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An Improved DCM-based Tunable True Random Number Generator for Xilinx FPGA

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Abstract—True Random Number Generators (TRNGs) play a very important role in modern cryptographic systems. Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) form an ideal platform for hardware implementations of many of these security algorithms. In this paper we present a highly efficient and tunable TRNG based on the principle of Beat Frequency Detection (BFD), specifically for Xilinx FPGA based applications. The main advantages of the proposed TRNG are its on-the-fly tunability through Dynamic Partial Reconfiguration (DPR) to improve randomness qualities. We describe the mathematical model of the TRNG operations, and experimental results for the circuit implemented on a Xilinx Virtex-V FPGA. The proposed TRNG has low hardware footprint and in-built bias elimination capabilities. The random bitstreams generated from it passes all tests in the NIST statistical testsuite.

Keywords—Digital Clock Manager, Dynamic Partial Reconfiguration, Field Programmable Gate Arrays, True Random Number Generator.

I. INTRODUCTION

True Random Number Generators (TRNGs) have become indispensable component in many cryptographic systems, including PIN/password generation, authentication protocols, key generation, random padding and nonce generation. TRNG circuits utilize a non-deterministic random process, usually in the form of electrical noise, as a basic source of randomness. Along with the noise source, a noise harvesting mechanism to extract the noise, and a post-processing stage to provide a uniform statistical distribution are other important components of the TRNG. Our focus is to design an improved FPGA based TRNGs, using purely digital components. Using digital building blocks for TRNGs has the advantage that the designs are relatively simple and well-suited to the FPGA design flow, as they can suitably leverage the CAD software tools available for FPGA design. However, digital circuits exhibit comparatively limited number of sources of random noise, e.g. metastability of circuit elements, frequency of free running oscillators and jitters (random phase shifts) in clock signals. As would be evident, our proposed TRNG circuit utilizes the frequency difference of two oscillators and oscillator jitter as sources of randomness.

Reconfigurable devices have become an integral part of many embedded digital systems, and predicted to become the platform of choice for general computing in near future. From

being mainly prototyping devices, reconfigurable systems including FPGAs are being widely employed in cryptographic applications, as they can provide acceptable to high processing rate at much lower cost and faster design cycle time. Hence, many embedded systems in the domain of security require a high quality TRNG implementable on FPGA as a component. We present a TRNG for Xilinx FPGA based applications, which has a tunable jitter control capability based on DPR capabilities available on Xilinx FPGAs. The major contribution of this paper is the development of an architecture which allows on-the-fly tunability of statistical qualities of a TRNG by utilizing DPR capabilities of modern FPGAs for varying the DCM modeling parameters. To the best of our knowledge this is the first reported work which incorporates tunability in a TRNG. This approach is only applicable for Xilinx FPGAs which provide programmable clock generation mechanism, and capability of DPR.

DPR is a relatively new enhancement in FPGA technology, whereby modifications to predefined portions of the FPGA logic fabric is possible on-the-fly, without affecting the normal functionality of the FPGA. Xilinx Clock Management Tiles (CMTs) contain Dynamic Reconfiguration Port (DRP) which allow DPR to be performed through much simpler means [1]. Using DPR, the clock frequencies generated can be changed on-the-fly by adjusting the corresponding DCM parameters. DPR via DRP is an added advantage in FPGAs as it allows the user to tune the clock frequency as per the need. Design techniques exist to prevent any malicious manipulations via DPR which in other ways may detrimentally affect the security of the system [2].

The goal of this paper is the design, analysis and implementation of an easy-to-design, improved, low-overhead, tunable TRNG for the FPGA platform. The following are our major contributions:

- 1) We investigate the limitations of the BFD-TRNG [3] when implemented on a FPGA design platform. To solve the shortcomings, we propose an improved BFD-TRNG architecture suitable for FPGA based applications. To the best of our knowledge this is the first reported work which incorporates tunability in a fully digital TRNG.
- 2) We analyze the modified proposed architecture mathematically and experimentally.
- 3) Our experimental results strongly support the mathematical model proposed. The proposed TRNG has low hardware overhead, and the random bitstreams derived from the proposed TRNG passes all tests in the NIST statistical testsuite [4].

