Article:
Linch, K orcid.org/0000-0002-7915-8489 (2017) An 'Unpleasant Dilemma': The Portsmouth Volunteers and the limits of loyalism, 1803-1805. Journal for Eighteenth-Century Studies, 40 (3). pp. 327-344. ISSN 1754-0194

https://doi.org/10.1111/1754-0208.12461

An 'Unpleasant Dilemma': The Portsmouth Volunteers and the limits of loyalism, 1803-1805

On the 4 June 1804 Portsdown Hill in Hampshire was the scene for the full spectacle of Georgian martial display when the garrison of Portsmouth marched out on the King's birthday for an inspection by the Lieutenant Governor of Portsmouth, Major-General Whitelocke, who later became infamous for the disastrous expedition to Buenos Aires in 1807.[1] The Hampshire Telegraph and Sussex Chronicle reported that 30,000 people attended this event, which mixed together the complete range of Britain's land forces at the time, as the garrison combined regiments of the British Army with militia units and volunteers (part-time soldiers).[2] The presence of the volunteers would appear to conform to the arguments, made by Linda Colley especially, that Britons were essentially loyal to the existing status quo and prepared to express this by taking up arms in defence of their locality. Additionally, J. R. Western has argued that the threat of Revolutionary and Napoleonic France infused within the volunteers a greater sense of political purpose as a counter-revolutionary force.[3] Such instances of loyalty were prompted by invasion threats that had punctuated Britain's wars with France from the 1740s to 1815, and that of 1803-5 was only the latest although probably most serious and quite different from those of before.[4]

Yet in Portsmouth, the King's birthday parade proved to be the finale to a sense of unease, and even outrage, amongst three volunteer officers (sometimes joined by a fourth) at Whitelocke's command of them, leading them to quit in protest after three earlier attempts to give up their commissions.[5] These events were the result of a dispute concerning Whitelocke's authority and jurisdiction over, and actions towards, volunteers in Portsmouth. Far from being a popular expression of loyalty to the monarch and defence of the realm, the much hoped-for mobilisation of Portsmouth's civilian population into volunteer units was

stymied; in fact by late 1804 the force was in disarray and could barely muster a third of its established strength.[6] As others have discussed, the eighteenth century military was peculiarly sensitive and picky about precedence and ritual.[7] Nor are we short of examples of inefficient, ill-disciplined, and short-lived units, as John Cookson highlighted in his work on the Sutton Volunteers in Cambridge,[8] or local social politics fermenting squabbles in auxiliary military forces.[9] What makes this case intriguing is that it happened at Britain's primary naval base and the detailed records left by the officers shed light on the nature – and especially the limits – of loyalism, so applying to a different context Mark Philp's caution that participation in loyalist activities did not necessarily mean acquiescence.[10]

What follows embraces Matthew McCormack's exhortation for closer scrutiny of loyalism across the eighteenth century through a case study of the Portsmouth Volunteers.[11] The quarrels that took place in Portsmouth produced voluminous correspondence, far more so than in other cases. The Lord Lieutenant – Thomas Orde-Powlett, Baron Bolton[12] – was an assiduous record keeper and his correspondence for the volunteers in Hampshire take up two volumes, with a further two volumes about Portsmouth alone. Supplementing these are the letters between Lord Bolton and the Home Office, those from generals in Portsmouth with the War Office and Commander-in-Chief, alongside reporting in the Hampshire Telegraph and Sussex Chronicle (itself published in Portsmouth). All told, this provides just shy of 100 items for the twelve months from the first raising of the volunteers to their near collapse by the end of 1804.[13] This wealth of information permits us to examine the interplay between rhetoric, behaviour, and identity of these soldiers, played out in the militarised space of Portsmouth. Moreover, it allows us to go beyond official and top-down correspondence, which was usually dominated by the military authorities and tended to shroud such incidents within a discourse of soldierly discipline or efficiency, which, perforce, has been reflected in the scholarship on volunteers and their conduct.[14]

The extensive correspondence and commentary that permits an exploration of the reasons for the failure of the Portsmouth Volunteers also provides a corpus through which representations of these actions can be examined at a much deeper level than has hitherto been the case. Before embarking on this, it is important to delineate the context and structure of this correspondence. The key actors / writers broadly form a quartet, each with a different position: the aggrieved officers of the volunteers and their advocates; General Whitelocke; Lord Bolton; and government officials (mainly the Secretaries of State for the Home Department). Little has been written about the genre of official or public business correspondence,[15] but certainly there were conventions to it that were observed. Generally, we can assume that the letters were read and composed sequentially, and cross-references between items are evidence of their conversational nature. Yet they were kept as a record and so these letters themselves may have consolidated attitudes towards the other parties by providing evidence that reinforced particular views. Additionally, there was a distinction, albeit vague, between public and private. Sometimes Lord Bolton categorised letters as 'private' even though they were sent to others who held official roles. In these cases, the author commonly offered a personal opinion. For example, when Bolton reported the incident on the King's Birthday to Lord Hawkesbury he wrote 'I have taken the liberty this for the present to mark, private, because I could wish of course, as I dare say, your Lordship would to avoid any public enquiry',[16] and writing to Hawkesbury again a week later, Bolton felt it his duty to present matters in a 'frank manner' in a private letter giving his opinion of Whitelocke.[17] However, the use of a letter following its delivery was in the hands of its recipient, something Bolton accepted when he noted in a letter to Lord Hobart that any part of his private letter could be considered public.[18]

Besides the volume of material, there are several factors that suggest that Portsmouth's example is instructive. The volunteer force has received the attention of

scholars recently, including John Cookson, Austen Gee, and a chapter in Linda Colley's Britons to name a few, but frequently the discussion focuses on the national and regional pictures, glossing over local circumstances.[19] Yet as Katrina Navickas and Jon Newman have shown in Resisting Napoleon, careful examination of the implementation of national legislation and policy at a local level reveals much more complex responses.[20] Besides the value of additional detailed studies, the specific political and physical environment of Portsmouth brought its part-time soldiers into closer contact with the government and the army. The particular circumstances there were as close as we can get to volunteers acting under the governance of the army, and so it presents an opportunity to explore the commitment of those who had enlisted as part-time soldiers.

Whilst Portsmouth has had plenty of historical attention, understandably focused on the Royal Navy, the dockyard, and its defences,[21] this work has largely ignored the social aspects of mobilisation. The scholarship on Portsmouth's extensive fortifications tends to consider form and function, assessing their effectiveness for the defence of key strategic points (in Portsmouth's case the dockyard and harbour) rather than the experience of mobilising the population to help man them. In part, this is because the large scale organisation of civilian-soldiers in Portsmouth during this period was chiefly confined to the Napoleonic Wars until the rifle volunteers of the Victorian era.[22] Nevertheless, the historiography on Portsmouth has missed the opportunity to study Britain's fiscal-military state where its domestic and external interests overlapped, and to expound upon John Brewer's outline of wartime mobilisation's impact on power relationships and local government.[23] This is particularly relevant for Portsmouth as its fortifications came with a military bureaucracy, and as Michael Wolfe has shown in his study of walled towns in France a synthesis between urban, military, and political history in the space of enclosed towns can tell us important things about the relationship between society and the state.[24] What follows is

an exploration of the interaction between this specific environment, the military establishment of the town, and the local forces raised to supplement its defence at a time when the town, and Britain, was under serious threat of invasion. Although there is much that is distinctive about the Portsmouth Volunteers, it provides a useful illustration of the shape and limits of loyalism as well as relationships between civilians and the state in the period.

