



UNIVERSITY OF LEEDS

This is a repository copy of *The United Kingdom: Hybrid Populisms, Mixed Fortunes, and Unstable Support*.

White Rose Research Online URL for this paper:  
<http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/106742/>

Version: Accepted Version

---

**Book Section:**

Stanyer, J, Archetti, C and Sorensen, L (2016) *The United Kingdom: Hybrid Populisms, Mixed Fortunes, and Unstable Support*. In: Aalberg, T, Esser, F, Reinemann, C, Stromback, J and de Vreese, C, (eds.) *Populist Political Communication in Europe*. Routledge Research in Communication Studies . Routledge , New York and London . ISBN 978-1138654792

<https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315623016>

---

© 2017, Taylor & Francis. This is an Accepted Manuscript of a book chapter published by Routledge in *Populist Political Communication in Europe* on July 26, 2016. The book is available online at: <http://www.tandfebooks.com/doi/book/10.4324/9781315623016>.  
Uploaded in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy.

**Reuse**

Unless indicated otherwise, fulltext items are protected by copyright with all rights reserved. The copyright exception in section 29 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 allows the making of a single copy solely for the purpose of non-commercial research or private study within the limits of fair dealing. The publisher or other rights-holder may allow further reproduction and re-use of this version - refer to the White Rose Research Online record for this item. Where records identify the publisher as the copyright holder, users can verify any specific terms of use on the publisher's website.

**Takedown**

If you consider content in White Rose Research Online to be in breach of UK law, please notify us by emailing [eprints@whiterose.ac.uk](mailto:eprints@whiterose.ac.uk) including the URL of the record and the reason for the withdrawal request.



[eprints@whiterose.ac.uk](mailto:eprints@whiterose.ac.uk)  
<https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/>

This is an Accepted Manuscript of a book chapter edited by Toril Aalberg, Frank Esser, Carsten Reinemann, Jesper Strömbäck, and Claes H. de Vreese published by Routledge as *Populist Political Communication in Europe* on July 26, 2016. The book is available online at: <http://www.tandfebooks.com/doi/book/10.4324/9781315623016>

### **13. The United Kingdom. Hybrid Populisms, Mixed Fortunes, and Unstable Support**

James Stanyer, Cristina Archetti, and Lone Sorensen

#### **Introduction**

The United Kingdom has traditionally not witnessed examples of successful populist parties in the way that they have been observed in many continental European countries. The recent success of the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) at a number of elections, however, has led some to claim that there is a growing populist influence in politics (Fella, 2008). This chapter reviews the literature on populist political communication, identifying the main actors and what has been said about them.

#### **Research on Populism in the United Kingdom**

There is no consensus on defining populism in the United Kingdom. Moffitt and Tormey (2014, p. 382) argue that it is “an axiomatic feature of literature on the topic to acknowledge the contested nature of populism,” with the term populism being used interchangeably with extreme right, the radical right, Euroskepticism, and various combinations of these terms. Most scholars focus on subtypes of populism, such as right-wing extremism (Eatwell, 2004; Goodwin, 2011; Pupcenoks & McCabe, 2013; Startin, 2014) and Euroskepticism (Gifford, 2006). Left-wing populism, in comparison, is largely overlooked, the term being more often linked to the political right (Baggini, 2013, p. 131). Studies of populism in the United Kingdom draw on a range of research methods, including discourse analysis (Atkins & Finlayson, 2013; Edwards 2012), content analysis (Rooduijn & Pauwels, 2011), interviews (Rhodes, 2009), network analysis (Kim, Rademakers, Sanchez, & van Vucht, 2013; O’Callaghan, Greene, Conway, Carthy, & Cunningham, 2013), and surveys (Borisjuk, Rallings, Thrasher, & van der Kolk, 2007; John & Margetts, 2009; Whitaker & Lynch, 2011).

In this chapter, we have included politicians and parties that the literature defines as populist but have excluded smaller players, such as the Populist Alliance and Britain First, given their very limited presences in the UK media and politics. We have selected four key populist actors. The Euroskeptic United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) is regularly called populist (see, e.g., Ford, Goodwin, & Cutts, 2012; Hayton, 2010; Whitaker & Lynch, 2011), as is the British National Party (BNP) (see, e.g., Akkerman, 2011), although others call the BNP fascist with populist overtones (Goodwin, 2014; Mammone, 2009). The Respect Party and English Defence League (EDL) have also been labeled populist (see Bartlett & Littler, 2011; Clark, Bottom, & Copus, 2008).

