
Book Section:
Bagguley, P orcid.org/0000-0001-6536-8322 and Hussain, Y (2017) Late Modern Muslims: theorising Islamic identities amongst university students. In: Mac an Ghaill, M and Haywood, C, (eds.) Muslim Students, Education and Neoliberalism Schooling a 'Suspect Community'. Palgrave Macmillan , London , pp. 35-49. ISBN 978-1-137-56920-2

https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-56921-9_3

Late Modern Muslims: theorising Islamic identities amongst university students

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Introduction

In this chapter we develop a series of theoretical reflections conceptualising Muslim identities in contemporary British universities. Given the securitised nature of dominant discursive constructions of Muslim identities in Britain today and the recent (2015) Prevent duty placed on Universities, this chapter focuses considerable attention on these which are transforming the Muslim experience of university in Britain.

Firstly, we discuss Muslim identity in the context of debates around late modernity (Giddens, 1990; 1994). Despite the Eurocentric nature of such approaches, they do recognise how many of the broader long-term social changes that are in play with Muslim identity claims. For Archer (2012) late modernity has created an imperative to be reflexive, people now have to make more decisions about their lives. For our purposes this is imposed upon Muslims from outside by wider social changes as well as the securitising effects of counter-terrorism (Hussain and Bagguley, 2012) to reflect upon their identity and the wider impacts of their actions as Muslims.

We then examine the state's counter terrorism strategy Prevent which has recently been extended to universities. This exemplifies features of late-modernity –fluid identities, the challenge of the transnational character of Muslimness, how Muslim identities resist traditional modernist forms of racialisation, issues of trust, risk and unease (Giddens, 1994). Next, we examine Prevent's objectification (Nussbaum, 1995) of Muslim identities. Drawing on Nussbaum we show how Prevent treats Muslims instrumentally, denies their autonomy and agency, treats them homogenously, treats Muslim identities as violable and as commodities, and denying the value of their subjectivities and experiences. These effects operate, we suggest, through Prevent exercising power in the form of a synopticon (Mathieson, 1997) where the many watch the few. Prevent seeks to mobilise the majority watching for signs of terrorism amongst Muslims. The overall effect is to undermine or threaten the ontological security (Giddens, 1994) of Muslims, a generalised feeling of 'anxiety of being'. It is this we surmise is increasingly characteristic of the Muslim experience of university.

Late Modernity and Reflexive identities

Giddens sees modernity's main characteristic as being incessant social change and the constant restructuring of social institutions. This is a global system of markets, culture, communications, and politics. Historically unique, this modernity is topen-ended,

unpredictable and uncontrollable (Giddens, 1991: 151-54). These societies are post-traditional with no uniformly accepted core values and norms that provide clear guidelines for action. Modernity's detraditionalization means that people now live and act in different segmentalised social settings. This produces a world where people have to constantly create new social bonds. However, we believe Islam and Muslims sit in a rather odd place in relation to such claims. Superficially it seems to us that they are mere 'remnants of the past' from Giddens' perspective. This belies his reliance upon a version of traditional secularisation theory, but we suggest that Muslims, certainly in the West, do live late modern lives, and that this is especially so for university students. Muslim students face numerous opportunities and dilemmas, and Islam is for them one amongst many decentred authorities. Furthermore, Islam is not simply 'inherited from the past', but rather subject to localised and contextualised application in the late-modern present. For Giddens globalisation links local social relations across great distances where events in one place have diverse consequences in many other locations. Muslim identities exemplify this by combining a global religious identity – the umma – with Britishness (Lynch, 2013) expressing what we have termed reflexive ethnicity (Hussain and Bagguley, 2015). These national combined with trans-local identities create 'unease' for nation-states providing the rationale for counter-terrorist strategies such as Prevent (Archer, 2009).

Detraditionalisation means that knowledge and belief are both contingent and contextual. Since there are numerous segmentalised settings for producing new, different forms of belief and culture, there are no longer any universally accepted absolute truths for cultural, political and moral questions. These claims by Giddens are clearly from a global perspective, and Islam sits as one amongst many belief systems. This in part, we think, accounts for the interest in formalised religious instruction amongst young Muslims in the West (Lynch, 2013: 252).

