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## **Social impacts of neoliberal conservation: formations, inequalities, contestations**

3

4 **Abstract:**

5 In recent years, perhaps the two most prominent debates in geography on issues of biodiversity  
6 conservation have hinged upon, firstly, the positive and negative social impacts of conservation  
7 projects on human populations, and, secondly, the apparent neoliberalisation of conservation. Yet  
8 so far there have been few explicit linkages drawn between these debates. This paper moves both  
9 debates forward by presenting the first review of how the neoliberalisation of conservation has  
10 affected the kinds of impacts that conservation projects entail for local communities. It finds that,  
11 whilst there are important variegations within neoliberal conservation, processes of  
12 neoliberalisation nevertheless tend to produce certain recurring trends in their social impacts.  
13 Firstly, neoliberal conservation often involves novel forms of power, particularly those that seek to  
14 re-shape local subjectivities in accordance with both conservationist and neoliberal-economic  
15 values. Secondly, it relies on greater use of use of representation and spectacle to produce  
16 commodities and access related markets, which can both create greater negative social impacts and  
17 offer new opportunities for local people to contest and reshape conservation projects. Thirdly,  
18 neoliberal conservation projects frequently widen the distribution of social impacts by interacting  
19 with pre-existing social, economic, and political inequalities. Accordingly, the paper illuminates how  
20 neoliberal approaches to conservation generate novel opportunities and constraints for struggles  
21 toward more socially and environmentally just forms of biodiversity preservation.

22 **Key words:** Neoliberalism; conservation; social impacts; political ecology; protected areas

23 **Running header:** Social impacts of neoliberal conservation

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27

28 **Introduction**

29 The last few decades have witnessed a rapid proliferation of interest amongst conservation  
30 agencies, civil society organisations, bilateral and multilateral donors, and academics about the  
31 social impacts of conservation measures, or the ways in which efforts to conserve biodiversity might  
32 positively and/or negatively affect the wellbeing of various human populations. Here, wellbeing  
33 encompasses a range of factors including livelihoods, culture and cultural survival, political  
34 empowerment, and physical and mental health. While conservation projects can deliver benefits  
35 such as employment opportunities and revenue from ecotourism or payment for ecosystem service  
36 schemes, they can also entail direct or indirect negative consequences, including restrictions on  
37 livelihoods, resource access, and forced displacements (West and Brockington, 2005).

38 Disagreements over the nature and distribution of these impacts have given rise to a vociferous and  
39 occasionally quite polarised debate within the pages of academic journals, as well as in conservation  
40 organisations, donor agencies, and international conferences (e.g. Roe 2008; Brockington and Wilkie  
41 2015). In recent years, these debates have been further complicated by an additional trend within  
42 academic publications – and largely without attaining a comparable degree of prominence within  
43 conservation organisations – about a perceived turn towards so-called ‘neoliberal’ forms of  
44 conservation (e.g. Igoe and Brockington 2007; Dressler and Roth 2011; Arsel and Büscher 2012).  
45 Here, ‘neoliberal conservation’ refers to a complex and multifaceted trend characterized largely by  
46 the rise of practices and discourses of financialisation, marketization, privatization, commodification,  
47 and decentralisation within conservation governance (Igoe and Brockington 2007; see also Castree  
48 2010; Fairhead et al. 2012). Although the rise of the academic literature on neoliberal conservation  
49 has been precipitous – including empirical case studies that explore how neoliberal forms of  
50 conservation have affected human wellbeing – there has been no comprehensive overview of these  
51 cases. Moreover, literatures on both neoliberalism and neoliberal conservation have grown so  
52 rapidly that they have arguably already engendered a certain ‘neoliberalism fatigue’ (e.g. Springer  
53 2016), and an accompanying search for novel modes of analysis. Yet, in order to truly appraise the  
54 enduring value of neoliberalization as an analytic for examining shifting geographies and political  
55 ecologies of conservation, there is a need to carefully examine its identifiable social impacts, with a  
56 particular focus on how its novel forms of governance and finance may have precipitated similarly  
57 novel patterns of social impact. Only then, we argue, can we properly take stock and identify points  
58 at which these inquiries can be productively complemented by other modes of inquiry.

59 This paper begins by briefly outlining key features of the literature on the social impacts of  
60 conservation and on neoliberal conservation. Second, we outline the methodology that guided our  
61 selection and analysis of relevant scholarship. Third, we present the key findings of a review of  
62 empirical case studies exploring neoliberal conservation projects and strategies, focusing on how  
63 these are: i) highly empirically diverse, exhibiting different constellations of marketization,  
64 privatization, commodification, financialisation, and decentralisation, ii) frequently involve novel  
65 forms of power, particularly those aiming to create new market and conservation-friendly  
66 livelihoods and subjectivities, iii) rely upon greater use of representation and spectacle to both  
67 produce commodities and access related markets, and iv) interact with and exacerbate pre-existing

68 social, economic, and political inequalities. Throughout, we argue that these social impacts of  
69 neoliberal conservation present novel opportunities and constraints for achieving more socially and  
70 environmentally just forms of conservation in the context of both global ecological and political-  
71 economic change.

## 72 **The Social Impacts of Conservation**

73 Although some publications, conference outputs, and organisations have raised the issue in previous  
74 decades (see Roe 2008 for an overview), concerns over the social impacts of conservation rose to  
75 unprecedented prominence in the early 2000s through three trends. Firstly, key academic  
76 publications on the issue by Stevens (1997), Chatty and Colchester (2002), Brockington (2002),  
77 Adams et al. (2004), West and Brockington (2005), West et al. (2006), Wilkie et al. (2006) and  
78 Brockington and Igoe (2006), amongst others, explored current and recent impacts from  
79 conservation, whilst Neumann (1998), Spence (2000), and Jacoby (2001) explored the negative  
80 impacts brought about by the earliest national parks in North America and Africa. Secondly, articles  
81 in popular press such as Chapin (2004) and Dowie (2005) brought the issue of negative impacts from  
82 conservation projects to a much broader audience, provoking a variety of responses by conservation  
83 organisations including denial, disavowal, and irritation. Thirdly, conservation's negative social  
84 impacts on indigenous people – both historical and contemporary – were a key theme of discussion  
85 at the 2004 World Parks Congress (WPC), to the extent that some prominent conservation biologists  
86 complained that such concerns 'dominated and drowned out the discussion of themes more directly  
87 related to conserving nonhuman life on this planet' (Terborgh 2004: 619). Related debates have also  
88 been sustained to a greater or lesser extent at subsequent WPCs and similar high-level conferences.

89 Some conservation organisations and scientists have responded by disputing the reliability of some  
90 case studies of negative social impacts (e.g. Curran et al. 2009; Burgess et al. 2013), by arguing that  
91 the literature disproportionately focuses on negative impacts of conservation (e.g. Dudley and  
92 Stolton 2010), and by seeking to mitigate such consequences through establishing ostensibly more  
93 equitable policies and institutions (see Roe 2008; Dressler et al. 2010). Nevertheless, these debates  
94 remain unresolved, with researchers, activists, journalists, and civil society organisations continuing  
95 to critique a range of active conservation projects with regard to their social consequences for  
96 affected populations.

