

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Connecting city and countryside: migration and decolonisation in Algiers, Casablanca, Hanoi and Saigon.

Lier ville et campagne : migrations et décolonisation à Alger, Casablanca, Hanoi et Saigon

Introduction

Much academic interest has focused on colonial migrations to Metropolitan France, notably to explain the way in which the relatively less constrained political space of the metropolis as opposed to the colonial theatre served as an important factor in the rise of anticolonial movements between the 1920s and 1950s.[1] However, greater numbers of socio-economic migrants remained within their own colonial territories during the first half of the twentieth century. This seldom-recognised but central element within the history of decolonisation underlines the profound consequences of colonial rule in the countryside creating such migration. It also reminds us of the importance of the social, economic and political role played by accelerated internal migrations towards large imperial 'showcase' cities such as Algiers, Casablanca, Hanoi and Saigon, on which this comparative article focuses.

This essay shows how, from the 1920s until the respective dates of independence in these territories (Indochina 1954, Morocco 1956, Algeria 1962), rural-to-urban migration brought fundamental transformations to Algiers, Casablanca, Hanoi and Saigon, especially since the wars of independence in Vietnam (1946-1954) and Algeria (1954-1962) generated vastly accelerated refugee flows alongside existing and continuing economic migrations. This presence of migrants in late-colonial cities greatly reworked existing forms of socio-ethnic segregation and also saw the redrawing of the cities' political geography. During the struggle for independence, anti-colonial movements then used migration and ethnic segregation as a key resource. This led to considerable intervention by colonial authorities, who attempted to re-impose colonial 'order' by regulating urban space and controlling who moved and lived

[1] Benjamin Stora, *Nationalistes algériens et révolutionnaires français au temps du Front populaire*, Paris, L'Harmattan, 1987; *Ils venaient d'Algérie : l'immigration algérienne en France, 1912-1992*, Paris, Fayard, 1992; Claude Liauzu, *Aux origines des tiers-mondismes : colonisés et anticolonialistes en France, 1919-1939*, Paris, L'Harmattan, 1982.

where, and, during the struggles for independence, by clamping down on pro-independence political activities.[2]

Indeed, this article's central thesis is that mobility between countryside and city, and, at times, within urban contexts themselves, became a key site of struggle between colonial authorities and local populations. Throughout, this article highlights an evolving relationship between on the one hand, poor, often newly-arrived city-dwellers and anti-colonial movements and, on the other, the colonial state and city councils. All of these actors, it is argued, adopted avowedly spatial tactics.

The 'spatial turn' in colonial history, drawing notably on the work of Ann Laura Stoler and Frederic Cooper, has done much to draw our attention to the circuits and networks of actors, from colonial migrants to administrators, who moved across colonial territories or indeed empires and the ideas they carried.[3] This important contribution, with its inbuilt comparative approach and attention to the different scales of analysis that shift from the local to the global, has usefully highlighted policy, for example through the ways in which colonial urbanism, architecture, public hygiene and military strategy (to name but these areas), drew on examples or counter-examples from other colonial contexts (or elsewhere) as well as Metropolitan France.[4]

Internal displacements, in the form of migrations within the same colonial territory, nevertheless provide a further meaningful comparative scale through which to analyse the long-term effects of colonisation and the process of decolonisation. This article argues that a productive combination of both 'bottom-up' and 'top-down' perspectives on mobility, reflected in the wide variety of sources used, can provide a novel perspective on the colonial

[2] See Janet L. Abu-Lughod, *Rabat. Urban Apartheid in Morocco* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980); Philippe Papin, *Histoire de Hanoi*, Paris, Fayard, 2001; Philippe Franchini (dir.), *Saigon 1925-1945. De la « Belle colonie » à l'éclosion révolutionnaire ou la fin des dieux blancs*, Paris, Autrement, 1993; Zeynep Çelik, *Urban Forms and Colonial Confrontations. Algiers under French Rule* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997).

[3] Frederick Cooper and Ann Laura Stoler, *Tensions of Empire. Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1997).

[4] Gwendolyn Wright, *The Politics of Design in French Colonial Urbanism* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1991); Paul Rabinow, *French Modern. Norms and Forms of the Social Environment* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989); Olivier Le Cour Grandmaison, *L'Empire des hygiénistes. Vivre aux colonies*, Paris, Fayard, 2014.

situation, its attendant unequal power relations,[5] and how local people experienced and challenged these constraints both informally and within organised political movements.

Such comparisons can also be more meaningful by including both socio-economic and political history, as well as city and countryside, within the same analytical framework.[6] For example, from the 1930s onwards, colonial officials, many fearful of the possible social and political consequences of modernisation and urbanisation, often represented internal migrants in cities as an amorphous 'mass' subjected to social *anomie* since they were deemed to have lost their rural sociability while having yet to fully integrate urban life.[7] Similar judgements were also made by analysts critical of the colonial situation. This reading was eloquently captured by what Abdelmalek Sayad, the eminent sociologist of Algerian migration in France, later called 'la double absence', where the migrant was physically distant from their home region (Algeria) while not fully integrated into the society into which they had migrated (France).[8]

Drawing on Sayad's insights into the ways in which migrants related to both their new location and their place(s) of socialisation, this article argues that many migrants who remained within the colonial theatre, through the close links they could more easily maintain with home regions, were able to simultaneously operate in both rural and urban contexts on socio-economic and political levels. In so doing, they displayed a form of 'double présence'[9] that was also a form of political agency. We therefore need to go beyond the idea of there being a clear-cut separation or 'opposition' between city and countryside and, instead, examine the evolving close connections or 'symbiosis' between urban and rural

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[5] Georges Balandier, « La Situation coloniale: approche théorique », *Cahiers internationaux de Sociologie*, 1951/11, p .44-79.

[6] Here, see Benjamin Stora, *Le nationalisme algérien avant 1954*, Paris, CNRS Éditions, 2010, p. 187-220.

[7] For such an approach from a colonial official, see Robert Montagne, *Naissance du prolétariat marocain*, Paris, Peyronnet, 1950. For a different political perspective that nonetheless underlines migrants' problems of socio-economic integration, see Pierre Bourdieu and Abdelmalek Sayad, *Le Déracinement. La Crise de l'agriculture traditionnelle en Algérie*, Paris, Minuit, 1964.

[8] Abdelmalek Sayad, *L'immigration ou les paradoxes de l'altérité*, Brussels, De Boeck Wesmael, 1991; *La double absence. Des illusions de l'émigré aux souffrances de l'immigré*, Paris, Seuil, 1999.

[9] Annie Rey-Goldzeiguer has described a 'double résidence' for newly-arrived migrants in Algiers (*Aux origines de la guerre d'Algérie 1940-1945*, Paris, La Découverte, 2006, p. 161).

environments, as Christopher E. Goscha has suggested for Vietnam.[10] Indeed, being a migrant may have contributed to the 'nationalisation' of political consciousness, since displacement brought different regional groups into close contact in urban contexts that often displayed colonial inequality in particularly intense ways, and to which migrants brought a new, comparative gaze. In such situations, new solidarities and identifications could be fostered.[11]

To be sure, the three territorial contexts were different. A settler colony, Algeria formed an integral part of the French Republic, and was under direct French rule for much longer than Morocco and to a lesser extent Indochina, with conquest having begun in 1830.[12] A French Protectorate (with local political leaders remaining putatively influential), colonial Indochina (covering today's Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos) came under French control from 1858 onwards.[13] Like Indochina, the French Protectorate of Morocco (1912-1956) saw relatively limited European settler migrations in relation to Algeria. However, both Morocco and Indochina were politically important territories with considerable French economic interests.[14] This economic role, as in Algeria, gave rise to considerable and accelerated internal migrations, which this article examines before moving on to explore the indirect urban consequences of these migrations in spatial and social terms so as to better examine the key role of internal migrants as actors in pro-independence movements, showing the overtly political consequences of population displacement.

