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https://doi.org/10.1177/1462474514560186

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'One cannot legislate kindness': Ambiguities in European legal instruments on non-custodial sanctions.

Abstract

Non-custodial sanctions, particularly those that are implemented in the community, have different historical roots in common law and in civil law jurisdictions. Nevertheless, various European instruments have emerged that seek to shape the imposition and the manner of implementation of such sanctions across the continent in a uniform manner. They reflect an apparent consensus about penal values, which culminated in Europe in 1992 with the adoption of the European Rules on Community Sanctions and Measures and of the Recommendation on Consistency in Sentencing. Nevertheless, in spite of the apparent pan-European consensus, some tensions remained as a result of underlying doctrinal differences and of the compromises that were required to accommodate them.

In the 21st century further European initiatives have sought to go beyond the 1992 instruments and focus on ‘what works’ and on the development of probation services. In the process, sight may have been lost of the initial objectives of penal reductionism, which were so important in 1992. This shortcoming can be addressed by reconsidering the approaches that had been rejected in the earlier search for consensus and by developing a more comprehensive understanding of the human rights safeguards to which all penal sanctions should be subject.
**Keywords:** community sanctions and measures, probation, Europe, suspended sentences, international standards, human rights, social control, rehabilitation.

**Introduction: Setting standards**

In Europe the late 1980s and early 1990s saw the apogee of standard setting for non-custodial sanctions. This was particularly true of community sanctions and measures, the implementation of which requires more detailed regulation than other less interventionist non-custodial sanctions. This process culminated in 1992 with the adoption by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe of both the European Rules on Community Sanctions and Measures and the Recommendation on Consistency in Sentencing.

Taken together the two instruments developed a comprehensive European penal policy on non-custodial sanctions. This policy set a clear course towards embracing both of what Christine Morgenstern (2002: 63) has identified as the two broad solutions prominent at the time for addressing the problems then facing penal law: the replacement of imprisonment by non-custodial sanctions and the development of such sanctions in a way that is compatible with the rule of law.

The simultaneous and unanimous adoption of the two instruments by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe indicates that at the time they were adopted there must have been a large degree of consensus about the values that they embodied. In next section we consider the historical process by which this consensus was created. We then turn to the arguments that were rejected in
the course constructing this consensus. The following section of the paper considers attempts in the 21st century to go beyond the 1992 framework by developing further instruments focussed on the implementation of community sanctions and measures. It argues that these instruments unmoored the debate about non-custodial sanctions from broader policy objectives of reducing the level of penal intervention. Finally, we offer some thoughts on how to ensure that sight is not lost of the key 1992 objectives.

The basis of the underlying consensus

What makes the consensus of the early 1990s surprising, in Europe in particular, is that historically there had been significant differences between the approaches to alternatives to imprisonment developed in the various jurisdictions. These differences are best illustrated by a brief and somewhat ideal-typical portrayal of the historical models on which they drew.

The ‘pure’ suspended sentence.

According to the classical model of criminal law, which dominated continental Europe from the late 18th century onwards, offences should be defined as precisely as possible, with fixed penalties for every offence. When an offence has been committed, it should be prosecuted without exception; following a conviction, the fixed penalty should be imposed without variation by the courts; and the punishment, typically imprisonment, should be carried out in full. In its extreme
form this model is usually associated with the idealism of the revolutionary French Code of 1791, and its proliferation across much of Western Europe. The classical model sought to prevent the abuse of discretion by abolishing it at different stages in the process. This was seen as the epitome of the legality in criminal justice. Supporters argued that if punishment has been set appropriately in legislation, it would be proportionate to the crime and that it should apply equally to all who chose to break the law (Dupont, 1979). Their equal ability to choose how to conduct themselves was simply assumed (Pieth, 2001; Van Zyl Smit, 1997).

From the second half of 19th century onwards the continental classical ideal came into conflict with the positivist challenge to the notion of untrammelled choice. For positivists, offenders could be seen primarily either as innocents, who had drifted into a crime by happenstance, or as hardened habitual criminals, whose capacity to choose not to commit crime had all but disappeared. Evidence was that a depressing number of offenders committed further offences, particularly those who had been jailed. What was to be done?

For those whose primary thinking was shaped by the classical ideal, the answer was to try and preserve resistance to abuse of discretion inherent in that model, while dealing with the reality that it did not always function as an effective crime prevention mechanism. Leaving aside the question of the ‘habitual’ offenders, the answer was an alternative to imprisonment: a suspended sentence, at least for the relatively ‘innocent’ first and young offenders. Such offenders would have a proportionate term of imprisonment imposed upon them, but its coming into effect
would be (wholly or partially) suspended for a period of time. If during that time the offender did not commit an offence his sentence would not come into effect. This approach had the advantage of preserving the notion that the offender had a choice to offend. He was simply given a further choice with the additional threat of punishment underlying the suspended sentence.

