**UK Euroscepticism and the Brexit referendum**

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**Abstract**

This article shows that key to understanding the referendum outcome are factors such as a profoundly Eurosceptic public, high levels of citizen uncertainty, divided mainstream political parties on the EU, and lack of unity within the Leave campaign. The Brexit referendum is more than just about domestic issues and government approval. Utilitarian concerns related to economic evaluations of EU integration coupled with support of or opposition to EU freedom of movement are very likely to influence vote choice. Those campaigns that focus on rational utilitarian arguments about the costs and benefits related to EU membership as a whole but also to EU freedom of movement are expected to swing voters.

**Keywords:**European Union,Britain, Brexit referendum, Euroscepticism, voting behaviour, EU Freedom of Movement

**Introduction**

Which factors are likely to influence citizen behaviour in the 2016 Brexit referendum? This article argues that the Brexit referendum vote is less likely to be the result of domestic factors such as partisanship, national economic considerations and satisfaction with UK democracy. Rather attitudes towards EU integration are very likely to affect vote choice. These include utilitarian concerns related to whether the UK has benefited from EU membership and specific issue preferences related to EU Freedom of Movement. This suggests that voters may be less influenced by the recommendations of the two mainstream parties. They may also be less receptive to campaigns that strictly focus on domestic politics. Those campaigns that will set the agenda by discussing the UK’s membership of the EU from a cost-benefit perspective and those that will stress the issue of EU Freedom of Movement are more likely to swing voters. In particular, questions that relate to whether EU citizens should have the right to access work and receive welfare in the UK are powerful frames because they tap into both economic cost-benefit considerations regarding the benefits of EU labour mobility and appeal to citizen concerns related to security, borders and multiculturalism.

To assess the underlying drivers of vote choice in the Brexit referendum, I first contextualise the UK referendum with reference to public opinion, party politics and campaigning. I then show that questions of EU labour mobility are core to British public concerns related to their country’s membership of the EU. I continue with an analysis of how people vote in EU referendums. I then proceed by empirically unpacking British support for Brexit and opposition to EU freedom of movement. The last section discusses the implications of these findings for campaigns.

**British Public Opinion on the EU**

How do British voters view European integration? Results from the British Election Study conducted in May 2015 show that over a quarter of the British population think that European unification has already gone too far (figure 1).[[1]](#endnote-2) This indicates that –at the very minimum– about a quarter of the population is very likely to support Brexit in the referendum and less likely to be influenced by campaigns. About 17 per cent of the respondents however position themselves in the middle of the scale and about another 11 per cent around the middle, which suggests that these individuals think that current levels of integration are about right. Another 17 per cent of the respondents do not know whether unification should be pushed further or has already gone too far. At the same time when asked how certain they feel about their own position on this scale, Britons tend to express a great degree of uncertainty when it comes to the EU issue with 38 per cent being ‘somewhat certain’, 5 per cent ‘not at all certain’, and about 10 per cent who do not know.

[Figure 1 about here]

This uncertainty is mirrored in people’s responses on how they would vote in the referendum. Results from 72 polls from 3 September 2015 to 14 March 2016 show that there is no clear winning camp (figure 2). Public opinion has been fluctuating with the number of those who respond that they do not know how they might vote being at times as high as 24 per cent. An ITV News poll conducted by ComRes in mid February 2016 found that only 57 per cent of the voters have definitively decided what they will vote, which leaves a significant percentage of the population that may still change their minds, even if they might not describe themselves as ‘undecided’ voters[[2]](#endnote-3). This suggests significant uncertainty among a remarkably large section of the population who may be more open to attempts at persuasion and more responsive to campaign influence.

