed and camouflage to avoid anti-slave trade cruisers. These vessels were built to last only three or four voyages, a circumstance that allowed their owners to sacrifice them on occasion without incurring massive losses.[86] It is little wonder that the British Mixed Commission judges in Havana commented on multiple occasions that these vessels were 'admirably adapted for escaping from and deceiving His Majesty's cruizers [sic].'[87]

Another alteration that allowed for the construction and use of smaller ships in the transatlantic slave trade was the optimization of the space existing to hold the slaves after their purchase had taken effect in Africa. Portable coppers, irons, etc., became customary, allowing the slavers, who were constantly ready to escape and deceive, to throw all compromising items overboard in the event of being discovered and captured, allowing for a faster escape. Equally, not having heavy weaponry on board had a similar effect whenever they were chased by anti-slave trade cruisers. All in all, the adoption of state-of-the-art technologies gave Cuban-based slave traders an indisputable advantage, not only over those who were not able to adapt and compete, but also with respect to the success of their ultimate *raison d'etre*, that of carrying as many men, women, and children across the Atlantic as they possibly could.

Eventually, in what was another moment of adaptation in the early 1850s, after the introduction of steamers, slave traders began using larger merchant vessels, which allowed them to carry much larger numbers of African slaves per voyage.[88] Although the British Navy eventually also introduced a number of steamers to patrol the waters of the island of Cuba, these steamers were frequently in need of repair and spent long periods in the arsenal of Havana, a circumstance that did not escape the eyes and ears of Havana-based slave traders, whose investments grew larger and larger during these years.[89] By the end of the decade, all British patrolling of the Cuban coastline was *de facto* terminated, further encouraging the fitting of large vessels and the chances of success of these large slave-trading expeditions.[90]

Conclusions

This article has brought to light a series of important aspects related to the adaptation to changing market conditions and their relationship with the emerging modern capitalism in the nineteenth-century Atlantic World, by examining the operational changes and innovative strategies introduced by Cuban-based entrepreneurs involved in the transatlantic slave trade. It has highlighted that it was mainly due to the decisions and capabilities of these entrepreneurs to adapt and innovate in a riskier and volatile business environment that they were able to gain a competitive advantage in the slave trade across the Atlantic. This, in turn, served the booming of the Cuban sugar industry, and contributed to the perpetuation of the inhuman trafficking and bondage of African men, women and children for several decades.

Our most significant findings point to the fact that to do so, the Cuban-based firms were forced: a) to learn the secrets of the existing slave trade through trial and error; and b) furthermore, to develop new skills and capabilities, which transformed them into successful entrepreneurs in spite of constant British surveillance. Specifically, their success was based on the following three strategies: a) the fostering of an extensive and personalized network of agents; b) the reduction of their risks through diversification and risk-management, and; c) the introduction of technological innovations into their business operations.

When the abolition of the slave trade by the British and their allies disrupted the regular operations of the slave trade, many existing firms exited the slave trade due to the increased risks and losses. Yet, newly formed Cuban-based entrepreneurs exploited this Schumpeterian shock in the slave trade to strengthen their competitive advantage; a competitive advantage that was based on rapid diffusion of information through their internalized networks of agents in the Atlantic, as well as through diversification, risk-management, and technological innovation. It was precisely due to the combination of these entrepreneurial endeavors that capture rates of slave vessels remained about the same after 1835 as they had been before, extending the calamitous transatlantic slave trade for another generation.[91]

Notes

[1] Casson and Wadeson, 'Entrepreneurship and macroeconomic performance,' p. 239.

[2] Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*.

[3] Dimov, 'Beyond the Single-Person, Single-Insight Attribution in Understanding Entrepreneurial Opportunities,' pp. 713-31; Casson and Wadeson, 'Entrepreneurship and macroeconomic performance,' p. 239.

[4] The Second Slavery period refers to the rise of heavily industrialized, slavery-based plantation economies in various parts of the Americas. See, among others, Tomich, *Through the Prism of Slavery*; and Laviña and Zeuske, eds., *The Second Slavery*.

[5] In 1820, at the time the Spanish transatlantic slave trade became illegal, Cuban sugar production constituted 13.64 per cent of all sugar bought and sold in the international markets. By 1837 that value had increased to 20.70 per cent, by 1851 had reached 30.99 per cent, and by 1868, it constituted a massive 40.90 per cent of all the sugar traded in the world. Moreno Fraginals, *El Ingenio*, vol. III, pp. 35-7; Eltis, *Economic Growth*, pp. 284, 287. See also Sheridan, 'Sweet Malefactor,' pp. 236-57.