Additional conclusions flowed from this approach. If the offender was capable of rational choice, then there was no need to offer him any assistance or impose any restrictions during the period of suspension, other than the actual sentence if he committed a further offence (and was caught). In fact the distrust of discretion worked in the opposite direction. It was considered undesirable for the courts to have the power to judge individuals and to order tailored intervention in their lives – other than the loss of liberty which formally applied equally to all who were subject to it. For the same reason there should be no discretion in bringing suspended sentences into effect against those who had reoffended during the period of suspension.

The first legislation to allow the suspension of sentences of imprisonment was heavily restrictive, in line with this classical model. Belgian and French legislation, of 1888 and 1891 respectively, provide primary examples of laws that permitted suspension of short sentences of imprisonment on the sole condition that the convicted offender not reoffend during the suspension (Ancel, 1971: 13-14). Much the same effect was achieved after 1895 in the territories that would become
modern Germany, by routinely granting pardons to offenders on condition that they not commit further offences (Meyer-Reil, 2005).

From the late 19th century onwards, provision also began to be made in these countries for early release from prison. In its 19th century incarnation in France and Belgium, early release was often a form of ‘parole’ in which released offenders, unlike those whose sentences were suspended from the point of conviction, were subject to supervision in the community by civilian ‘comités de patronage’ (Christiaensen, 2004). Early release in these systems had a close connection to the ancient power of the sovereign to pardon, but now on a more systematic basis and to a growing range of offenders (Whitman, 2003).

Probation

While the suspended sentence was emerging as an alternative to imprisonment within the broadly classical tradition, a very different model was developing in common law jurisdictions. This model was ‘probation’, regarded, initially at least, simply as a way of avoiding the formal imposition of punishment entirely and replacing it with some form of community-based supervision. Probation emerged almost simultaneously in England and in the US (Timasheff 1943a: 1-2). This reflected the pragmatism of the common law with developments in the US serving as a source of continual inspiration for those in England.

Probation in Europe undoubtedly began in the United Kingdom (Vanstone, 2008). Although formally enshrined in national criminal justice only in 1907 by the
Probation of Offenders Act, the English probation movement traces its origins back further. In his centenary review of its development, Timasheff (1943a: 12-13) identified the origins of British probation in the work of a Birmingham judge in 1841, who was prepared to place ‘juvenile delinquents’ under the supervision of parents, masters, or volunteers. Nellis (2007: 28) also pointed to a tradition in English penal practice as early as the 18th century of exercising ‘preventative justice’, which aimed to avoid the imposition of punishment in favour of judicial oversight.

The institutionalisation of English probation was primarily a product of Victorian civil society, rather than a principled development of the criminal justice system. 19th century English public discourse was characterised by both explicit moralism and considerable emphasis on charity as a response to social problems (Mair and Burke, 2012: 7-24). Both strands contributed to the formation of rudimentary analogues of modern probation institutions. Crime was viewed principally as a product of social and moral decay, which led, it was feared, to the creation of a ‘criminal class’ united against the prosperous middle-class mainstream (Emsley, 2010: 177-187). This inspired the intervention of numerous charitable organisations into the lives of offenders, which aimed to secure the spiritual and social ‘salvation’ of offenders by engaging with alcohol addiction. These organisations played a similar role to the civilian ‘comités de patronage’ in Francophone Europe, with the important difference that, unlike their continental counterparts, they focused on offenders prior to (or instead of) formal sentence, rather than on released prisoners.
Gradually these activities were incorporated into statute and the charitable interveners replaced with a formal secular institution, the probation service, created in 1907 (Nellis, 2007: 28-31). The activities comprising English ‘probation’ are diverse, having been accumulated piecemeal over the service’s existence (see McGarva, 2008: 269-278 for a comprehensive overview of modern functions). From the outset, the probation service was responsible for non-custodial supervision of offenders, especially juveniles. During the interwar years, the probation service expanded its role in adult justice and the probation officers’ trade union, the National Association of Probation Officers, campaigned with some success for probation supervision to be seen as ‘part of a wider social work “profession”’ (Nellis, 2007: 34) – albeit of a specialist criminal justice variety. Critically, until the 1990s, this supervision was largely regarded as an alternative to punishment, the imposition of which was postponed conditionally: on the offender not reoffending or infringing other requirements of probation (Mair, 1998: 263). The focus was on the social work aspects of probation, summed up by the service’s famous injunction to ‘advise, assist, and befriend’ offenders (Canton, 2011: 30; Raynor, 2012: 176-177). Their responsibilities in this area continued to expand as a range of ‘community sentences’ other than supervision developed during the second half of the 20th century.