[Figure 2 about here]

**Partisan and leadership cues**

Whereas there are high levels of party polarisation on the EU, this is not necessarily understood in partisan terms. We know that UKIP is situated firmly on the Leave camp and the Greens and Liberal Democrats on the Remain camp. However, the mainstream Labour and Conservative parties are not uniform on the referendum question. The Conservative Party has been historically divided on Europe and this is also manifested in this referendum, as the party has pledged to be officially neutral in order to avoid infighting. We may identify two main Conservative-led campaigns, including Conservatives for Reform in Europe who support Britain’s EU membership and Conservatives for Britain who support Brexit. And while Prime Minster David Cameron and Chancellor of the Exchequer George Osborne are actively supporting UK continuous membership of the EU, prominent Conservatives such as Justice Secretary Michael Gove and Mayor of London Boris Johnson have sided with Brexit.

Unlike the Conservatives, Labour has declared its unqualified support for EU membership officially campaigning for the UK to stay in the EU. This decision, however, sits in stark contrast with the party’s Eurosceptic history. Labour is also divided with some MPs affiliated with the Eurosceptic Labour Leave campaign and others with Labour In for Britain. Labour leader, Jeremy Corbyn, has endorsed the Remain campaign, arguing that his party should be pushing for a social Europe. However, he has expressed Eurosceptic arguments in the past, voted to leave the European Economic Community in the 1975 referendum, and did not take a clear stance on this issue during the Labour leadership contest in 2015. Corbyn’s Eurosceptic past combined with a general caution not to appear that he is supporting Cameron have contributed towards a sense of ambivalence with regard to Labour’s EU position.

Divisions and ambiguities regarding Conservative and Labour EU positions suggest that these two mainstream parties are less able to provide their voters with clear signals as to where they stand, thus potentially diluting the effect of partisanship on vote choice in the Brexit referendum. Research suggests, however, that party leaders may affect the outcome of the referendum. This is because leaders also provide information shortcuts influencing citizens’ policy evaluations. For example, an online survey experiment carried out in October 2015 showed that both Cameron’s and Corbyn’s endorsement of Britain remaining in the EU is associated with rising public support for the Remain campaign. Interestingly Corbyn’s effect is stronger among lower middle class and working class voters. At the same time, it is noteworthy that the effect of UKIP leader, Nigel Farage, is limited[[3]](#endnote-4). Thus although there is fundamental ambiguity regarding where the Conservative and Labour parties stand on the issue, the heuristic influence of their leaders should be taken into consideration in understanding the referendum outcome.

**The Campaign Environment**

There are three broad campaign groups, including Britain Stronger In Europe, Vote Leave and Grassroots Out/ Leave.EU. On the Remain side, Britain Stronger in Europe is a cross-party campaign that brings together businessmen, the Labour In for Britain campaign, and MPs from the Conservative, Liberal Democrat and Green parties. The key arguments of this campaign can be summarised as: better economy, better leadership and better security. EU membership has a positive impact on the UK economy, including trade, jobs and growth; being part of the EU enables Britain to be a leader in the world; and terrorism and cross border crime may be better addressed through EU cooperation.

Unlike the Britain Stronger In Europe campaign, which appears to be united, the Leave side is divided between two rival groups which battle for becoming the official Leave campaign. The comparatively moderate Vote Leave campaign is a cross-party group consisting of the Eurosceptic groups Conservatives for Britain, Labour Leave and Business for Britain. The Grassroots Out/Leave.EU is also endorsed by politicians across the political spectrum, such as UKIP, Conservatives, Labour and the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP). Prominent figures include UKIP’s Nigel Farage but also Labour MP Kate Hoey and former Respect MP George Galloway. There is a great overlap in the arguments of the two Leave campaigns. They both focus on the cost of membership, suggesting that these funds should be spent on domestic priorities. They contend that the UK will be a stronger world leader outside the EU, regaining its seat in international organisations. They both also argue that the UK could have a fairer migration policy outside the EU. The key difference, however, is that immigration appears to be the primary concern of Grassroots Out/ Leave.EU whereas Vote Leave tends to focus more on business interests and the economy.