As noted above, most British scholarship focuses on specific subtypes of populism. Only Clark et al. (2008) compare left- and right-wing populism in the Respect Party and the British National Party. Applying Taggart’s (2000) taxonomy of populist actors, they find a common core of populist characteristics shared by the two parties, which take different forms depending on the host ideology. Given the limited possible cases in the United Kingdom, Clark et al.’s comparative study is unfortunately unable to consider party size or position of

power as variables. Many of the similarities identified—direct communication, anti-system challenges, locally adaptable campaigns, adopting the role of the underdog—may be affected by these factors.

In terms of Jagers and Walgrave's (2007) typology, UKIP and the BNP could best be described as complete populists. Each makes reference and appeals to the people, is anti-elitist, and calls for the exclusion of EU migrants. The EDL could best be described as excluding populist. It makes reference and appeals to the people and calls for the exclusion of out-groups, namely Muslims. The Respect Party could best be described as anti-elitist populist. It makes reference and appeals to the people and is highly critical of the political establishment. It was founded in response to the United Kingdom's involvement in Iraq.

The extent of support for these actors varies. UKIP support is on the rise. Founded in the early 1990s, in reaction to the EU Maastricht Treaty, it fought its first European parliamentary election in 1994. In the 1999 European parliamentary election it gained its first member of the European Parliament (MEP), and by the 2014 European elections, it secured 27% of the vote and 23 MEPs. In the local government elections the same year, it gained 163 seats across a number of local councils. The party now has its highest number of members since its foundation, an estimated 42,000. In 2015, in the country's general election, it gained one MP in the national parliament and received more than 12% of the national vote, almost twice the level of the Liberal Democrats, and four times that of the Scottish Nationalist Party. This support is largely based in England.

The British National Party's support, in contrast, seems to be on the wane. The party formed in the early 1980s and reached the peak of its electoral success in 2009 when it gained two MEPs and 55 councilors in local government elections, including in the London Assembly. However, in the 2014 European parliamentary elections, it lost both its MEPs, including the party leader Nick Griffin, and was left with only two councilors. Party membership also declined and is now estimated to be around 500. In the same year, Nick Griffin, leader since 1999, lost a party leadership contest and was later thrown out of the party. The BNP only received less than two percent of the vote in the 2010 general election and had much less support in the 2015 general election.

The EDL, formed in 2009, is a movement, not a political party. It has no formal membership and does not stand in elections. As such, it is difficult to determine how much support the EDL has. One estimate was that it had 20,000–30,000 supporters in 2010 (Bartlett and Littler, 2011). However, the arrest and resignation of its leader, Tommy Robinson, in 2013 may have reduced the movement's momentum.

The Respect Party was formed in 2004 in the wake of the Iraq war, and while it has enjoyed some electoral success, its support also seems on the wane. Unlike the other populist parties, it is on the left, and its support comes in the main from ethnic minority voters, especially from Muslim communities in major urban conurbations (Borisjuk et al., 2007). The party won its first local council seat in 2004 and its first MP, George Galloway (the party leader), in the 2005 general election. By 2007, the party had 18 local councilors in England. A split in the party and a series of local government election losses, however, meant that by 2015, the party had no local councilors, and George Galloway lost his Bradford West parliamentary seat in the general election. The Respect Party also had little support in the 2015 general election.

As will be discussed later in the chapter, the literature points to a range of contextual factors that underlie the success of populist political actors. The first is a deep dissatisfaction with the main political parties (Ford et al., 2012; Whitaker & Lynch, 2011) and a cynicism about, and distrust of, the political establishment (Hayton, 2010). The second is industrial decline and high unemployment (Ford, 2010; Ford & Goodwin, 2010, 2014). Third, the perceived level of inward migration from outside the United Kingdom (Ford et al., 2012; Whitaker & Lynch, 2011). Fourth, the changing culture and values, and concern about the influence of Islam and Muslims on British life (Bartlett & Littler, 2011; Goodwin, Cutts, & Janta-Lipinski, 2014). And the fifth factor is UK government policy. The Respect Party benefited from a backlash against UK involvement in the invasion and occupation of Iraq, particularly among Britain's Muslim population. Although not discussed in the literature, other factors, like electoral systems and party finances, may also play an important role.

### **Populist Actors as Communicators**

The literature on populist actors in the United Kingdom is somewhat sketchy and colored by the UK context: Populists constitute small opposition parties with limited chance of governing in the current electoral system, and radical right populism in ethnocentric or Euroskeptical forms dominates.