97 A number of trends can be identified from this literature (for an overview, see reviews including  
98 Brockington and Igoe 2006; West et al. 2006; Adams and Hutton 2007). Negative impacts include  
99 eviction and exclusion from customary land and natural resources such as grazing land, firewood,  
100 bushmeat, medicinal plants, timber, and culturally important resources and places, with implications  
101 for both monetary income and non-monetary livelihoods (e.g. Cernea and Schmidt-Soltau, 2006,  
102 West et al 2006, Vedeld et al. 2007; Holmes and Brockington, 2012, Oldekop et al. 2015), health and  
103 physio-psychological wellbeing (Zahran et al. 2015), as well as culture and cultural survival (West and  
104 Brockington, 2004; Hitchcock et al. 2015). Conservation regulations are sometimes imposed or  
105 enforced in a harsh, violent, or corrupt manner, precipitating allegations of human rights abuses  
106 (e.g. Beymer-Farris and Basset 2012; Cavanagh and Benjaminsen 2014, 2015). Other negative  
107 impacts are less direct, such as the social upheaval caused by the sudden growth of a tourism  
108 industry (e.g. Benjaminsen and Bryceson 2012; Ojeda 2012). Many of these negative impacts are  
109 imbricated within Eurocentric notions of 'wilderness', and the corresponding desire to territorialise

110 conservation spaces that are insulated from human impacts, habitation, and influence (West et al.  
111 2006; Adams and Hutton 2007). Such spaces can be imposed because – although conservation  
112 organisations may occasionally represent themselves as valiantly struggling to save biodiversity from  
113 the callous and incessant expansion of human economies – conservationists tend to have  
114 substantially more resources and political influence than the rural communities whose lives they  
115 affect (Brockington 2004; Holmes 2013). This is especially the case when the state forcibly imposes  
116 conservation regulations, and when conservation objectives become aligned with with  
117 (inter)national ‘security’ objectives (Lunstrum 2013; Cavanagh et al. 2015; Massé and Lunstrum  
118 2016).

119 Reported positive impacts mirror their negative counterparts, and include more secure land tenure  
120 (particularly in the case of indigenous and community conserved areas [ICCAs] – Stevens, 1997,  
121 Berkes, 2009), increased income from ecotourism and payment for ecosystem service (PES)  
122 schemes, secure or reliable access to natural resources and ecosystem services, employment  
123 opportunities, insulation from natural hazards, and compensation schemes for either direct or  
124 opportunity costs of conservation (Dudley and Stolton 2010). The question over whether positive  
125 impacts tend to be more or less frequent than negative ones is complex and fraught with  
126 methodological complications, such as difficulties in systematically gathering data, or comparing  
127 very different kinds of impact (Oldekop et al. 2015, Wilkie et al. 2005; Brockington and Wilkie 2015).  
128 In some instances, it is complicated by the vested interests of those involved in debating such  
129 research, and the reliance on self-reported data within some analyses (Holmes and Brockington  
130 2012). This is despite the number of different frameworks and approaches used to study the impacts  
131 of conservation, including cost-benefit analyses, institutional approaches, livelihoods frameworks,  
132 and political ecology studies rooted in political economy and environmental history. Additionally, the  
133 literature to date exhibits a strong focus on protected area issues, particularly stricter terrestrial  
134 protected areas (Oldekop et al. 2015), although many other forms of conservation intervention have  
135 also been studied.

136 Moreover, calculations of conservation’s costs and benefits often fail to consider the unequal  
137 *distribution* of impacts, and the ways in which those individuals or groups who experience negative  
138 impacts are often distinct from those who experience benefits. Both positive and negative impacts  
139 are frequently unevenly distributed along pre-existing social cleavages, such as gender, class, caste  
140 and ethnicity (Adams and Hutton, 2007; Dressler et al. 2013; Tumusiime and Sjaastad 2014).  
141 Conservation practices may exacerbate social difference, wherein benefits accrue asymmetrically to  
142 wealthier or more powerful members of a community, for example, through processes of elite  
143 capture (To et al. 2012; Benjaminsen et al. 2013; Cavanagh and Benjaminsen 2015). Conversely,  
144 costs sometimes appear to disproportionately fall upon the already socially, politically and  
145 economically marginalized (Adams and Hutton, 2007, Holmes and Brockington, 2012). In some  
146 cases, this may be because the impacts of conservation are wrapped up in wider conflicts – for  
147 example, the treatment of indigenous groups in Kenyan, Zimbabwean, or Botswanan protected  
148 areas largely reflects their respective marginalization in society and politics more generally (e.g.  
149 Hitchcock et al. 2015).

150 Further, there has been insufficient exploration, either by reviewing empirical case studies or by  
151 drawing upon theoretical insights, of the precise mechanisms that link certain conservation policies  
152 to their social impacts. For example, it is unclear how projects using payments for ecosystem

153 services as a key conservation mechanism might result in different impacts, with a different  
154 distribution, compared to projects relying upon strict regulations to prohibit the use of natural  
155 resources. In part, this is due to a lack of theorisation on the more subtle dimensions of power, of  
156 how different conservation strategies seek to mould human behaviour into more conservation-  
157 friendly forms (but see Neumann, 2001, Agrawal, 2005; Fletcher 2010). Whereas some forms of  
158 power in conservation are straightforward and relatively crude, such as the deployment of state  
159 violence to impose the boundaries of conservation ‘fortresses’, others are more complex and subtle,  
160 such as attempts to generate support for conservation through collective self-surveillance,  
161 employment opportunities, incentive payments, or compensation schemes. Whilst a growing  
162 literature examines how conservation regulations might be contested and resisted (Holmes 2007;  
163 Benjaminsen et al. 2013; Cavanagh and Benjaminsen 2015; Holmes 2016), there is perhaps  
164 inadequate exploration of why these efforts might fail or succeed, and how this relates to the  
165 shifting deployment of power in conservation.

166 Although there has been some discussion of trends such as ecotourism and the rise of civil society  
167 involvement in conservation governance (e.g. West et al. 2006) there has not been much *empirical*  
168 attention to the ways in which processes of neoliberalisation may alter the social impacts of  
169 protected areas. This lacuna is particularly curious given the number of scholars who work  
170 thematically on both neoliberal conservation and the social impacts of conservation. That said, the  
171 former inquiries have yielded a number of important conceptual insights on the ‘nature’ of  
172 neoliberal conservation, which we briefly review below.

### 173 **Neoliberal Conservation**

174 The literature on neoliberalism is vast, precluding a thorough review here. That said, we concur with  
175 many geographers and political ecologists that conceptualize neoliberalism as a complex and  
176 variable assemblage of ideologies, institutions, discourses, actors, and related practices that seek to  
177 broaden and deepen processes of financialisation, privatisation, marketisation, decentralisation,  
178 and/or commodification in society (e.g. Peck and Tickell 2002; Igoe and Brockington 2007; Brenner  
179 et al. 2010; Peck 2010a; Springer 2010). In this sense, neoliberalism is perhaps better conceptualized  
180 as an ongoing and dynamic process rather than a steady economic or social state (Peck, 2010a),  
181 which proceeds in uneven and variegated ways in different empirical contexts (see also Brenner et  
182 al. 2010). In many cases, such variegation results from the underlying historical-geographical context  
183 or ‘out there’ (Peck and Tickell 2002) that processes of neoliberalization inevitably articulate with,  
184 from the intensification of state-led capitalism in China, to oil-fuelled urbanization in the United Arab  
185 Emirates, to circuits of patronage-based rule in Cambodia (e.g. Springer 2011).