**The issue of EU freedom of movement as a powerful campaign frame**

Which issues related to the UK referendum are likely to be powerful campaign frames? As mentioned above, the key themes on the agendas of both the Remain and Leave campaigns include Britain’s economy and trade relationships with its European partners, British influence and international standing, as well as its security and borders. To assess the potential strength of campaign frames, however, one needs to also take into consideration public preferences. One key message from opinion polls is that migration is a prominent issue in the hearts and minds of the voters. According to the latest Eurobarometer survey published in December 2015, 61 per cent of Britons feel that immigration is the most important issue facing the EU, three percentage points above the EU average. Immigration is also their top concern at the national level at 44 per cent. [[4]](#endnote-5)

This is not surprising given widespread insecurity as a result of the on-going refugee crisis, large migration flows and terrorist attacks in France and elsewhere. At the same time, however, domestic political entrepreneurs such as UKIP have been able to link the issue of immigration, and more specifically EU freedom of movement to Britain’s EU membership[[5]](#endnote-6). This is a fundamental principle of cooperation within the EU framework, which relates to EU citizens’ right to freely work and reside in another EU country and to enjoy equal treatment with nationals in access to employment, working conditions and all other social and tax advantages.

Issues related to EU migration, including control of borders and access to welfare, were the top two priorities in British citizens’ EU negotiation wish list with 52 per cent of Britons wanting Cameron to seek change in the area of greater control of borders and immigration from the EU and 46 per cent asking for limits on benefits EU migrants are eligible for (figure 3). Questions that relate to sovereignty such as greater powers for national Parliaments and ending the commitment towards an ‘ever closer union’ were lagging behind in terms of Britons’ renegotiation concerns with 29 and 14 per cent respectively. Economic issues related to employment regulation, the environment and the much-contested Common Agricultural Policy were not as prominent among the British public. Interestingly only 4 per cent of the respondents felt that less regulation on the City and Britain’s financial sector is a priority in the renegotiation.

[Figure 3 about here]

Attitudes towards EU migration and freedom of movement appear to be strong voting predictors of the Brexit referendum. The ITV poll mentioned above asked people which is the most important issue in deciding which way to vote. Results suggest that control over the number of EU migrants entering Britain also topped voters’ minds. This concern was higher than control over Britain’s laws, the economy and national security. This is because entitlements related to freedom of movement within the EU, such as the right to work and receive welfare in another EU country, can constitute powerful frames because they tap into a variety of citizen concerns that cut across most campaign themes, including economy and security. They also have the potential to appeal to voters’ sentiment towards foreigners.

EU freedom of movement has a strong utilitarian component related to the financial benefits and disadvantages of employing EU workforce in the UK labour market. This issue may also relate to the broader question of who should be entitled to the collective goods of the state, whether EU migrants are putting unnecessary strain on the state and its resources, whether the welfare state has enough resources to cater for higher number of people living in the UK when it comes to welfare state provision in education and health; or whether, on the other hand, EU migration is a potential opportunity to improve the welfare state and its provisions through EU nationals’ taxation and welfare contributions. It also taps into questions of security, i.e. whether UK borders are adequately controlled and whether there is an association with higher levels of crime among EU migrants, especially those on lower incomes.

**Which factors may determine the Brexit vote?**

To understand the factors that may affect the referendum outcome, we also need to explore citizen behaviour in past EU referendums. Literature suggests that voters view them as ‘second order elections’. Voting is conditioned by domestic issues, and therefore citizens either follow party recommendations on what to vote or they use these elections to signal their satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the national government and/or the economy. Following this line of argumentation, voting does not reflect a genuine consideration of the EU issue. Rather it becomes influenced by domestic party competition dynamics. Work on previous referendums supports this argument. For example, the rejection of the Maastricht Treaty in Denmark and the French ‘petit oui’ have been attributed to the unpopularity of government. Domestic political evaluations and partisan cues were associated with the Dutch rejection of the European Constitutional Treaty in the mid 2000s. In France, national considerations and the performance of the right-wing government were key to understanding the no vote in 2005.[[6]](#endnote-7)