A number of populist stylistic features stand out in the UK literature. The first is the juxtaposition of the elite and the people. Populist actors present themselves as the voice of the silent majority, speaking the direct, politically incorrect language of the common man, pitched against an oppressive or unresponsive elite (on measuring this feature of populism in the United Kingdom, see Rooduijn & Pauwels, 2011). In the United Kingdom, however, a number of studies identify this characteristic of anti-elitist populism in mainstream parties, too (see, e.g., Baggini, 2013; Bale, 2013). The second feature is the construction of otherness. Right-wing populists in the United Kingdom identify a range of out-groups, especially immigrants. In the case of UKIP, this is combined with Euroskepticism. The third is anti-system challenges. There is theoretical disagreement on whether populism is opposed to representative democracy per se (Taggart, 2000) or whether, more specifically, it rejects the principles and procedures that define liberal democracies, such as the separation of powers, respect for minorities, and so on (Albertazzi & Mueller, 2013). A direct democratic promise is inherent in populism's anti-system challenges (Mammone, 2009; Painter, 2013). This distinguishes it from undemocratic forms of extremism. The final feature is the use of simplistic and emotionally laden messages. Populist rhetoric uses simple language and seeks to arouse emotions such as fear and indignation (Fieschi & Heywood, 2004, p. 291; Taggart, 2000, p. 101).

The strategic use of charismatic leadership is also seen as a dominant feature of populism in the UK literature (Taggart, 2000, pp. 102–103; Wodak & KhosraviNik, 2013), if not a defining one. Empirical studies agree on the importance of charismatic leadership to populists' success. George Galloway, leader of the Respect Party, was found to use charisma to patch up contradictory arguments (Clark et al., 2008; Crines, 2013). Former EDL leader Tommy Robinson and former UKIP leader-in-waiting Robert Kilroy Silk were found to use charisma to gain media coverage and obtain internal party cohesion (on the EDL, see Oaten, 2014; on the UKIP, see Fella, 2008). In the case of the British National Party's Nick Griffin, results showed that his lack of charisma had a negative impact on media coverage and party cohesion (Startin, 2014, pp. 291–292; Eatwell, 2004). Current UKIP leader Nigel Farage has reinvented himself as an outsider, despite an elite background of private school and City of

London stockbroking. No studies that we could find compared charismatic leadership in populist and mainstream parties in the United Kingdom.

There is a gap in the literature (in particular, in theoretical studies) on populist actors' approach to the media. Most empirical investigations examine the British National Party's media strategy and its attempt to both shed its former neo-Nazi image and to openly (if unsuccessfully) adopt a "more populist" rhetoric (Nick Griffin, as cited in Fella, 2008, p. 193). With mainstream media, the BNP tries to strike a difficult balance: It uses "coded" messages to simultaneously gain mainstream support and reassure old hard-liners that the extremist stance remains within (Eatwell, 2004, p. 63). Another strand of research interrogates mainstream politicians' strategic communication and finds that they use a populist style to strategically adapt their message to the medium when approaching tabloid media (e.g., Blumler & Kavanagh, 1999; Fella, 2008).

The literature is somewhat skewed by its focus on mainstream parties and the British National Party: The former make their communication style more extreme in their relations with popular media, whereas the latter tones down radical rhetoric to appeal to mainstream voters. Yet these cases do not represent the breadth of populism in the United Kingdom and the complexity of its relations with the media. Furthermore, the lack of theory on both media populism and populist media strategy make such generalizations unrepresentative.

As far as we can tell, there are no comparative studies of populist and mainstream party communication in the United Kingdom. However, a significant body of literature agrees on mainstream parties' flair for populist communication. This aptitude is found to be more pronounced in the United Kingdom than in other European cases studied, possibly due to the competitive two-party system (Rooduijn, de Lange, & van der Brug, 2014, p. 568).

Various scholars have studied different aspects of populist communication in New Labour and the Conservative Party: populist discourse and style (e.g., Fella, 2008; Hoggett, Wilkinson, & Beedell, 2013), the adoption of what are considered typical populist issues (e.g., Bale, 2013), and the use of populist ideology (Atkins & Finlayson, 2013). Paradoxically, such populist strategies in British mainstream parties appear to create opportunities for truly populist parties. As Baggini (2013) and Hoggett, Wilkinson, and Beedell (2013) explain, from the perspective of political consumerism, populist strategies have the adverse effect of casting too wide a net. The result is a gap for small populist parties to pitch themselves as parties of conviction and sincerity framed in an anti-establishment narrative by using more extreme rhetoric on single issues where they have a distinctive position. In this sense, party size and election prospects also play a role in determining which parts of the populist communication toolbox a party chooses to adopt. Such factors require further investigation in comparative studies that will be able to shed light on the role of the British electoral system, which favors established parties.