Portsmouth and its volunteers

At the outbreak of war in 1803 the government encouraged the recruitment of part-time soldiers into volunteer corps to help bolster Britain's defences against the threatened invasion from Napoleonic France, and the Portsmouth area was, superficially, no different from other parts of the British Isles and soon had its own units.[25] Like many towns across the British Isles, volunteer soldiering provided Portsmouth with a means of expressing urban pride and loyalism within a national framework.[26] What made Portsmouth unusual was its substantial military infrastructure, which was both physical and administrative, headed by its governor. Portsmouth was an important, if not the principal, naval base in the United Kingdom and successive British governments had invested heavily to protect the town, with the fortification of Portsmouth going back as far as the King Edward IV. The configuration of these defences was entwined with developments in cannon technology, such that by the late 1700s Portsmouth had all the features of eighteenth century military engineering: ditches, ramparts, bastions, a glacis, and ravelins (and the list could go on).[27] Moreover, the whole of Portsea Island was fortified, and particularly noteworthy were the Hilsea lines that stretched across the north of the island and controlled its single access road, reinforcing the separation and distinctiveness from the mainland. The geography of this militarised space has been examined Raymond Riley, and his figures show that over half of the surface area of Portsmouth was accounted for by fortifications and related spaces.[28]

Portsmouth was also distinctive because of the size of the town that was enclosed within the fortifications, with some 15,000 inhabitants within the defences of Portsmouth and Portsea. Chatham dockyard was heavily defended but the town was outside of the 'Chatham lines' as they were known, and Devonport was also separate from Plymouth. Likewise, there were large modern fortresses outside of Inverness in the Scottish Highlands, Dover in Kent, St Peter Port (Guernsey) and St Helier (Jersey), often designed to dominate the town and surrounding area. Elsewhere across Britain there were other towns enclosed by walls, but the fortifications were usually old and the town small, a good example being Berwick upon Tweed on the English-Scottish border.[29] In fact, Portsmouth was comparable to the fortress towns of continental Europe, particularly those on both sides of the Rhine: a contemporary guide to Portsmouth claimed its works were 'as complete a work of the kind as any in Europe: being no ways inferior in strength or beauty to any of the so highly vaunted fortresses of the continent.'[30]

These fortifications required a large garrison, and even with some 6,600 men (including militia regiments)[31] the authorities still felt it necessary to explore ways of mobilising Portsmouth's population to help defend the town. As Lord Bolton put it 'by taking upon emergency the duty of the Garrison and charge of the works under proper command will liberate a very important portion of the regular force [British Army soldiers] for other purposes'.[32] During the French Revolutionary Wars (1793-1801) three volunteer units were raised in Portsmouth,[33] and as war loomed with Napoleonic France in the spring and summer of 1803, offers were made to resurrect this force and expand it.[34] The mobilisation of Portsmouth's population into part-time forces meant that distinction between civilians (although this term was not current in the period) and the army in the town would be blurred. Of course, a large proportion of the residents in Portsmouth had connections with the armed forces either directly, such as the 4,000 dockyard workers, or indirectly through the trade and

services.[35] But this was not the same as taking up arms and being trained. The situation in 1803 meant that the inhabitants of the town were expected to, and indeed wanted to be seen to, contribute to its defence. With such a heavily militarised space, one might expect the civilian population there to be attuned to military life, although proximity does not necessarily engender good relations. Also, both contemporaries and historians have suggested that urban environments fostered larger and better trained volunteer units;[36] using this equation the Portsmouth Volunteers ought to have ranked as some as the best in the country.

The context for the development of the volunteers in Portsmouth was complicated by parallel lines of bureaucracy that had overlapping jurisdictions in the town and which were especially confusing regarding the management of the volunteers. The army had more authority in the town than the rest of Britain, and although Daniel Defoe noted in 1724 that the civil government was not much interrupted by military arrangements, inhabitants were examined at the town gates, and were expected to 'keep garrison hours' and so were not let out or in of the town after nine o'clock at night.[37] The expansion of the old town was impossible because building was forbidden near the fortifications, and during wartime, the governor (and by extension his staff) had considerable authority.[38] The situation was further confused by the liminal status of volunteers, particularly the extent of army control over them. In March 1804 Charles Yorke (the Home Secretary) clarified to Lord Bolton that volunteers were completely under Whitelocke's command whilst they were under arms and that the volunteers were required to notify him of any drills or movement when armed; the fact that this clarification was sought is indicative that such authority was not well established.[39] Additionally, the town was governed by a close corporation of the Mayor and alderman,[40] and the whole of Portsea Island fell within the purview of the county authorities, headed by the Lord Lieutenant, Lord Bolton, who reported to the Secretary of State for the Home Department in all matters of 'internal defence'. So, for example, when Whitelocke

wanted to arm the Portsmouth Volunteers the application had to be approved by the Home Secretary, even though equipment was stored for them within Portsmouth garrison.[41]

Nor was it just the army that was important in the town. As Britain's primary naval base the Royal Navy also had a significant influence there and large numbers of men were employed in the Royal dockyards and Victualling yard, besides the transient population of sailors. Those working in these yards were ultimately accountable to the Navy Board and the Admiralty, introducing a further level of administrative complexity and potential friction. Generally, however, the army and county authorities shied away from direct involvement in the affairs of the Navy regarding the military training of naval personnel. Sir Charles Saxton, commissioner of the navy for the dockyard, [42] was left to make arrangements himself for the dockyard workers, whilst the attempt to make the Victualling yard men into an effective unit was thwarted when the Admiralty would not release Captain Henry Deacon (who although a captain in the Navy was not employed) to command the force, and so he could neither get pay as an army Major or naval Master and Commander for commanding the corps.[43]

Muddying the situation further were the political and social tensions within the town, which were often personal and fractious. In 1804 Lord Bolton explained to the new Home Secretary Lord Hawkesbury that 'Political differences and other more trifling dissension have long prevailed between parties at Portsmouth'[44] and there was particular animosity between the Garrett and Carter families, where their different political views were reinforced by a commercial rivalry as they were both involved in brewing and competed for naval contracts. Lord Bolton was particularly aggrieved at the contrast between the conduct of the two: Sir John Carter 'uniformly acted as an impediment to the measures of Government, and during the whole war had, I believe, not contributed one farthing except by involuntary payment of taxes to the efforts of the Country in its defence' whilst William Garrett had been generous with money and time in his command of Portsmouth Volunteers during the French

Revolutionary War.[45] Tensions within Portsmouth about volunteers in the 1790s had already attracted the attention of satirists, sufficient to stimulate Charles William's 1798 print It is not all gold that glitters, or volunteers settling about pedigree and precedence.[46] William Garrett also singled out particular odium for the Deacon family, describing them as 'those friends of mischief discord envy and hatred'.[47]

Despite these factors, initially all went well in Portsmouth, with the mobilisation of large numbers to help defend the town, so conforming to models of loyalism through voluntary military service. Although the hopes for 3,000 part-time soldiers in the town proved to be optimistic,[48] eighteen infantry companies were established in Portsmouth and Portsea each of 80 privates, and their numbers were limited by government policy.[49] Men that were part of the shore establishment of the navy also contributed to the figures, with a separate corps from the Victualling Office and the expectation that 800 to 1,000 dockyard workers could help man the fortifications in an emergency.[50] We lack the detailed quantitative analysis and population data to make robust comparisons, but nevertheless Portsmouth mobilised a significant proportion of its male, military-aged population. 2,000 volunteers paraded during inspections by the Duke of York (the Commander in Chief) and the Prince of Wales in August 1803, so at least a third of adult males in the area were in the volunteers.[51]