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[10] Christopher E. Goscha, 'Colonial Hanoi and Saigon at War: Social Dynamics of the Viet Minh's 'Underground City'', *War in History*, vol. 20, no.2 (2013), p. 222-250, here p. 245.

[11] For the comparative gaze of the migrant, see Abdelmalek Sayad, 'Nationalisme et émigration', in (same author), *La Double absence*, *op. cit.*, p. 135-159 (cf. note 8).

[12] See Charles-Robert Ageron, (1979) *Histoire de l'Algérie contemporaine*, Paris, PUF, 1979; Daniel Rivet, *Le Maghreb à l'épreuve de la colonisation*, Paris, Hachette, 2002.

[13] This article focusses on Vietnam, made up of Tonkin (Hanoi), Cochin China (Saigon, today Ho Chi Minh City), and Annam. Cochinchina was under direct French rule, whereas Tonkin and Annam were under indirect rule. See Pierre Brocheux and Daniel Hémery, *Indochine : la colonisation ambiguë, 1858-1954*, Paris, La Découverte, 2001 (1ère édition 1994).

[14] See Brocheux and Hémery, *Ibid.*; René Gallissot, *Le Patronat européen au Maroc (1931-1942)*, Eddif, Casablanca, 1990 (1ère édition 1964); Daniel Lefeuvre, *Chère Algérie. La France et sa colonie 1930-1962*, Paris, Flammarion, 2005.

Like the processes of colonisation and consolidation of colonial rule, the forms taken by these struggles for independence were also far from identical. Nevertheless, here again, we also find similarities.[15] In Morocco, there was an increasingly close identification between the main pro-independence nationalist movement, the *Istiqlāl* ('independence'), and the ruler Mohamed Ben Youssef, whose exiling by the French in August 1953 largely triggered the shift to violent opposition to colonial rule in the form of an urban guerrilla (1953-56) and, only in the last year of colonial rule (1955-56), the formation of a rural-based Moroccan Liberation Army (*Armée de libération marocaine*) based mainly in the northern, Spanish-ruled zone.[16]

In Algeria, a war lasting over seven years (1954-1962) pitched an initially makeshift and unknown *Front de libération nationale* (FLN) against the French army in mostly indirect guerrilla-style conflict in both urban and rural contexts involving widespread suffering and the spreading of the violence to Metropolitan France.[17] In Vietnam, as with Algerian nationalism, there were considerable tensions between those challenging French rule as well as an armed conflict (1946-1954) between the main Vietnamese pro-independence movement, the communist *Viet-Minh* (created in 1941), and the French state: here again, the independence war had considerable ramifications on everyday life for millions of people. In Vietnam, as in Algeria and Morocco, the French state sought to reassert colonial control after the political, military and symbolic defeat of France to Germany in 1940 (and, in Vietnam, due to Japanese control in 1945) that had severely weakened its hand, but from which France initially recovered. In Vietnam, the French seized back control of Saigon (1945) and then

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[15] On these comparative aspects, see Benjamin Stora, *Algérie, Maroc : Histoire parallèles, destins croisés*, Paris, Maisonneuve et Larose, 2002; *Imaginaires de guerre. Les images dans les guerres d'Algérie et du Vietnam*, Paris, La Découverte, 2004.

[16] On the struggle for independence in Morocco, see Mohammed Zade, *Résistance et Armée de Libération au Maroc (1947-1956)*, Rabat, Haut Commissariat aux Anciens Résistants et Anciens Membres de l'Armée de Libération, 2006; Daniel Rivet, *Le Maghreb à l'épreuve*, *op.cit*. (cf. note 12).

[17] See Sylvie Thénault, *Histoire de la guerre d'indépendance algérienne*, Paris, Flammarion, 2012 (first ed. 2005); Gilbert Meynier, *Histoire intérieure du FLN, 1954-1962*, Paris, Fayard, 2002. The armed wing of the FLN was called the *Armée de libération nationale*.

Hanoi (1947) from Ho Chi Minh's Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, declared in 1945), in the latter city after a highly violent conflict.[18]

In all three contexts, the ensuing asymmetry between opposition and colonial armed forces led to guerrilla war. This much-neglected but fundamental similarity involved dense relations between city and countryside within the four cities, as well as a deliberate policy of internationalisation, as anti-colonial movements appealed to the United Nations and world opinion to defeat the French diplomatically and politically, if not militarily.[19] Consequently, Algiers, Casablanca, Hanoi and Saigon became 'showcase' cities at the international level not just as centres of French colonial power, but wherever possible, also for the anti-colonial resistance. Migrations would play a significant role in all these developments.

Comparing the causes and nature of internal colonial migrations

Turning, firstly, to the causes of colonial migrations, we see some similarities across the three territories, all of which witnessed rural impoverishment under colonialism and a fundamental transformation of the spatial, economic and social dynamics. The conquest of local societies and then consolidation of colonial power relations, influenced existing migratory patterns and processes across Algeria, Vietnam and Morocco in complex ways. Writing of Algeria, but in terms that also applied to Morocco and, to a certain extent Vietnam, Marc Côte described transformations produced by colonialism that restructured and dislocated physical space, land use and rural ways of life, changes that produced migration into the cities. In Algeria, the growth of coastal cities such as Algiers and Oran shifted the balance of power away from the interior.[20] In Morocco, the colonial relation produced new urban and regional hierarchies as Casablanca became a migrant hub because the Protectorate constructed that city as the

[18] Christopher Goscha, *Vietnam. Un État né de la guerre 1945-1954*, Paris, Armand Colin, 2011 (trans. Agathe Larcher).

[19] On these international dimensions, see Christopher Goscha, *Ibid.*, p. 368-419; Meynier, *Histoire intérieure*, *op.cit.*, pp. 549-634 (cf. note 17); David Stenner, 'Networking for Independence: The Moroccan Nationalist Movement and its Global Campaign against French Colonialism', *Journal of North African Studies*, vol.17, no.4 (2012), p. 573-594.

[20] Marc Côte, *L'Algérie ou l'espace retourné*, Constantine, Media-Plus, 1993.

country's economic capital and relegated Fez and Marrakech, politically and economically.[21] In Vietnam, French rule encouraged urban primacy, slowly diminishing the significance of rural life.[22]

Analysing the main causes of internal migration in colonial Vietnam, Ngô Viňh Long highlights the combined problems of land appropriation, concession and usurpation that were also found in Algeria and Morocco. Some of this land was given to loyal Vietnamese supporters of French rule or French settlers.[23] In many instances, poor local people were forced off their own and / or communal land. Again as in colonial Morocco and Algeria, in Vietnam new forms of indirect colonial rule altered local power relations, allowing for considerable abuses by rural political and economic elites that many sought to flee. Similarly, with increasing pressure on land, and population growth, there was a larger proportion of small landholders who could not produce enough food, let alone cover other expenses.[24] Other peasants were entirely without land, with southern Cochinchina having the largest percentage of landless peasants in Vietnam in the late 1930s.[25] As in Algeria and Morocco, many people in Vietnam became tenant farmers, sharecroppers or agricultural wage labourers and lived increasingly precariously, with high rents, taxes, and loans contracted at exorbitant rates. In addition to poverty, periodic famines, such as those in northern Vietnam in 1944-1945, sent starving families into Hanoi.[26]

However, initially, people remained on the land more in Vietnam than in Morocco and, in particular, Algeria. How should we account for this? Before the late 1940s, migration in

[21] See André Adam, *Casablanca. Essai sur la transformation de la société marocaine au contact de l'Occident*, Paris, Éditions du CNRS, 1968; Janet L. Abu-Lughod, *Rabat*, *op.cit.*, p. 33-34 (cf. note 2).