### **The Media and Populism**

The most striking feature of the literature about media and populism in the United Kingdom is its patchy nature. Although the literature covers different dimensions of the media/populism nexus, studies tend to deal with a specific populist party or its use of a specific technological platform (most often social media). These glimpses into populism and the roles of both media organizations and communication technologies in regard to it do not amount to a broad, in-depth understanding of the phenomenon.

A meagre amount of literature deals with the way media outlets cover populist groups or populist discourse (Akkerman, 2011;). That said, these 170 James Stanyer, Cristina Archetti, and Lone Sorensen studies help challenge the widespread belief that newspapers might contribute to the success of populist actors by giving these groups a voice and even supporting their rhetoric. Akkerman (2011, p. 12), for example, tests the claim that popular newspapers have a stronger tendency “to share the anti-establishment position of populist parties” by comparing tabloids in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. He concludes that “there is no evidence that popular newspapers share an anti-elitist bias with populist parties.”

A study by Cardo (2014) looks further at the representation of populist figure George Galloway in the context of a reality TV program, *Celebrity Big Brother*, in 2006. Beyond the analysis of coverage, Copsey and Macklin (2011, p. 82) examine the media’s role in the rise of the British National Party. Media contributions are analyzed along three dimensions; namely, the opportunity the media gives the party (a) to drop the barriers of entry into the electoral market by enabling it to communicate with a wide audience, (b) to bestow respectability and legitimacy upon newcomers, and (c) to provide momentum by giving the impression of a mass following.

There are suggestions in the literature that the media themselves engage in populism (see Stanyer, 2007). Wayne and Murray (2009), in examining which political actors dominate the UK TV coverage, also investigated the extent to which British news is cynical or populist. Cynicism and populism are here taken as synonyms and refer to the tendency to “underemphasize ‘substantive’ themes such as policy issues to focus on (less important) themes such as popularity, conflict, strategy, tactics and personalities” (p. 419). Some authors make strong statements about the media’s role in the rise of ideologies often associated with populist groups, such as Islamophobia (Ansari, 2012) and racism (Bates, 2012). Despite the suggestion that the media have a key function in providing the stage on which ideas and discourses by populist groups are aired and “normalized,” no critical approach has been developed to assess how the media would actually assume this role. Strong evidence—empirical or otherwise—is all too often missing.

Bale, Kessel, and Taggart (2011) find that the term populism is used by British newspapers to refer to a variety of topics and actors that might have little in common with each other. Populist topics, for example, can range from calls for social justice to Islamophobia, while populist leaders might include politicians like Silvio Berlusconi and Gordon Brown.

Although there are comparative studies involving the United Kingdom, they do not really lead to a systematic identification of the reasons why there are differences in the media/populism relationship across European countries. Rather than explaining the differences, these studies tend to describe them (O’Callaghan et al., 2013).

When it comes to non-journalistic online media, the focus of interest appears to be in the use of social media by populist actors, particularly by the EDL. There is a widespread assumption that the Internet, particularly social media, is a “fitting” tool for populist actors. As Bartlett, discussing the link between social media and populism, puts it:

## The United Kingdom 171

The medium fits the message; it is distributed, non-hierarchical and democratic. It is an alternative to the mainstream media. It is not controlled by the elites and content is generated by the honest, hardworking, ordinary citizens, exactly the people who the populists are defending. (2014, pp. 93–94)

Atton (2006) analyzes the BNP online discourse and concludes that the BNP practices an online “authoritarian populism.” This is expressed discursively through symbols—“a mythic past, a repressed present and a secure future for the innocent”—which draw on the “lived experiences” of the British National Party’s members (Atton, 2006, pp. 585–586). As part of the interest in the way populists operate online, there are studies applying network analysis, particularly on Twitter data, to map the exchanges among activists. Kim et al. (2013), for example, mapped the digital network of the EDL by examining the Twitter exchanges among 40 selected activists, concluding that the EDL online community is “loosely connected by a small group of operators in control of pushing content in and out” (n.p.). O’Callaghan et al. (2013) examined international relationships established through Twitter among far-right groups across eight European countries. Most of the users tended to be connected to formal groups that include, in the United Kingdom, populist groups like UKIP. The findings suggest the existence of stable communities. Some of them focus around local interaction networks. Others are transnational in scope, especially in cases of linguistic proximity. One aspect that the authors are careful to point out is that it is unclear to what extent such patterns of interaction are representative of exchanges that occur offline.

Jackson (2011, p. 43) examines the EDL’s online presence, including websites, blogs, and social media (Facebook), concluding that “new media networking sites have become a vital tool for the EDL.” However, while the main EDL Facebook page tends to maintain a strict “party line,” other websites and blogs that are more indirectly associated with the organization send out “a more diverse set of messages” (Jackson, 2011, p. 43). They include, for example, “advancing a more nuanced view of the threat allegedly posed by Muslims in Britain” or promoting “an openly violent, extreme right-wing set of messages” (Jackson, 2011, p. 43). Although Jackson finds some level of connection between the content on new media and offline activity, the question of the relationship between the online and off-line dimensions of populism is largely still open.