186 Despite such variegations, a number of scholars have now examined the interface between various  
187 processes of neoliberalization and the environment, identifying several of neoliberalism’s  
188 ‘constituent processes’ (McCarthy and Prudham 2004; Heynen et al. 2007; Castree 2008), the most  
189 prominent of which are defined in Table 1. In short, the specification of these constituent processes  
190 assists us – following Brenner et al. (2010) – in avoiding the twin pitfalls of both monolithic  
191 fetishization, on one hand, and endless contextualization on the other. By focusing on the  
192 constituent processes of neoliberalism outlined in table 1, we can analyse the phenomena of  
193 neoliberalized conservation, whilst avoiding the analytical trap of simply chronicling the potentially  
194 limitless range of place-specific idiosyncrasies. A further analytical danger concerns the (dis)junctures

195 between neoliberalization and various other formations of capitalism. Processes such as  
 196 marketization, commodification, and privatization were underway in the nineteenth century as they  
 197 are today in many of the historical-geographical contexts discussed below (see also Silver and Arrighi  
 198 2003). That said, we have focused our attention on heightened, intensified, or otherwise novel  
 199 incarnations of these constituent processes, and especially so when these were previously absent  
 200 from prevailing forms of conservation governance.

201 **Table 1 – Constituent processes of neoliberalisation. Adapted from Harvey (2007), Büscher (2010),**  
 202 **Castree (2010), Fairhead et al. (2012), Sullivan (2013).**

Marketisation	The regulation of exchange in goods or services via markets rather than an alternative mode of distribution. Often entails commodification and/or privatization as a necessary precondition. Example: Payments for ecosystem services on privately-owned lands in the Amazon (Pokorny et al. 2012).
Commodification	The legal or institutional re-inscription of ‘things’, interactions, processes or services as commodities rather than gifts, entitlements, or rights. Commodities are generally obtained by monetary payment, but not always via markets, and are not always privately owned. Example: Commodification of carbon sequestration or other ecosystem services originating within state-owned protected areas with public trust funds (Nel and Hill 2013; Cavanagh et al. 2015).
Privatization	The conversion of property rights to land, resources, services, or commodities from communal, state, or open access non-property to private ownership. Sometimes entails commodification as a necessary precondition. Example: Privatisation of wildlife on private game reserves in South Africa (e.g. Snijders 2014).
Financialization	The creation and valuation of ‘derivative’ commodities without necessarily commodifying or privatizing an underlying asset or resource. Derivative commodities are not always traded via markets or privately owned. Example: Carbon or biodiversity offsets derived from state managed protected areas and circulated on voluntary ecosystem service markets (e.g. Cavanagh and Benjaminsen 2014).
Decentralisation	The delegation, outsourcing, or extension of administrative functions without necessarily altering underlying property rights, typically via the involvement of ‘flanking organisations’ such as NGOs, community organisations, or private firms. May also be combined with ‘new public management’ strategies and the budgetary surplus-driven management of state agencies. Example: Extension or delegation of protected area management via private and civil society organisations (e.g. Adams et al. 2013).

203

204 Neoliberal conservation is frequently accompanied by a triumphalist ‘triple win’ discourse that  
 205 eulogises its ability to simultaneously protect the environment, grow the economy, and deliver  
 206 benefits to local communities (Igoe and Brockington 2007). Accordingly, neoliberal conservation’s  
 207 proponents typically frame these interventions as fundamentally technical or apolitical in nature, or

208 simply as ‘commonsensical’ attempts to relieve tensions between conservation, environmental  
209 change mitigation, and community livelihoods (e.g. Bracking 2015). Conservation’s neoliberalisation  
210 has been explained in terms of the search for new outlets for overaccumulated capital, particularly  
211 under the auspices of the so-called ‘green economy’, as well as emerging from incentives for  
212 conservationists seeking to align with dominant actors, trends, and ideas in order to gain additional  
213 power, resources, and influence (Igoe et al. 2010; Fairhead et al. 2012, Holmes 2011). Although  
214 conservation’s ability to actually deliver returns to investors – much less ‘market-rate’ returns – has  
215 recently been brought into question (e.g. Dempsey and Suarez 2016), we emphasise as well the  
216 ‘extra-economic’ dimensions of neoliberalization, which may be as much concerned with the  
217 inculcation of new subjectivities and forms of governance as they are with securing profits for  
218 individuals and institutions (see especially Neumann 2001; Fletcher 2010).

219 From Table 1, it is clear that neoliberal conservation projects retain the potential for high levels of  
220 empirical variegation. For example, individual projects might not always entail the privatisation or  
221 decentralisation of state control over natural resources. Indeed, the commodification and  
222 financialisation of forest carbon potentially offers incentives for the *recentralisation* of government  
223 control over forest resources and the exacerbation of conflicts resulting therefrom (see also Phelps  
224 et al. 2010; Sandbrook et al. 2010; Cavanagh et al. 2015). Likewise, although payment for ecosystem  
225 service (PES) schemes have sometimes been classified as non-neoliberal or pseudo-neoliberal due to  
226 their occasionally tangential engagement with markets (Dempsey and Robertson 2012; McElwee  
227 2012; Milne and Adams 2012) – perhaps operating even as an ‘indirect subsidy’ (Lansing 2013) –  
228 they may still entail neoliberal processes of commodification, decentralisation, or financialization,  
229 with implications for the wellbeing of affected populations.

230 Nonetheless, claims that neoliberal conservation is ‘new’ must be treated with caution. Capitalism  
231 was involved in conservation long before neoliberalism emerged (Igoe and Brockington 2007). Many  
232 projects labelled as neoliberal conservation also bear the imprint of much longer histories of  
233 environmental regulation and its relationship to state formation (Vandergeest and Peluso 1995;  
234 Roth and Dressler 2012; Cavanagh and Himmelfarb 2015). There is also often a gap between the  
235 neatly conceptualised neoliberalising intentions of conservation projects, and the messy realities of  
236 how they are implemented (Fletcher and Breitling 2012). These issues are not always fully accounted  
237 for in the literature, perhaps because of an apparent tendency to take political economy theory as a  
238 starting point for exploring neoliberal conservation, rather than the empirics of case studies. Further  
239 blurring the line between neoliberal and non-neoliberal forms of conservation is the prevalence of  
240 global processes of neoliberalisation, denoting that even attempts at non-neoliberal conservation  
241 must take place within this broader context and are frequently shaped by it. For example, efforts in  
242 Chile to create private protected areas to counter the increased integration of the region’s natural  
243 resources into global capitalism are shaped by the Chilean state’s highly neoliberal political  
244 structures and economy (Holmes, 2015). Thus, while some conservation strategies attempt to offer a  
245 bulwark against neoliberalisation, they discover that they must engage and harness such processes  
246 in order to achieve conservation goals. In this sense, ‘neoliberal’ and ‘non-neoliberal’ forms of  
247 conservation do not exist in binary opposition, but rather constitute opposite ends of a messy and  
248 complex spectrum. In general, however, the above discussion suggests that – just as processes of  
249 neoliberalisation and neoliberal conservation variegate across different empirical contexts – so too  
250 will their social impacts. It is therefore difficult to deduce the general consequences that practices of  
251 neoliberal conservation will produce for the populations they affect (see also Dressler and Roth



252 2011; Roth and Dressler 2012). Nonetheless, based on the methodological approach outlined below,  
253 we have sought to identify general patterns or tendencies of social impact within the empirical  
254 literature on neoliberal conservation.