In late modernity our everyday experiences are increasingly mediated, rather than based on face to face interaction. We experience many other cultures, events, ideas through the global mass media. These processes construct new identities, and new bases for social differences (Giddens, 1991: 86-7). Late modernity is profoundly disembedding. Beliefs and social relations used to be embedded in particular places, particular times, and rooted in local cultures. Social relations and culture are spread to different times and different places, and global Islam and the global Islamophobia are no exception to this in our view. Reflexivity has become a chronic feature of late-modernity so that:

> ... the self as reflexively understood by the person in terms of his or her biography. Identity here still presumes continuity across time and space: but self-identity is such continuity as interpreted reflexively by the agent. (Giddens, 1991: 53)

In contrast to this Archer (2012) sees reflexivity in a generic feature of all human action, but identifies several different forms of reflexivity. Crucially for her the recent social changes in the West have created an imperative towards what she terms meta-reflexivity where people feel that they have to routinely evaluate themselves and the effectivity of their actions in society (Archer, 2012: 13). Archer thus differs from Giddens who see reflexivity as

the consequence of individualisation produced by the social structural changes of 'late-modernity', by seeing different social circumstances as being conducive for different forms of reflexivity. Of importance for the discussion here is her claim that conditions of 'contextual discontinuity', where people experience new and challenging social situations, characterises most people's circumstances in the West and that this produces an imperative towards 'meta-reflexivity'. Elsewhere we have suggested that Archer's conceptualisation of different forms of reflexivity is a fruitful way of approaching the theme of reflexivity in relation to ethnic identities (Hussain and Bagguley, 2015).

In late-modernity one can no longer simply be born a Muslim, rather one is forced to reflect upon and decide what kind of Muslim one might wish to be. Religion has increasingly replaced ethnicity as the principal source of self-identification for many Muslims in Britain (Ahmed and Donnon, 1994; Samad, 1996). The re-imagining of Islam as a global religion, is seen to be offering an important mode of being for young Muslims in Britain within the context of their British identities (Ahmed and Donnon, 1994). Undergoing education within the diaspora enables them to access modernist interpretations of the religions (Samad, 1996). Such tendencies are not unique to Islam, but are found more widely amongst diasporic communities, and pose a challenge to conceptions of hybridity framed in terms of ethnicity. The distinctiveness of religious as opposed to ethnic identity arises from the belief in the universally applicability of Islam, whilst ethnic identities are seen as particularistic. Within Islam anyone can become a Muslim, but ethnicity remains productive of difference and boundary making. Furthermore, Islam brings a sense of belonging to a global community – the umma, and provides detailed rules for everyday life (Jacobson, 1997). In addition the development of the assertion of an Islamic identity as the outcome of a complex political process operating locally, for example the Satanic Verses affair, the first gulf war and the current 'war on terror'. The response of the wider society was to demonise all Muslims thus ignoring the complex set of different identities of the first generation migrants (Samad, 1996). This has been exacerbated by the development of Muslims as a 'suspect community' and subject to various securitising discourses and practices (Hussain and Bagguley 2012; Abbas 2005; Modood 2005). There is then in late modernity a long dialectic of external objectification of Muslim identities by the state and various dominant discourses, and internal reflexivity of ethnicity (Hussain and Bagguley, 2015) where its meaning is re-created and re-thought in current conditions of contextual discontinuity.

Prevent and the Construction of Muslim identities

Underlying the policy and practices of Prevent is the idea of 'radicalisation' which is central to how it constructs Muslim identities. This concept has emerged relatively recently in official security policy circles and political and media debates. For instance it was not used with reference to the conflict in the North of Ireland in the latter decades of the last century (Richards, 2011: 144). Radicalisation was rarely referred to before 2001, and 'took off' as a key theme of public media discourse in relation to terrorism around 2006-07 (Sedgewick, 2010: 480), and others have noted how its conceptualisation in official discourse draws upon themes which were only previously present in American neo-conservative debates (Spalek and McDonald, 2009:129). Radicalisation discourse is seen by many as a product of counter-

terrorism policy, and the rise of academic interest in radicalisation is evident from 2004 onwards in terms of peer-reviewed journal articles using the term (Kundnani, 2012: 5-7).