Participation in public parades played an important part of the process of making them into soldiers in their eyes and those of others.[52] In a printed general order after the August review, the Duke of York expressed his:

> most sincere satisfaction, from having had this day an opportunity of personally witnessed the effects of the spirit of unanimity and loyalty in the inhabitants of Portsmouth and its vicinity, of which he had previously received the most favourable report from Major General Whitelocke.[53]

In the Duke's eyes the volunteers represented the success of the town in overcoming its existing political divisions – through a reference to effect of unanimity – in the cause of national defence. And there were further examples of their voluntary efforts to aid the garrison of the town. During a volunteer parade in the evening of 7 August 1803, signals from the Isle of Wight indicated that there was an enemy force off the coast and the volunteers duly assembled across Portsea Island, ready for action;[54] and on 3 November 1803 garrison duty in Portsmouth was taken by the volunteers whilst the regular troops engaged in a sham fight across Portsea Island.[55]

Underlying this initial success was a careful compromise brokered by Lord Bolton to address the political and social divisions in the town. To deal with these concerns Lord Bolton held a separate meeting in Portsmouth to overcome 'local jealousies' in July 1803,[56] where it was agreed that the unit would be formed into independent companies and an experienced officer from the army would superintend them all. Reporting this the Hampshire Telegraph and Sussex Chronicle noted 'his Lordship's language to be delicate towards the Inhabitants'.[57] Although settled locally the agreement needed the endorsement of the government, and so Lord Bolton pressed the case for the volunteers in Portsmouth to have 'military officers at the Head of the Arrangement',[58] instead of promoting officers from within the volunteers to the rank of major or higher as was the usual practice, thus avoiding a preference to a person, family, or political faction. A flavour of the difficulties was highlighted by Whitelocke who thought that giving Mr Elias Bruce Arnaud a rank higher than captain would result in 'universal disgust', probably because of the family's background in trade or, more likely, the custom service.[59] The government recognised the case for different arrangements in Portsmouth and sanctioned Lord Bolton's plan in late August.[60] However, the delay in ratifying the agreement made some volunteers a little nervous, and all eyes were anxiously watching for the appointment of officers in the London Gazette.[61] On 1 October

1803 all the officers appeared in the Gazette: there were only two officers ranking above captain, and although the whole force had been listed as one unit it did not have the usual command structure for a force of its size.[62]

Yet from this successful start in August 1803 the unit rapidly declined. As early as November 1803 General Whitelocke tangentially inquired if 'there will be any difficulty for the sake of example in getting rid of a troublesome Attorney in the shape of an Officer'.[63] Later, in January 1804 he reported to Lord Bolton that some 'Dirty Family Quarrels' had disrupted the Portsmouth Volunteers and he was requesting the resignation of some officers after which all would be well.[64] In March 1804 the escalation of the dispute led Whitelocke to arrange the corps into five divisions, each of two companies, with separate days for drill so that the affronted officers would avoid serving with, or worse under, other officers. This came after repeated representations about wounded feelings whilst on parade.[65] Such was the rancour that the corps effectively split into two, a fact underlined in April when six companies turned their backs on the other four as they passed each other near Southsea Common, understandably considered as 'a mark of the utmost contempt'.[66] By May 1804 the Portsmouth Volunteers were 'completely disorganised; the four companies are in tolerable good order but their spirits, zeal and order are checked and suppressed and as for the Six Companies they are far from being in a State of Harmony one with another.'[67] It was reported in July 1804 that a parade of ten companies only mustered 98 men,[68] and although the pay lists for the Portsmouth Volunteers show a slightly better picture than this account, nevertheless the 229 men that were present at their inspection on 19 April 1805 was a long way short of the parades of August 1803.[69] In a report of 1806 presented to Parliament of all the UK's volunteers the entry for the Portsmouth Volunteers stands in stark contrast to the earlier hopes for the force there. With an establishment of six companies totalling 525 privates it only mustered 317 out of 450 men on the books. Perhaps fortunately, or maybe

even deliberately, there was no official review of the unit, contrasting with other units in Hampshire that were declared 'Fit to Act with the Line'.[70]

The failure of the unit could be explained by the political and social divisions in the town seeping into the new arena of part-time soldiering, a common enough problem in other studies of volunteers.[71] However, as we have seen above, these divisions were initially overcome and new tensions emerged about what defined 'loyal' actions and behaviour in the context of volunteer soldiering – a contest between obedience to military authority and conduct shaped by a legal framework. Matters were made worse because both required public displays to reinforce and reaffirm either vision.

The nature of Portsmouth Volunteer's loyalism

The loyalism of the Portsmouth Volunteers had a strong legalist and contractual tone, echoing political and philanthropic associations of the eighteenth century.[72] A principle cause of disruption in the Portsmouth Volunteers was their desire for their actions to be legally and publically recognised both according to the laws and regulations for the volunteers issued by the government, and also their own agreement reached in July 1803. For example, the officers refused to act until their commissions were announced in the London Gazette, a pronouncement that legitimised them. Even in the enthusiasm of autumn 1803 there were signs that if these formalities were not observed then problems could arise. General Whitelocke commented 'if the Officers are not soon gazetted and Arms put into the hands of the Men the undertaking which a short time since looked so promising will prove precisely the reverse';[73] furthermore the men refused to take the Oath of Allegiance until the officers' appointments were notified.[74] Confirming the importance of such public declarations, Whitelocke reported in October that the volunteers had resumed 'their former good humour' after the names of the officers appeared in the London Gazette.[75]

Much more divisive was the appointment of the commanding officers for the unit. General Whitelocke went beyond of the legal framework set out in the various volunteer acts of 1803-1804 and subsequent regulations, as well misinterpreting the July agreement that Lord Bolton had brokered. This caused the schism in the unit outlined above that proved irreparable.[76] Whitelocke and Lord Bolton had asked for Lieutenant-Colonel George Duke, a half-pay officer living in Hampshire, to be the commander of the Portsmouth Volunteers but in September he was employed by the Government in the role of an inspecting officer of volunteers.[77] The Duke of York, unaware of the local July agreement about the commanding officers, allowed Whitelocke to recommend officers for these appointments and he nominated Majors Hugh Maxwell and William Cater.[78] Furthermore, Whitelocke's arrangements were in effect establishing the volunteers into larger units, which challenged their status as independent companies.