### **Citizens and Populism**

In the main, the UK literature focuses on identifying the supporters of, and on explaining voter support for, minor populist parties in the European parliamentary elections and in local government elections, especially in 2004 and 2009 (Borisyuk et al., 2007; Ford, 2010; Goodwin, 2014; John & Margetts, 2009; Whitaker & Lynch, 2011). Only a few studies look at support and supporters outside elections (Bartlett & Littler, 2011; Ford & Goodwin, 2010, 2014; Goodwin, Ford, Duffy, & Robey, 2010; Webb & Bale, 2014). The media-effects dimension is glaring in its absence, and within the parameters of our search, we could find no studies that examined the effects of populist messages on citizens’ emotions, knowledge, and perceptions. That

said, there is one study that examines the impact of the press on citizens' support for populist parties (Ford & Goodwin, 2010). The rest of this section provides an overview of the findings of the UK literature.

Most of the studies seek to explain support for UKIP and the British National Party. By contrast, only a few studies focused on the EDL (see Bartlett & Littler, 2011; Goodwin et al., 2014) and on the Respect Party (Borisjuk et al., 2007).

These studies provide important insights into supporter demographics and the attitudes of supporters of populist political parties. Supporters of UKIP, the British National Party, and the EDL are in the majority white and male (Bartlett & Littler, 2011; Ford & Goodwin, 2010, 2014; Goodwin et al., 2010, 2014; Whitaker & Lynch, 2011). UKIP and BNP supporters tend to be older or elderly (over 55) (Borisjuk et al., 2007; Whitaker & Lynch, 2011) or middle aged (Ford, 2010; Ford & Goodwin, 2010; Ford et al., 2012), whereas EDL supporters are young—72% are under 30 (Bartlett

& Littler, 2011). Research shows Respect Party supporters tend “to be concentrated in areas where the Muslim population is larger and where other ethnic groups are also located” and can also be “left of center” (Borisjuk et al., 2007, p. 674).

The studies reveal that BNP supporters are mainly manual working class (Borisjuk, et al., 2007; Ford, 2010; Ford & Goodwin, 2010, 2014; Goodwin et al., 2010; Rhodes, 2009, 2011), whereas UKIP supporters are mainly skilled working class (Ford et al., 2012) or professionals (Whitaker & Lynch, 2011). A large proportion of EDL supporters are unemployed (Bartlett & Littler, 2011). The majority of the supporters of UKIP, the British National Party, and the EDL have few educational qualifications, with few educated beyond the age of 16 (Bartlett & Littler, 2011; Ford & Goodwin, 2010, 2014; Goodwin et al., 2010, 2014). Some studies distinguish between core supporters and those who vote for these parties for other reasons, such as fear of immigrants (Ford et al., 2012; Kellner, 2009). Ford et al., (2012) note, for example, that UKIP core supporters are likely to be more working class, more likely to live in the south, and more xenophobic and racist than strategic supporters.

Support for UKIP is mainly focused in the South and the Midlands (Ford et al., 2012), whereas support for the BNP has been mainly in the declining industrial towns of the North (Ford, 2010; Ford & Goodwin, 2010, 2014) and in economically deprived urban areas of Wales (Goodwin & Harris, 2013). EDL supporters live in or near the large conurbations in the United Kingdom (Bartlett & Littler, 2011). At the level of the council ward, support for UKIP and the BNP is concentrated in traditionally conservative wards

The United Kingdom 173  
(Borisjuk, et al., 2007) and wards with high levels of immigrants (Ford & Goodwin, 2010). Borisjuk et al. (2007, p. 674) note that the Respect Party's support “was most keenly observed in London, where the party captured more than one in five votes in two of the city's boroughs.”

As noted, supporters of these parties tend to be dissatisfied with the main political parties (Ford et al., 2012; Rhodes, 2009; Whitaker & Lynch, 2011) and are cynical about, and distrusting of, the political establishment (Bartlett & Litter, 2011; Hayton, 2010). UKIP and BNP supporters

view each other's party favorably (Hayton, 2010; John & Margetts, 2009; Whitaker & Lynch, 2011). UKIP supporters tend to have a conservative family background (Ford et al., 2012) or to be socially conservative (Webb & Bale, 2014). EDL supporters viewed the BNP most favorably and voted for right-wing parties (Bartlett & Littler, 2011; Goodwin et al., 2014). Borisjuk et al. (2007) observe an inverse relationship between support of UKIP and the Respect Party: "[W]here one party did relatively well, the other performed relatively poorly" (p. 677). The most important issue of concern for supporters of UKIP and the BNP was immigration, followed by the European Union (Ford & Goodwin, 2010, 2014; Ford et al., 2012; Goodwin & Harris, 2014; Whitaker & Lynch, 2011), while for EDL supporters, it was Islam and Muslims (Bartlett & Littler, 2011; Goodwin, et al., 2014). Whitaker and Lynch (2011) note that these attitudes are more important in explaining support for populist parties than demographic factors.