A second explanation of voting behaviour in EU referendums stresses the attitudinal basis of voting. Citizens are seen as rational individuals who evaluate EU policy-making. Their voting is conditional upon underlying evaluations of European integration. Naturally, pro-EU voters are likely to support their country’s EU membership and approve changes that enhance European integration and Eurosceptic citizens are likely to prefer the opposite. Public preferences on the EU may be seen as the result of individuals’ cost-benefit analysis related either to whether individuals perceive they have been personally better off as a result of their country’s membership of the EU or whether joining the EU has economically benefited their country as a whole.[[7]](#endnote-8) EU opinion may also be conditional upon the strength of national identity and the extent to which individuals feel European at heart (see the article in this Special Issue entitled ‘A Question of Culture or Economics? Public Attitudes to the European Union in Britain’ by Curtice).[[8]](#endnote-9) EU attitudes may be influenced by citizens’ evaluations of the political system both national and European (which to some extent overlaps with the second order model of vote).[[9]](#endnote-10) However, there is no clear agreement in the literature about the direction of the relationship. High levels of trust in the national government tend to be related to higher support for the EU. Equally, individuals may support the EU precisely because they are dissatisfied with their national political system.

Here it is important to note that people’s socio-demographic characteristics also matter as they may condition the effect of utilitarianism, identity, and satisfaction with the system, as highly educated and more affluent people are more likely to express positive EU attitudes. They tend to consider themselves ‘winners’ of globalisation and thus less likely to express dissatisfaction, more likely to reap the economic benefits of European integration and less likely to feel threatened by other cultures.

These factors taken together give us an indication as to what is likely to influence citizen behaviour in the Brexit referendum. These include: partisanship, national economy evaluations, cost-benefit analysis of European integration, identity considerations, satisfaction with the UK and EU political regimes, levels of education and income. To assess what may determine voting behaviour in the Brexit referendum, I rely on multivariate statistical analysis.[[10]](#endnote-11) This allows the specification of a model which can test the explanatory value of all the above explanations. I can do so in conjunction with assessing the effect of preferences towards EU freedom of movement on referendum vote choice.

The results are shown in table 1. The first observation –as expected– is that income and education are negatively associated with support for leaving the EU. In other words the higher the income someone has the less likely s/he is to support Brexit, and the higher the levels of education the less likely s/he is to express support leaving the EU. Factors associated with the second order model of vote are not strong predictors of the referendum vote. National economy evaluations, and satisfaction with democracy either on the national UK level or the EU level do not have an effect on support for leaving the EU. While right-wing positions on the left-right dimension are associated with support for Brexit, partisanship is not a very strong predictor except for UKIP. Those who feel close to UKIP are more likely to support leaving the EU.

The findings strongly support the utilitarian approach. The strongest effects in the model relate to citizens’ evaluations of whether the UK has benefited from being a member of the EU: those who feel that EU membership entails cost are more likely to support leaving the EU. There is no effect of European identity on vote choice. The results from table 1 also indicate the strong effect of attitudes towards EU freedom of movement. Respondents were asked the extent to which they agreed with the statements ‘The right of EU citizens to work in other EU countries should be restricted’ and ‘EU citizens should be allowed to receive welfare benefits only in their country of origin’. While holding all other factors constant, results suggest a significant association between positive responses to the above statements and support for Brexit. Those who agree that welfare should not be extended to EU nationals and those who support restrictions to the right to work across the EU are very likely to vote for Brexit.

[Table 1 about here]

But what explains attitudes towards EU freedom of movement? To what extent are these attitudes driven by socio-demographic characteristics, utilitarian considerations, identity and/or ideological preferences? Table 2 shows that socio-demographic characteristics, such as income and education are not related to attitudes towards EU freedom of movement. This is an important finding, as one would expect that highly educated people and those with higher income would support citizen’s right to work and claim welfare in another EU country. Older people are more likely to support restrictions to right to work across the EU. Predictably opposition to ethnic diversity and multiculturalism is related to support for restrictions to right to work and claim welfare in another EU country. Feelings of European identity are negatively associated with support for such restrictions, which suggests that there is a strong identity component to such attitudes. Utilitarian considerations are also a factor with those who feel that the UK has not benefited from EU membership supporting both work and welfare related restrictions. Those who place themselves to the right of the political spectrum tend to be more supportive of such restrictions. Overall the findings suggest that there is both an economic and a cultural component to these attitudes, which is why the issue of EU freedom of movement makes a powerful campaign frame.