Lord Bolton knew nothing of Whitelocke's measures, despite regulations that all volunteer officer appointments should be passed through him as Lord Lieutenant to the Secretary of State for the Home department, who then laid them before the King. Although Bolton at first thought there was some mistake,[79] as he looked further into the appointments he was troubled by Whitelocke's actions as it became clear that Whitelocke had bypassed the approved channel for commissioning volunteer officer and had gone directly to the Commander-in-Chief.[80] Moreover, those chosen by Whitelocke were particularly inappropriate: Major Carter was a nephew of the Mayor of Portsmouth and an inhabitant of the town, a double transgression of the July agreement to appoint independent officers from outside the town to command the unit; and the second appointment was used as patronage by Whitelocke, whereby the position was offered to Major Maxwell of the 48th Foot in an exchange with the husband of Whitelocke's sister-in-law.[81]

In response to these appointments made by Whitelocke, three officers (Captains George Garrett, William Greetham, and J. A. Hickley) offered their resignations in January 1804. In the inquiries that followed, loyalism tempered by a punctilious observance of the law was a key component of their identity, their understanding of loyalism, and their vision of the nation. William Garrett, a brother of one of the volunteer captains who acted as an advocate and intermediary for them, reported to Lord Bolton on the 'illegal and indecorous conduct'[82] conduct of Whitelocke, whilst also highlighting that Majors Maxwell and Carter had no legal authority over the volunteers.[83] Such views were not restricted to William Garrett who was endeavouring to justify and support upset parties. Both Lord Bolton and Charles Yorke were shocked by Whitelocke's circumvention of the official methods for the recommendation of volunteer officers. Bolton questioned Whitelocke as to how he could sanction an arrangement that was 'conducted by means totally different from those established by the Legislature, and directed by the King?',[84] and Charles Yorke 'certainly expected that the Recommendation of the Persons to be appointed to these situations would be made by your Lordship to the Secretary of State, to be by him transmitted in the usual way through the Commander in Chief for His Majesty's approbation.'[85]

These aggrieved officers (sometimes joined by a fourth captain, J. C. Mottley) consistently coupled loyalty with adherence to the law in their letters to Whitelocke and Bolton where they either justified their conduct or wish to resign. The concordance of references to the law and loyalty were epitomised in February 1804 when they wrote of their sentiments of 'Loyalty, Cheerful Obedience to the Laws of our Country, and respect to our Superiors Civil as well as Military'.[86] This appeal manifested an orientation towards the civil administration rather than the military and respect rather than obedience, which would have been particularly pointed as the letter was sent to Whitelocke. A letter of a month later from these four officers reiterated their loyalty, this time to Bolton, but rephrased their legal

concerns with a wish to be under the same footing as 'Corps in every other District and Place in the Kingdom.'[87]

As the latter quote suggests, they viewed Portsmouth as a peculiar jurisdiction, further amplifying legal issues.[88] As discussed earlier, the army held more sway in Portsmouth than elsewhere in Britain by virtue of being a permanent garrison but also because of the physical fortification of the town. As the four disgruntled officers highlighted in April 1804, during another attempt at reconciliation, they were:

> under the Impression that the Volunteers were not of that correct disposition and Character that they ought to be, and that Powers not know to the Law or ever hinted at in Parliament, should be given to the Lieutenant Governor of Portsmouth, that are not adopted in any other Garrison in the Kingdom, at least as we believe and suppose.[89]

Indeed, previous to this they had even offered to serve as privates in other corps outside Portsmouth so as to be removed from Whitelocke's 'exclusive Influence and Interference', the implication being that they would be more regularly under the volunteer laws outside the garrison.[90]

As the dispute continued on into the late spring of 1804, it became clear that although there was a general problem regarding volunteers in garrison towns there was also an issue about Whitelocke and his actions.[91] Previously, the volunteers had been left to the own devices during the French Revolutionary War,[92] but Whitelocke's aims for the volunteers from 1803 were to make them as soldier-like as he could and so employed the authority he had over them to that end.[93] He had the means to exercise this power through garrison orders,[94] and any men under arms were entirely under his command, which meant Whitelocke could determine when and if companies could drill and even re-arrange units as he saw fit.[95] The appointment of field officers and forming larger units from the companies provided further mechanisms for improving the volunteers. He viewed his appointment of

field officers as a good public policy and military arrangement, although he admitted that he did not know if the measure was 'precisely sanctioned by law'.[96] Major Maxwell was under the impression from Whitelocke that he was going to be commanding a unit on regular duty and behaved accordingly.[97] Worse, the London Gazette indicated that the volunteers were on permanent duty, in effect under the constant authority of Whitelocke, as well as declaring that the independent companies – so crucial to the arrangement of volunteers in the town – were formed into a battalion.[98] As William Garrett put it he did not know 'a single volunteer ever had any idea of permanent duty until they saw mention made of it in the Gazette.'[99] By their very nature, volunteer soldiers could only be called out in certain circumstances and for the legally prescribed days of drill, but in Portsmouth they had regular army officers constantly placed in command of them.

Considering the sensitivities of the Portsmouth Volunteers, Whitelocke's conduct was ill-judged, leaving aside its legality, and led to him being increasing characterised as a military despot. Whitelocke, and the field officers he appointed, successively offended the four officers in ways that they would be particularly sensitive to. In February, the recently appointed Major Maxwell ordered the four volunteer companies commanded by Captains Garrett, Greetham, Hickley, and Mottley to wear black belts instead of white – uniforms were a delicate issues for volunteers – distinguishing them with a visible marker of their lower status within the garrison.[100] This was only staved off by intervention from the Home Secretary who clarified that Whitelocke had no authority to change volunteer uniforms.[101] At the same time, Whitelocke publically verbally abused Captain Mottley over a matter of authority: Whitelocke had forbidden any volunteer officer from taking command of other volunteer companies without his express permission, but the officer concerned had taken command of four volunteer companies the previous day as they marched back from parade at the request of the lieutenants commanding them as he was the senior officer. The interesting

aspect of this very one-sided row was that the volunteer officer clearly felt affronted at being spoken to in such a way 'at his own door' and in front of so many people, yet Whitelocke equally felt at the garrison commander that he could admonish a volunteer officer wherever he saw them.[102]

We shall probably never know the full extent of Whitelock's interactions with the volunteers, but enough remains to explore how his character and actions were regarded with increasing hostility. Initially, Whitelocke's actions were viewed as a result of him being duped by the Corporation, almost with some sympathy,[103] and considered 'idle and vain',[104] but such opinions were soon revised and his behaviour was progressively depicted as oppressive and violent.[105] In February, William Garrett highlighted Whitelocke's 'bombastic and tryannic threats and orders.';[106] in March, Captains Garrett, Greetham, Hickley, and Mottley were subject to 'a Torrent of violent abuse against us, our conduct, our Principles and our Characters' from Whitelocke;[107] whilst in April they justified another wish to resign due to his continued hostility.[108] The conclusion to these tensions came during the preparations for the celebrations of the King's birthday in 1804, in which the three Captains felt Whitelocke's actions continued to demonstrate the latter's prejudice against them. Initially excluded from the invitation to parade, their inclusion became conditional on them accepting Whitelocke's authority with the concomitant potential for him to publically demean them. Although they paraded, the three Captains wrote to Lord Bolton at the earliest opportunity offering their resignation.[109] This time their wishes were fulfilled and despite further efforts by Bolton to appoint a new commanding officer the Portsmouth Volunteers were practically defunct.

Contemporary views of Whitelocke's behaviour could have easily drawn upon fears of the standing army and the rhetoric of soldiers as slaves that were longstanding in the eighteenth century, but in the correspondence on these events it was never the condition of

being a soldier that was focused upon but the emotional response to Whitelocke's actions. Bolton expressed this early on the quarrels when he described the 'very extraordinary harshness has been used towards these Gentlemen, and a mode of treatment of the Volunteers perfectly incomfortable to the nature of their establishment.'[110] William Garrett echoed these sentiments when he recounted the incident between Captain Mottley and Whitelocke, depicting Mottley's actions as innocent and inoffensive.[111] Later, in one of their attempted resignations the four captains expressed a simple wish to 'put ourselves beyond the reach of his Intemperance towards us'.[112]

An appeal to sentimentality in their cause mirrored wider notions of gentlemanly independence and sociability, and William Garrett exemplified their response to the situation when he reflecting on the whole history of the volunteers in the town and highlighted 'the system of terror adopted in this town. The distrust we all live in of one another.'[113] His depiction of the events in Portsmouth as a struggle against subjugation was further confirmed in a later letter after the resignations had finally been accepted, where he stated that the 'struggle has hitherto has been to oppose oppression.'[114] Such damming observations of Whitelocke's time as Lieutenant Governor require elaboration. Rather than a recourse to the tropes of upholding English or British liberties, the speed and consistency with which they branded Whitelocke's behaviour as despotic echoes the broader context of the war, where Britain was fighting against Napoleon's military tyranny. The similarity between the public language and representation of Napoleon, particularly in the broadsides that were circulating in the period, and the way Whitelocke was described in the series of letters in striking.[115] Interesting, the local tensions between Portsmouth residents diminish in the correspondence, underscoring the equation of Whitelocke's action with military repression and that this was the most dangerous threat and challenge to genuine expressions of loyalty.