[6] Only now are scholars starting to pay attention to these issues. See for example, Felipe Gonzalez and Iglesias Utset, 'Cuba and the United States in the Atlantic Slave Trade.'

[7] For the Spanish slave trade pre-1800 see: Borucki, Eltis and Wheat, 'Atlantic History and the Slave Trade to Spanish America,' pp. 433-61.

[8] Landowners and merchants from Havana to the King. Manifest of 12 January 1803. Archivo Nacional de Cuba (Hereafter ANC): Asuntos Políticos 106/9.

[9] Murray, *Odious Commerce*, p. 10.

[10] See Real Cédula of 28 February 1789 allowing the direct trade with Africa for a period of two years. Only the ports of Havana and Santiago de Cuba were allowed to import Africans,

and only in Havana were foreigners permitted to participate in this business. For a full list of the restrictions imposed, see Murray, *Odious Commerce*, 11-2.

[11] Landowners and merchants from Havana to the King. Manifest of 12 January 1803. ANC: Asuntos Políticos, 106/9.

[12] Ortega, 'The Cuban Sugar Complex,' pp. 65-6.

[13] Moreno Fraginals, *El Ingenio*, vol. I, pp. 266-7.

[14] See, for example, Nerín, *Traficantes d'ànimes*.; Barcia, 'Fully Capable of any Iniquity,'; and Zeuske, *Amistad*.

[15] There was a large number of African-based slave traders who provided slave shipments to Cuba from the 1790s onwards, including the notorious John Ormond, Tom Curtis, John Lightbourne, and Francisco Felix de Souza, among many others.

[16] Murray, *Odious Commerce*, p. 13.

[17] See, among others, Findlay, *The Triangular Trade*; Morgan, *Slavery, Atlantic Trade and the British Economy*; and Miller, *The French Atlantic Triangle*.

[18] Eltis, *Economic Growth*, pp. 47-77. For more recent works discussing these links see: Baptist, *The Half has Never been Told*; and Beckert, *Empire of Cotton*.

[19] 'Reclamations made by various traders from the island of Cuba,' Madrid, 10 February 1831. Archivo Histórico Nacional, Madrid (Hereafter AHN), Estado, 8022/4, no. 6. On this reliance on friends or *paisanos*, see Lamikiz, *Trade and Trust*, p. 10; and Baskes, 'Communication Breakdown,' p. 45.

[20] Tolmé to John Backhouse. Havana, 9 May 1835. TNA: Foreign Office, 84/177, f. 252.

[21] Eltis, 'The Nineteenth-Century,' pp. 109-11.

[22] Haggerty. 'Risk and risk management.'

[23] Richardson, 'West African consumption patterns.'

[24] For a comprehensive discussion on slave traders' adjustments on the African coast to efforts to suppress the trade see Eltis, *Economic Growth*, pp. 165-84.

[25] Mayer, *Captain Canot*, p. 100.

[26] Ibid.

[27] Barcia, *West African Warfare*, pp. 73-4.

[28] James Kennedy and Campbell J. Dalrymple to the Earl of Aberdeen. Havana, 8 November 1843. The National Archives (Hereafter TNA): Foreign Office 84/452, ffs. 121-6.

[29] He was eventually replaced by John S. Calhoun. Extract from 'The New York Commercial Advertiser,' 7 September 1839. HCPP. 1840 [265]. Class A. Correspondence with the British Commissioners at Sierra Leone, Havana, Rio de Janeiro, and Surinam, relating to the slave trade, f. 198.

[30] Report of the Case of the Spanish Schooner "Opposição", João Rodriguez, Master, April 1838. HCPP. 1839 [188]. Class A. (Further series). Correspondence with the British Commissioners at Sierra Leone, the Havana, and Rio de Janeiro, relating to the slave trade. From February 2, to May 31, 1839, f. 6.

[31] Francisco Dionisio Vives to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Reservado. Havana, 6 January 1825. AHN: Estado, 8036.

[32] Tacón to ?. Barcelona, 27 June 1844. AHN: Estado, 8035, no. 4.