It has been argued that there is no policy or academic consensus on what radicalisation means in this context (Richards, 2015: 373). The incoherence of Prevent's underlying conception of radicalisation has led some to conceptualise it as an 'assemblage' of governance (De Goede, and Simon, 2013: 317) rather than a logically coherent policy framework. However this has not prevented the idea from being challenged from a variety of perspectives by academic critics. Government policy has implied a pre-emptive counter-radicalisation strategy, hence 'Prevent', but this has vacillated between addressing violent extremism on the one hand and promoting broader community cohesion and shared values on the other (Richards, 2011: 143). This originates in the view of some commentators in the refusal of the Government to recognise and accept that British foreign policy was a primary source of grievances, and their preferred option of seeing domestic factors as the drivers of 'radicalisation' (Richards, 2011: 147). The discourse of radicalisation thus enables the state and its academic advisors to treat terrorism as something that can be subject to internal 'governance'. Facilitating practices that seek to control the future behaviour of individuals (Heath-Kelly, 2013: 396). There is also the suggestion that the radicalisation discourse provides an easy to follow narrative about how otherwise 'ordinary' Muslims become terrorists (Githens-Mazer and Lambert, 2010). It also fits with a wider narrative about 'dysfunctional' Muslim communities that do not share 'British values', a theme that emerged especially after the 2001 riots, and one that informed the community cohesion agenda (Bagguley and Hussain, 2008).

Initial Prevent funding focused on local authorities with sizeable Muslim communities (Husband and Alam, 2011; Thomas, 2012), and early activities were focused on developing discussions amongst Muslims about violent extremism and cultural and sports activities (Heath-Kelly, 2013: 403-4). Prevent from its outset clearly targeted Muslims, especially in younger age groups, as in the early years of Prevent between 2007-10 1120 individuals were identified as liable to radicalisation, of whom over 90 percent were Muslim, 290 were under 16 and 55 under 12 (Kundnani, 2012: 20). Prevent and Contest have a 'pre-emptive logic' that 'denies young British Muslims social and political agency' (Coppock and McGovern, 2014: 253).

In the revised 2009 version of the Prevent strategy radicalisation was understood to refer to 'the process by which people come to support violent extremism and, in some cases, join terrorist groups' (quoted in Richards, 2011: 145). Hence there was a move toward defining extremism in terms of people's ideas and beliefs, rather than actions. This is underscored by the focus on becoming a radical rather than becoming a terrorist (Richards, 2011: 145). The discourse around radicalisation shifted from the grievances, ideas and strategies of terrorist groups to the individual's beliefs (Sedgewick, 2010: 480-1). This has entailed a clear move away from the political context of terrorism to a focus on psychological factors, which reflects a broader contemporary cultural concern with psychological dysfunction as an explanation of all kinds of social and political phenomena. Consequently, otherwise normal ideas, thoughts and behaviours become framed as potential security risks

and signs of vulnerability to radicalisation (Coppock and McGovern, 2014: 250). This reflects a broader increase in societal concern with and use of the 'Psy-disciplines' that sociologists have related to the emergence of late-modernity (Giddens, 1994) and related processes of individualisation.

A strategically significant change in the 2011 version of Contest, the overall counterterrorism strategy of which Prevent is a part, was to define radicalisation to include 'non-violent' extremism such as a desire for fundamental social change. This was explicitly borrowed from the Danish Security and Intelligence Service (Coppock and McGovern, 2014: 245), which also illustrates how Prevent is part of a global network of similar initiatives in other Western countries. Blurring the distinctions between 'terrorism', 'radicalisation' and 'extremism' and the distinction between extremist ideas and extremist has led to Prevent's renewed focus on ideas which themselves are non-violent (Richards, 2015: 373). Radicalisation discourse has become distinct from previous official terrorism discourses by virtue of its focus on religious belief and psychology (Kundnani, 2012: 10). This has apparently continued with the Counter Terrorism and Security Act 2015 which has extended Prevent to universities (Abbas and Awan, 2015).