[22] Brocheux and Hémery, *Indochine*, *op.cit.* (cf. note 13).

[23] Ngô Viňh Long, *Before the Revolution. The Vietnamese peasants under the French* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1973), p. 19, 14-15.

[24] On the impact of colonial rule in Algeria, see Didier Guignard, *L'abus du pouvoir dans l'Algérie coloniale*, Nanterre, Presses universitaires de Paris Ouest, 2010. For Morocco, see Mohamed Salahdine, *Maroc : tribus, makhzen et colons. Essai d'histoire économique et sociale*, Paris, L'Harmattan, 1986

[25] Ngô Viňh Long, *Before the Revolution*, *op.cit.*, p.28 (cf. note 23).

[26] See William S. Turley, "Urbanization in War: Hanoi, 1946-1973", *Pacific Affairs*, vol. 48, no. 3, (1975), p. 370-397, here p. 373. Both Algiers and Casablanca also saw in-migration due to the 1945 famines.

Vietnam was not mainly one of rural to urban areas: rural-to-urban migration was only one aspect amongst several, due to insufficient industrial infrastructure in most Vietnamese cities for mass migration there.[27] In contrast, Algiers and especially Casablanca had a larger industrial if not commercial base in relation to Saigon and Hanoi. However, in both Algiers and Casablanca, employment opportunities were often overstated, even under the latter city's accelerated growth, and unemployment and underemployment caused a crisis of income amongst the poorest, just as those who were fully employed were usually relegated to the lowest-paid jobs. In all contexts in fact, there was urbanisation with only relatively limited industrialisation. Contemporary European writers often underlined the supposed attractiveness of the large colonial city, overstating the 'pull' factors, perhaps since this minimised socio-economic poverty in rural areas.[28]

Furthermore, Algiers and Casablanca especially constituted not just regional but also national destinations for both temporary and permanent, 'single' and family migration from the 1920s onwards. In both Algiers and Casablanca, strong regional migratory networks emerged, affecting where migrants worked and lived in the city.[29] However, in Vietnam, some of the industrial development (mines, plantations) that did attract migrant labour from the north, was situated in rural areas. Official French encouragements directed at Vietnamese during the 1930s to settle in other areas, ostensibly to reduce 'over-population' in the Red River Delta, proved largely unsuccessful. The colonial administration tied in identity documents (needed for travel) to taxation, and clamped down on the 'rootless' errant population, in effect limiting potential migration from the Red River Delta.[30]

In Morocco, outbreaks of typhus saw official attempts to block departures from the Moroccan south in the late 1920s, mid-1930s, and 1945, accompanied by 'round-ups' of poor

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[27] Andrew Hardy, *Red Hills. Migrants and the State in the Highlands of Vietnam* (Copenhagen: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies, 2003).

[28] See Robert Montagne, *Naissance*, *op.cit.* (cf. note 7); Robert Descloîtres, Claudine Descloîtres and Jean-Claude Reverdy, *L'Algérie des bidonvilles. Le tiers-monde dans la cite*, Paris, Mouton, 1961; Rachid Sidi Boumedine, 'Présentation et commentaire' in Jean Pelletier, *Alger 1955. Essai d'une géographie sociale*, Algiers, Apic, 2015, pp. 11-79.

[29] See Robert Montagne, *Naissance*, *op.cit.* (cf. note 7). On Algeria, see Robert Descloîtres, Claudine Descloîtres and Jean-Claude Reverdy, *L'Algérie*, *op.cit.* (cf. note 28).

[30] Andrew Hardy, *Red Hills*, *op. cit.*, p. 118-119 (cf. note 27).

Moroccans in Casablanca, some of whom were sent back 'home', often under the pretext of public health, since the 'population flottante', as colonial officials called them, was a preoccupation here, as in Vietnam.[31] Yet, for Moroccan Protectorate officials, there was always a fine balance to be drawn between such public health and 'welfare' concerns and the need for a plentiful labour supply.[32] In Algiers, there were few such co-ordinated attempts to limit internal migrations before 1954, since the public hygiene discourse was less strong there, and because the authorities realised the high levels of investment needed to address unequal economic development and rural poverty.[33] In addition, the greater logistical difficulties of migration to Metropolitan France during World War Two had increased internal migrations in Algeria (as in Morocco).

With the war of independence in 1946-1954, migration in Vietnam then changed entirely in scale, accelerating existing migrations more spectacularly even than in Algeria, which, as we have seen, already had higher levels of rural-urban migration than Vietnam. Mass migration in Vietnam was generally due to conflict: in Algiers and Morocco on the other hand, such displacements were already commonplace for socio-economic reasons. In Vietnam, the causes of displacements shifted after 1945, as refugee migrations henceforth made up a large part of such movements. Now, migration became ever more national as well as regional. Hundreds of thousands of people left the Tonkin highlands during the war, and in 1952, the French military displaced 100,000 people from a zone located between Hanoi and Haiphong to prevent its use by the *Viet Minh*.[34] However, many of these migrations between 1945 and 1954 were to flee the cities such as Hanoi (1945-46) as opposed to move to them, although people returned to Hanoi once relative peace there was re-established, and in-migration to Saigon continued apace. In Morocco, by contrast, the conflict for independence was short-

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[31] Centre des Archives diplomatiques de Nantes, Protectorat du Maroc (hereafter CADN PM), Direction de l'Intérieur (hereafter DI), 621; 624; 626.

[32] For example, see CADN PM, DI 624, note from Direction des Affaires indigènes, 20 June 1933; CADN PM, Direction des Affaires Indigènes, 1MA/285/443, Rapport 70, Lieutenant De Kergaradec, *Le prolétariat indigène : les bidonvilles*, undated (1936 / 1937).

[33] On post-war poverty in Algiers, see Archives nationales d'Algérie (henceforth ANA), Santé publique, 376; 381.

[34] Andrew Hardy, *Red Hills*, *op. cit.*, p. 137-8 (cf. note 27).

lasting (1953-1956), with military operations occurring away from most main cities without largescale population displacement.