[33] James Kennedy and Campbell Dalrymple to the Earl of Aberdeen. Havana, 9 August 1842. TNA: Foreign Office, 84/396, ffs. 35v.-7.

[34] Ibid.

[35] Crawford to Malmesbury. Havana, 25 January 1859. TNA: Foreign Office 84/1073, ffs. 23-3v.

[36] Murray, *Odious Commerce*, p. 19.

[37] Ibid.

[38] Richardson, ed., *Bristol, Africa*, vol. 4, pp. 182-6; and Thomas, *The Slave Trade*, pp. 683-4, 694; and Law, *Ouidah*, pp. 201-79.

[39] Pearson and Richardson, 'Social capital,' pp. 765-80.

[40] Arrow, 'Economic Welfare,' p. 615. See also Williamson, 'Transaction costs economics,' pp. 233-61.

[41] There were a number of zones along the African coast – Gold Coast, Bight of Biafra, Mozambique – where establishing successful agents proved impossible in spite of the repeated attempts to replicate the success that such a model had had in other regions like the Upper Guinea coast, the Bight of Benin and the Congo-Angola region.

[42] Granovetter, 'Economic Action and Social Structure,' pp. 481-510; Gulati, 'Alliances and Networks,' pp. 293-317.

[43] Larson, 'Network Dyads in Entrepreneurial Settings,' pp. 76-104; Powell, 'Neither market not hierarchy.'

[44] Uzzi, 'The sources and consequences of embeddedness,' pp. 674-98. David Turnbull, who spent time in Cuba in the late 1830s and early 1840s divided up functions or costs in the slave trade into four categories: African costs (which relates to what is being discussed in this section), Factor Costs, Shipping costs, and Distribution costs. See Turnbull, *Travels in the West*, pp. 403-6. Both E. Phillip LeVeen and David Eltis also discussed this issue, relying in Turnbull's opinion. Phillip LeVeen, *British Slave Trade Suppression*, pp. 9-34, 164; Eltis, *Economic Growth*, pp. 269-82.

[45] Barcia, *West African Warfare*, pp. 73-9.

[46] See also João Joze Zangrony, hespanhol requesting passport, 28 March 1835. Arquivo Provincial da Bahia: Policia, Maço 5883, passaportes, 1834-37. It is worth noting here that several shipments of slaves were made from Bahia to Cuba during this period, a circumstance that would help explain the presence of Cubans in Bahia.

[47] Eltis, *Economic Growth*, pp. 148-9.

[48] 'Minutes of Evidence Taken Before the Select Committee on Slave Trade Treaties.' HCPP. 1852-53 (920) Report from the Select Committee on Slave Trade Treaties; together with the proceedings of the committee, minutes of evidence, appendix, and index, ffs. 90-1.

[49] Matson, *Remarks on the Slave Trade*, pp. 46-7. See also Forçade to François Barraillier. Havana, 15 May 1839. HCPP. 1841 Session 1 [330] Class A. Correspondence with the British commissioners at Sierra Leone, the Havana, Rio de Janeiro, and Surinam, relating to the slave trade. From May 11th, to December 31st, 1840, inclusive, f. 118.

[50] 'Abstract of the Proceedings during the year 1844.' HCPP. 1846 [723] Class A. Correspondence with the British commissioners relating to the slave trade, ffs. 324-5.

[51] The bankruptcy of Blanco and Carballo led to the suicide of the latter. The documents recorded before Havana notaries litigating their debts are numerous and can be found at the Archivo Nacional de Cuba's Tribunal de Comercio and Protocolos Notariales collections.

[52] Law, *Ouidah*, p. 173.

[53] 'Abstract of the Case of the Spanish Schooner San Rafael. Francisco Chinchurreta, Master, liberated on the 19th of January 1823.' HCPP. 1824 (002) Class B. Correspondence with the British commissioners, at Sierra Leone, the Havannah, Rio de Janeiro and Surinam, relating to the slave trade, 1823, ffs. 50-1; R. Doherty and Walter W. Lewis to Viscount Palmerston, Sierra Leone, 19th August, 1837. HCPP. 1837-38 [124] Class A. Correspondence with the British commissioners, at Sierra Leone, the Havana, Rio de Janeiro, and Surinam, relating to the slave trade, 1837, ffs. 3-4; Pedro Martinez & Co. to José H. Alvarez. Havana, 19 September 1838. HCPP. 1839 [188] Class A. (Further series.) Correspondence with the British commissioners. At Sierra Leone, the Havana, and Rio de Janeiro, relating to the slave trade. From February 2, to May 31, 1839, ffs. 41-2. For the most in-depth discussion of the

impact of the suppression of the slave trading business see Eltis, *Economic Growth*, ffs. 148-59.