Underlying the Prevent programme is the assumption of the 'vulnerability' of those susceptible to 'violent extremism' (Richards, 2011: 150). This securitises institutions and practices such as education and health care. Young British Muslims in particular are constructed as 'vulnerable', as both suspects and 'in need of being saved' (Coppock and McGovern, 2014: 243). These assumptions distract attention from the idea of terrorism as a calculated collective political strategy (Richards, 2011). In terms of Prevent discourses Muslim identities are seen as 'risky', where '… risk is understood as 'performative', in that it 'produces' the effects it names.' (Heath-Kelly, 2013: 395). Risk and trust are of course key themes identified by leading theorists of late modernity again illustrating how several of the characteristics of Prevent reflect the wider late-modern social condition. Constructing Muslims as vulnerable also has the effect of securitising them so that radicalisation is a discourse that: '… actually produces (discursively) the threats it claims to identify for the performance of governance, rather than as reacting to the existence of such risks.' (Heath-Kelly, 2013: 408). Around 2010-11 the scope of Prevent was revised so that local authorities have to integrate Prevent work into all aspects of their work (Coppock and McGovern, 2014: 246). This has enabled the state to exceptionally enlist civil society in counter-terrorism work aimed at: '… the regulation of social lifeworlds and the production of intimate, personal and situated interventions'. (De Goede, and Simon, 2013: 328). Such 'care-based interventions' and discourses seek to mobilise the ethical motivations of professionals. Hence the discourse of vulnerability mobilises an ethic of care, which also has the effect of depoliticising Prevent work.

However, early Prevent work was considerably modified in practice (Husband and Alam, 2011; O'Toole et. al., 2015; Thomas, 2012). This has led some to suggest that Prevent has been both ineffective and counter-productive (Thomas, 2012), whilst others suggest that local authority staff have had an important role in mediating the effects of an inherently flawed policy imposed from above (Husband and Alam, 2011; O'Toole et. al., 2015). Whilst

much of this work has focused on local authorities' Prevent work and hence the earlier 'softer' versions of the policy, circumstances have changed with both a 'harsher' less community cohesion led version with the revisions of the coalition Government with their focus on individual beliefs (Richards, 2011) and its extension into all areas of local authorities' work, the NHS, schools (Coppock and McGovern, 2014) and most recently universities (Abbas and Awan, 2015). In comparison there are relatively few studies that focus on the implementation of Prevent in an educational context (Sian, 2015). In primary schools it seems that Prevent training has been given priority over race equality training (Sian, 2015: 184), and it seems to be targeted at schools with large numbers of Muslim students (Sian, 2015: 192). Furthermore, despite the concerns with vulnerability (Coppock and McGovern, 2014) and the manner in which Prevent seeks to draw upon the ethic of care of professionals (De Goede, and Simon, 2013), those working with young Muslims put in a difficult position, and are trained to try and apply an unrealistic list of 'signs' of extremism (Sian, 2015: 190).

At this stage it is unclear quite how Prevent will be implemented in Universities. Despite the highly prescriptive nature of the Prevent Duty Guidance, universities are institutions that are immensely protective of their traditional autonomy and legal immunities. Formally at least this is a battle which they have lost in the case of Prevent. However, we suspect there will be considerable diversity of response both due to local institutional, political and contextual factors, but also organised resistance, which has not been seen to the same extent in the other sectors where Prevent has been implemented.

Prevent, Objectifying Muslim Identities and the production of ontological insecurity

In this section we want to suggest that Prevent has the effect of objectifying Muslim identities with the ultimate effect of producing ontological insecurity for Muslims in contemporary Universities in the UK. Whereas there are frequent references to the negative effects of Prevent on Muslims in the general literature on the programme, these tend to be rather superficially conceptualised. Here we try to conceptualise more rigorously what exactly is negative about Prevent and how it has negative effects on Muslim identities. We suggest that drawing upon wider conceptions of objectification (Nussbaum, 1995) and ontological security (Giddens, 1990; 1994) is a fruitful way towards addressing these issues.

Nussbaum (1995) identifies seven aspects of objectification and we can see that these apply to how Prevent treats Muslims. Firstly, Muslims are treated instrumentally by Prevent, they are treated as the tool for its purposes. If we see Prevent as a discourse concerned with producing a governable population of Muslims (Heath-Kelly, 2013), then this implies they are being treated instrumentally. Prevent attempts to give the impression of controlling terrorism, and ordinary Muslims are the tools to achieve this. Secondly, objectification denies people's autonomy, and this is evident in Prevent's discourse of vulnerability. By constructing Muslims as vulnerable to radicalisation, their autonomy is denied and they are assumed to be powerless in the face of the process of radicalisation. This is also related to Nussbaum's third aspect which is where objectification entails treating the objectified as not being capable of agency. Thus Muslim populations have to 'saved' by the forces of the state from radicalism, which they are assumed to be incapable of resisting (Coppock and