## 255 **Methodology**

256 This study aims to identify patterns and trends in the social impacts of neoliberal conservation  
257 projects. To do so, we utilised a comprehensive selection of empirical case study literature as our  
258 starting point for informing our findings, as well as for broadly distinguishing between explicitly  
259 neoliberal and comparatively non-neoliberal projects. We aimed to identify any general trends in the  
260 literature, especially causal mechanisms linking particular social impacts to specific conservation  
261 approaches or tools used, and how these regulations were accepted or contested. To identify case  
262 studies, we used the Scopus database (first accessed 29th December 2014, and supplemented by  
263 further searches throughout 2015). We searched for papers which included in their title, keywords  
264 or abstract the word “conservation”, as well as one of “neoliberal\*”, “market\*”, “PES”, “payments  
265 for ecosystem services”, “ecotourism”, “NGO”, as well as one of “resistance”, “cost”, “benefit”,  
266 “eviction”, “exclusion”, “impact”. This produced 128 papers. This sample was screened, and papers  
267 were included in the final analysis if they detailed at least one empirical case study of an effort to  
268 conserve biodiversity, and whether it was judged to be an example of neoliberal conservation. To  
269 meet this latter criterion, the case study described must contain one or more of the processes  
270 outlined in Table 1. This resulted in an initial sample of 43 papers, which was later supplemented  
271 following reviews of literature identified with the same search terms throughout 2015. These papers  
272 were coded according to certain criteria, to guide qualitative analysis of the patterns emerging,  
273 rather than a quantitative analysis of trends. Criteria included the geographical location of case  
274 studies, the nature of the conservation intervention (e.g. a protected area), the presence and type of  
275 negative and positive social impacts experienced, whether local people had contested these impacts  
276 formally or informally, and the form of neoliberalised conservation being introduced. These included  
277 state roll-back, re-regulation, and use of payment based conservation, where the latter was  
278 subdivided into ecotourism, carbon-based payments for ecosystem services, and other mechanisms.  
279 To ensure that we were capturing the social impacts of specifically neoliberal forms of conservation,  
280 rather than broader conservation practices, we only included in our analyses those impacts which  
281 were explicitly linked to the constituent processes of neoliberalisation of conservation present in the  
282 case study. This does not mean that the impacts can be ascribed entirely to neoliberal conservation,  
283 as discussed below, but it does give greater confidence that they are the result of neoliberal logics  
284 and processes.

285 While this approach is broad enough to capture the breadth of projects considered as neoliberal  
286 conservation, we include three main caveats. First, we do not claim that this is a universal or  
287 representative sample of the literature on neoliberal conservation, a virtually impossible task given  
288 its variegations. Second, there is a distinct geographical bias in our sample, with almost all cases  
289 taken from the global South, reflecting the inattention to the North in both the literature on social  
290 impacts of conservation (Oldekop et al, 2015) and that on neoliberal conservation (Apostolopoulpou  
291 and Adams 2015). Third, there is a challenge in drawing broader lessons from varied case studies  
292 (Castree, 2005). As Sullivan (2005) pointed out in an early piece on neoliberal conservation, these  
293 cases are bound together by similar logics and practices, the ‘constituent processes’ of  
294 neoliberalism. In order to emphasise where the comparability lies between these cases, we focus on

295 how the social impacts identified in the case study are related to the fundamental logics and  
296 practices at the heart of neoliberalism, as set out in Table 1. It is this focus on the underlying logics  
297 and practices, on neoliberalisation as a phenomena rather than neoliberalism as a singular thing  
298 (Sullivan 2005; Peck 2010a), that allows us to compare case studies effectively. Whilst we cannot  
299 claim that the social impacts we identify are omnipresent or somehow determined by the adoption  
300 of neoliberal conservation practices, we can say that they are common and recurring outcomes of  
301 the neoliberalisation of conservation.

## 302 **Results**

303 Many of the same kinds of impacts, and the same trends regarding their distribution, were found to  
304 be present within both the literature on neoliberal conservation and the more general literature on  
305 the social impacts of conservation (West et al. 2006, Oldekop et al. 2015). Neoliberal conservation  
306 projects have been shown to bring both extra income – for example, as private-community  
307 partnerships in Uganda allowed local residents to earn money from ecotourism (Ahebwa et al. 2012)  
308 – and reduced income, such as where a neoliberal approach to a marine protected area in Honduras  
309 favouring foreign tourist companies heavily restricted the livelihoods of artisanal fishermen (Brondo  
310 and Bown, 2011). They can sometimes empower local communities – for example, through greater  
311 civil society involvement and community participation in a reserve in Mexico (Doyon and Sabinot,  
312 2014), or of fishing communities near a marine protected area in the Philippines (Segi 2014).  
313 Conversely, neoliberal conservation projects have also been shown to disempower communities and  
314 expose them to greater risk of harsh treatment, such as where tourism economies have led to local  
315 communities losing control over their land and suffering from violent enforcement of regulations in  
316 Tanzania (Benjaminsen and Bryceson, 2012) and Colombia (Ojeda 2012). Different articulations  
317 between the conservation, carbon offsetting, and ecotourism industries have also led to  
318 communities being evicted from their land in Guatemala (Devine 2014), Honduras (Timms 2011),  
319 and Uganda (Nel and Hill 2013), occasionally with significant violence (Cavanagh and Benjaminsen  
320 2014). Impacts have been found to be unevenly distributed by class (Ahebwa et al., 2012), gender  
321 (Ogra 2008), ethnicity (Dressler and Roth 2011, Devine, 2014), the ability to maintain congenial  
322 relations with conservation authorities (Nakakaawa et al. 2015), and other social characteristics  
323 (Tumusiime and Sjaastad 2014; Silva and Motzer 2014). They are occasionally also regressive, with  
324 benefits accruing to the already powerful and costs to the weakest (To et al. 2012; Benjaminsen et  
325 al. 2013; Lansing 2014). Market based conservation schemes such as ecotourism and payments for  
326 ecosystem services are more easily harnessed by the powerful because they have greater economic,  
327 political or social capital, which serves as leverage to access such markets (Fletcher 2012). For  
328 example, Igoe and Croucher (2007) explore how reforms to facilitate community involvement in  
329 ecotourism led to elite capture of wildlife revenues through both legal and illegal means, with similar  
330 dynamics leading to the elite capture of revenues from PES schemes in Vietnam (To et al. 2012). At  
331 the same time, the weakest in society are most vulnerable to resource grabbing associated with  
332 conservation and to cope with the restrictions placed by conservation projects: for instance,  
333 Benadusi (2014) shows how local elites, allied with the state, were able to dispossess weaker  
334 peasants of their lands surrounding Yala National Park in Sri Lanka during a government initiative to  
335 liberalise land markets and facilitate ecotourism.