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The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II discusses the preliminaries, followed by the proposed TRNG design in Section III. The mathematical model of the proposed design is discussed in Section IV. Section V describes the implementation and experimental results. We conclude in Section VI.

II. BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION

This section briefly describes the basic BFD-TRNG model and the DPR methodology utilizing DRP ports available in *Xilinx* CMTs.

A. Single Phase BFD-TRNG Model

The BFD-TRNG circuit [3] is a fully-digital TRNG, which relies on jitter extraction by the *Beat Frequency Detection* (BFD) mechanism, originally implemented as a 65-nm CMOS ASIC. The structure and working of the (single phase) BFD-TRNG can be summarised as follows, in conjunction with Fig. 1:

- 1) The circuit consists of two quasi-identical ring oscillators (let us term them as $ROSC_A$ and $ROSC_B$), with similar construction and placement. Due to inherent physical randomness originating from *process variation* effects associated with deep sub-micron CMOS manufacturing, one of the oscillators (say, $ROSC_A$) oscillates slightly faster than the other oscillator ($ROSC_B$). In addition, the authors [3] proposed to employ trimming capacitors to further tune the oscillator output frequencies.
- 2) The output of one of the ROs is used to sample the output of the other, using a D flip-flop (DFF). Without loss of generality, assume the output of $ROSC_A$ is fed to the D -input of the DFF, while the output of $ROSC_B$ is connected to the clock input of the DFF.
- 3) At certain time intervals (determined by the frequency difference of the two ROCs), the faster oscillator signal passes, catches up, and overtakes the slower signal in phase. Due to random jitter, these capturing events happen at random intervals, called “Beat Frequency Intervals”. As a result, the DFF outputs a logic-1 at different random instances.
- 4) A counter controlled by the DFF increments during the beat frequency intervals, and gets reset due to the logic-1 output of the DFF. Due to the random jitter, the free-running counter output ramps up to different peak values in each of the count-up intervals before getting reset.
- 5) The output of the counter is sampled by a sampling clock before it reaches its maximum value.
- 6) The sampled response is then serialized to obtain the random bitstream.

B. Shortcoming of the BFD-TRNG

One shortcoming of the previous BFD-TRNG circuit is that its statistical randomness is dependent on the design quality of the ring oscillators. Any design bias in the ring oscillators might adversely affect the statistical randomness of the bitstream generated by the TRNG. Designs with same number of




Fig. 1: Architecture of single phase BFD-TRNG [3].

inverters but different placements resulted in varying counter maximas. Additionally the same ring-oscillator based BFD-TRNG implemented on different FPGAs of the same family shows distinct counter maximas. Unfortunately, since the ring oscillators are free-running, it is difficult to control them to eliminate any design bias. The problem is exacerbated in FPGAs where it is often difficult to control design bias because of the lack of fine-grained designer control on routing in the FPGA design fabric. A relatively simple way of tuning clock generator hardware primitives on *Xilinx* FPGAs, particularly the *Phase Locked Loop* (PLL) or the *Digital Clock Manager* (DCM) as used in this work, is by enabling dynamic reconfiguration via the *Dynamic Reconfiguration Ports* (DRPs). Once enabled, the clock generators can be tuned to generate clock signals of different frequencies by modifying values at the DRPs [1] on-the-fly, without needing to bring the device off-line.

We next describe the proposed tunable BFD-TRNG suitable for FPGA platforms.

III. TUNABLE BFD-TRNG FOR FPGA BASED APPLICATIONS

A. Design Overview

Fig. 2 shows the overall architecture of the proposed TRNG. In place of two ring oscillators, two DCM modules generate the oscillation waveforms. The DCM primitives are parameterized to generate slightly different frequencies, by adjusting two design parameters M (*Multiplication Factor*) and D (*Division Factor*). In the proposed design, the source of randomness is the jitter presented in the DCM circuitry. The DCM modules allow greater designer control over the clock waveforms, and their usage eliminates the need for initial calibration [3]. Tunability is established by setting the DCM parameters on-the-fly using DPR capabilities using DRP ports. This capability provides the design greater flexibility than the ring oscillator based BFD-TRNG. The difference in the frequencies of the two generated clock signals is captured using a DFF. The DFF sets when the faster oscillator completes one cycle more than the slower one (at the beat frequency interval). A counter is driven by one of the generated clock signals, and is reset when the DFF is set. Effectively, the counter increases the throughput of the generated random numbers. The last three LSBs of the maximum count values reached by the count were found to show good randomness properties.