[Table 2 about here]

**Conclusions**

This article explored British Euroscepticism by analysing British attitudes towards the EU, how the EU issue features within UK party agendas and the campaign environment. Findings suggest that partisanship and domestic issues such as national economic considerations and satisfaction with UK democracy -although relevant- may not have a strong influence on the referendum outcome. Instead, utilitarian concerns regarding the cost and benefit of European integration coupled with support for/opposition to EU freedom of movement are very likely to influence vote choice. Questions that relate to EU citizens’ right to work and receive welfare in another EU country are particularly powerful frames as they tap into cost-benefit evaluations of EU membership but also concerns that relate to ethnic diversity and multiculturalism.

What does this mean for campaigns? Those campaigns that focus on rational utilitarian arguments about the costs and benefits related to EU membership as a whole, but also to EU freedom of movement, are likely to swing voters. General frames regarding the economic dimension of EU membership are being used by both Remain and Leave campaigns. Questions related to EU freedom of movement, however, tend to feature only in the Leave campaigns. The Grassroots Out/ Leave.EU campaign argues that EU migration deprives low skilled Britons from work and puts pressure on public services. Despite the fact that the Vote Leave campaign seeks to portray the EU through a predominantly cost-benefit lens, it mentions EU migration arguing that EU membership entails an ‘an open door to the EU while blocking people who could contribute to the UK coming from non-EU countries’.

A credible Remain campaign would need to engage directly with the question of EU freedom of movement in order to openly address the Leave campaigns’ criticisms. This could be done, for example, by making a positive case about how EU citizens contribute to Britain’s growth and the welfare state. Specific information could include educational backgrounds of EU migrants, the sectors in which they work, assessments from companies on the extent to which EU migration is useful to their businesses, and the types of skills EU migrants bring to the UK economy that may be potentially lacking among the British workforce. The question, however, remains whether the Remain campaign is able to take this issue on board, as scepticism towards EU freedom of movement is prevalent among both Labour and Conservative supporters.[[11]](#endnote-12)


**Acknowledgements**

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**List of figures**

**Figure 1** Some say European unification should be pushed further. Others say it has already gone too far. What is your opinion?

*Source*: Post-Election Wave 6 of the 2014-2017 British Election Study Internet Panel.

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**Figure 2** Should the United Kingdom remain a member of the European Union or leave the European Union?

*Source:*

<http://whatukthinks.org/eu/questions/should-the-united-kingdom-remain-a-member-of-the-eu-or-leave-the-eu/>

**Figure 3** EU negotiation wish list: When renegotiating Britain’s relationship with the EU, in which if any of the following areas do you think David Cameron should seek to change our relationship? (%)

*Source:* <https://yougov.co.uk/news/2015/12/10/eu-polling-soft-leave/>

**Table 1: Support for leaving the EU**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
|  | Support for Brexit |
|  |
| Male | -0.0759  (0.054) |
| Income | -0.0286\*\*\*  (0.011) |
| Education | -0.130\*\*\*  (0.033) |
| Age (in years) | -0.0132\*\*\*  (0.002) |
| National Economic Conditions | 0.0296  (0.030) |
| Conservative Party ID | -0.0547  (0.076) |
| Labour Party ID | 0.103  (0.074) |
| LibDem Party ID | -0.0221  (0.113) |
| Green Party ID | -0.0471  (0.131) |
| UKIP Party ID | 0.782\*\*\*  (0.101) |
| Left-right self placement | 0.0627\*\*\*  (0.015) |
| The UK has not benefited from EU membership | 0.607\*\*\*  (0.022) |
| European identity | 0.0108  (0.018) |
| Satisfaction with UK democracy | 0.0110  (0.013) |
| Satisfaction with EU democracy | 0.0103  (0.014) |
| Restrict EU citizens’ right to work | 0.220\*\*\*  (0.018) |
| EU welfare only in country of origin | 0.116\*\*\*  (0.018) |
| Constant | 0.309  (0.267) |
| Observations | 2552 |
| *R*2 | 0.577 |