Some studies provided information about the media consumption patterns of these parties' supporters. Supporters of UKIP, the EDL, and the BNP are more likely than the electorate at large to read a right-wing tabloid newspaper (the Daily Mail, Express, Sun, Star) than a broadsheet newspaper (Ford et al., 2012; Goodwin et al., 2014; Kellner, 2009). Other research suggests, in turn, that tabloid readers are most positive toward populist parties and broadsheet readers are more negative (Widfeldt & Brandenburg, 2013).

Only one study sought to determine if there was any kind of media effect. Ford and Goodwin, (2010) tested to see if there is a priming effect of negative media coverage of immigrants, asylum seekers, and Muslims on readers of the Daily Mail, the Express, and the Sun. They found that "readers of these papers are more likely to support the BNP even after controlling for their social characteristics" (2010, p. 15). They note, while it is possible that this is a selection effect, with xenophobic voters attracted to papers that reflect their views, this finding suggests that high-profile, anti-immigrant campaigns such as those appearing in these newspapers could promote support for the extreme right, a finding mirrored in studies of ERP [extreme right populist] support elsewhere in Europe.

(Ford and Goodwin, 2010, p. 15)

174 James Stanyer, Cristina Archetti, and Lone Sorensen

### **Summary and Recent Developments**

Empirical research on populist political actors in the United Kingdom shows that they share certain stylistic traits, such as drawing contrasts between the elite and the people, anti-system challenges, and the use of simplistic, emotional language. Right-wing populists also seek to construct out-groups. Some of these traits can be seen in the communication of mainstream parties. Different electoral strategies, however, make large mainstream parties select different tools from the populist communication toolbox than small populist parties. No studies have yet investigated factors such as party size or position of power to enable a distinction between populist and other small-party types. Future research should include comparative studies with a systemic basis to investigate the relationship between media, political systems, and populist communication.

Overall studies on populism and the media focus on (a) how the media, especially the press, cover populist groups and the themes associated with them (typically racism or Islamophobia) and (b) the engagement of media outlets in populist communication and the use of the Internet, particularly social media. Such studies, however, do not explore the media/populism link across the whole spectrum of parties and media outlets. Furthermore, the few European comparative studies are descriptive rather than explanatory of national or regional differences.

Research on citizens and populism shows that supporters of populist parties share many demographic and attitudinal features. The supporters of UKIP, the EDL, and the BNP are mainly white, male, working class, politically conservative, and middle-aged or older, with limited educational qualifications. They are concerned mainly with immigration, the European Union, and Islam and are dissatisfied with the existing parties and the political establishment. Supporters of the Respect Party, however, are from ethnic minority communities in urban areas or are left-of-center politically. Few studies explored the impact of populist media messages on citizens, and those that did have not shed much light on this matter. These areas are important for future research in the United Kingdom.

### **References**

- Akkerman, T. (2011). Friend or foe? Right-wing populism and the popular press in Britain and the Netherlands. *Journalism*, 12(8), 1–15.
- Albertazzi, D., & Mueller, D. (2013). Populism and liberal democracy: Populists in government in Austria, Italy, Poland and Switzerland. *Government and Opposition*, 48(3), 343–371.
- Ansari, H. (2012). Islamophobia and the British National Party: A commentary. In H. Ansari & F. Hafez (Eds.), *From the far right to the mainstream: Islamophobia in party politics and the media* (pp. 154–184). Birkach, Germany: CPI.
- Atkins, J., & Finlayson, A. (2013). "... A 40-year-old black man made the point to me": Everyday knowledge and the performance of leadership in contemporary British politics. *Political Studies*, 61(1), 161–177.
- The United Kingdom 175
- Atton, C. (2006). Far-right media on the Internet: Culture, discourse and power. *New Media and Society*, 8(4), 573–587.
- Baggini, J. (2013). A very British populism. In C. Fieschi, M. Morris, & L. Cabarello (Eds.), *Populist fantasies: European revolts in context* (pp. 27–32). London, UK: Counterpoint.
- Bale, T. (2013). More and more restrictive—but not always populist: Explaining variation in the British conservative party's stance on immigration and asylum. *Journal of Contemporary European Studies*, 21(1), 25–37.
- Bale, T., van Kessel, S., & Taggart, P. (2011). Thrown around with abandon? Popular understandings of populism as conveyed by the print media. *Acta Politica*, 46(2), 111–131.
- Bartlett, J. (2014). Populism, social media and democratic strain. In G. Lodge & G. Gottfried (Eds.), *Democracy in Britain: Essays in honour of James Cornford* (pp. 91–96). London, UK: Institute for Public Policy Research.
- Bartlett, J., & Littler, M. (2011). *Inside the EDL: Populist politics in a digital age*. London, UK: Demos.
- Bates, D. (2012). Workers of the world disunite the media: 'Race' and the politics of national identity. *Fifth Estate Online: The International Journal of Radical Mass*