The Algerian war of independence thus represents the closest analogy with Vietnam regarding refugee migrations. Sayad and Bourdieu argued that this war simply accelerated a deep-rooted phenomenon of colonial dislocation (*déracinement*), rather than creating it from scratch.[35] In Algeria, the French military recognized (as in Vietnam) that the flight of over one million people to the cities, where a less dangerous environment usually existed, was caused by military operations from 1955.[36] Such tactics involved the creation of *zones interdites*, punitive destruction of villages, forced relocation to *camps de regroupement*, and brought evident economic consequences.[37] The Plan Challe military offensive (1959-1961), seeking to weaken the FLN militarily as negotiations loomed with the French state to end the conflict, produced further waves of refugee migrations into Algiers, increasing employment difficulties.[38]

In Algiers, these refugee arrivals, part of individual and collective survival strategies, often congregated in the suburban shantytowns, where there was less surveillance than in the central city, which was already full. For example, the shantytown population in suburban Maison-Carrée (today El-Harrāch) more than doubled between 1958 and 1960.[39] After 1955, the military authorities in Algiers regularly discussed forcing refugees back to their home regions, but any large-scale measures were generally considered unwise logistically,

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[35] Pierre Bourdieu and Abdelmalek Sayad, *Le Déracinement*, *op.cit.* (cf. note 7).

[36] Guy Pervillé, *Pour une histoire de la guerre d'Algérie, 1954-1962*, Paris, Picard, 2002, p. 248-9.

[37] Algiers Prefecture archives (henceforth AWA), SK84, Head of Algiers Sections administratives urbaines (*hereafter SAU*) to Secrétaire général at Algiers Prefecture, 28 December 1960. Created in 1957, the military SAU oversaw urban reform and security (see Grégor Mathias, « La Fin d'une rumeur : l'organisation des manifestations de décembre 1960 à Alger par les officiers des SAU d'Alger », in Jean-Charles Jauffret (dir.), *Des hommes et des femmes en guerre d'Algérie*, Paris, Autrement, 2003, p. 509-524). On the relocation camps, see Michel Cornaton, *Les Camps de regroupement de la guerre d'Algérie*, Paris, L'Harmattan, 2000 (1st edition 1967).

[38] See Pierre Bourdieu, Alain Darbel, Jean-Paul Rivert and Claude Seibel, *Travail et travailleurs en Algérie*, Paris, Mouton & Co., 1963, p. 451-557. Internecine conflict between and within nationalist movements also caused flight migration.

[39] Archives nationales d'outre-mer (hereafter ANOM), Aix-en-Provence, 2 SAS 65, Head of Maison-Carrée SAU, 23 January 1960.

psychologically and legally, and the administration's permit system designed to control mobility proved impossible to fully implement.[40]

In brief, until the early 1950s, migration within Vietnam (all causes considered) was not centrally one of rural to urban areas, with the exception of northern migrants heading to Saigon-Cho Lon:[41] in Vietnam, rural-to-urban migration stood alongside migration from one rural area to another. In all four contexts examined here, however, the city could be a place of refuge as part of survival strategies elaborated at family or village level in the face of famine, poverty, disease and conflict.

Migration and its socio-spatial consequences on the changing colonial city

The population increases in our respective cities are eloquent reminders of the entirely different scale and speed that in-migration displayed from the 1920s onwards: greater Algiers grew from 266,268 inhabitants in 1926 to 473,261 in 1948 to 570,086 in 1954, by which time (Muslim) Algerians had become a majority.[42] In Saigon-Cholon, the general population doubled from 249, 481 in 1911 to 500,000 in 1946.[43] Hanoi ville grew from 130,000 people in 1932 to 160,000 in 1940:[44] many peasants then came into Hanoi in 1945, with the

[40] ANOM, 1K875, Head of Belcourt SAU, report of 31 January 1958. See also ANOM, 2SAS/8.

[41] On this latter trend, see Christopher E. Goscha, "A 'Popular' Side to the Vietnamese Army. General Nguyen Binh and War in the South", in Christopher E. Goscha and Benoît de Tréglodé (dir.), *Naissance d'un État-Parti. Le Viêt Nam depuis 1945*, Paris, Les Indes Savantes, 2003, p. 325-353, here p.352.

[42] See Robert Descloîtres, Claudine Descloîtres and Jean-Claude Reverdy, *L'Algérie*, *op.cit.*, p. 79 (cf. note 28). In Casablanca, Hanoi and Saigon, Europeans were a distinct minority.

[43] Tâm Quach-Langlet, « Saigon, capital de la République du Sud Vietnam (1954-1975), ou une urbanisation sauvage », in P.-B. Lafont, *Péninsule indochinoise. Études urbaines*, 1991, p. 185-206, here p. 190.

[44] Philippe Papin, *Histoire des territoires de Hà-Nôi. Quartiers, villages et sociétés urbaines du XIXè au début du XXè siècle*, Paris, Les Indes savantes, 2013, p. 208.

population across the city rising to 350,000.[45] In Casablanca, the Muslim population grew from 52,134 in 1926 to 433,504 by 1950.[46]

Migration profoundly transformed urban space and its use. The ensuing housing crisis reveals how colonial authorities and wider European colonial society viewed such migrants and allows us to examine the subsequent intervention regarding who lived where in the colonial city. In turn, these policies would profoundly influence the forms and physical spaces of anti-colonial urban resistance.

The often limited incomes of migrant newcomers, alongside those of the existing city population, increased pressure on cheap accommodation in already overcrowded areas near the historic (pre-colonial) central cities. These factors encouraged recourse to informal housing, notably the shantytowns in Casablanca and Algiers, and the *paillotes* (wooden houses or grass / thatched huts) in Saigon and Hanoi, that the colonial authorities would deem problematic, yet would never entirely eradicate. In Casablanca and Algiers especially, this spatial redistribution within the city led to shantytowns coming to symbolise the impact of colonial dislocation, rural-to-urban migration and the housing problem.[47]

Yet the colonial authorities' attempts to regulate and control the city usually involved implicit 'compromise' for political, social and economic reasons: there was the city as planned by urbanists and politicians, and the city as envisaged by its residents. The colonial authorities' desire to separate residential urban space along ethnic lines – a policy often termed ethnic 'dualism' - was complicated by the reality that such space was always, to some degree, the result of interventions by a range of actors.[48] Here, migrants' residential strategies involved, in addition to cost, the need for proximity to work, and, often, links to wider migrant networks. The dynamic relations between city councils representing the Europeans'

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[45] Philippe Papin, *Histoire de Hanoi*, *op. cit*., p. 292-3 (cf. note 2).

[46] Archives nationales de France, Pierrefitte-sur-Seine, Centre des Hautes études sur l'Afrique et l'Asie modernes, 20000046/63, article 1712, Roger Maneville, 'Prolétariat et bidonvilles', p. 15. The Moroccan Protectorate distinguished between Moroccan Muslims, Moroccan Jews, and foreigners (mostly French).

[47] See André Adam, *Casablanca*, *op.cit.*, p. 49-68, 85-99 (cf. note 21); Rachid Sidi Boumedine, 'Présentation', *op.cit.* (cf. note 28).

[48] On ethnic dualism in a colonial context, see Janet L. Abu-Lughod, *Rabat*, *op.cit.* and Zeynep Çelik, *Urban Forms*, *op.cit.* (cf. both note 2).

economic and wider socio-political interests, and the priorities of European employers, constituted further factors, just as local landowners, property owners and landlords also co-produced urban space.[49]

Colonial policy regarding informal settlements generally navigated an unsteady course between tolerance, containment, improvement and reorganisation on the one hand, and eradication on the other. Authoritarian public hygiene and urban planning and, later, political and security considerations, were used to justify intervention that reworked or reproduced ethnic segregation, indirectly or directly: in the colonial situation, class and ethnicity were closely linked. European health, political and economic interests remained primary throughout when it came to dealing with the often vastly-underestimated urban growth that resulted from in-migrations, as French colonial urbanists refused to allot sufficient space to adequately house internal migrants.[50] The colonial state's apparently different logics of reform and repression, and the various types of urban 'legibility' and spatial intelligibility that they sought to affirm, were often interlinked:[51] the emphases placed on these considerations shifted over time, producing a fluctuating police 'mix'.