Fig. 2: Overall architecture of proposed Digital Clock Manager based tunable BFD-TRNG.




Fig. 3: Architecture of tuning circuitry.

Additionally, we have a simple post-processing unit using a *Von Neumann Corrector* (VNC) [5] to eliminate any biasing in the generated random bits. VNC is a well-known low-overhead scheme to eliminate bias from a random bitstream. In this scheme, any input bit “00” or “11” pattern is eliminated; otherwise, if the input bit pattern is “01” or “10”, only the first bit is retained. The last three LSBs of the generated random number is passed through the VNC. The VNC improves the statistical qualities at the cost of slight decrease in throughput.

B. Tuning Circuitry

The architecture of the tuning circuitry is shown in Fig. 3. The target clock frequency is determined by the set of parameter values actually selected. The random values reached by the counter, as well as the jitter are related to the chosen parameters M and D (details are discussed in Section IV). This makes it possible to tune the proposed TRNG using the predetermined stored M and D values. As unrestricted DPR has been shown to be a potential threat to the circuit [6], the safe operational value combinations of the D and M parameters for each DCM are predetermined during the design time, and stored on an on-chip *Block RAM* (BRAM) memory block in the FPGA.

There are actually two different options for the clock generators – one can use the *Phase Locked Loop* (PLL) hard macros available on *Xilinx* FPGAs, or the DCMs. We next describe analytical and experimental results which compelled us to choose DCM in favor of the PLL modules for clock waveform generation.

IV. MATHEMATICAL MODEL OF PROPOSED TRNG

A. Circuit Behavior with PLL as Clock Generator

We first consider the operational principle for the PLL, and its feasibility as a component of the proposed TRNG. The *Xilinx* PLL synthesizes a clock signal whose frequency is given by:

$$F_{CLKFX} = F_{CLKIN} \cdot \frac{M}{D} \quad (1)$$

where F_{CLKIN} is the frequency of input clock signal, and M and D are the multiplication and division factors previously mentioned. Values of M and D can be varied to generate the required clock frequency. The two PLLs can be parametrized with the necessary set of (M, D) values to generate two slightly different clock frequencies. Without loss of generality, assume PLL_A is set up to be slightly faster than PLL_B , i.e. the time periods are related by $T_A < T_B$. On reaching the beat frequency interval (say, n clock cycles), by definition, PLL_A completes one cycle more than the slower one. The following equation depicts this simple model:

$$\frac{T_A}{T_B} = \frac{N}{N+1} \quad (2)$$

$N = 2.n$, where n is the estimated maximum counter value. For the first n clock cycles, the counter does not increment, and then increments by one for each of the next n clock cycles. Hence, the maximum counter values reached is n . Then, Eqn. (2) leads to:

$$n = \left\lfloor \frac{T_B}{2(T_B - T_A)} \right\rfloor \quad (3)$$

Using design configuration parameters (M and D) one of the oscillators is made to run faster than the other. This is done in order to limit the range of counter values produced. If both the oscillators were configured to run at the same frequency we may get random numbers, but the maximum counter value produced will be very high (theoretically infinite) as per Eqn. (3). In other words, the latency of the circuit will be very high, since the counter sets and resets only after reaching a very large count value. When the *Xilinx* PLLs are used as clock generators, the predicted and observed counter values for all combinations of (M, D) values remain the same. This confirms that the *Xilinx* PLL instances demonstrate close-to-ideal behavior and are quasi-identical, and have negligible jitter between the waveforms generated by them. Since the BFD-TRNG is critically dependent on the presence of jitter between the two generated clock waveforms, PLLs seem unsuitable as components of the proposed TRNG. Hence, next we examine the DCM as clock generators.