The English probation service also developed a key role in the ‘aftercare’ of ex-prisoners from the 1920s onwards, initially alongside wider civil society, but formally taking over in 1965. This, in turn, morphed into a formal responsibility for
the supervision of offenders released early from prison on parole (Maguire, 2007: 399-401).

Consensual synthesis or a synthetic consensus?

The suspended sentences of continental Europe and the probation systems of the common law did not exist in separate silos. Even before the English probation system was enshrined in legislation, probation had been the subject of debate in the continental European-dominated ‘scientific’ conferences of the 19th and early 20th centuries, which adopted resolutions that were the early forerunners of the European standards of the 1990s. To take but one example: the International Penal Law Association, established in 1889 by the three leading continental European criminal justice experts of their generation, Professors van Hamel of the Netherlands, von Liszt of Germany and Prins of Belgium, included in its constitution that the Society regarded the substitution of short terms of imprisonment by other equally effective punishments as possible and desirable. From its inception the meetings of the Society were also attended by representatives of common law countries, including both the UK and the US, who could and did accept this article of constitutional faith and simply interpreted it as applicable to the existing probation system. They also supported proposals for the increased use of carefully calibrated fines as less interventionist alternatives to imprisonment proliferated.

Gradual changes in national practice followed from this. In particular the continental European systems began to attach conditions to some of their grants of suspension of sentences: this happened not only in the Franco-Belgian-German
core but also in most other northern, western and southern European countries (Timasheff, 1943b: 1-62; van Kalmthout and Durnescu, 2008: 3-5, 10-12).

As in England, volunteer bodies that had assisted prisoners in the Netherlands and other countries began to be transformed into ‘professional’ probation organisations. Typically, they too were employed directly or indirectly by the state and approached their task with a strong ‘social work’ focus, but operated inevitably in the penal shadow of the criminal justice system. From the beginning these organisations had much in common when it came to dealing with released prisoners. Gradually their affinity increased in the area of implementing community sentences too, as suspension of imprisonment in continental Europe increasingly became conditional on submission to community sanctions and measures. By 1981, their interests were sufficiently common across Europe to allow the establishment of the ‘Conférence Permanente Européenne de la Probation’ (CEP) (Scott, 2006). The CEP included not only probation officers for the United Kingdom, where this term originated, but also officials responsible for working with offenders serving suspended sentences or who had been released conditionally in other European countries.

After the Second World War, scientific conferences about non-custodial sanctions continued. In the early years the United Nations played a prominent part in shaping the debate in Europe and elsewhere. Thus in 1952 a European Seminar on Probation was held in London under the auspices of the Social Commission of the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. It revealed that there were
still significant differences between continental European systems, in which the simple suspended sentence was the norm, and the common-law probation model, which still did not require a formal criminal conviction.

Common ground was sought in probation techniques rather than law. At the London seminar, Marc Ancel noted the increasing professionalization of social workers involved in supervising offenders throughout Europe. He observed that various continental systems were making legal changes:

The admission, timid at first, of probation into the criminal law of the Continent may thus contain the germ of later reforms which will tend to transform the old Continental criminal procedure into a modern procedure of défense sociale. (Ancel, 1952: 38)

Ancel observed, however, that the concerns of the lawyers for procedural probity should and could be met by linking probation to the existing institution of the suspended sentence.5

The United Nations continued to play a significant role in the development of alternative sanctions in Europe, particularly through the work of its formal affiliate, the Helsinki Institute for Crime Prevention and Control (HEUNI). A major HEUNI conference in 1987 brought together participants from Western and Eastern Europe to discuss a study of non-custodial alternatives in Europe, which HEUNI had commissioned (HEUNI, 1988; Bishop, 1988).
At the same conference it became clear, however, that the (regional) initiatives of the Council of Europe had begun to overtake the United Nations on non-custodial sanctions. The first of these was a failure: in 1964 a European Convention on the Supervision of Conditionally Sentenced or Conditionally Released Offenders had been adopted by the Council of Europe. However, in practice the Convention has been used very rarely: by 2008 it had been ratified by only 12 states, several of which made lengthy reservations thereto.