A facet of this fear of military control was the three Captains' concerns over the way their actions would be represented to others in authority and to the public. In their first resignation attempt in January 1804 William Garrett claimed that Whitelocke would represent George Garrett 'as disloyal and disaffected and that he would ruin Mr Greetham one of the Gentlemen in his profession, he being Judge Advocate of the Navy.'[116] William was also particularly concerned any injury his brother's reputation might have suffered in the way Whitelocke represented the dispute to Colonel Robert Brownrigg (the Duke of York's Military Secretary),[117] besides potential misrepresentations locally.[118] In parallel to the worsening characterisation of Whitelocke's actions, so the three Captains became increasingly concerned about their public reputations, suggesting in March that 'We are in Constant apprehension that our feelings will be hurt or our Characters injured'.[119] In the wake of the King's Birthday parade Whitelocke threatened to refuse the resignations so that the officers concerned could be publically dismissed 'with disgrace'.[120] The only salve to these ruffled egos proved to be Lord Bolton's continued care and attention to them.

The martial spaces in Portsmouth also played their part in amplifying these concerns, as they provided places where the control of the army could be exercised to the detriment of reputations and in a very public way. This has been alluded to in the incident on Southsea Common and the rebuking of Captain Mottley outlined above, but the most instructive example of this came in the preparations of the King's Birthday parade. When the three Captains' companies were included in the instructions for the parade, the place of assembly was changed to the glacis and they were told that if their companies were not up to strength then they would be intermixed with the others. This was potentially a serious affront to their status and the attachment of their men to them, as this re-arrangement would be played out in a very open space and in full view of all of those on the ramparts both other soldiers and civilians. Changing the place of assembly certainly altered the perceptions of Garrett,

Greetham and Hickley such that they stated it was impossible for them to follow Whitelocke's orders. Potentially denied the opportunity to demonstrate their loyalty, these officers later acquiesced, but they were further agitated by Whitelocke during the march to Portsdown Hill when he sent them a message stating that he was pleased to see the men parade but not the officers, which was taken as a further attempt to separate their men from them. In this context, Whitelocke's threats to disarm and disband three companies whilst still on duty after the parade provided an additional example, not that one was needed, of the potential power Whitelocke had to publically embarrass volunteer officers.[121]

Conclusion

Lord Bolton was probably relieved when Whitelocke left Portsmouth and took up the position of Inspector-General of Recruiting, thus avoiding the inquiry that Bolton thought was inevitable. There is no direct evidence of the government engineering this appointment, but the timeliness of the move suggests a desire to remove Whitelocke from further trouble. Bolton attempted to be fair in his judgement ascribing the troubles to mistakes and misunderstandings on both sides. In some ways the collapse of the Portsmouth Volunteers was a clash between a 'simple soldier' and the mentalities of citizen-soldiers acted out inside the unusual space of Portsmouth, and the incident could be added to the catalogue of tense civil-military relations in Britain that stretched well beyond the long eighteenth century. Nevertheless, there were more fundamental issues in play at Portsmouth. The case of the Portsmouth Volunteers indicates that incidents which superficially appear ill disciplined or peculiar (certainly from the army's perspective) were a manifestation of different interpretations of loyalism brought out through service in the force. Moreover, it questions the pluralism of loyalism that has often been cited as the reason for its success in the period.[122]

The loyalism expressed by the three Captains, and which they were so concerned to defend, was not a straightforward obedience to the government and its policies, and was more complex than constitutional propriety and support for the established order argued by Gee.[123] It was underpinned by the desire to act in a generous and public-spirited way within a national legal framework. By noting the irregularities in Portsmouth the officers made comparisons with the rest of the country and so evinced their ideas of the nation. Repeatedly, they re-affirmed their desire to serve 'King and Country' and although the territorial definition of this country were never openly expressed as England or Britain, because they had such a concern for the law we can see that they were imaging a Britain where Parliamentary legislation applied. The nature of their country was therefore jurisdictional as much as it was social and cultural, and was elastic depending on the applicability of relevant laws. The Portsmouth volunteers were acutely aware of the national legal picture and how it played out in a local context: they highlighted peculiarities that appeared to prejudice them. At once loyalism was both parochial and national, and shows that volunteering was more nationally conscious than is suggested by John Cookson's 'national defence patriotism', whilst equally more attuned to locality than is implied by Colley's Britishness which overlaid and superseded other identities.[124]

The volunteer officer's royalism also reveals more about their identity and their relationship to the state. The 'King' that they felt a duty towards and wish to serve through volunteering was an abstract relationship but it also manifested itself in their interactions with monarch's representatives. In Portsmouth's case, there were two: the Lord Lieutenant appointed to the county and the military officers appointed to the garrison. In Whitelocke and Bolton they came to represent two different faces of the state, the former under direct control of the central authorities whilst in Bolton we find someone able to adapt the application and communication of the state's wishes. Certainly, the volunteer officers who resigned conveyed

their preference for Bolton as the more 'civil' representative of the monarch rather than the military, as did the government officials in the Home Office. The volunteer officers were hyper-sensitive to any manifestations of the outright authority of the army without due regard to the law as well as individual and collective feelings. Bolton's role proved to be instrumental in the incident not escalating further still (and indeed it having been unheard of until now), and as Lord Lieutenant he became a crucial mediator between the government, communities, and individuals. Mass mobilisation through the volunteers brought the tensions between the two channels of state power to the fore, and the volunteer officers' recourse to legalism provided a bastion against this mobilisation descending into military despotism and the consequent loss of their ability to represent their actions to others and to shape their performance as loyalists. Herein lies an explanation for the paradox of the success of the British state in the period, which proved so able to obtain ever increasing resources for war yet did this with relatively little internal dissent or rebellion in the process.[125] A feat all the more remarkable in the politically charged atmosphere in the British Isles after 1789. The officers of the Portsmouth Volunteers demonstrate that their loyalism – and probably many others too – was shaped by a condition that they should not have to submit to unadulterated obedience, as it contradicted the very reason they agreed to lead volunteers: to defend Britain against military tyranny.

---

[1] John D. Grainger, 'Whitelocke, John (1757–1833)', in Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, ed. H. C. G. Matthew and Brian Harrison (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004; online edn, Jan 2008), accessed 7 January 2016, http://0-www.oxforddnb.com.wam.leeds.ac.uk/view/article/29300.

[2] 'Portsmouth, Saturday June 9', Hampshire Telegraph and Sussex Chronicle, 11 June 1804.

[3] John Randle Western, 'The Volunteer Movement as an Anti-Revolutionary Force, 1793-1801', The English Historical Review 71, no. 281 (1956): 603-14.