B. Circuit Behavior with DCM as Clock Generator

Without loss of generality, the clock signals produced by one of the DCM (say, DCM_A) is slightly faster than the other (DCM_B), implying $T_A < T_B$. This is ensured by assigning the design parameters M and D as in Eqn. (7). More details are discussed in Section IV-C. Timing diagrams of the DCM clock outputs and the resultant DFF response is shown in Fig. 4. Let N be the number of clock cycles of the slower clock signal in which the faster clock signal completes exactly one cycle more. Then,

$$t_A[N+1] = (N+1)T_A + \epsilon_A \quad (4)$$

and

$$t_B[N] = NT_B + \epsilon_B \quad (5)$$

where ϵ_A and ϵ_B are the uncertainties due to jitter in DCM_A and DCM_B respectively. The uncertainties due to jitter in




Fig. 4: Timing diagram of DCM output waveforms and the corresponding and DFF response.

TABLE I: Hardware Footprint of the Proposed TRNG[‡] and the Ring Oscillator based TRNG

Design	Module Name	Slice	SliceReg	LUTs	BUFG	DCM_ADV	PLL_ADV
DCM-based TRNG	Oscillators	4	0	4	4	2	0
	DFF	1	1	0	0	0	0
	Counter	9	25	15	30	0	0
	Total	14	26	19	34	2	0
Ring Oscillator based TRNG	Oscillators	23	0	90	0	0	0
	DFF	1	1	0	0	0	0
	Counter	9	25	15	30	0	0
	Sampler	0	0	0	1	0	1
	Total	33	26	15	31	0	1

[‡] The hardware footprint excludes the *MicroBlaze* soft processor necessary for overall control and data acquisition from the TRNG, and 46 bytes of memory required in the BRAM module to store the 23 feasible (M, D) calculations.

TABLE II: On-Chip Power Dissipation* of the Proposed TRNG and the Ring Oscillator based TRNG[‡]

On-Chip	Clock	Logic	Signal	BRAM	PLL	DCM	IO	Leakage	Total
DCM	0.098	0.001	0.002	0.003	0.134	0.136	0.034	1.062	1.470
-based TRNG									
Ring Oscillator	0.053	0.000	0.002	0.000	0.268	0.000	0.000	1.061	1.384
-based TRNG									

* Power dissipation in watt.

[‡] Sampling clock frequency is 103.1992 kHz.

DCM_A and DCM_B are different, this is because the DCMs are designed with distinct modeling parameters M and D . The corresponding jitter for each of the DCMs used in the proposed design is presented in Table III. For example, consider the configuration presented in Sl.No. 1. In this case, DCM_A is configured with $M=15$ and $D=31$ and DCM_B is configured with $M=14$ and $D=29$. This results in peak-to-peak jitter of 0.600 ns and 0.568 ns for DCM_A and DCM_B respectively. Of course, we also have: $t_A[N+1] = t_B[N]$. Assuming there is no metastability for the DFF if signal transitions occur in the setup-hold timing window around its driving clock edge (the metastability issue can be avoided by cascaded DFF combination), the transition time (t_d) of the DFF, the time interval after which it sets (i.e. the counter driven by the DFF resets), is estimated by:

$$t_d = \frac{t_A[N+1] + t_B[N]}{2} = \frac{(N+1)T_A + NT_B + \epsilon_A + \epsilon_B}{2} \quad (6)$$

From Eqn. (6), the transition time of DFF is a random process. The output of the DFF, i.e. the time interval (t_d) after which the counter resets, is thus a random function. As a result, the count value obtained when the counter resets is also a random quantity. The counter resets automatically when the DFF sets, and the operation continues. The DFF resets approximately n cycles after it sets, and the counter starts counting again.

C. Tuning Parameter Value Ranges

Eqns.(1)–(2) also holds true for DCM based beat frequency detection also. Hence, we have the following relationships:

$$\frac{D_1 \cdot M_2}{D_2 \cdot M_1} = \frac{N}{N+1} \begin{cases} 2 \leq M_i \leq 33, \\ 1 \leq D_i \leq 32, \\ 400 \leq N \leq 1000, \\ M_i, D_i, N \in \mathbb{Z}. \end{cases} \quad (7)$$