Subsequently, however, the Council of Europe was much more successful in shaping the European debate about the form that non-custodial punishments should take. This was reflected in an impressive list of Resolutions and Recommendations of the Committee of Ministers. Three stand out. The first was the 1965 Resolution that dealt briefly with 'Suspended Sentences, Probation and Other Alternatives to Imprisonment'. It emphasised the ‘disadvantages’ of imprisonment and in its key substantive provision combined the 19th century view of the place of the suspended sentence with notions of probation, recommending that:

member countries' legislations [sic] should authorise the judge, or other competent authority, to substitute for a sentence involving deprivation of liberty, or for the execution of such a sentence before it has been carried out, a conditional measure (suspended sentence, probation order, or similar measures) in the case of any person who is a first offender and who has not committed an offence of special gravity.
A second resolution in 1970, on the ‘practical organisation of measures for the supervision and after-care of conditionally sentenced or conditionally released offenders’, blurred the differences between suspended sentences and probation by encouraging the use of conditional non-custodial sentences. It also supported further conditional release for offenders with criminal records, as part of its explicitly stated objective of avoiding the use of imprisonment. This broadening of the mandate, as well as recognition of the desirability of the establishment of common principles for the use of conditional measures paved the way for the 1992 Recommendations.

In 1976 a third Resolution, ‘on some alternative penal measures to imprisonment’, followed. It confidently identified a ‘tendency, which is observable in all member states, to avoid prison sentences’ and extolled the virtues of a common crime policy amongst member states of the Council of Europe. The substance of the Resolution recommended that member states remove legal obstacles to imposing alternatives to imprisonment and suggested the expanded use of various practical measures, such as increased housing for probationers and community work, as well as the use of fines on a broader basis.

The 1976 Resolution was based on a detailed study conducted by the European Committee on Crime Problems (1976) of the Alternative Penal Measures to Imprisonment that were then available in the Council of Europe member states. A feature of this study was the depth of its analysis. It began by situating criminal justice in the context of wider social policy and emphasised that other systems of
social control had a key part to play, not only in assisting the criminal justice system but in avoiding invoking it at all. It recognised the stigmatising effect of every institutional form of social control including criminal justice interventions and therefore argued that all penal interventions, custodial or otherwise, ought to be used as minimally, and to intervene as little as possible in the lives of offenders. While it noted that ‘for many offenders supervision on probation was likely to be at least as effective in preventing recidivism as a custodial sentence’, it unanimously supported the more extensive use of fines, which it found had even lower recidivism rates than imprisonment or probation (European Committee on Crime Problems, 1976:28).

In 1986 Rentzman and Robert built on this study as the basis for a further report, *Alternative Measures to Imprisonment*, which they presented to the annual Conference of Directors of Prison Administrations, held by the Council of Europe. In this report, the differences between a suspended sentence and probation order are effectively buried: they were simply described as ‘different legal forms of probation’ (Rentzman and Robert, 1986: 9). The Conference of Directors of Prison Administrations endorsed the 1976 Resolution, but went further and called for the Council of Europe to develop ‘basic rules for the administration and implementation of non-custodial sentences once the offender had been declared guilty’ (Rentzman and Robert, 1986: 35). Such Rules, the Conference of Directors insisted, should include a code of ethics for those responsible for enforcement, and safeguards for offenders’ rights. In other words, the Conference of Directors of Prison
Administrations highlighted the need to respect human rights in the implementation of non-custodial sentences.

The Rentzman and Robert report formed the basis for deliberations on what would eventually become the 1992 European Rules on Community Sanctions and Measures. One should not lose sight of the fact that the consensus that the Rentzman and Robert report represented was also consistently underpinned by a call for the reduction in the use of imprisonment and that this aspect was reflected in the reductionist elements of the 1992 Recommendation on Consistency in Sentencing.


Immediate support for the emerging European consensus was provided by two international instruments, the 1988 Standard Minimum Rules for the Implementation of Non-Custodial Measures involving the Restriction of Liberty (Groningen Rules) and the 1990 United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for Non-Custodial Measures (Tokyo Rules). In order to understand the scope of the 1992 European instruments, the European Rule on Community Sanctions and Measures and the Recommendation on Consistency in Sentencing, it is necessary to refer to the Groningen and Tokyo Rules too, as they crystallized the ideals of the time. Their influence on these key European instruments was considerable, not least because many of the same experts were involved in drafting them. Taken together, the four instruments give a snapshot of international standard-setting at perhaps the most crucial point in its development.
Standard Minimum Rules for the Implementation of Non-Custodial Measures involving the Restriction of Liberty (Groningen Rules). Chronologically, the 1988 Groningen Rules were the first in this series. Although they were the product of an NGO, the International Penal and Penitentiary Foundation (IPPF), and therefore had no formal legal status, they were important worldwide. In part, the Groningen Rules were taken seriously because of the status of the IPPF, the predecessor organisation of which, the International Penal and Penitentiary Council, had been responsible for the drafting of an early version of what became the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners. To a greater extent, however, the Groningen Rules were important as a ground-breaking set of standards drafted by an influential international group of, largely European, academics and civil servants who, both as individuals and through the IPPF, sought to shape the other standards that were being developed at roughly the same time. Indeed, the preamble to the Groningen Rules noted that both the United Nations and the Council of Europe were already working in this area and invited them to make use of these new Rules.