Hanoi presents an interesting case, since explicit colonial intervention in the built form largely precedes that in Morocco. Philippe Papin has shown how colonial Hanoi was transformed, with the confiscation of common land, the French buying up or expropriating private land, and the city council clamping down on local built forms in ways that also applied in Morocco.[52] Many poor Vietnamese lived in *paillotes*, which Hanoi council banned from most of the city, pushing out many such dwellings towards the municipal periphery, but also tolerating them in one southern urban district where Vietnamese personnel was needed.[53]

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[49] On such co-production, see Brenda Yeoh, *Contesting Space in Colonial Singapore: power relations and the urban built environment* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).

[50] See Olivier Le Cour Grandmaison, *L'Empire, op.cit.*; Gwendolyn Wright, *The Politics of Design*, *op.cit.*; Paul Rabinow, *French Modern, op.cit.* (cf. all note 4).

[51] See James C. Scott, *Seeing like a State. How Certain Schemes to improve the Human Condition Have Failed* (New Yaven, Yale University Press, 1998).

[52] Philippe Papin, *Histoire de Hanoi*, *op.cit.*, p. 246 (cf. note 2). On Morocco, see Paul Rabinow, *French Modern, op.cit.*, p. 290-295 (cf. note 4).

[53] Philippe Papin, *Histoire de Hanoi*, *op.cit.*, p. 249 (cf. note 2).

In Hanoi, as in Casablanca especially, migrants' presence was allowed because of their economic function. Increasingly seen as a signifier of precarious urban existence, the *paillotes* grew back during economic crises, such as the 1930s.[54] In Hanoi, we see a policy of ethnic zoning similar to that espoused by Morocco's first Resident General Hubert Lyautey (1912-1925), who had decreed a separation of commercial, residential and industrial urban areas that also carried implicit restrictions on who could live where. In essence this policy aimed to better separate out ethnic communities.[55] In Hanoi, such policies aimed to 'protect' middle-class, mostly French areas, and involved policies of *alignement* and *assainissement* to order urban space along 'rational', 'European' standards.[56] Over time, the poor Vietnamese population was increasingly limited to the 'inner' *quartier indigène* as well as the outer-lying *villages urbains*.[57]

Indeed, of our four cities, Hanoi and Casablanca displayed the strongest similarities regarding official policy towards the makeshift housing where many migrants lived. In Casablanca, constant migrations led to city council intervention displaying a logic that Janet L. Abu-Lughod has termed 'resegregation', as the initial French urban plans of the 1910s were compromised by growth driven by migration.[58] This meant that the city council invoked public health and hygiene in 1938-39, as thousands of shacks from the *micro-bidonvilles* of the city centre, and situated next to where many Europeans lived, were forcibly relocated to or beyond the city limits, rather like with the *paillotes* in Hanoi.[59] This led to the creation of

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[54] Philippe Papin, *Histoire des territoires*, *op.cit.*, p. 150 (cf. note 44).

[55] *Ibid.*, p. 151-54. See also Gwendolyn Wright, *The Politics of Design*, *op.cit.*, p. 202-222, (cf. note 4); Paul Rabinow, *Colonial Modern*, *op.cit.*, p. 211-250, 288-316 (cf. note 4); Spencer D. Segalla, *The Moroccan Soul. French education, colonial ethnology, and Muslim Resistance, 1912-1956*, (Lincoln, NB., University of Nebraska Press, 2009), p. 11-15.

[56] Lisa Drummond, 'Colonial Hanoi. Urban space in public discourse', in Laura Victoir, Victor Zatsepine, eds., *Harbin to Hanoi. The Colonial Built Environment in Asia, 1840 to 1940* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2013), p. 207-229.

[57] See Danielle Labbé, Caroline Herbelin, and Quang-Vinh Dao, 'Domesticating the Suburbs. Architectural Production and Exchanges in Hanoi during the Late French Colonial Era', in Laura Victoir and Victor Zatsepine, eds., *Ibid.*, p. 251-271, especially p. 258-259.

[58] Janet L. Abu-Lughod, *Rabat*, *op.cit.*. p. 221 (cf. note 2).

[59] Archives nationales du Royaume du Maroc, Rabat, E831, M. Bon, *Rapport général sur l'assainissement de la Ville de Casablanca. Bidonvilles et derbs. Exercices 1938-1939*, 27 February 1939.

two very large suburban shantytowns such as Ben M'sik and Carrières centrales respectively, each of which housed over 45,000 people by the late 1940s, and also led to population growth in areas such as the New Medina that the French wanted to be other Muslim-Moroccan preserves.[60] Acknowledging that they could not get rid of the shacks, given the prohibitive expense, the colonial authorities sought to contain and control Ben M'sik and Carrières centrales, by numbering the shacks, widening the streets, and increasing surveillance of illicit building. These 'improved shantytowns' (as officials in Morocco called them) had their corollary in Saigon, where there was a policy of building '*paillotes améliorées'* (1943-1945).[61]

In Algiers, the City Council generally adopted non-intervention as policy, leading to complex forms of segregation than in Casablanca, Saigon or Hanoi. There was no mass-scale relocation of central shantytowns to the suburbs.[62] The first consequential measures to address the issue through re-housing only came with reformist Algiers mayor (1953-1958) Jacques Chevallier's self-espoused 'bataille du logement' aiming to buy social peace. [63] Indeed, we should note the simultaneity of these Algiers initiatives with the ambitious social re-housing and shantytown destruction undertaken in Morocco (peaking in 1953-1956) along with the social housing efforts in Hanoi and Saigon in the early 1950s.[64] In Morocco, as in Vietnam and Algeria, the few 'early' re-housing initiatives for the colonised had often stalled because of World War Two. With hindsight, this policy inertia sowed the seeds of an insurmountable problem post-1945.[65]

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[60] On Carrières centrales, see Najib Taqi, *Djuānib min dhākirat Karyān sentrāl – al-hay al-Muhammadi bi Dar al-Bayda' fi-al Qarn al-'shrīn: Muhāwala fi-atawthīq*, Casablanca, Casamémoire, 2012. On Casablanca generally, see also André Adam, *Casablanca*, *op.cit.* (cf. note 21).

[61] Caroline Herbelin, « Des habitations à bon marché au Viet Nam. La question du logement social en situation coloniale », *Moussons. Recherches en sciences humaines sur l'Asie du Sud-Est*, nos.13-14, 2009, p. 123-146, http://moussons.revues.org/883 [accessed 12 March 2016].

[62] For policy until the early 1950s, see ANA, Travaux publics, 138; 645; 653; 1271; 1673.

[63] On Chevallier, see Zeynep Çelik, *Urban Forms*, *op.cit.*, p. 143-173 (cf. note 2).

[64] Caroline Herbelin, « Des habitations à bon marché », *op. cit.* (cf. note 61).

[65] Gwendolyn Wright, *The Politics of Design*, *op.cit.* p. 216-17 (cf. note 4); Zeynep Çelik, *Urban forms*, *op.cit.*, p. 130-179 (cf. note 2); Jean-Louis Cohen and Monique Eleb, *Casablanca. Mythes et figures d'une aventure urbaine*, Paris, Hazan, 2004, p .220-234, 273-348.