Media Criticism. Retrieved from <http://independent.academia.edu/DavidBates>.

Borisjuk, G., Rallings, C., Thrasher, M., & van der Kolk, H. (2007). Voter support for minor parties: Assessing the social and political context of voting at the 2004 European elections in Greater London. *Party Politics*, 13(6), 669–693.

Blumler, J. G., & Kavanagh, D. (1999). The third age of political communication: Influences and features. *Political Communication*, 16(3), 209–230.

Cardo, V. (2014). Celebrity politics and political representation: The case of George Galloway MP on Celebrity Big Brother. *British Politics*, 9(2), 146–160.

Clark, A., Bottom, K., & Copus, C. (2008). More similar than they'd like to admit? Ideology, policy and populism in the trajectories of the British National Party and Respect. *British Politics*, 3, 511–534.

Copsey, N., & Macklin, G. (2011). 'THE MEDIA=LIES, LIES, LIES!' The BNP and the media in contemporary Britain. In N. Copsey & G. Macklin (Eds.), *British National Party: Contemporary perspectives* (pp. 81–102). Abington, UK: Routledge.

Crines, A. S. (2013). An analysis of George Galloway's oratorical and rhetorical impact. *Politics*, 33(2), 81–90.

Eatwell, R. (2004). The extreme right in Britain: The long road to modernisation. In R. Eatwell & C. Mudde (Eds.), *Western democracies and the new extreme right challenge*. London, UK: Routledge.

Edwards, G. O. (2012). A comparative discourse analysis of the construction of "in-groups" in the 2005 and 2010 manifestos of the British National Party. *Discourse and Society*, 23(3), 245–258.

Fella, S. (2008). Britain: Imperial legacies, institutional constraints and new political opportunities. In D. Albertazzi & D. McDonnell (Eds.), *Twenty-first century populism: The spectre of Western European democracy* (pp. 181–197). Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.

Fieschi, C., & Heywood, P. (2004). Trust, cynicism and populist anti-politics. *Journal of Political Ideologies*, 9(3), 289–309.

Ford, R., (2010). Who might vote for the BNP? Survey evidence of the electoral potential of the extreme right in Britain. In R. Eatwell & M. J. Goodwin (Eds.), *The new extremism in 21st century Britain* (pp. 145–168). London, UK: Routledge.

176 James Stanier, Cristina Archetti, and Lone Sorensen

Ford, R., & Goodwin, M. J. (2010). Angry white men: Individual and contextual predictors of support for the British National Party. *Political Studies*, 58(1), 1–25.

Ford, R. & Goodwin, M. J. (2014). *Revolt on the right: Explaining support for the radical right in Britain*. London, UK: Routledge.

Ford, R., Goodwin M. J., & Cutts, D. (2012). Strategic Eurosceptics and polite xenophobes: Support for the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) in the 2009 European Parliament elections. *European Journal of Political Research*, 51(2), 204–234.

Gifford, C. (2006). The rise of post-imperial populism: The case of right-wing Euroscepticism in Britain. *European Journal of Political Research*, 45(5), 851–869.

Goodwin, M. J. (2011). *New British fascism: The rise of the British National Party*.

London, UK: Routledge.

Goodwin, M. J. (2014). Forever a false dawn? Explaining the electoral collapse of the British National Party. *Parliamentary Affairs*, 67(4), 887–906.

Goodwin, M. J., Cutts, D., & Janta-Lipinski, L. (2014). Economic losers, protestors, islamophobes or xenophobes? Predicting public support for a counter-Jihad movement. *Political Studies*. 19 August. Retrieved from <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/>.

Goodwin, M. J., Ford, R., Duffy, B., & Robey, B. (2010). Who votes extreme right in 21st century Britain? The social basis of support for the National Front and British National Party. In R. Eatwell & M. J. Goodwin (Eds.), *The new extremism in 21st century Britain* (pp. 191–210). London, UK: Routledge.