[4] Linda Colley, Britons: forging the nation 1707-1837 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992); see also Harry Thomas Dickinson, 'Popular Conservatism and Militant Loyalism 1789-1815.' in Britain and the French Revolution, 1789-1815, edited by Harry Thomas Dickinson (Basingstoke and New York: Macmillan, 1989), 282-83. On the invasion threats, see Sudipta Das, De Broglie's armada: a plan for the invasion of England, 1765-1777 (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 2009), A. Temple Patterson, The other armada: the Franco-Spanish attempt to invade Britain in 1779 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1960), and J. E. Cookson, The British armed nation, 1793-1815 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1997), especially chapter 2; on 1803-5, see Mark Philp, 'Introduction', in Resisting Napoleon: The British Response to the Threat of Invasion, 1797-1815, ed. by Mark Philp (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), 6-11.

[5] The resignation letters are: HRO, 11M49/239, John Whitelocke to Lord Bolton, 14 January 1804, fols. 36-37; George Garrett, Mr Greetham junior, J. A. Hickley, J. C. Mottley to Lord Bolton, 29 March 1804, fols. 144-47; & G. Garrett, J. C. Mottley, M. Greetham, and J. A. Hickley to Lord Bolton, 26 April 1804, fols. 156-157; The National Archives (TNA), London, HO50/107, Home Office: Military Correspondence, Hampshire and Isle of Wight, G. Garrett, M. Greetham and J. A. Hickley to Lord Bolton, 4 June 1804.

[6] Hampshire Record Office (HRO), Winchester, 11M49/239, Papers of Thomas Orde, 1st Baron Bolton - letter books and papers of Lord Bolton, Lord Lieutenant: letter book: 'Portsmouth etc Volunteer Correspondence, 1803-1804: 1', Bgd. Gen. George Porter to Lord Bolton, 29 August 1804, fols. 255-59.

[7] Matthew McCormack, ‘Stamford Standoff: Honour, Status and Rivalry in the Georgian Military’ in Britain's soldiers : rethinking war and society, 1715-1815 ed. Kevin Linch and Matthew McCormack (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2014), 77-92.

[8] J. E. Cookson, ‘The Rise and Fall of the Sutton Volunteers, 1803-4’, Historical Research 64, no. 153 (1991): 46-53. See also J. W. Fortescue, The county lieutenancies and the army, 1803 - 1814 (Uckfield, England: Naval & Military Press, 2002).

[9] Katrina Navickas, ‘The Defence of Manchester and Liverpool in 1803: Conflicts of Loyalism, Patriotism and the Middle Classes’ in Resisting Napoleon : The British Response to the Threat of Invasion, 1797-1815, edited by Mark Philp (Aldershot, England; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2006), 61-73.

[10] Mark Philp, ‘Vulgar Conservatism, 1792-3’ The English Historical Review 110, no. 435 (1992): 66.

[11] Matthew McCormack, ‘Rethinking “Loyalty” in Eighteenth-Century Britain’, Journal for Eighteenth-Century Studies 35, no. 3 (2012): 407-21.

[12] James Kelly, ‘Powlett, Thomas Orde-, first Baron Bolton (1746–1807)’, in Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, ed. H. C. G. Matthew and Brian Harrison (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004; online edn, Jan 2008), accessed 26 March 2013, http://0-www.oxforddnb.com.wam.leeds.ac.uk/view/article/20811.

[13] Transcriptions of these letters are available at Kevin Linch (2016): Portsmouth Volunteers 1803-1805 correspondence University of Leeds. [Dataset]. http://doi.org/10.5518/50.

[14] Cookson, The British armed nation,, 191-93; Austin Gee, The British volunteer movement, 1794-1814 (Oxford; New York: Clarendon Press ; Oxford University Press, 2003), 213-19.

[15] For example, there is little mention of it in Clare Brant, Eighteenth-century letters and British culture (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006). The only volume to cover this is

Marina Dossena and Susan M. Fitzmaurice, eds., Business and official correspondence : historical investigations, Linguistic insights (Bern; Oxford: Peter Lang, 2006).

[16] HRO, 11M49/239, Lord Bolton to Lord Hawkesbury, 10 June 1804, fols. 180-83.

[17] TNA, HO 50/107, Lord Bolton to Lord Hawkesbury, 21 June 1804.

[18] HRO, 11M49/F/O38, Hampshire Volunteer Force: letter book, Lord Bolton to Lord Hobart, 28 July 1803, fols. 40-44.

[19] Colley, Britons: forging the nation; Cookson, The British armed nation, 1793-1815; Gee, The British volunteer movement.

[20] Navickas, 'The Defence of Manchester and Liverpool in 1803', and Jon Newman. '"An Insurrection of Loyalty": The London Volunteer Regiments' Response to the Invasion Threat.' in Resisting Napoleon, 61-73, and 75-89.

[21] See for example, Dan Cruickshank, Invasion : defending Britain from attack (London: Boxtree, 2001), and Norman Longmate, Island Fortress : The Defence of Great Britain 1603-1945 London: Hutchinson, 1991.

[22] Ian Beckett, Riflemen form : a study of the Rifle Volunteer Movement, 1859-1908 (Aldershot [Hampshire] : Ogilby Trusts ; Speldhurst, Tunbridge Wells, Kent : Distributed by Midas Books, 1982). Anthony Page, Britain and the Seventy Years War, 1744-1815 : Enlightenment, Revolution and Empire (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 36 mentions a 'volunteer militia' being raised in 1779 in Portsmouth but no reference is given and the author has been unable to confirm what this unit was.

[23] John Brewer, 'The Eighteenth-Century British State: Contexts and Issues' in An Imperial State at War: Britain from 1689 to 1815, edited by Lawrence Stone (London: Routledge, 1994), 52-71.

[24] M. Wolfe, Walled Towns and the Shaping of France: From the Medieval to the Early Modern Era (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2009).

[25] Cookson, The British armed nation, 1793-1815, 79-81.

[26] Colley, Britons: forging the nation, 316-17.

[27] For the improvements to Portsmouth's fortifications in the eighteenth century, see Andrew Saunders, Fortress Britain : artillery fortification in the British Isles and Ireland (Liphook: Beaufort, 1989), 20-24, & 115.

[28] Raymond Rile, 'Military and Naval Land Use as a Deteminant of Urban Development - the Case of Portsmouth', in The Geography of defence, ed. M. Bateman and R. C. Riley (Totowa, N.J.: Barnes & Noble Books, 1987), 59.

[29] For full details of Britain's fortresses in the period see Saunders, Fortress Britain : artillery fortification in the British Isles and Ireland, 130-52.

[30] The ancient and modern history of Portesmouth, Portsea, Gosport, and their environs, (Gosport: printed and sold by J. Watts; sold by W. Matthews, Portesmouth, and T.N. Longman, and O. Rees, London, [1800?]), 46.

[31] TNA, WO 17/2787, Office of the Commander in Chief: Monthly Returns to the Adjutant General, Quarters of Troops in Great Britain, 1 September 1803 - 30 June 1804.

[32] TNA, HO 50/72, Home Office: Military Correspondence, Lord Bolton to Charles Yorke, 5 Decemeber 1803.

[33] The Portsmouth Loyal Volunteers, the Portsmouth Volunteer Artillery, and the Royal Portsmouth Garrison Volunteers.

[34] HRO, 11M49/239, Thomas Whitcomb to Lord Bolton, 14 March 1803; TNA, HO 50/72, S. Gaselee, Mayor, to Lord Pelham, 14 July 1803; TNA, HO 50/336, Home Office: Military Correspondence, Volunteers, supplementary Hampshire to Huntingdon 1794-1813, Lord Bolton to Lord Hobart, 23 May 1803.