Yet to French colonial officials and politicians, all had not seemed lost in 1945. The French state, seeking to reassert political control after the humiliation suffered during World War Two, and faced with reinvigorated pro-independence movements, had prioritised reformist policies to show that colonial rule provided tangible material benefits. Such reforms also looked to steer the colonised away from a relationship to vernacular forms of place and space (Casbah / medina, shantytown, *paillote*) seen by the French to facilitate deep-seated resistance.[66] Reflecting these priorities, in both Casablanca and Algiers, the re-housing initiatives of the 1950s thus sought to turn these cities into 'welfare arenas'. However, in Algiers, as in Casablanca and Vietnam, re-housing all those in informal settlements was judged unaffordable. A stop-gap policy of what was termed *humanisation* in Algiers improved shantytown infrastructure, and this despite the truly ambitious Plan de Constantine (1958-1962) that aimed to provide mass housing for Algerians.[67]

However, such measures could not keep pace with the continued arrival of economic migrants and, in Vietnam and Algiers, increasingly refugees. Re-housing seldom went to the poorest, and razing informal settlements often simply displaced, rather than reduced, segregation.[68] In Algiers especially, continual arrivals of migrants / refugees during the war of independence compromised 'urban order'. Speaking of the situation in October 1960 in suburban Algiers, one officer from the Section administrative urbaine (SAU), which was in charge of reform and surveillance in majority Algerian Muslim areas, regretted the increasing number of shacks. For him, this situation 'va directement à l'encontre des efforts de l'Autorité Militaire dans le domaine de la pacification et du maintien de l'ordre. […] une telle implantation si elle devait se poursuivre, réduirait à néant les calculs concernant la construction de logements dans le Grand Alger et établirait à demeure un terrain de choix pour la pénétration de toutes les idées subversives'.[69] Such statements reveal the tensions between reformist and repressive policies designed to ensure rural and / or urban pacification.

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[66] See Ed Naylor (dir.), *France's Modernising Mission: Welfare, Citizenship and the Ends of Empire* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, forthcoming, 2017).

[67] See Zeynep Çelik, *Urban Forms*, *op.cit.*, p. 120-122, 173 (cf. note 2).

[68] See Janet L. Abu-Lughod, *Rabat*, *op. cit.*, p. 228-236 (cf. note 2).

[69] AWA, SK84, *Rapport du Chef d'Escadron Chevillion, Commandant le Quartier de la Bouzaréah (SAU) sur les bidonvilles et le Contrôle de l'habitat*, 31 October 1960.

Colonial authorities found it difficult to control not just mobility into the cities, but where migrants lived when they first arrived or where they later settled in the city. This created new possibilities for rural-urban links to be harnessed during the anti-colonial struggle, as the political geography of all four cities changed due to the size and location of the main areas of residency for the colonised.

Rural-urban dynamics during anti-colonial resistance

During decolonisation, all four cities saw the development of what Christopher E. Goscha has usefully termed the 'underground city', as legal opposition was repressed and nationalists / communists moved in increasingly clandestine ways for their military and political activities. Now secret urban guerrillas, backed up by complex, non-military support networks, engaged in asymmetrical conflict with the militarised colonial state, and in violence with rival nationalist or communist groups. Other targets included those seen as 'collaborating' with the French, and, especially in Algiers and Casablanca, radicalised Europeans determined to maintain colonial rule.[70]

The focus here is on some of the spatial dynamics of how migrants, usually recruited and organised into cells via neighbourhood, village-based or work-affiliated relations (or a combination of these), and under the supervision of senior cadres (who may well have been migrants themselves), played a key role as resource, given migrants' often close links between city and countryside that displayed the 'double présence'. Such connections allowed them to move around arms, supplies, money, intelligence and personnel to whichever area – urban, suburban or rural – was most in need according to changing strategic priorities. Furthermore, anticolonial movements might draw on migrants' presence in the city during mass demonstrations and strikes of European economic interests as part of the 'media war' to show their popular base and appeal to world opinion.[71] By the early 1950s, the colonial

[70] Christopher E. Goscha, 'Colonial Hanoi and Saigon', *op.cit.* (cf. note 10).

[71] See Benyoucef Ben Khedda, *Alger, capitale de la résistance 1956-1957*, Algiers, Éditions Houma, 2002; David Stenner, 'Networking for Independence', *op. cit.* (cf. note 19); Christopher E. Goscha, 'Colonial Hanoi and Saigon', *op. cit.*, p.236 (cf. note 10).

authorities increasingly viewed migrants not principally as a health and social danger, but as a political and security menace.

There is no linear development in any of our four cities. For example, in Casablanca, the key dates centre around the banning in December 1952 of the *Istiqlāl* pro-independence movement that had created a support base amongst industrial workers (most of migrant origin) living in and around the Carrières centrales shantytown. This was where the pro-nationalist protests of 7-8 December 1952 erupted.[72] This repression radicalised some activists and then, after the French forcibly exiled the Sultan Mohamed Ben Youssef in August 1953, a pro-independence nationalist urban guerrilla developed until 1956. Casablanca was largely the centre of organised urban resistance in Morocco, and as such had symbolic predominance over the countryside throughout.[73]

Algiers, on the other hand, saw the FLN seizing the political initiative in the early years of the war of independence (1954-1962), alongside the spread of armed resistance in the countryside. After the brutal repression of the 'Battle of Algiers' (1957), as the French dismantled the FLN's urban networks, the nationalist underground city's relationship to other regions evolved, with Algiers being politically and militarily 'downgraded', its leadership fleeing the city, and the *maquis*, not the capital, becoming a refuge for militants. Until late 1960, primacy was then with the conflict in the countryside.[74] In 1961-62, the FLN once more attached greater importance to Algiers, given French successes due to the Plan Challe.[75]

During the war in Vietnam that started in 1946, the 'underground city' of the resistance was operating in a highly constrained urban environment that the French ostensibly dominated in Saigon from late 1945 as it reoccupied the city, taking back control from the Japanese. From 1947 onwards in Hanoi, the French seized back control from DRV-backed forces after a long-awaited battle (December 1946 to February 1947) prior to which the *Viet Minh* had moved key resources out of the city. From the *Viet Minh's* perspective, the political initiative thus moved from the urban to the rural, although the cities remained important, as we shall

[72] See Jim House, « L'impossible contrôle d'une ville coloniale ? Casablanca, décembre 1952 », *Genèses. Sciences sociales et histoire*, no.86, mars 2012, p. 79-104.

[73] Mohammed Zade, *Résistance*, *op cit.*, p. 158-159, 195 (cf. note 16).

[74] Meynier, *Histoire intérieure*, *op.cit.*, p. 322-332 (cf. note 17).

[75] Grégor Mathias, « La Fin », *op. cit.*, (cf. note 37).

see.[76] The closest comparisons that can be made across our four case studies relate to Saigon (important as a guerrilla base between 1945 and 1950), Hanoi after 1947, and Algiers post-1957, especially 1958-1960.