336 Another broad similarity is that the social impacts of neoliberal conservation projects cannot be  
337 understood outside of the broader historical and political context in which they are located. For

338 example, projects in South Africa aiming to integrate communities, ecotourism and protected area  
339 management were fundamentally shaped by wider trends in land reforms, race and ethnic relations,  
340 and development in the post-Apartheid era (Fay, 2013). Devine (2014) demonstrates how the class  
341 and ethnicity based evictions and violence in creating ecotourism in Guatemala are a continuation of  
342 previous rounds of such evictions and violence experienced during the long civil war. Cavanagh and  
343 Himmelfarb (2015) illuminate how conservation governance in Uganda is inextricably related to  
344 much longer processes of state formation and (re)territorialisation, where long histories of tensions  
345 between conservation authorities and historically marginalised local populations are only now  
346 beginning to articulate with 'neoliberal' interventions.

347 Nonetheless, our review also highlights three trends not widely seen in the broader social impacts of  
348 conservation literature, concerning: i) new forms of power and the formation of neoliberal-  
349 environmental subjectivities, ii) the use of representation and spectacle to link conservation projects  
350 to markets and consumers, and iii) the exacerbation of inequality and social differentiation.

### 351 ***New Forms of Power and Neoliberal Subjects***

352 Regardless of the precise 'formation' in question, neoliberal conservation is often integrated into  
353 people's everyday lives in ways that are different to conventional forms of conservation governance.  
354 In classically 'fortress conservation' schemes, regulations generally act primarily against people's  
355 livelihoods, for example, as legal-judicial restrictions on using certain resources, enforceable  
356 through the courts and punishable by fines and imprisonment. However, in neoliberal conservation  
357 there is a tendency to act not simply against, but also *through* existing livelihoods; to re-regulate  
358 them by advocating or incentivizing certain kinds of practices rather than merely enforcing  
359 restrictions upon pre-existing strategies. The emphasis is not on stopping local people from  
360 undertaking certain practices, but also on incentivizing them to adopt desired alternatives. Whilst  
361 there is a longer history of conservation interventions working through livelihoods which predates  
362 and exists outside of neoliberal forms of conservation, such as alternative livelihood projects, what is  
363 different is the extent to which this happens, and the way it is fundamentally linked to novel logics of  
364 marketization and commodification in particular. There is an assumption that market mechanisms  
365 and forces are the best tools or approaches to saving biodiversity, and these are inevitably livelihood  
366 focused. The point of these processes is that local people must become part of this process, their  
367 relationship with natural resources reshaped by and conditioned by these market mechanisms.

368 Our review identifies a range of cases in which new, ostensibly both nature and market friendly  
369 livelihoods are being created in ecotourism, payments for ecosystem services and related sectors.  
370 For example, NGOs and state bodies working to conserve protected areas in Mexico's Yucatan  
371 peninsula have sought to regulate local people's behaviour not just through bans on harmful  
372 activities, but through measures to transform livelihoods to more conservation-friendly forms  
373 dependent on ecotourism, through education programmes, small grants and other means (Doyon  
374 and Sabinot, 2014). In Thailand, after decades of coercive bans on certain livelihood activities as the  
375 key conservation measure, authorities moved to compliment these with planned transitions from  
376 traditional subsistence livelihoods to ones based on conservation, ecotourism, and market friendly  
377 agroforestry and cash crop production through low-cost loans, agricultural outreach programmes  
378 and privatisation of communal property (Dressler and Roth, 2012; Youdelis 2013). Rather than just  
379 banning traditional agriculture as the Vietnamese government expanded its Ba Vi National Park,

380 conservation authorities sought to create conservation-based livelihoods by granting local people  
381 private land rights and paying them to reforest land (Dressler et al. 2011). Moreover, case studies  
382 from marine protected areas in the Philippines show that, even when strict conservation regulations  
383 were ‘forcibly imposed’ around marine protected areas in the Philippines (Segi 2013), relevant  
384 authorities and civil society organisations still sought to change behaviour and attitudes through  
385 different types of outreach and community participation schemes. As Seki (2009) puts it, the  
386 subtlety of such forms of power also leads to complex forms of agency, ones that defy categorization  
387 under any simple ‘domination-resistance’ binary. This is also a more insidious form of power –  
388 whereas previously local people may have only interacted with conservation when they encountered  
389 park rangers or boundary fences, they are increasingly now being incorporated into conservation  
390 every time they conduct their new conservation friendly livelihood activities, such as working in  
391 tourism, paid reforestation, or growing ‘forest-friendly’ cash crops.

392 Whilst our empirical review shows this increased frequency and depth of regulation within  
393 neoliberal forms of conservation, the theoretical literature points to regulation at the level of  
394 thoughts and values, particularly via the extension of Foucault’s work on governmentality and  
395 subjectification to environmental regulation (e.g. Neumann 2001; Agrawal, 2005; Fletcher 2010). As  
396 Neumann (2001) observes, the ‘limits of coercive approaches’ to conservation had become fairly  
397 evident by the 1980s, giving rise to a number of community-based conservation (CBC) initiatives (see  
398 also Dressler et al. 2010). Neumann (2001: 326) draws upon Foucault’s notion of disciplinary power  
399 to explore how conservationists sought not merely to coerce local people into certain patterns of  
400 behaviour, but also to internalise conservationist norms by recruiting locals as game scouts, creating  
401 a structure in which communities surveil and regulate each other. Similarly, Agrawal (2005) explores  
402 Foucault’s work on governmentality, attributing changing local behaviour towards forest resources  
403 in India to the way in which governance structures changed the values and ideologies of local  
404 people, resulting in the wholesale production of ‘new political subjects’ that adopted or even *desired*  
405 new forms of stewardship over the environment. Fletcher (2010) theorises ‘neoliberal  
406 environmentality’ as the provision of ‘incentives sufficient to motivate individuals to choose to  
407 behave in conservation friendly ways. Especially in the later case, we see the ways in which  
408 conservation works not just through threats of legal and/or physical violence, but also via the  
409 creation of pro-environment and pro-market subjects. The point here is not that neoliberal forms of  
410 environmentality have supplanted the use of coercive sovereign power or disciplinary power, but  
411 that each of these forms articulate in novel ways within distinct empirical contexts to produce both  
412 environmentally and market-friendly subjects.