Note: Standard errors in parentheses \* *p* < 0.10, \*\* *p* < 0.05, \*\*\* *p* < 0.01. Dependent variable measured on a seven-point scale with higher values indicating support for Brexit.

*Source:* Vasilopoulou, S. and Bone, J. (2015) Survey of attitudes in the UK. Conducted by Research Now, April 2015.

**Table 2: Support for restrictions of EU citizens’ right to work in other EU countries and support for EU citizens’ receiving welfare benefits only in their country of origin**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | Restrict EU citizens’  right to work | EU welfare only in country of origin |
|  |
| Male | -0.133\*\*  (0.055) | -0.0286  (0.057) |
| Income | -0.00948  (0.011) | 0.00543  (0.011) |
| Education | -0.0440  (0.034) | -0.0122  (0.035) |
| Age (in years) | 0.00887\*\*\*  (0.002) | 0.00296  (0.002) |
| Ethnic diversity weakens British society | 0.210\*\*\*  (0.017) | 0.0608\*\*\*  (0.018) |
| The UK has not benefited from EU membership | 0.147\*\*\*  (0.022) | 0.0601\*\*\*  (0.023) |
| European identity | -0.0826\*\*\*  (0.018) | -0.0674\*\*\*  (0.019) |
| EU welfare only in country of origin | 0.322\*\*\*  (0.018) |  |
| Restrict EU citizens’ right to work |  | 0.348\*\*\*  (0.019) |
| Left-right self placement | 0.0476\*\*\*  (0.013) | 0.0626\*\*\*  (0.014) |
| Constant | 1.314\*\*\*  (0.218) | 3.142\*\*\*  (0.220) |
| Observations | 2611 | 2611 |
| *R*2 | 0.385 | 0.266 |

Note: Standard errors in parentheses \* *p* < 0.10, \*\* *p* < 0.05, \*\*\* *p* < 0.01. Dependent variable measured on a seven-point scale with higher values indicating support for restrictions to EU freedom of movement.

*Source:* Vasilopoulou, S. and Bone, J. (2015) Survey of attitudes in the UK. Conducted by Research Now, April 2015.