[54] For example, in 1838, Pedro Enarche acted as an agent in Puerto Rico for the notorious slave-trading firm of Pedro Martínez & Co. Equally, Jose Ybern, acted as an agent for the same firm in the island of St Thomas. Pedro Martínez & Co to Jozé H. Alvarez. Havana, 15 September 1838. HCPP. 1839 [188]. Class A. (Further series). Correspondence with the British Commissioners at Sierra Leone, the Havana, and Rio de Janeiro, relating to the slave trade. From February 2, to May 31, 1839, f. 39.

[55] F. G. Veiga to Pedro Blanco. Sierra Leone, 23 January 1839. HCPP. 1841 Session 1 [330] Class A. Correspondence with the British commissioners at Sierra Leone, the Havana, Rio de Janeiro, and Surinam, relating to the slave trade. From May 11th, to December 31st, 1840, inclusive, f. 131.

[56] 'Power of Attorney from Mr. Zulueta to Mr. Martinez.' HCPP: 1840 [266] Class B. Correspondence with Spain, Portugal, Brazil, the Netherlands, and Sweden, relative to the slave trade. From June 1st to December 31st, 1839, inclusive, ffs. 37-8. See also William Rothery to the Lords Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury. Stratford Place, 7 March 1840. TNA: Treasury, 1/4235.

[57] Teece, 'Economies of Scope,' pp. 223-47.

[58] Diversification had been a common pattern in the slave trade. In this sense, Cuban-based slave traders' new diversification strategies related mostly to the type and quality of merchandise they were able to deal in, and according to the times, to the changes on patterns of human trafficking that from the 1840s involved Chinese and Meso-American indentured workers.

[59] Barcia, *The Great African Slave Revolt*, pp. 68-96.

[60] Landowners and merchants of Havana to the King. Manifest of 12 January 1803. ANC: Asuntos Políticos 106/9.

[61] 'Reclamations made by various traders from the island of Cuba,' Madrid, 10 February 1831. AHN: Estado, 8022/4, no. 6.

[62] Eltis, *Economic Growth*, p. 355.

[63] For the British-Atlantic merchants referred to here, see: Hancock, *Citizens of the World*.

[64] McDade, 'Liverpool slave merchant entrepreneurial networks,' pp. 1092-1109.

[65] William Macleay to the Earl of Aberdeen. Havana, 1 January 1830. TNA: Foreign Office, 84/107, ffs. 8-8v.

[66] Tolmé to Backhouse. Havana, 9 May 1835. TNA: Foreign Office, 84/177, f. 259.

[67] Ibid., ffs. 259-60.

[68] José Garde to the British Admiralty. Havana, 11 April 1835. TNA: Admiralty, 1/4670; 'J. M. Urzaínqui against Font, Ricart and Co. reclaiming pesos, 1839.' ANC: Tribunal de Comercio, 128/17; and 'José Miguel Urzaínqui, Director of the Compañía de Seguros Marítimos de la Habana, against Sebastián de Mendoza about nullity of a compromise, 1845.' ANC: Tribunal de Comercio, 128/19.

[69] 'Project of José María Calvo for fomenting white population immigration to Cuba.' Havana, 1844; ANC: Real Consulado y Junta de Fomento, 192/8589; 'Propositions made by Domingo Goicuría for the introduction in this island of colonists from the provinces of Spain.' Havana, 1844. ANC: Real Consulado y Junta de Fomento, 192/8615; and 'Project of Colonization by the Count of Jaruco.' Havana, 1844. ANC: Real Consulado y Junta de Fomento, 182/8284 and 8600; 'Project submitted by Zulueta y Compañía of a contract to supply this island with free colonists to work on the sugar plantations.' Havana, 1845. ANC: Real Consulado y Junta de Fomento, 193/8652.

[70] 'José Suárez Argudín, and Ruíz Lacasa y Cía requesting permission to introduce free negroes in Cuba.' There were also similar requests made by Manuel Basilio Cunha Reis and Ramón Mandillo. AHN: Ultramar, 90/14.