413 As a note of caution, it is important to stress that the empirical case studies explored did not  
414 demonstrate a total creation of environmental subjects, whose behaviour and subjectivity closely  
415 matched that of the ideal neoliberal conservation subject. This may be because the timeframes  
416 between the creation of neoliberal approaches in these places and the empirical observations of the  
417 researchers was too short, compared to the decades-long framing of Agarwal’s (2005) study. It may  
418 also arise from contradictions in the process of subject creation; indeed, as Youdelis (2013) shows,  
419 the creation of environmental subjects can also undermine conservation, as attempts to create  
420 ‘authentic’ nature-loving Karen people in Thailand to promote ecotourism also allowed people to  
421 articulate ‘authentically’ egalitarian Karen-ness as a way of critiquing the uneven spread of benefits  
422 of ecotourism. More likely is that the interventions are too partial and limited. Within any  
423 community, individuals use a portfolio of mixed livelihood strategies, of different activities at

424 different times, and not all individuals share the same portfolio. Market based conservation projects  
425 may only target a few of these activities, or add a few more options, but this still leaves space for  
426 alternative strategies, with their own subjectivities. Certainly, local people retain the potential to  
427 operate as ‘organic intellectuals’, with the agency to demystify neoliberal conservation, and to use  
428 strategies and express ideas and behaviours that do not follow that of the ideal neoliberal  
429 conservation subject (Cavanagh and Benjaminsen 2015). This is not to say that there is no shaping of  
430 subjectivities by neoliberal conservation, only that it should not be assumed to be all-powerful.

### 431 ***Representation and Spectacle***

432 Another of neoliberal conservation’s distinctions concerns the necessary centrality of spectacle and  
433 representation to its operations (Igoe 2010). Whilst the literature on the social impacts of  
434 conservation more generally has identified how Eurocentric ideas, myths, and representations of  
435 wilderness has driven certain negative impacts (Brockington 2004; West et al. 2006; Adams and  
436 Hutton 2007), neoliberal conservation projects go well beyond this, often relying not only on selling  
437 particular goods or services, but also normative ideas or images of how those commodities *should be*  
438 *experienced*, such as pristine landscapes and ‘authentic’ cultures that are consumable via ecotourism  
439 (Carrier and Macleod 2005; Youdelis 2013), or the global commensurability of different types of  
440 carbon emissions (Cavanagh and Benjaminsen 2014). What is being marketised is not only these  
441 places and ecosystems, but also an underlying image, conception, or representation of their  
442 functionality in practice. Needless to say, such representations may or may not correspond to  
443 reality. Yet in order for these markets to operate effectively, they must nonetheless maintain the  
444 idea that purchasing an ecotourism package or carbon offset contributes directly to both  
445 conservation and local livelihoods, or that reforestation in a tropical country might assist in  
446 mitigating climate change. In some cases, these objectives are pursued via the ‘spectacular’ (Igoe  
447 2010) enrolment of celebrities and other notable personalities in marketing activities, often  
448 mediated by sleek websites and social media campaigns, to the extent that a productive sub-field of  
449 critical research has now emerged around the concept of ‘Nature 2.0’ (e.g. Büscher 2013). Crucially,  
450 these ‘virtual’ representations can also reshape reality, as individuals internalise the images of  
451 nature and culture they are selling to tourists, or as nature is reshaped to be more “authentic”,  
452 closer to the image sold to tourists than to the pre-existing reality (Youdelis, 2013; Carrier 2004).

453 These representations can entail negative social impacts. In some cases, local people appear to have  
454 been evicted from land or be forced to change their livelihoods so that the reality of ecotourism  
455 projects match the image and spectacle used to sell them; in other words, communities must leave  
456 so that life imitates the advertiser’s ‘art’ (Hansen et al. 2011). For example, at Tayrona National Park  
457 in Colombia, ‘the protection of nature – allegedly made possible by its commodification for tourist  
458 consumption – justifies and even legitimates the dispossession of local community members’ (Ojeda  
459 2012: 364). Likewise, Vedeld et al. (2012) link their discussion of eviction for conservation at Mikumi  
460 National Park in Tanzania to post-independence evictions from the Tanzanian protected area estate  
461 more generally, highlighting the overarching ecotourism-driven dimensions of this process. Such  
462 expulsions are not *always* undertaken directly by the state. Timms (2011) writes of how the  
463 displacement caused by Hurricane Mitch in Honduras resulted in a unique form of ecotourism-driven  
464 ‘disaster capitalism’ at Celaque National Park, as population movements suddenly raised the  
465 prospect of newly ‘pristine’ and therefore commercially valuable landscapes, prompting state  
466 enclosure.

467 Similarly, the representation and spectacularisation of carbon and biodiversity offsetting schemes  
468 also appears to provide additional incentives for the removal of certain populations. In some cases,  
469 such expulsions appear to be necessary so that processes of carbon sequestration might be more  
470 easily measured, quantified, and modelled over time — and therefore more reliably represented as  
471 commodities. A number of cases have reported carbon forestry related displacements in Uganda  
472 (Cavanagh and Benjaminsen 2014, Nel and Hill 2013, Westoby and Lyons 2015, Grainger and Geary  
473 2011). Beymer-Farris and Basset (2012) present a case of large-scale evictions for alleged REDD+  
474 readiness activities in the Rufiji delta, Tanzania, apparently to enable similar processes of carbon  
475 accounting in mangrove forests. Cavanagh et al. (2015) suggest that such processes may be at work  
476 in across the forest estate in eastern Africa more broadly, given that national-level REDD+ readiness  
477 activities increasingly provide financial incentives for the removal of alleged ‘squatters’ or  
478 ‘encroachers’ from within forested protected areas.

479 Conversely, the centrality of ‘spectacular’ representations to neoliberal conservation also presents  
480 novel opportunities for local people to shape or resist conservation projects, and to potentially  
481 accrue positive social benefits. In *neoliberal* conservation, a growing range of initiatives and schemes  
482 rely increasingly on global markets and donors via certain forms of representation and  
483 spectacularisation. This produces new vulnerabilities for conservation, giving disenchanting local  
484 populations new avenues to pursue their struggles, particularly challenging the financial support for  
485 conservation. Brondo and Bown (2011) show how Garifuna communities, aided by human rights  
486 organisations, were able to successfully challenge the management plan and strategy of a marine  
487 protected area in part by demonstrating that claims made by conservation NGOs and government  
488 that it would combine environmental protection with local development had not been met.  
489 Likewise, the framing of capitalism and conservation as compatible in South Africa was used by  
490 Makalele communities to claim rights to land within Kruger National Park, and benefit from  
491 ecotourism revenue (Ramutsindela and Shabangu, 2011). The desire – or even the necessity – for  
492 some carbon offsetting projects to be seen as a ‘triple win’ for biodiversity, climate mitigation, and  
493 local livelihoods creates opportunities for local populations to seek redress for projects that flout  
494 one or more of these objectives. In a context of prevailing scepticism and low consumer confidence  
495 in carbon markets, there is additional pressure for carbon offsets to be ‘virtuous’ in order to be  
496 marketable (Paterson and Stripple 2012 Cavanagh and Benjaminsen 2014).

497 Conservation-affected populations sometimes lack the knowledge or resources to challenge the  
498 image and spectacle created around such projects, and to present a counter-image to appropriate  
499 audiences in government or the international media (Holmes, 2013). For example, Igoe (2010)  
500 demonstrates the huge disparity between representations of conservation and tourism  
501 interventions in media produced by conservation NGOs and tourism companies, and the way these  
502 media successfully obscure the reality of the impacts of these interventions on local communities. In  
503 the cases described by Brondo and Bown (2011), Ramutsindela and Shabangu (2011), and Cavanagh  
504 and Benjaminsen (2014, 2015) communities received help from other organisations to ‘jump scales’  
505 (Smith 1992) and access important political and legal arenas. In the latter case of carbon offset  
506 forestry at Mount Elgon National Park in Uganda, such opposition was successful to some degree,  
507 and precipitated the decline and eventual cessation of the scheme in question.