The Groningen Rules focussed narrowly on interventionist non-custodial measures. Moreover, the Commentary to the Rules makes it clear that they were not intended to be ‘instruments to promote the increased use of non-custodial sanctions and measures in general’ (IPPF, 1988: 18) and that they did not deal with general crime and sentencing policy. Quite intentionally, they mostly addressed authorities responsible for enforcement. What the Groningen Rules emphasised were the
human, civil and political rights of the individuals subject to liberty restrictions in
the community (Rule 4). Other rules specifically guaranteed their privacy (Rule 5)
and provided procedural safeguards against the abuse of power (Rules 14-16).

*United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for Non-Custodial Measures (Tokyo
Rules).* The Tokyo Rules, in partial contrast to the Groningen Rules, dealt
predominantly with sentencing policy and ‘safeguards against abuses, with the
fundamental aim of ensuring that Member States develop non-custodial measures
‘to provide other options, thus reducing the use of imprisonment, and to rationalize
criminal justice policies...’ (Rule 1.5). The official Commentary to the Tokyo Rules
emphasised that the aim of this Rule was an overall reduction of imprisonment. It
explained that ‘[t]his should be understood to refer not only to a reduction in the
number of custodial measures imposed (including both pre-trial detention and
prison sentences), but also to a reduction of the actual length of any such

The wider context within which the Tokyo Rules sought to operate is underlined by
Rule 2.6 and 2.7, which provide respectively that ‘[n]on-custodial measures should
be used in accordance with the principle of minimum intervention’; and that their
use ‘should be part of the movement towards depenalization and decriminalization,
instead of interfering with or delaying efforts in that direction’.

The official Commentary warns presciently that:

Rule 2.7 places the development and use of non-custodial measures firmly
in the context of the movement towards restricting and reducing the use of
criminal law and the numbers of persons affected by it as the social environment changes. *Respect for individual rights and freedoms as set out in international instruments requires that penal measures should not be imposed where they cannot be justified using strict criteria. Since non-custodial measures are less intrusive than custody there is a danger that they may be imposed even when the development of society would no longer require it.* (United Nations, 1993: 10, emphasis added)

The Tokyo Rules sought to balance its wider penal policy pronouncements with human rights concerns. Thus Rule 1.5, quoted above, goes on to stipulate that such policies should be followed ‘while taking into account the observance of human rights, the requirements of social justice and the rehabilitation needs of the offender’. As with the Groningen Rules, the human rights concerns were spelt out in subsequent rules. However, the Tokyo Rules had one distinct limitation: Rule 1.3 provided that:

> The [Tokyo] Rules shall be implemented taking into account the political, economic, social and cultural conditions of each country and the aims and objectives of its criminal justice system.

This qualification rather undermined the thrust of the Tokyo Rules as a whole, for countries were virtually invited to justify their existing practices on the basis of prevailing conditions rather than to re-examine them in the light of human rights principles (Morgenstern, 2002: 86). Could European instruments give tighter
protection to human rights, while retaining the reductionist focus of the Tokyo Rules?

*The European Rules on Community Sanctions and Measures.* The answer to the first half of this question was given by the European Rules on Community Sanctions and Measures, which provide considerable protection against human rights abuses for those persons subject to community sanctions. The human rights guarantees in these Rules are more extensive than those in the Tokyo Rules. Rule 22 of the European Rules on Community Sanctions and Measures provides that: ‘The nature of all community sanctions and measures and the manner of their implementation shall be in line with any internationally guaranteed human rights.’ And Rule 22 is only one of nine rules, Rules 20 to 29, in a chapter of the European Rules on Community Sanctions and Measures titled ‘Respect for Fundamental Rights’. These further rules cover matters such as the privacy and dignity of offenders in even more detail than the Groningen Rules. The principle of legality is highlighted too. Not only must community sanctions and measures be defined in law and not be of indefinite duration, but the procedures for imposing and enforcing them must be specified in law too (Rules 3 -11).

*Recommendation on Consistency in Sentencing.* The European Rules on Community Sanctions and Measures were complemented by the less well-known Recommendation on Consistency in Sentencing, adopted by the Council of Europe in the same year. In as much as it dealt with community sanctions the Recommendation on Consistency in Sentencing saw them as part of a wider range
of non-custodial sanctions. The use of such sanctions is encouraged as part of a reductionist strategy, which includes also the use of fines, to ensure that imprisonment is used only as a last resort and for the minimum period possible (Ashworth, 1994).