McGovern, 2014)). Fourthly, objectification constructs people as interchangeable with others of the 'same type'. Prevent discourse and practices essentially treat all Muslims as the same, there appears to be no way of discriminating between 'real terrorists' and ordinary Muslims despite this being a familiar theme of much counter terrorism discourse. Any Muslim student for example could be 'suspect'. Fifthly, objectification renders people violable, their identities are seen as accessible to manipulation and modification. Prevent interventions are assumed to be legitimate violations of and interventions in Muslim communities and individuals' lives (DeGoede and Simon, 2013). Prevent thus seeks to render Muslims 'governable' to 'modify their conduct' (Heath-Kelly, 2013: 396). Prevent seeks to control Muslim bodies as if they were owned and controlled, and only when they are deemed to be no longer at risk of or vulnerable to radicalisation are those bodies released. Finally, objectification involves a denial of subjectivity, where the objectified person's experiences and feelings are not taken account of. This is also evident in the case of Prevent, which has proved remarkably resilient to the experiences and critical views of it amongst the majority of Muslims who have encountered it (Husband and Alam, 2011; O'Toole et. al., 2015; Thomas, 2012). Over time Prevent has become more extensive across a range of institutions, and has shifted its focus from violence to support for extremist ideas and become a legal duty on hospitals and universities. The new Prevent duty enshrines in law what was previously a frequent if unorganised practice in many universities, based on advice rather than a legally enforceable duty (Brown and Saeed, 2015).

One of the reasons for the character of Prevent and radicalisation discourse is the unpredictability of Muslim identities that is rooted in their being expressions of Muslim reflexivity and agency where they displace racialized forms of identification with religious ones. As Tyrer and Sayyid argue:

> '… the expression of Muslim identities interrupts the processes by which racialized minorities are subjectified in western states, since by choosing their preferred modes of categorization they express an agency not generally afforded to racialized populations within the logics of the racial imaginary, and since by supplanting ascribed racial labels with religious identification they reveal the limits of that imaginary as the basis for governing racialized populations.' (Tyrer and Sayyid, 2012: 353)

One implication of this insight is that securitising discourses and practices such as Prevent cannot readily latch onto racialized identities, practices or symbols, although they frequently attempt to do so. Rather we want to suggest that Prevent recognises the fluidity (Bauman, 2000) of Muslim identities and constitutes this fluidity as the object of its interventions, treating it as pathological and as a symptom or sign of potential radicalisation, involvement in clandestine violence and therefore as a threat. Apparent changes in the identity practices of Muslims are to be taken as signs of being at risk of radicalisation and violent extremism. Contemporary Muslim students are thus treated as having 'suspect identities', they are suspect not just because they are Muslim but because they are mutable. Prevent is in this sense a form of late-modern, liquid counter-terrorism policy aimed at 'risky' Muslim identities. They are risky identities not just because of their Muslimness, but because

of their fluidity. Their Muslimness is unfathomable from a Eurocentric perspective, but their liquid, late-modern fluidity risky from the perspective of a state promoting their securitisation. What is seen by some as a generalised feature of liquid modernity (Bauman) in the case of Prevent and Muslim identities is constructed as pathological and potentially threatening.

The Prevent duty and the associated emerging training materials operate with a limited normalised view of Muslim students. They are assumed to be like White middle class as being away from home for the first time, and experimenting with new identities and practices. However, this overlooks the plurality Muslim identities in universities. Many will still be living at home with their parents, and enter into complex negotiations with their parents over whether or not to leave home to attend university for complex moral, economic and gendered reasons (Hussain and Bagguley, 2016). Yet others will be international students. Amongst the Muslim student body, then there will be a plurality of ethnicities and nationalities articulated in diverse ways with being Muslim. Prevent discourses and practices have the effect of homogenising, reifying and essentialising Muslim student identities.

Some years ago Thomas Mathieson (1997) proposed the concept of the synopticon as a parallel to Foucault's concept of the panopticon. Mathieson and those who have followed up his suggestions have applied this to the mass media where the control of the many is achieved through their viewing of the few. Mathieson drew the parallel partly through noting how Foucault saw 'traditional punishment' entailing the many watching the public spectacle of the torture of the few. Here we want to suggest a rather different kind of synopticon, where Muslim minorities are subjected to the gaze of the non-Muslim majority in order to police them in the name of counter-terrorism. This synoptical gaze is actively encouraged and promoted, in the UK at least, by the state through Prevent. The state's 'softer' counter-terrorist policies actively promote a constant watch over the Muslim minority not in a panoptical manner, but in a synoptical manner encouraging everyone to look out for signs of 'radicalisation'. Whilst some have used the synopticon to examine tele-mediated social relations, where power is exercised over the many through consumerist seduction (Bauman, 2000), we wish to conceptualise synoptical power as characterising the state's management of relations between reified and essentialised ethno-religious groups. Through Prevent institutions of civil society such as schools, hospitals, Universities, mosques, community groups and public spaces more generally have become the loci of synoptical power. They become places where the many non-Muslims watch the few Muslims for signs of radicalisation.