[35] Alfred Temple Patterson, Portsmouth : a history (Bradford-on-Avon: Moonraker Press, 1976), 91.

[36] Colley, Britons: forging the nation, 316-17; K. B. Linch, 'A Geography of Loyalism?: The Local Military Forces of the West Riding of Yorkshire, 1794-1814', War and Society 19, no. 1 (2001): 15.

[37] Daniel Defoe, A tour thro' the whole island of Great Britain, divided into circuits or journies, (1724), http://www.visionofbritain.org.uk/text/chap_page.jsp?t_id=Defoe&c_id=8.

[38] John Webb, The Spirit of Portsmouth : a history (Chichester, Sussex: Phillimore, 1989), 25 & 76.

[39] HRO, 11M49/239, Charles Yorke to Lord Bolton, 9 March 1804, fol. 56.

[40] Brian Murphy and R. G. Thorne, 'Portsmouth, Borough', Institue of Historical Research, http://historyofparliamentonline.org/volume/1790-1820/constituencies/portsmouth.

[41] TNA, HO 50/394, Home Office: Military Correspondence - War Office, etc., W. H. Clinton to John King Esq., 3 September 1803.

[42] J. K. Laughton, 'Saxton, Sir Charles, baronet (1732–1808),' rev. Roger Morriss, in Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, ed. H. C. G. Matthew and Brian Harrison (Oxford: OUP, 2004); online ed., ed. David Cannadine, 2004, http://0-www.oxforddnb.com.wam.leeds.ac.uk/view/article/24759 (accessed July 25, 2016).

[43] For the plan for dockyard and victualling office, see TNA, HO50/72, Lord Bolton to Charles Yorke, 24 August 1803. On the problems appointing Deacon, HRO, 11M49/239, John Whitelocke to Lord Bolton, 12 November 1803, fol. 17, HRO, 11M49/239, John Whitelocke to Lord Bolton, 14 January 1804, and HRO, 11M49/239, Bgd. Gen. George Porter to Lord Bolton, 29 August 1804, fols. 255-259.

[44] HRO, 11M49/239, Lord Bolton to Lord Hawkesbury, 10 June 1804, fols. 180-83.

[45] TNA, HO 50/336, Lord Bolton to Lord Hobart, 23 May 1803.

[46] Charles Williams, It is not all gold that glitters, or volunteers settling about pedigree and precedence, (S. W. Fores, 1798), height: 256 millimetres, width: 358 millimetres. A print

with two designs side by side, in one a volunteer sits on a latrine, wiping his derriere with a letter from Mr Hick---; in the second part, in a brewer's counting house one volunteers receive the letter and complains of the affront it is to him, whilst another volunteer counsels him to 'have a pop at him' For full details see http://www.britishmuseum.org/research/collection_online/collection_object_details.aspx?assetId=91982001&objectId=1466904&partId=1.

[47] HRO, 11M49/239, William Garrett to Lord Bolton, 17 February 1804, fols. 127-33.

[48] HRO, 11M49/239, Lord Bolton to Lord Hobart, 21 August 1803, fol. 3.

[49] TNA, HO 50/72, Lord Bolton to Lord Hobart, 16 August 1803. On the limiting of volunteer numbers see Fortescue, The county lieutenancies and the army, 1803 – 1814, 63-64, and for Bolton's indignant response to limiting volunteer numbers, see TNA, HO 50/72, Lord Bolton to Lord Hobart, 16 August 1803.

[50] HRO, 11M49/F/O38, Lord Bolton to Lord Hobart, 28 July 1803, fol. 40-44.

[51] There were 6,011 men aged 18-45 in the Portsdown division of Hampshire (TNA, HO50/336, ? Bishop to Lord Pelham, 28 March 1802) and 9,032 aged between 17 and 55. Comparison at county level show an average of 22% acorss the UK of the male population in the volunteers: 'Volunteers of the United Kingdom, 1803', House of Commons Papers, 1803-4, XI.9, http://parlipapers.proquest.com/parlipapers/docview/t70.d75.1803-000613?accountid=14664 compared to population figures in 'Account of Abstracts of Subdivision Rolls in Great Britain under Militia Act', HCP, XI.253, http://parlipapers.proquest.com/parlipapers/docview/t70.d75.1803-000621?accountid=14664.

[52] K. Linch, 'Making New Soldiers', in Britain's soldiers : rethinking war and society, 1715-1815, ed. K. Linch and M. McCormack (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2014), 202-19.

[53] 'Portsmouth, Saturday August 20', Hampshire Telegraph and Sussex Chronicle, 22 August 1803.

[54] 'Portsmouth, Saturday August 13', Hampshire Telegraph and Sussex Chronicle, 15 August 1803.

[55] 'Portsmouth, Saturday November 5', Hampshire Telegraph and Sussex Chronicle, 7 November 1803.

[56] HRO, 11M49/239, John Whitelocke to Lord Bolton, 6 September 1803, fol. 7; HRO, 11M49/F/O38, Lord Bolton to Lord Hobart, 28 July 1803, fols. 40-44.

[57] Portsmouth, Saturday July 30', Hampshire Telegraph and Sussex Chronicle, 1 August 1803.

[58] HRO, 11M49/239, Lord Bolton to Lord Hobart, 21 August 1803, fol. 3.

[59] 'Portsmouth Cathedral - The Arnaud Family,' http://www.memorials.inportsmouth.co.uk/churches/cathedral/arnaud.htm; HRO, 11M49/239, John Whitelocke to Lord Bolton, 6 September 1803, fol. 7.

[60] HRO, 11M49/239, Lord Bolton to Lord Hobart, 21 August 1803, fol. 3; HRO, 11M49/239, Charles Yorke to Lord Bolton, 26 August 1803, fol. 6.

[61] HRO, 11M49/239, John Whitelocke to Lord Bolton, 25 September 1803, fol. 10.

[62] 'Portsmouth, Portsea, and Gosport Volunteers', The London Gazette, 1 October 1803.

[63] HRO, 11M49/239, John Whitelocke to Lord Bolton, 12 November 1803, fol. 17.

[64] HRO, 11M49/239, John Whitelocke to Lord Bolton, 14 January 1804, fols. 36-37.

[65] HRO, 11M49/239, George Garrett, Mr Greetham junior, J. A. Hickley, J. C. Mottley to Lord Bolton, 29 March 1804, fols. 144-47.

[66] HRO, 11M49/239, William Garrett to Lord Bolton, 9 June 1804, fols. 175-79.

[67] HRO, 11M49/239, William Garrett to Lord Bolton, 23 May 1804, fols. 157-62.

[68] HRO, 11M49/239, William Garrett to Lord Bolton, 5 July 1804, fols. 203-06.

[69] 9 sergeants, 20 corporals, 13 drummers, and 190 privates; TNA, WO13/4365, War Office and predecessors: Militia and Volunteers Muster Books and Pay Lists, Inspection Return and Certificates, Return of the Portsmouth Battalion of Volunteer Infantry present at Inspection during the Year 1805, 1805.

[70] Return of Effective Strength of Volunteer Corps of Cavalry, Infantry and Artillery in Great Britain, March 1806, House of Commons Papers; Accounts and Papers (1806), X: 269-271.

[71] Cookson, 'The Rise and Fall of the Sutton Volunteers, 1803-4'; Fortescue, The county lieutenancies and the army, 1803 – 1814, 98-110.