Although neither the Recommendation on Consistency in Sentencing nor the European Rules on Community Sanctions and Measures is ‘hard law’ in the sense of being a binding treaty, they were a product of a treaty-based organisation, the Council of Europe. From the perspective of the time, the European Rules on Community Sanctions and Measures in particular seemed to provide a legal basis for the entrenchment of a comprehensive and eventually binding legal framework that would prevent the abuse of community sanctions (Van Zyl Smit, 1993). It would not have been unreasonable to predict that, as the legality principle was extended to cover community sanctions and measures more comprehensively, their legitimacy would be increased too. Around that time this was beginning to happen with similar international and European rules for prisons (Van Zyl Smit, 2013), which the European Rules on Community Sanctions and Measures sought to parallel. Before tracing how this would develop further, however, we need to consider some of the ideas that were not incorporated in the 1992 instruments.

**Underplaying existing ideas in the lead up to 1992**

*Liberal scepticism*
The eventual acceptance of comprehensive European standards for community sanctions and measures meant that some existing ideas had to be abandoned. One of these, voiced during the run-up to the Groningen Rules, was a liberal scepticism about the utility of international rule-making in this area. It was articulated in a remarkable paper presented to an IPPF colloquium in Poitiers in 1987 by William Bohan, a senior civil servant in the English Home Office (Bohan, 1989). In his paper Bohan supported interventions that would reduce prison populations but argued that international rules were badly suited to regulating such interventions. In his view, successful intervention emphasised the non-criminal justice aspects of community treatment. Bohan’s approach reflected a revival of neo-classical ideals, which emphasised that offenders should take personal responsibility for their conduct. However, meeting their social needs should not be the function of penal institutions, lest these institutions become disproportionately repressive.

The model of traditional English probation was prominent in Bohan’s presentation. He referred approvingly to ‘the professional casework relationship in which the probation officer’s warm and sincere concern fertilises the probationer’s capacity for growth and change’ but asked rhetorically: ‘are there to be standard minimum rules for the practice of friendship?’ Bohan (1989: 46). Although he did not argue that there should be a separation between the social work and purely penal aspects of community sanctions - that is, that steps should be taken to ensure that offenders could be sentenced to social work – Bohan played down the abuses that could arise in both social work interventions and in the more restrictive aspects of community sanctions. He concluded that in any event, given divergent
practices in this area, the development of international standards for community sanctions was premature.

Perhaps unsurprisingly, Bohan’s conclusions were not supported by any other IPPF member. Many of them, like the chairman, Hans Tulkens (1989), simply stressed that international standards were needed to protect persons subject to community sanctions against abuse.

One of the most interesting responses came to Bohan from Edgardo Rotman, who was already establishing his reputation as a leading theorist of rehabilitation. According to Rotman (1986), rehabilitation should be seen not as a philosophy favouring paternalistic and oppressive forms of intervention in offenders’ lives but rather as a right of offenders to enjoy opportunities to improve themselves. He conceded that Bohan correctly questioned whether there are minimum standards for friendship. However, Rotman argued that the function of standard minimum rules was to create ‘certain objective conditions that make interpersonal action possible and meaningful’ (Rotman, 1989: 170). He explained that such rules ‘not only help to avoid abuses in state intervention but also establish positive duties of the state to provide certain services and opportunities with a minimum degree of quality and frequency’ (Rotman, 1989: 170). As explained below, this notion of a positive duty on states to provide opportunities for offenders was adopted by supporters of an expanded role for community sanctions in the future.

Bohan’s remarks were made in the context of a debate about a specific proposal to introduce rules to govern community sanctions and measures and one
can understand why they were resisted. What was missing in the wider debates of the late 1980s was any explicit discussion of the ‘traditional’ suspended sentence, that is, the sentence that placed no additional burden on the offender other than the requirement that he should not commit further offences.

One may have anticipated some support for this sentence on the grounds that it did not intervene unnecessarily in the lives of those subjected to it. However, proponents of intervention were on the rise. Looking back on this period, the Cambridge criminologist, Sir Leon Radzinowicz expressed his contempt both for the old, ‘pure’ suspended sentence and for sentences suspended on more elaborate conditions:

I turned against [the suspended sentence] in the most categorical terms. I tried to show that [it] was largely used on the continent faute de mieux, simply because they did not have probation or conditional discharge; that in comparison the suspended sentence was definitely inferior; and if added to probation and conditional discharge it would harm their basic distinctiveness and in practice confuse both the offenders concerned and the courts. (Radzinowicz, 1999: 329).

**Radical non-interventionism**

Support for the traditional suspended sentence may have been expected, especially for those who favoured various forms of penal non-interventionism. In Europe a movement favouring radical non-interventionism had been taking shape in academic penology since the late 1960s. Some of its intellectual antecedents lay in
the work of the American sociologist Edwin Schur (1973) and were much bolstered by the widely published finding that in the sphere of rehabilitation, ‘nothing works’ (Martinson, 1974). Schur's approach was largely based on a critique of traditional approaches to rehabilitation, which it berated for an unjustified determinism.