In Vietnam, the provision of this largely rural war state under the RDV was dependent on what could be obtained in the cities (medicine, arms, clothing and footwear). If the city was to act as a resource, migration and migrants could be called upon. In both Hanoi and Saigon, activists played on the dense economic, social and political interconnections between city, suburbs and countryside.[77] Women street vendors, and some refugees (even orphaned children) acted as messengers, guides and intermediaries, and some might then be recruited into the urban guerrillas to help with commando operations. For example, in Saigon and its suburbs, General Nguyên Binh recruited amongst the northern migrant (Tonkinois) workforce that he knew from earlier in his career.[78] In turn, the war, through the refugee migrations and the transfer of political operatives moving to, from and between the cities, increased such existing connections.

For Tonkin, *Viet Minh* agent Nguyên Bac has provided an eloquent account of the porous links between city, suburbs and countryside.[79] Bac's testimony usefully sets up interesting parallels with the way in which migration – and migrants – in Algiers formed an important political resource for the FLN. Indeed, FLN leaders in Algiers were openly admiring of the *Viet Minh* from whom they drew lessons and who, they thought, 'a su faire des villes des havres de ravitaillement, des nids de contre-espionnage, des lieux de repos pour les combattants tout en maintenant un rythme de harcèlement de l'ennemi'.[80]

Operating in Hanoi between 1951 and 1954, Bac's duties involved co-opting the urban elites: the *Comité urbain du parti* for Hanoi had taken refuge outside the city, given French urban

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[76] Christopher E. Goscha, 'Colonial Hanoi and Saigon', *op. cit.*, p. 224-226 (cf. note 10).

[77] Hanoi's *villages urbains* linked the city to surrounding countryside (Philippe Papin, *Histoire des territoires*, *op. cit.*, p. 198 (cf. note 44)).

[78] Christopher E. Goscha, "A 'Popular' Side to the Vietnamese Army", *op. cit.*, p. 339 (cf. note 41).

[79] Nguyên Bac, *Au Cœur de la ville captive. Souvenirs d'un agent du Viêt-minh infiltré à Hanoi*, Paris, Arléa, 2004.

[80] Report by 'Kamel' (pseudonym), political head of FLN in Algiers, August 1957 (reproduced in *Naqd. Revue d'études et de critique sociale*, no.14-15, 2001, p .231-238, here p. 234).

dominance. Bac's testimony shows how the resistance adopted spatialised logics to hide in peripheral and central urban areas (or the countryside) with people from different social classes, and used a variety of dress codes, playing on the highly gendered expectations of the socio-cultural behaviour of both peasants and city dwellers, as well as the security forces. Even in a context of heavily restricted movement, the resistance was still able to move around people, messages, money and weapons, with women playing a crucial role.[81] Such a role can also be found in both Casablanca and Algiers: statistically, this involved far more poor women (many of whom were migrants) than the better known middle-class militants who could dress in a 'European' way. Ultimately, however, the priority was for women to go 'unnoticed', whether dressing as poor or better-off, 'local' or 'European'.[82]

Bac also refers to Vân-Dinh, a town 40 km from Hanoi, and that played a role of buffer zone (*sas*) for the transportation of people to and from the city / maquis.[83] In Algiers, suburban areas such as Maison-Carrée arguably fulfilled a similar function. This district's expanding migrant population provided ideal cover for highly mobile activists using large markets and rail and coach networks.[84] In Casablanca, the urban guerrillas (1953-1956) operated likewise, for the transfer of weapons from the American airbases (where such arms might be procured by activists employed there) into Casablanca, between city and suburbs, and between different city districts.[85] Such links had not been born overnight: the *Ittihād al-djanūb* (*L'Union du Sud*) group existed between 1949 and 1951, linking migrants in Casablanca originally from the Moroccan south to their home regions, and aiming to radicalise the

[81] Not all such women were migrants: see the woman guiding Ngo-Van-Chieu into Hanoi in 1951 in Ngo-Van-Chieu, *Journal d'un combattant Viet-Minh*, Paris, Seuil, 1955, p.163-168.

[82] Author's interview with Khaduj H., Casablanca, 22 April 2014. For Algeria, see Natalya Vince, *Our Fighting Sisters. Nation, Memory and Gender in Algeria, 1954-2012* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2015).

[83] Nguyên Bac, *Au Cœur de la ville captive*, *op. cit.*, p.19-20 (cf. note 79).

[84] Author's interview with Mahious A., a former FLN activist in Maison-Carrée, Algiers, 31 May 2009. See also the SAU reports for Maison-Carrée, ANOM, 2SAS65.

[85] Najib Taqi, *Djuānib*, *op.cit.*, p. 254 (cf. note 60); Mohammed Zade, *Résistance*, *op. cit.*, p. 253-54 (cf. note 16).

countryside that, in Morocco, was often under tighter colonial control than the cities, and to provide safe-houses in the city.[86]

To illustrate the use in Algiers of ethnically-segregated, largely migrant-based areas as a resource, we can cite the role of man known locally as El-Hāfi, who ran the largest café / hostel in the Mahieddine shantytown (12,000 inhabitants) where many *célibataires* lived. Appointed head of the *chefs d'îlots* in Mahieddine and hence close to the French SAU (who co-opted such local *notables*), this man could sign-off official forms to authorise a new-comer's presence in the shantytown. Probably playing a double game, El- Hāfi was in fact also providing a safe-house for FLN militants en route either to or from the maquis. The best-known figure in the shantytown, El- Hāfi was not harmed by the FLN either during or after the war, and his family remained within the area, a sign of social acceptance.[87]

In Algiers, using links forged during the black market era of World War Two and beyond, medication and clothing were regularly smuggled out initially to the FLN's surrounding *wilāya* IV region and then beyond through existing migrant networks. In interview, former militants explain how visits to ostensibly 'sick' relatives back home provided an ideal cover for car, coach or lorry journeys, often with complicit drivers, to deliver to the maquis. In turn, because such men and women belonged to cells often formally based in their home village, rather than Algiers, they might evade Algiers-based security services, although they were, through necessity, also liaising within the capital. As one interviewee, living in the Mahieddine shantytown in Algiers, but who originated from Tablat (35km to the south) and transported shoes and medicine to the *maquis* there, put it: 'il y avait des contacts au maquis et il y avait des contacts ici'.[88]

As we have seen, due to migration, and its place as a regional and national pole, the Algiers population originated from across all of Algeria. In situations of considerable constraint, pragmatism dictated flexibility, notwithstanding the FLN's espoused critique of regionalism. To ensure that some money / supplies continued to leave Algiers after the 1957 repression

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[86] On urban-rural political socialisation, see André Adam, *Casablanca*, *op. cit.*, p. 540-541 (cf. note 21).

[87] Author's interview with Mme E.H., Algiers, 8 April 2014. Many of the author's oral history interviews (2012-2016) with former inhabitants of the Mahieddine shantytown refer to El-Hāfi.