We suggest that Synoptical power depends upon both the generation of a specific kind of subject position that of disciplinary citizenship, and a reflexive relationship between the watched and the watchers. In some respect then it bears some of the characteristics of panoptical power, but differs in crucial aspects. Watching and knowing you are being watched, as well as the watcher knowing that the watched knows they are being watched is central to this form of power. There is no realistic option of 'flight' for the watched. It becomes a condition of citizenship to allow yourself to be constantly observed. Where everyone else like you is used to being observed and 'tolerates' this, then you tend to go with the flow and tolerate being watched as well. To do otherwise is to risk drawing attention not

just to your self, but to others like you. In this sense the synopticon exerts its power through the reflexivity of those who are subject to it. Whereas panoptical power crucially depends on the invisibility of the watcher – you can never be sure you are being watched, and discipline is achieved by subjects having to assume that they are always being observed.

Rather than synoptical power being technologically determined (as implied by Bauman, 2000) it is relational and reflexive. It constructs relations between reified groups and demands reflexivity amongst those subject to it. For the synopticon to operate the subjects have to be visibly identifiable. Muslims have to be rendered visible, which is why Islamophobia is routinely articulated with processes of racialization. Visible physical signs of the Muslim become a pre-occupation.

Whilst many if not all of the aspects of the objectification and synoptical power inscribed by Prevent's discourses and practices are morally objectionable in and of themselves, it is still legitimate to pose the question as to the effects of objectification. We want to suggest that Prevent through its objectifying practices has the effect of undermining the ontological security of Muslims. Prevent has the effect of undermining the ontological security (Giddens, 1991) of Muslim students. Central to ontological security are relations of trust, especially with professionals and experts and the predictability of everyday interactions in institutionalised settings. If these are thrown into question, anxiety is the result. Anxiety arises from a more or less perceived threat to the ontological security of self-identity (Giddens, 1991: 42-7). Anxiety is a 'generalised state … diffuse, it is free-floating; lacking a specific object…' (Giddens, 43-4). As Bauman notes such generalised anxiety is generated by the liquid modern condition, however, we want to suggest that it is more targeted and focused in this present context. Trust is central to the social relations between professionals and clients, and this is no less the case for HE professionals and students. Prevent undermines this trust relationship. Although Giddens sees ontological security as a generic consequence of the character of late modernity, we see it as logically connected to questions of power and inequality. Structural forces produce ontological insecurity for the powerless. One of the gaps in Giddens' analysis is that he does not seem to consider ontological security as an aspect of social inequality whereby the mechanisms producing ontological insecurity are targeted at marginalised groups. Thus in specifying such processes and mechanisms and how they operate through objectification and synoptical power we are able to uncover the unevenness of ontological insecurity.

Conclusion

In this chapter we have argued that the government's Prevent counter-terrorism strategy alongside the wider securitisation of Muslim's is now playing a central role in the external construction of Muslim identities in British universities. We began by examining Giddens' conception of late-modern life and identity. From that we concluded that despite its Eurocentric assumptions in many respects it is a valuable characterisation of the fluidity of contemporary Muslims identities and lives. From there we moved on to critically examine

government's counter-terrorist Prevent programme which has recently been extended to universities. Prevent is focused on the identities of Muslim students and we have drawn out its objectifying consequences constructing a synoptical framework which undermines the ontological security of Muslim students. More specifically prevent treats Muslim students instrumentally, denies their autonomy and agency, homogenising them, seeking to govern their conduct and deny their subjectivities. Prevent has constructed a synoptical form of power, whereby Muslims are policed on an everyday basis under the gaze of the many. Everyone now in universities are expected to be suspicious of Muslims, constantly vigilant for signs of vulnerability to radicalisation. For Muslim students these 'imaginary identities' constructed within official discourses and practices undermine their 'ontological security' producing a generalised feeling of anxiety and the destruction of trust in those around them.

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