In Europe, radical non-interventionism took the form of an abolitionist critique of the prison as the site of penal processes (van Swaanningen, 1997: 116-130). Some Europeans from this tradition were prepared to work with the Council of Europe in order to propose reforms that would reduce the scope of criminal law in society generally (Cf. Hulsman, 1980, 1984). However, they do not appear to have engaged directly in the 1992 standard-setting on non-custodial sanctions.

Perhaps it was the extent to which the standards of this period collectively held out the promise of a reduction of prison numbers that led European abolitionists to pay little attention to them and certainly not to critique them directly. In fairness, recommendations of the Council of Europe adopted in 1992, and subsequently in the rest of the 1990s could be seen to give hope to more incremental abolitionists, who reluctantly accepted that the abolition of prisons could not be achieved in a single step. Thus the 1999 Recommendation concerning Mediation in Penal Matters saw its objective as encouraging ‘more constructive and less repressive penal outcomes’. Even more to the point was another reductionist recommendation adopted in 1999 concerning Prison Overcrowding and Prison Population Inflation. Basic Principle 1 of this Recommendation provided:
Deprivation of liberty should be regarded as a sanction or measure of last resort and should therefore be provided for only where the seriousness of the offence would make any other sanction or measure clearly inadequate.

Penal abolitionists ought perhaps to have been worried about Basic Principle 4 of the same Recommendation:

Provision should be made for an appropriate array of community sanctions and measures, possibly graded in terms of relative severity; prosecutors and judges should be prompted to use them as widely as possible.

Why did it not continue to say ‘in order to replace sentences of imprisonment’ or words with similar effect? In the 1990s it may have been reasonable to assume that this was implicit in the context of the Recommendation as a whole. In the following decade, however, this assumption could not readily be made, as the next section demonstrates.

**Ambiguities in 21st century standards**

Close analysis of 21st century Council of Europe recommendations related to non-custodial sanctions reveals a change of emphasis, with the inherent value of such dispositions being highlighted and practical means for implementing them being stressed. At the same time, relatively less attention began to be paid to their function of assisting in the reduction in the use of imprisonment and, in some instances, to the risks they posed to the human rights of offenders.
In 2000 the Recommendation on Improving Implementation of the European Rules on Community Sanctions and Measures was adopted. The official Commentary to this Recommendation reveals a subtle shift in the underlying attitude. It noted that, although for a time a ‘nothing works’ philosophy had predominated, the overall climate had changed and, notably as a result of Canadian research and extensive meta-analyses, a more optimistic view had come into being. This had led to the development of cognitive-behavioural and psycho-social interventions with greatly improved possibilities to help offenders to adjust in society (para. 30). Subsequently, the Commentary concluded confidently that:

These methods, based on accepted theories are increasingly being used as a basis for national strategies to improve the effectiveness of community sanctions and measures. (para. 140)

This conclusion is not surprising. It reflects the 'what works' strategy strongly championed by Sir Graham Smith, the chairman of the committee of experts that advised on this Recommendation, as an antidote to ‘nothing works’ pessimism. In his preparatory paper, ‘Community Sanctions and Measures – What Works’, Smith (1998) expressed support for the risk-needs-responsivity approach, which underpins the ‘what works’ strategy.
The 2000 Recommendation on Improving Implementation of the European Rules on Community Sanctions and Measures reflected this positive commitment to the use of community sanctions. While it still referred to human rights, it was also strongly positive about community sanctions and measures as a means of risk management. The Recommendation amended the provision of the European Rules on Community Sanctions and Measures that previously outlawed indeterminate community sanctions. They were now held to be acceptable if someone posed a continuing grave threat to life, health or safety in the community. Admittedly, such continuation was to be subject to review. The fact remained that a previously strict safeguard had been modified and that the emphasis was now on the ‘effective supervision and control of offenders’ (Rule 15) as a way of making ‘adequate provision for community safety’ (Commentary on Rule 19).

Another interesting dimension was the extent to which the Recommendation was a tool for propagating the use of community sanctions and measures. The Commentary made it explicit that ‘difficulties exist[ed] notably, but not exclusively, in eastern and central European countries where opportunities to use community sanctions and measures [were] often in an early stage of development’ (para 154). It hinted that it was up to European countries with well-established community sentencing regimes to overcome these difficulties.


The same commitment to community based programmes was reflected in the 2003 Recommendation concerning Conditional Release (Parole). As has become apparent,
the mechanism of imposing a sentence, then suspending it conditionally, in whole or in part, and thus releasing the offender was one of the most important bases of non-custodial punishment in Europe. By the beginning of the 21\textsuperscript{st} century many such sentences differed little, if at all, from the conditional release of prisoners who had already served part of their terms of imprisonment. Indeed, statistics in Germany still lump together offenders whose prison sentences are suspended conditionally immediately on imposition and those who are released after having served part of them in prison (Dünkel and Pruin 2010).