[72] Eugene Charlton Black, The Association : British extraparliamentary political organization, 1769-1793 (London: Harvard University Press, 1963).

[73] HRO, 11M49/239, John Whitelocke to Lord Bolton, 25 September 1803, fol. 10.

[74] TNA, HO 50/72, Lord Bolton to Charles Yorke, 5 Decemeber 1803.

[75] TNA, 11M49/239, John Whitelocke to Lord Botlon, 6 October 1803, fols. 12-13; 'Portsmouth, Portsea, and Gosport Volunteers', The London Gazette, 1 October 1803.

[76] For a full catalogue of Volunteer legislation see Fortescue, The county lieutenancies and the army, 1803 - 1814.

[77] TNA, HO 50/72, Lord Bolton to Charles Yorke, 5 Decemeber 1803. Lieutenant-Colonel Duke had served in the American War of Independence and Canada during the French Revolutionary Wars; 'Lieutenant-Colonel George Duke', in The Royal Military Calendar, Or Army Service and Commission Book, ed. John Philippart (A.J. Valpy, sold by T. Egerton, 1820), 307.

[78] HRO, 11M49/239, John Whitelocke to Lord Bolton, 28 September 1803, fols. 11-12.

[79] TNA, HO 50/72, Lord Bolton to Charles Yorke, 5 Decemeber 1803.

[80] TNA, HO 50/396, Home Office: Military Correspondence - War Office, etc., W. H. Clinton to Pole Carew, 11 February 1804; HRO, 11M49/239, Charles Yorke to Lord Bolton, 15 February 1804, fols. 51-52.

[81] HRO, 11M49/239, Memorandum, (not dated but around 10 or 11 February 1804), fols. 77-79.

[82] HRO, 11M49/239, William Garrett to Lord Bolton, 11 February 1804, fols. 105-12.

[83] HRO, 11M49/239, William Garrett to Lord Bolton, 17 February 1804, fols. 127-33.

[84] HRO, 11M49/239, Lord Bolton to John Whitelocke, 11 February 1804, fols. 94-105.

[85] HRO, 11M49/239, Charles Yorke to Lord Bolton, 15 February 1804, fols. 51-52.

[86] HRO, 11M49/239, William Garrett to Lord Bolton, 11 February 1804, fols. 105-12.

[87] HRO, 11M49/239, George Garrett, Mr Greetham junior, J. A. Hickley, J. C. Mottley to Lord Bolton, 29 March 1804, fols. 144-47.

[88] HRO, 11M49/239, William Garrett to Lord Bolton, 11 February 1804, fols. 105-12.

[89] HRO, 11M49/239, G. Garrett, Mr. Greetham junior, J. A. Hickley to Lord Bolton, 11 April 1804, fols. 151-54.

[90] HRO, 11M49/239, George Garrett, Mr Greetham junior, J. A. Hickley, J. C. Mottley to Lord Bolton, 29 March 1804, fols. 144-47.

[91] HRO, 11M49/239, G. Garrett to Lord Bolton, 22 April 1804, fols. 155-56.

[92] HRO, 11M49/239, G. Garrett, J. C. Mottley, M. Greetham, and J. A. Hickley to Lord Bolton, 26 April 1804, fols. 156-157.

[93] HRO, 11M49/239, John Whitelocke to Lord Bolton, 14 January 1804, fols. 36-37; TNA, HO50/107, Lord Bolton to Charles Yorke, 1 February 1804.

[94] HRO, 11M49/239, William Garrett to Lord Bolton, 17 February 1804, fols. 127-33.

[95] HRO, 11M49/239, Charles Yorke to Lord Bolton, 9 March 1804, fol. 56.

[96] HRO, 11M49/239, John Whitelocke to Lord Bolton, 10 February 1804, fols. 80-91.

[97] HRO, 11M49/239, Memorandum, (not dated but around 10 or 11 February 1804), fols. 77-79.

[98] 'Battalion of Volunteers formed for permanent Duty at Portsmouth and its Dependencies', The London Gazette, 26 November 1803; 'Battalion of Volunteers formed for permanent Duty at Portsmouth and its Dependencies', The London Gazette, 6 December 1803.

[99] HRO, 11M49/239, William Garrett to Lord Bolton, 17 January 1804, fols. 38-40.

[100] HRO, 11M49/239, William Garrett to Lord Bolton, 17 February 1804, fols. 127-33; HRO, 11M49/239, William Garrett to Lord Bolton, 23 January 1804, fols. 43-45.

[101] HRO, 11M49/239, Charles Yorke to Lord Bolton, 9 March 1804, fol. 56.

[102] HRO, 11M49/239, James Charles Mottley to Lord Bolton, 15 February 1804, fols. 126-27.

[103] HRO, 11M49/239, William Garrett to Lord Bolton, 13 January 1804, fols. 35-36.

[104] HRO, 11M49/239, William Garrett to Lord Bolton, 17 February 1804, fols. 127-33.

[105] HRO, 11M49/239, M. Greetham junior to Lord Bolton, 24 January 1804, fols. 68-69; HRO, 11M49/239, William Garrett to Lord Bolton, 17 February 1804, fols. 127-33.

[106] HRO, 11M49/239, William Garrett to Lord Bolton, 17 February 1804, fols. 127-33.

[107] HRO, 11M49/239, George Garrett, Mr Greetham junior, J. A. Hickley, J. C. Mottley to Lord Bolton, 29 March 1804, fols. 144-47.

[108] HRO, 11M49/239, G. Garrett, J. C. Mottley, M. Greetham, and J. A. Hickley to Lord Bolton, 22 April 1804.

[109] HRO, 11M49/239, G. Garrett, M. Greetham, and J. A. Hickley to Lord Bolton, 4 June 1804, fols. 163-70.

[110] TNA, HO50/107, Lord Bolton to Chalres Yorke, 1 February 1804.

[111] HRO, 11M49/239, William Garrett to Lord Bolton, 17 February 1804, fols.127-33.

[112] HRO, 11M49/239, George Garrett, Mr Greetham junior, J. A. Hickley, J. C. Mottley to Lord Bolton, 29 March 1804, fols. 144-47.

[113] HRO, 11M49/239, William Garrett to Lord Bolton, 9 June 1804, fols. 175-79.

[114] HRO, 11M49/239, William Garrett to Lord Bolton, 5 July 1804, fols. 203-06.

[115] Stuart Semmel, Napoleon and the British (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004), 44-46.

[116] HRO, 11M49/239, William Garrett to Lord Bolton, 13 January 1804, fols. 35-36.

[117] HRO, 11M49/239, William Garrett to Lord Bolton, 23 January 1804, fols. 43-45.

[118] HRO, 11M49/239, William Garrett to Lord Bolton, 17 February 1804, fols. 127-33.

[119] HRO, 11M49/239, George Garrett, Mr Greetham junior, J. A. Hickley, J. C. Mottley to Lord Bolton, 29 March 1804, fols. 144-47.

[120] HO 50/107, Lord Bolton to Lord Hawkesbury, 21 June 1804.

[121] HRO, 11M49/239, William Garret to Lord Bolton, 11 June 1804, fols. 184-89.

[122] See for example, Jennifer Mori, 'Languages of Loyalism: Patriotism, Nationhood and the State in the 1790s' English Historical Review 118, no. 475 (2003): 56.

[123] Gee, The British Volunteer Movement, 266.

[124] Cookson, British Armed Nation, 211-213; Colley, Britons.

[125] Lawrence Stone, ed., An Imperial State at War: Britain from 1689 to 1815 (London: Routledge, 1994), 6.