508 But precisely where and when will local populations choose to utilise such opportunities for  
509 contesting neoliberal conservation? In the penultimate section of our review, we examine this

510 question through the prism of neoliberal conservation's apparent effects on different forms of  
511 inequality and socioeconomic differentiation.

### 512 ***Inequality and Differentiation***

513 Lastly, our review suggests that processes of neoliberalisation substantially influence the dynamics  
514 of both new and pre-existing conservation projects, whether by enhancing or diminishing certain  
515 kinds of social impacts. Moreover, regardless of the precise dynamics at work, a key finding seems to  
516 be that neoliberalisation alters the *distribution* of both positive and negative benefits, often – but  
517 perhaps not universally– increasing pre-existing inequalities and social differentiations.

518 Of course, conventional forms of conservation have also been shown to reproduce or exacerbate  
519 existing social and economic inequalities (Paudel 2006; Adams and Hutton 2007), but neoliberal  
520 conservation projects can further exacerbate such dynamics, as the commodification and  
521 marketization of nature creates new rents and incomes for formal or informal appropriation by elites  
522 and patron-client networks. For example, elite capture or manipulation of rents from ecotourism,  
523 carbon and biodiversity offsetting, and other PES schemes has been identified as a feature of case  
524 studies in Tanzania (Igoe and Croucher 2007; Benjaminsen and Bryceson 2012; Benjaminsen et al.  
525 2013; Kijazi 2015), Namibia (Silva and Motzer 2014), Nigeria (Schoneveld 2014), Uganda (Cavanagh  
526 and Benjaminsen 2015), Vietnam (To et al. 2012), and Zambia (Bandyopadhyay and Tembo 2010).  
527 Crucially, the extent of such forms of rent capture appears to both open up and shut down  
528 opportunities for resistance. Although the elite appropriation of additional rents may simply  
529 consolidate existing power relations, such intensified consolidation may also catalyse resistance. For  
530 example, Dressler et al. (2013) show how villagers near Ba Vi National Park in Vietnam had long  
531 resisted conservation regulations through non-cooperation with government directives. Such  
532 strategies were undermined by the introduction of neoliberal policies to contract out the  
533 management of land and forests, leading to elite capture. In response, local people surreptitiously  
534 damaged trees in reforestation schemes on contracted land, and targeted elite-controlled land for  
535 sabotage, resulting in an unprecedented worsening of conservation-related conflicts.

536 Secondly, a variety of case studies suggest that the 'baseline' assets of an individual or household  
537 also significantly influence the ability to access benefits from new conservation schemes. For  
538 example, Pokorny et al. (2012) show how local 'undercapitalized' actors in a transboundary  
539 Amazonian PES scheme face competitive disadvantages for accessing payments, largely due to high  
540 transaction costs and information asymmetries, with wealthier individuals and firms best placed to  
541 benefit from the initiative. These findings corroborate with Lansing's (2014: 1310) study of Costa  
542 Rica's PES programme, in which payments were found to 'generally go to larger landowners and [...] exclude certain kinds of smallholders', primarily as a result of the government's broader  
543 unwillingness to address historical patterns of land consolidation and inequality. In Vietnam, rising  
544 land values in and around forested protected areas as a result of neoliberal conservation have been  
545 shown to precipitate a 'land rush' of sorts, in which elites have utilised surplus capital to acquire  
546 properties in such locations, exacerbating land consolidation (Dressler et al. 2013).  
547

548 Conversely, in Osborne's (2011) analysis of carbon offset forestry payments specifically to  
549 smallholding farmers in Mexico, conservation agroforestry practices were found to result in  
550 immediate negative impacts in the form of lower productivity and higher labour expenditure,  
551 thereby contributing to the concentration of poverty rather than wealth among the smallholding

552 community. Similarly, in Lansing's (2015: 605) comparative analysis of two specific carbon offsetting  
553 projects in Costa Rica, household socioeconomic stability or 'flexibility' at baseline was found to  
554 influence the ability to benefit from carbon payments, given that relative wealth denotes the ability  
555 to absorb costs or shocks related to 20-year commitments to carbon offset contracts, which would  
556 'foreclose upon a number of future livelihood adaptation choices.' By implication, then, such findings  
557 suggest that neoliberal conservation schemes potentially reinforce much broader processes of  
558 agrarian change and differentiation (e.g. Bernstein 2010), wherein new revenue streams contribute  
559 to the further consolidation of wealth among larger and more prosperous landholders, and the  
560 marginalization or exacerbation of vulnerability among less well-off smallholders.

561 Third, and relatedly, neoliberal conservation may exacerbate inequality by imposing culturally  
562 arbitrary distinctions and symbolic differentiations between communities or ethnic groups. For  
563 instance, Sundberg (2006) shows how conservation donors and 'flanking organizations' of NGOs  
564 favoured a group classified as 'Petenero' in their management plans for the Maya Biosphere Reserve  
565 in Guatemala, on the somewhat arbitrary grounds that the Petenero were inherently more  
566 conservationist than other communities living nearby. Likewise, Ojeda (2012: 371) writes of a  
567 conservationist-driven process of differentiation in Colombia, wherein individuals and communities  
568 who were able to demonstrate their 'embodied greenness' via an association with various  
569 'indigenous' identities were better placed to benefit from new conservation interventions, whereas  
570 other nearby communities were labelled as 'bodies out of place' and therefore as 'eco-threats.'  
571 Similar processes are at work in East Africa, where ecotourism enterprises have decreed certain  
572 communities, such as the Maasai, to be especially 'indigenous', 'iconic', and therefore of particular  
573 interest for incorporation into combined ecotourism and cultural tourism schemes – a move that is  
574 somewhat ironic given that the Maasai were in fact one of the last groups to migrate into the  
575 territories that are today Kenya and Tanzania (e.g. Comaroff and Comaroff 2009; Hodgson 2011).

576 Finally, although the evidence for this last dynamic was decidedly thinner than the other trends  
577 identified above, there may in fact be cases in which neoliberal conservation stands to widen the  
578 distribution of *positive* impacts. For instance, Silva and Motzer (2014) provide a somewhat  
579 counterintuitive account of ecotourism-based neoliberal conservation in Namibia, in which already  
580 marginalized individuals within local communities emerged as some of the most earnest supporters  
581 of the implementation of such initiatives. The reasons for this are complex, but appear to arise from  
582 the disenchantment of certain elements of communities with their position in prevailing economic  
583 and status hierarchies, perhaps related to land inequality and resultant barriers to marriage,  
584 respectability, or full social adulthood. Here, neoliberal conservation appears to have provided new  
585 opportunities for social mobility in the context of otherwise entrenched social and economic  
586 inequality. Indeed, as Gardner (2012) argues, certain individuals and communities may elect to  
587 support similar neoliberal conservation initiatives, notwithstanding the inequities and inequalities  
588 that they entail. This may be so simply because they create a limited number of economic  
589 opportunities in the context of otherwise serious poverty and material deprivation, or because they  
590 provide a novel arena for contesting state claims to land and territory. Likewise, Green and Adams  
591 (2015: 112) explain why certain local-level individuals elected to actively participate in ecotourism  
592 schemes within Tanzanian Wildlife Management Areas (WMAs) – even as such schemes resulted in  
593 instances of 'green grabbing' more broadly – precisely 'to position themselves to benefit from the  
594 opportunities presented by neoliberalization'.