[71] Her Majesty's Commissioners to the Earl of Clarendon. Havana, 15 May 1856. HCPP. 1857 Session 2 [2281] Class A. Correspondence with the British Commissioners at Sierra Leone, Havana, the Cape of Good Hope, and Loanda; and reports from British naval officers, relating to the slave trade.

[72] Yun, *The Coolie Speaks*, p. 15; and Lopez, *Chinese Cubans*, pp. 19-22. See also Eltis, Free and Coerced Transatlantic Migrations,' p. 261.

[73] See among others: Rugeley, *Yucatán's Maya*; and Reed, *The Caste War of Yucatan*. For the Zangroniz and Goicuría deals with the Mexican government see: Mr Doyle to the Earl of Clarendon. Mexico, 5 February 1855. HCPP: 1854-55 (0.4) Class B. Correspondence with British ministers and agents in foreign countries, and with foreign ministers in England, relating to the slave trade, ffs. 287-8; and Joseph T. Crawford to Captain General José de la Concha. Havana, 15 April 1858. HCPP. 859 Session 2 [2569-I] Class B. Correspondence with British ministers and agents in foreign countries, and with foreign ministers in England, relating to the slave trade, ffs. 160-1.

[74] As we saw before, this process went both ways, and also leading sugar planters invested on the slave trade, also from the 1790s.

[75] See Perret Ballester, *El azúcar en Matanzas*, pp. 390-439.

[76] The Palmerston Act of 1839 caused great disturbances among Cuban-based slave trading firms and individuals. Some of them, as Pedro Blanco, went as far as to abandoning their West African factories and moving to Cuba or Spain. The use of existing Courts of Vice-Admiralty to judge slave-trading vessels carrying Portuguese flags, and the destructions of slave factories in the Upper Guinea and Ambriz in 1842, also contributed to a slowdown of

business until circumstances changed again in 1842, shortly after Lord Palmerston was replaced by Lord Aberdeen as Foreign Secretary.

[77] Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*.

[78] This reliance on small and fast sailing vessels continued at least until the early 1850s, when slave traders decided to start using larger, merchant-looking vessels to carry out their slaves to Cuba.

[79] Chapelle, *The Baltimore Clipper*. Large steam vessels were popular again during the late 1850s and early 1860s. See Murray, *Odious Commerce*, p. 308.

[80] The average tonnage for the previous period (1820-1834) was of 159.2 tons. *Slavevoyages*. http://www.slavevoyages.org/tast/database/search.faces (accessed 8 October 2015).

[81] Zeuske and García Martínez, 'La Amistad,' p. 224. A study of where slave vessels were built during this period is still wanting.

[82] Chapelle, *The Baltimore Clipper*, p. 108.

[83] Schenley and Madden to Admiral Sir P. Halkett. Havana, 11 October 1836. TNA: Foreign Office 84/197, f. 215.

[84] Matson to Sir George Cockburn. 8 January 1844. In Matson, *Remarks*, p. 70.

[85] Schenley and Madden to Admiral Halkett. Havana, 11 October 1836. TNA: Foreign Office 84/197, ffs. 215-5v.

[86] Extract of a Letter, dated Rio Nuñez, 24 August 1836. HCPP. 1837 [001] Class A. Correspondence with the British Commissioners at Sierra Leone, Havana, Rio de Janeiro and Surinam, relating to the slave trade, f. 7.

[87] Schenley and Madden to Palmerston. Havana, 25 October 1836. HCPP. 1837 [001] Class A. Correspondence with the British Commissioners at Sierra Leone, Havana, Rio de Janeiro and Surinam, relating to the slave trade, f. 191.

[88] Eltis, *Economic Growth*, p. 136. See also the tonnage figures from *Slavevoyages* for the periods 1820-34, 1835-50, and 1851-66.

[89] Joseph T. Crawford and Francis Lousada to the Earl of Malmesbury. Havana, 26 February 1858. HCPP: 1859 Session 2 [2569] Class A. Correspondence with the British commissioners at Sierra Leone, Havana, the Cape of Good Hope, and Loanda; and reports from British Vice-Admiralty Courts, and from British naval officers, relating to the slave trade from April 1, 1858 to March 31, 1859; f. 17.

[90] Crawford to Malmesbury. Havana, 25 January 1859. TNA: Foreign Office 84/1073, ffs. 21-8v.

[91] See graph on Eltis, *Economic Growth*, p. 100.

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