where, M and D values are as per the *Xilinx DCM* specification [1]. The count value to be sampled was set to be between 200 and 500, hence the values of N are as per Eqn. (7). Higher value of count is not desired, as it leads to higher power dissipation. As per Eqn. (7), there are 23 sets of (M, D) value combinations for the two DCMs, which satisfy the required count range. These values are stored in a *BRAM*, and for 23 distinct pairs we require 5 bit address line for selecting one of the combinations of M and D values, and if the *BRAM* is configured to hold 16-bit words, we require 46 bytes of memory. The address increments to the required *BRAM* location where the corresponding values of the DCM_B is stored on demand, using a simple address generation module. In this way, using a restricted DPR methodology, the designer has control over the DCM configuration to choose the best combination generating random numbers with the best statistical quality. In order to avoid malicious modifications via DPR, we have enabled DPR restrictively by storing the allowable modelling parameters. In order to implement this secure tunable design slightly higher hardware overhead and power dissipation is required. The DCM-DRP controller initiates DPR in DCM_A and DCM_B using standard *Xilinx* design methodology [1].

V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS

The proposed circuit was designed using *Verilog* HDL, and implemented using *Xilinx ISE* (v 14.5) CAD software platform targeting the *Xilinx Virtex-V* FPGA platform. The DCM-DRP controller was implemented using the *MicroBlaze* soft processor directly core directly instantiable in a *Xilinx* FPGA. Table-I shows the hardware resource requirements results of the proposed TRNG, excluding the soft processor and the *BRAM* memory. This table also compares the hardware resource incurred in the design of ring oscillator-based BFD-TRNG which configured with target (nominal) time period of 38.00 ns (89 inverters). The clock signals produced by the DCMs are sets of values of the design parameters M and D as per Eq.(1). DCM is more controllable because there is control over the two parameters M and D which is set by the designer, no such parameters exist for the RO based conventional BFD-TRNG. Additionally, it was observed that same hard macro based conventional BFD-TRNG implemented on different FPGAs show different counter maximas. In ASIC-based designs, trimming capacitors are used to adjust the frequencies of the clock generator circuitry; however, it is difficult to have such a mechanism on FPGA implementations. A *Microblaze* processor is used in this design to collect the generated random numbers back to the computer. Due to the process variation effects, a frequency difference of 0.1959%

TABLE III: Experimental and Estimated Results of Counter Value Distribution

Sl.No.	DCM-1						DCM-2						Counter	
	M	D	Output Freq. (MHz)	Period Jitter (unit interval) (ns)	Period Jitter (pk-to-pk) (ns)		M	D	Output Freq. (MHz)	Period Jitter (unit interval) (ns)	Period Jitter (pk-to-pk) (ns)		Estimated Max. Count	Experimental Relative Std. Dev. (%)
1	15	31	48.3871	0.029	0.600		14	29	48.2759	0.027	0.568		217	0.7683
2	21	22	95.4545	0.043	0.453		20	21	95.2381	0.042	0.436		220	1.1735
3	17	21	80.9534	0.035	0.436		21	26	80.7692	0.042	0.518		220	3.0310
4	20	27	74.0741	0.040	0.535		17	23	73.9130	0.035	0.469		229	6.3010
5	15	29	51.7241	0.029	0.568		16	31	51.6129	0.031	0.600		232	5.4424
6	17	25	68.0000	0.034	0.502		19	28	67.8571	0.037	0.551		237	1.2370
7	22	23	95.6522	0.045	0.469		21	22	95.9545	0.043	0.453		241	3.3484
8	19	29	65.5172	0.037	0.568		17	26	65.3846	0.034	0.518		246	5.0744
9	19	32	59.3750	0.037	0.617		16	27	59.2593	0.032	0.535		256	1.0534
10	22	31	70.9677	0.043	0.600		17	24	70.8333	0.034	0.486		268	0.8939
11	23	24	95.8333	0.047	0.486		22	23	95.6522	0.045	0.469		269	4.6929
12	19	25	76.0000	0.038	0.502		22	29	75.8621	0.043	0.568		275	1.0690
13	24	25	96.0000	0.048	0.502		23	24	95.8333	0.047	0.486		287	1.9877
14	21	32	65.6250	0.040	0.617		19	29	65.5172	0.037	0.568		304	0.9336
15	23	31	74.1936	0.045	0.060		20	27	74.0741	0.040	0.535		310	1.2826
16	25	26	96.1538	0.050	0.518		24	25	96.0000	0.048	0.502		312	5.3238
17	21	26	80.7692	0.042	0.518		25	31	80.6452	0.048	0.600		325	5.0382
18	26	27	96.2963	0.052	0.535		25	26	96.1538	0.050	0.518		337	1.8000
19	27	28	96.4286	0.053	0.551		26	27	96.2963	0.052	0.535		364	1.5485
20	28	29	96.5517	0.055	0.568		27	28	96.4286	0.053	0.551		391	1.7102
21	29	30	96.6667	0.056	0.584		28	29	96.5517	0.055	0.568		420	14.3593
22	30	31	96.7742	0.058	0.600		29	30	96.6667	0.056	0.584		449	3.8755
23	31	32	96.8750	0.060	0.6170		30	31	96.5542	0.058	0.600		480	3.6902