595 Collectively, such findings are highly suggestive for a broader understanding of why communities or  
596 certain community strata may or may not elect to contest neoliberal conservation, perhaps even if it  
597 entails a certain degree of negative social impact. In other words, even the most highly marginalized  
598 individuals within a given community may choose not to resist neoliberal interventions if such  
599 schemes promise novel opportunities for upward social mobility, checks on the power of the state,  
600 or broadened access to resources or privileges normally enjoyed only by local elites. Consequently, it  
601 is this interplay between the exacerbation and alleviation of different forms of inequality, along with  
602 the corresponding possibilities for successful forms of contestation, which will greatly influence  
603 whether communities choose to resist neoliberal conservation in its various empirical formations.

#### 604 **Discussion and Conclusion**

605 Overall, it is difficult to infer from our review that neoliberal forms of conservation either collectively  
606 improve or degrade human wellbeing, whether absolutely or in relation to other forms of  
607 conservation intervention. In large part, this is due to broader difficulties in measuring and  
608 comparing very different forms of impact, and the availability of appropriate data. Yet this is also  
609 due to the status of neoliberal conservation projects as an evolution or reworked continuation of  
610 previous initiatives, which therefore contain within them the legacies of previous iterations of  
611 design, function, and social relations (Roth and Dressler 2012; Cavanagh and Himmelfarb 2015).  
612 Indeed, such historical (dis)continuities complicate any straightforward analysis of how the social  
613 impacts of conservation shift in accordance with contemporary governance strategies. Moreover,  
614 although it might be tempting for critical researchers to conclude that neoliberal conservation  
615 universally produces negative social impacts on human wellbeing, one must also acknowledge the  
616 empirical instances in which diverse constituencies have discovered the perhaps counter-intuitive  
617 ‘uses of neoliberalism’ (Ferguson 2010) for contesting their marginalization or subjugation to the  
618 whims of more powerful actors.

619 Notwithstanding these complexities, we have identified four broad trends concerning the  
620 relationship between neoliberal conservation and its social impacts. Firstly, it must be said that the  
621 incarnations of neoliberal conservation are empirically diverse, resulting in different patterns of  
622 social impact depending on the exact neoliberal ‘formation’ involved. Indeed, the cases reviewed  
623 above each involve novel constellations of marketization, privatisation, commodification,  
624 financialisation, and decentralisation, understandably resulting in a similarly diverse range of social  
625 impacts.

626 Secondly, despite such empirical variability, neoliberal conservation strategies collectively tend to  
627 involve novel forms of power relations – ones that work through rather than merely upon or against  
628 local identities, subjectivities, and livelihoods. In some cases, this appears to involve the production  
629 of so-called ‘neoliberal environmentalities’, in which people come to desire new forms of  
630 engagement with both markets and the environment. In other words, conservation regulations are  
631 moving from being an external force to working within the lives of rural people, changing their  
632 behaviour not just by threatening them with the law and its agents, but also by appealing to  
633 economic rationales and altering values and ideologies.

634 Thirdly, we find that practices of representation and spectacularisation are increasingly central to  
635 the workings of neoliberal conservation. In the first instance, such representations are necessary for  
636 linking particular ecotourism or PES projects to global markets and often geographically distant

637 consumers. Conversely, such representations also present novel vulnerabilities for resistance to  
638 conservation, giving disenchanted actors a novel means of challenging the distribution of negative  
639 social impacts from conservation. Though communities often need to forge alliances with NGOs,  
640 activists, researchers, or journalists to fully harness such strategies, they perhaps nuance more  
641 pessimistic accounts about the capacities of fortress conservation to simply repress local opposition  
642 (e.g. Brockington 2004, Holmes, 2013).

643 Finally, we find that neoliberal conservation broadly tends to intensify dynamics pertaining to the  
644 distribution of both positive and negative social impacts. It does so in a variety of ways: by  
645 increasing the scale of resources available for elite capture; by structurally rewarding participants  
646 that were economically better-off at baseline; and occasionally by imposing arbitrary symbolic  
647 distinctions between certain social or ethnic groups, which retain implications for who is most able  
648 to benefit from conservation. Conversely, we have also identified a modest amount of evidence to  
649 suggest that, under certain conditions, neoliberal conservation may actually contribute to the  
650 *alleviation* of certain forms of pre-existing inequalities, primarily via the disruption of prevailing  
651 economic and status hierarchies. Accordingly, the interplay between the exacerbation and  
652 alleviation of such inequalities will greatly impact decisions about whether communities – or certain  
653 strata within communities – choose to resist or acquiesce to different neoliberal interventions.  
654 Future research might thus consider, whilst taking into account the particularities of place and the  
655 variegations between specific formations of neoliberal conservation, why different processes  
656 involved in the neoliberalisation of conservation do or do not elicit various forms of resistance, or  
657 produce certain patterns of social differentiation and class formation (e.g. Bernstein 2010). Further,  
658 there is also a need for studies which review and explain the varieties of specifically *environmental*  
659 or ecological – rather than merely social – impacts of neoliberal conservation, which are of growing  
660 importance in relation to deleterious processes of global environmental change.

661 In aggregate, then, these findings suggest the need for sustained, critical engagements with the  
662 geographies and political ecologies of neoliberal conservation, but also perhaps point to the limits of  
663 neoliberalization as a useful empirical analytic. Admittedly, the distinctions and divergences  
664 between the above-discussed neoliberal conservation initiatives and neoliberal doctrine *as such*  
665 might lead some analysts to classify them as ‘hybridized’, ‘impure’, ‘incompletely neoliberal’, or  
666 otherwise ‘pseudo-neoliberal’. In this regard, there is surely space for novel analyses and  
667 interrogations of the changing forms of conservation governance, as well as explanations of its  
668 diverse social and economic outcomes. Conversely, though – as Peck (2010a: 15) once put it – ‘just  
669 because neoliberalism does not, indeed cannot, satisfy these absolutist, hyperbolic criteria, this does  
670 not mean that it is a figment of the (critical) imagination.’ What should fascinate us about both  
671 neoliberalism and neoliberal conservation, we argue, is precisely their empirical variability or  
672 flexibility; in other words, their chameleonic ‘nature’ and adaptability to diverse social, economic,  
673 and political contexts or agendas. Ultimately, it is the durability of neoliberal approaches and the  
674 support from elites that they continue to enrol that demands sustained examination from critical  
675 human geographers and political ecologists, especially those concerned with identifying more  
676 socially and environmentally just modes of conservation in an era of both global environmental and  
677 political-economic change.

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