[88] Author's interview with 'Tahar' (a pseudonym), Algiers, 12 July 2013.

had left that city's FLN networks temporarily moribund, some only liaised with the FLN structure from their home region (*wilāya*) instead. However, such links could prove complex and double-sided, and question the nationalist version of total symbiosis between city and countryside. For example, in Algiers, as the FLN re-built itself in 1960-61, it took time to re-establish the predominance of the *wilāya* IV (into which Algiers was incorporated) over those other *wilāyas* (such as Kabylia) to which people in Algiers might have been paying dues and giving allegiance, whether they were longer-established in the city or because they were wartime refugees.[89] As one experienced Algiers-based political cadre put it in November 1961, in relation to wartime refugees: '(c)es anciens paysans, nouveaux citadins, nous ont posé des problèmes d'organisation. Au début ils restaient longtemps reliés à leur Wilaya d'origine (ce qui explique que trois ou quatre Wilayas aient travaillé sur le Grand Alger à un moment donné).'[90]

More generally, accelerated mobility due to war might create other problems as well as advantages: the 'dual surveillance'[91] exercised over the urban population by both pro-independence movements and the colonial state was designed to detect new arrivals, who, for activists, could be much-feared informers. For the FLN, the rural populations were supposed to remain in place to support the maquis, yet the chaos of war partly undermined this directive.[92] In Algiers, the SAU, for its part, sought to liaise with their colleagues in the region from which the newly-arrived migrant came, just as the FLN needed guarantees, often provided by family members, of the new arrival's political reliability.[93] Monitoring such a highly mobile population was certainly undertaken in different ways by nationalist groups and the colonial state, but was designed to meet similar objectives.

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[89] Author's group interview with former war-time Algiers-based FLN cadres, Algiers, 14 March 2009; Gilbert Meynier, *Histoire intérieure*, *op. cit.*, p.329 (see note 17).

[90] 'Le second souffle de la Révolution', *El-Moudjahid*, no.86, 1 November 1961, p. 612-616, here p. 615 (Yugoslav edition, 1962).

[91] Christopher E. Goscha, 'Colonial Hanoi and Saigon', *op. cit.*, p. 230 (cf. note 10). In the Algerian case especially, this might involve a 'triple surveillance', given the existence of bitterly competing nationalist groups (FLN and MNA).

[92] Author's interview with Lakhdar A. Algiers, 8 April 2014.

[93] Author's group interview with former war-time Algiers-based FLN cadres, Algiers, 14 March 2009.

Furthermore, given the complex political situation in the interior, conflicts there might impact on migrant communities within the city. The rivalries in the Mahieddine shantytown between the FLN and its bitter opponent, the MNA were partly linked to the tensions between these two movements in and around Djelfa and Bou-Saada (250km respectively south and south-east of Algiers), from where some of this area's inhabitants originated, and where anti-FLN elements, whether openly MNA or not, remained present despite the FLN's victory over the MNA in Algiers by 1957. Ultimately, this meant that neither shantytown nor home region necessarily constituted a safe haven for militants fleeing rival nationalists or the French authorities.[94] Similarly, members of the Casablanca resistance returning to their home villages could easily be arrested there.[95] Furthermore, in Casablanca during 1954, the French brought in Moroccan local leaders (*caïds*) from the countryside (and their staff) to fight nationalist activities, again showing the close links maintained between rural and urban forms of colonial control used against a mobile population.[96]

Certainly, anti-colonial movements might convert forms of spatial segregation – largely forged out of the colonial urbanism previously analysed - into a resource to facilitate many of the operations of the 'underground city' in the Casbah / medina, shantytown or *paillote*, since these were areas in which the people, materials and messages to be transported (or received) could be hidden. However, large concentrations of the colonised in restricted urban areas also presented advantages to the colonial authorities, as it became possible to seal off, invade such areas and repress the inhabitants.[97]

Colonial officials alternatively underestimated or overestimated the political 'danger' posed by one ethnically segregated area and its mobile population in relation to other districts. In reality, the factors that made one urban area more or less 'militant' were complex and

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[94] These comments draw on the author's many interviews with former inhabitants of the Mahieddine shantytown. On the MNA and other armed anti-FLN groups, see Philippe Gaillard, *L'Alliance. La guerre d'Algérie du général Bellounis (1957-1958)*, Paris, L'Harmattan, 2009.

[95] Najib Taqi, *Djuānib*, *op.cit.*, p. 246 (cf. note 60).

[96] *Ibid.*, p. 249.

[97] For example, in Hanoi between December 1946 and February 1947, when the DRV forces used the narrow streets of the Sino-Vietnamese quarter to hold out against the French, during the repression of nationalists and trade unionists in Casablanca (December 1952), and with the 'Battle of Algiers' (1957).

fluctuating: the political implantation of nationalist or communist support might be uneven. In Casablanca's Carrières centrales shantytown, grouping together up to 50,000 Moroccans next to key suburban industrial zones arguably complicated long-term political control. Here, the Protectorate authorities admitted the gaps in intelligence and surveillance.[98] In smaller areas such as Mahieddine shantytown in Algiers, however, the authorities probably exerted greater control, but as we have just seen, checks were far from total over a population of around 12,000, and similar, city-wide judgments might be made for Hanoi and Saigon in the late 1940s, as resistance involving links between city and countryside continued in a context of considerable repression.

Conclusion

Migrants constituted key actors in the decolonisation process, as the cities to where they moved became refuges, support bases and political 'showcases', existing in close connection with the immediate and more distant countryside as part of guerrilla warfare. How these dynamics evolved depended in part on the colonial state and city authorities' earlier, ongoing and only ever partially successful intervention to re-impose colonial control and segregation for social, health or openly political and security reasons.

Internal migration may initially have served the economic aims of the colonial project and, later, the security imperative of pacification during decolonisation (for example, through forced relocations). However, migrations arguably brought new social and spatial relations that the colonial state struggled to contain, as the anti-colonial movements turned adversity and constraint into advantage. That said, such tactics did not come without political risks, as we have seen.

The most dispossessed of the colonised often played political roles. This challenges many contemporary discourses that underlined the supposed failed integration of migrants into the city environment and hence their reduced social, economic and political agency. However, as we have seen, it was often the very links that these people maintained with their home regions that allowed them to become political actors from within their new city or suburban

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[98] CADN, APM, DI 380, Report by Capitaine de la Porte des Vaux, 'Le Parti de l'Istiqlal à Casablanca', July 1953, p. 6, 11, 48.

dwellings, and, sometimes, in both city/suburbs and countryside simultaneously. 'Double présence', in this sense, might thus be more significant than 'double absence'.

Such an approach arguably better accounts for the social experiences of many newly-arrived migrants in colonial cities and more accurately reflects the logics used by the clandestine opposition to colonial rule. It also suggests the need for a more nuanced reading, notably in the Algerian context, of who, between the peasantry and the urban proletariat, was the more politically radical. In fact, much remains to be known about the key vectors of political socialisation and processes of political radicalisation and incorporation amongst the poorest sectors of the urban colonised, many of whom were migrants.

Summary

Colonisation increased migration for socio-economic reasons and wars of independence gave birth to refugee migrations. Comparing Algiers, Casablanca, Hanoi and Saigon, this article examines the causes of internal migrations, and their social, spatial and political ramifications. Migrants played a key role in the struggle for independence, connecting city with countryside and using segregated urban spaces as a political resource: colonial authorities responded with both repression and reform.

Key words

Migration / segregation / agency / nationalism / urbanism

Résumé

La colonisation a accéléré les migrations économiques, et les conflits pour l'indépendance ont généré des migrations de fuite. En comparant Alger, Casablanca, Hanoi et Saigon, cet article examine les causes de telles migrations internes et leurs conséquences sociales, spatiales et politiques. Des migrants un joué un rôle primordial dans les luttes pour l'indépendance, liant la ville avec l'intérieur et se servant d'espaces urbains ségrégués comme ressource politique, provoquant une réplique à la fois répressive et réformiste de l'État colonial.

Mots-clés

Migrations / ségrégation / capacité d'agir / nationalisme / urbanisme