was observed between the two ring oscillators. Additionally, hardware resource and power consumption varies with different clock frequency of the ring oscillator. Also, this design is vulnerable to Hardware Trojan Horse (HTH) insertions imposed on sampling clocks [7]. Table-II shows the power analysis report of the proposed TRNG and the Ring Oscillator based BFD-TRNG, the proposed design has about 6% power overhead compared to BFD-TRNG. Assuming an average TRNG count of 271 (corresponding to memory location 12), counter operating at 75.8621 MHz (corresponding to DCM_B), 50% bits rejected by the Von Neumann Corrector, and 3 bits per random number retained, the *Power-delay Product* (PDP) of the proposed TRNG is 3.50 mJ per kilobit.

The tunable sets of DCM parameters, and the resultant theoretical and experimental random numbers are shown in Table-III. To understand the results, consider the configuration presented in Sl.No. (1) in the table. In this case, DCM_A is configured with $M = 15$ and $D = 31$, and DCM_B is configured with $M = 14$ and $D = 29$. This results in peak-to-peak jitter of 0.600 ns and 0.568 ns for DCM_A and DCM_B respectively. The resulting clock frequencies synthesized are 48.3871 MHz and 48.2759 MHz respectively. The estimated counter values as per Eqn. (3) is 217, and the corresponding mean of the counter value distribution obtained experimentally is 215. Hence, there is a relative deviation of 0.7683.

The statistical performance of the design is shown in Table-IV. This table presents the p -values and proportions corresponding for the individual NIST tests on the generated random numbers with mean 217, 275 and 480 respectively (corresponding to results for three separate cases: Sl. No. 1, 12, and 23 considered in Table III). From the results, it is evident that the proposed TRNG exhibits excellent randomness properties at low hardware footprint and low power dissipation.

VI. CONCLUSION

We have presented an improved fully digital tunable TRNG for FPGA based applications, based on the principle of Beat Frequency Detection and clock jitter, and with in-built error-correction capabilities. The TRNG utilizes this tunability feature for determining the degree of randomness, thus providing

TABLE IV: NIST Statistical Test Results[‡]

Max. Count	217		275		480	
	$\Delta f = 0.1112$		$\Delta f = 0.1379$		$\Delta f = 0.3208$	
Test	p-value	prop.	p-value	prop.	p-value	prop.
Frequency	0.9114	1.0	0.5341	1.0	0.0669	1.0
BlockFrequency	0.9114	1.0	0.2133	1.0	0.7399	1.0
CumulativeSums*	0.3505	1.0	0.52133	1.0	0.1223	1.0
Runs	0.0089	0.8	0.7399	1.0	0.1223	0.8
LongestRun	0.7400	1.0	0.5341	1.0	0.2133	1.0
Rank	0.3505	1.0	0.5341	1.0	0.5341	1.0
FFT	0.0089	1.0	0.0352	1.0	0.5341	1.0
NonOverlappingTemp.*	0.0043	1.0	0.0089	0.8	0.0089	0.8
OverlappingTemplate	0.2133	0.8	0.3505	1.0	0.5341	1.0
ApproximateEntropy	0.7399	1.0	0.7399	1.0	0.5341	0.9
Serial*	0.5341	1.0	0.1223	1.0	0.7399	1.0
LinearComplexity	0.9114	1.0	0.5341	1.0	0.7399	1.0

[‡] For tests with more than one subtest, the p -value and proportion shown are the smaller values.

a high degree of flexibility for various applications. The proposed design successfully passes all NIST statistical tests.

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