1. E. Fieldhouse, J. Green., G. Evans., H. Schmitt, and C. van der Eijk, *British Election Study,* Internet Panel Wave 6, 2015. [↑](#endnote-ref-2)
2. See <http://www.itv.com/news/2016-02-15/itv-news-poll-big-rise-in-those-who-want-britain-to-leave-eu/> [↑](#endnote-ref-3)
3. See M. Goodwin, S. Hix and M. Pickup Cameron, *Corbyn and Farage: How might they affect the EU Referendum Vote?,* available at <http://whatukthinks.org/eu/cameron-corbyn-and-farage-how-might-they-affect-the-eu-referendum-vote/> [↑](#endnote-ref-4)
4. Eurobarometer, *Standard Eurobarometer 84*, Autumn 2015, Public Opinion in the EU, First results. [↑](#endnote-ref-5)
5. M. Goodwin and C. Milazzo, *UKIP: Inside the Campaign to Redraw the Map of British Politics*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2015. [↑](#endnote-ref-6)
6. See for example M. Franklin, C. Van der Eijk, and M. Marsh, 'Referendum outcomes and trust in government: Public support for Europe in the wake of Maastricht', *West European Politics*, vol. 18, no 3, 1995, pp.101-117; P. Hainsworth, ‘France Says No: The 29 May 2005 Referendum on the European Constitution’, *Parliamentary Affairs*, vol. 59, no. 1, 2006, pp. 98-117; P. Taggart, ‘Keynote article: Questions of Europe – The domestic politics of the 2005 French and Dutch Referendums and their challenge for the study of European integration,’ *Journal of common Market Studies*, vol. 44, Annual Review, 2006, pp. 7-25; M. Lubbers, ‘Regarding the Dutch ‘Nee’ to the European Constitution: A test of the identity, utilitarian and political approaches to voting ‘No’’, *European Union Politics*, vol. 9, no 1, 2008, pp. 59-86. [↑](#endnote-ref-7)
7. See for example C. J. Anderson and M. S. Reichert, ‘Economic Benefits and Support for Membership in the E.U.: A Cross-National Analysis’, *Journal of Public Policy*, vol. 15, no. 03, 1995, pp. 231-249; M. Gabel and H. Palmer, ‘Understanding Variation in Public Support for European Integration’, *European Journal of Political Research,* vol. 27, 1995, pp. 3-19; M. Gabel and G.D. Whitten, ‘Economic Conditions, Economic Perceptions and Public Support for European Integration’, *Political Behavior*, vol. 19, no. 1, 1997, pp. 81–96; F. Serricchio, M. Tsakatika, and L. Quaglia, ‘Euroscepticism and the Global Financial Crisis’, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, vol. 51, no 1, 2013, pp. 51–64; R. Gomez, ‘The Economy Strikes Back: Support for the EU during the Great Recession’, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, vol. 53, no. 3, 2015, pp. 577-592. [↑](#endnote-ref-8)
8. See for example S. Carey, ‘Undivided loyalties: is national identity an obstacle to European integration?’ *European Union Politics,* vol. 3, no. 4, 2002, pp. 387–413; L.M. McLaren, ‘Public support for the European Union: cost/benefit analysis or perceived cultural threat?’ *Journal of Politics,* vol. 64, no. 2, 2002, pp. 551–566; L. Hooghe and G. Marks, ‘A Postfunctionalist Theory of European Integration: From Permissive Consensus to Constraining Dissensus’, *British Journal of Political Science,* vol. 39, 2009, pp. 1-23. [↑](#endnote-ref-9)
9. See for example C. J. Anderson, ‘When in Doubt, Use Proxies: Attitudes toward Domestic Politics and Support for European Integration’, *Comparative Political Studies,* vol. 31, no. 5, 1998, pp. 569–601; I. Sanchez-Cuenca, I., ‘The political basis of support for European Integration’, *European Union Politics,* vol. 1, no. 2, 2000, pp. 147–171; S. Hobolt, ‘Citizen Satisfaction with Democracy in the European Union’, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, vol. 50, no. S1, 2012, pp. 88-105; K. Armingeon and B. Ceka, ‘The loss of trust in the European Union during the great recession since 2007: The role of heuristics from the national political system’, *European Union Politics*, vol. 15, no. 1, 2014, pp. 82–107. [↑](#endnote-ref-10)
10. The analysis is based on a survey carried out online in April 2015 by Research Now among 3000 citizens representative of the British population. Pairwise correlation coefficients between the independent variables are under 0.5, except EU cost and European identity at -0.6637 and EU cost and satisfaction with EU democracy at -0.5085. I have run the model in Table 1 without the right to work and EU welfare variables. Identity remains not significant. [↑](#endnote-ref-11)
11. For the Brexit campaigns, see See <http://leave.eu/en/the-facts/on-migration> and <http://www.voteleavetakecontrol.org/our_case>; for a comparison of attitudes between Labour and Conservative supporters and MPs see T. Bale, P. Cowley, A. Menon, and S. Vasilopoulou, *Speaking for Britain? MPs broadly reflect the views of their supporters on Europe – but one side should worry a little more than the other* 2015, available at <http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexitvote/2016/02/12/speaking-for-britain-mps-broadly-reflect-the-views-of-their-supporters-on-europe-but-one-side-should-worry-a-little-more-than-the-other/> [↑](#endnote-ref-12)