Goodwin, M. J. & Harris, G. (2013). Rallying intolerance in the valleys: Explaining support for the extreme right in Wales. *British Politics*, 8, 433–456.

Hayton, R. (2010). Towards the mainstream? UKIP and the 2009 elections to the European Parliament. *Politics*, 30(1), 26–35.

Hoggett, P., Wilkinson, H., & Beedell, P. (2013). Fairness and the politics of resentment. *Journal of Social Policy*, 42(3), 567–585.

John, P., & Margetts, H. (2009). Latent support for the extreme right in British politics. *West European Politics*, 32(3), 496–513.

Jackson, P. (2011). The English Defense League's "new far right" rhetoric and the new media. In P. Jackson & M. Feldman (Eds.), *The EDL: Britain's "new far right" social movement* (pp. 30–43). Northampton, UK: The University of Northampton.

Jagers, J., & Walgrave, S. (2007). Populism as political communication style: An empirical study of political parties' discourse in Belgium. *European Journal of Political Research*, 46(3), 319–345.

Kellner, P. (2009). Britain's oddest election? *The Political Quarterly*, 80(4), 469–478.

Kim, G., Rademakers, J., Sanchez, M., & Van Vucht, W. (2013). Online activity of the English Defense League. Retrieved from Digital Methods Initiative website: <https://www.digitalmethods.net/CounterJihadism/ProjectGroup2>.

Mammone, A. (2009). The eternal return? Faux populism and contemporarization of neo-fascism across Britain, France and Italy. *Journal of Contemporary European Studies*, 17(2), 171–192.

Moffitt, B., & Tormey, S. (2014). Rethinking populism: Politics, mediatisation and political style. *Political Studies*, 62(2), 381–397.

Oaten, A. (2014). The cult of the victim: An analysis of the collective identity of the English Defence League. *Patterns of Prejudice*, 48(4), 331–349.

O'Callaghan, D., Greene, D., Conway, M., Carthy, J., & Cunningham, P. (2013). An analysis of interactions within and between extreme right communities in social media. *Ubiquitous Social Media Analysis*, 8329, 88–107.

The United Kingdom 177

Painter, A. (2013). *Democratic stress, the populist signal and extremist threat*. London,

UK: Policy Network.

Pupcenoks, J., & McCabe, R. (2013). The Rise of the fringe: Right wing populists, Islamists and politics in the UK. *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, 33(2), 171–84.

Rhodes, J. (2009). The political breakthrough of the BNP: The case of Burnley. *British*

- Politics, 4(1), 22–46.
- Rhodes, J. (2011). “It’s not just them, it’s Whites as well”: Whiteness, class and BNP support. *Sociology*, 45(1), 102–117.
- Rooduijn, M., de Lange, S., & van der Brug, W. (2014). A populist zeitgeist? Programmatic contagion by populist parties in Western Europe. *Party Politics*, 20(4), 563–575.
- Rooduijn, M., & Pauwels, T. (2011). Measuring populism: Comparing two methods of content analysis. *West European Politics*, 34(6), 1272–1283.
- Stanyer, J. (2007). *Modern political communication: Mediated politics in uncertain times*. Cambridge, UK: Polity.
- Startin, N. (2014). Contrasting fortunes, differing futures? The rise (and fall) of the Front National and the British National Party. *Modern & Contemporary France*, 22(3), 277–299.
- Taggart, P. (2000). *Populism*. Buckingham, UK: Open University Press.
- Wayne, M., & Murray, C. (2009). UK television news: Monopoly politics and cynical populism. *Television and New Media*, 10(5), 416–433.
- Webb, P., & Bale, T. (2014). Why do Tories defect to UKIP? Conservative party members and the temptations of the populist radical right. *Political Studies*, 62(4), 961–970.
- Whitaker, R., & Lynch, P. (2011). Explaining support for the UK Independence Party at the 2009 European Parliament elections. *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties*, 21(3), 359–379.
- Widfeldt, A., & Brandenburg, H. (2013, September). The Populist beauty and the fascist beast?: Comparing the support bases of UKIP and the BNP. Paper presented at the Elections, Public Opinion and Parties Conference, Lancaster, UK: Lancaster University.
- Wodak, R., & KhosraviNik, M. (2013). Dynamics of discourse and politics in right-wing populism in Europe and beyond: An introduction. In R. Wodak, M. KhosraviNik, & B. Mral (Eds.), *Right-wing populism in Europe: Politics and discourse*. (pp. xix–xxvii). London, UK: Bloomsbury