Historically, suspension and sometimes also early release were subject only to the single condition that offenders not commit further offences during the period of suspension. Only gradually were further conditions attached. Even so, across much of Europe the majority of suspensions and many releases from prison still take place subject to the single condition to avoid reoffending. The motivations for not imposing further conditions vary. They may be an expedient way of reducing prison overcrowding as cheaply as possible (Beyens et al, 2013). However, there may also be a principled policy, as in Finland, of making reoffending the only condition that can lead to re-imprisonment for both parolees and those with conditional sentences (Lappi-Seppälä, 2010). Yet Paragraph 1 of the 2003 Recommendation defines conditional early release narrowly, as ‘the early release of sentenced prisoners under individualised post-release conditions’. The same Paragraph provides further: ‘Amnesties and pardons are not included in this definition.’
Paragraph 2 emphasises that: ‘Conditional release is a community measure.’ The Recommendation on Conditional Release thus excludes from its ambit releases on the simple condition of not reoffending, as not sufficiently interventionist to count as ‘conditional’ for its purposes. What makes this more serious is that in some European countries, the period during which a former prisoner will be subject to post-release conditions may routinely be significantly longer than the original prison sentence. The practical outcome is that where additional conditions are imposed, prisoners refuse release because it means that they will be under state control for longer (whilst subject to a high risk of recall) than if they remain in prison.

The Recommendation on Conditional Release, as its preamble makes clear, was designed to reduce the prison population. Nevertheless, by its narrow definition of ‘conditional’, the Recommendation may inadvertently encourage the setting of conditions, thus ignoring the injunction of the Tokyo Rules that restrictive penal measures should not be unjustifiably imposed, and the related insight in the same Rules, that, since non-custodial measures are less intrusive than custody, there is a danger that they may be imposed even where they are not required. This can be explained by the growing confidence expressed in the Preamble to the Recommendation on Conditional Release that conditional release, in the interventionist way it is defined, is ‘one of the most effective and constructive means of preventing reoffending and promoting resettlement’.
2008 EU Framework Decision on the mutual recognition of probation decisions (FD 947)

Chronologically, the next European instrument to emerge on an aspect of community sanctions was the 2008 Framework Decision of the European Commission ‘on the application of the principle of mutual recognition to judgments and probation decisions with a view to the supervision of probation measures and alternative sanctions’. It was explicitly designed to set up a more effective system for enforcing community sanctions imposed in one EU member state on a national of another EU member state. Here too, the primary motive seems to have been to increase the use of community sanctions. Arguably though, this was not being done for its own sake but to reduce the use of imprisonment of foreign nationals, by enabling them to serve a community sentence in their own country rather than a sentence of imprisonment in the sentencing country (Morgenstern 2009). This positive view of the Framework Decision is reinforced by the careful way in which it has been interpreted, as requiring those who implement it to emphasise the social rehabilitative function of the sentences that fall within its purview (Snacken and McNeill, 2012).

In practice though, the Framework Decision on the mutual recognition of probation decisions may prove as ineffective as the 1964 Council of Europe Convention. The states to which it could apply are limited to the 28 members of the European Union and its scope is therefore far from pan-European. Moreover, by February 2014 only 14 had fulfilled their obligations to transpose it into their
national law, effectively making implementation impossible for the time being.\textsuperscript{13} In addition, states have a right\textsuperscript{14} to opt out of certain Framework Decisions prior to 1 December 2014. It seems likely that the United Kingdom will do so in this case.

What is significant about the adoption of the Framework Decision on the mutual recognition of probation decisions is that it reflects a growing commitment of the EU to involve itself in penal matters, including non-custodial sanctions (Baker, 2013). This perhaps explains why so much effort has been devoted to clarifying a directive that is unlikely to have much direct impact. Although the focus of the EU is still on implementing sentences on an inter-state basis, it follows that the EU now also has an interest in developing substantive standards for community sanctions, which will make it easier in the future for states to accept - and therefore implement where required - the sentences imposed by other European states.

\textit{Council of Europe Probation Rules (2010)}

The most recent Council of Europe instrument to deal with non-custodial sanctions, the Council of Europe Probation Rules, follows the pattern of others adopted in the 21\textsuperscript{st} century, in that their primary purpose is to propagate community sanctions and measures and, in this case, also to entrench the position of probation agencies. To some extent this may be a product of the involvement of the CEP, which lobbied strongly for their creation, contributed actively to their formulation,\textsuperscript{15} and now uses them as an example of what ‘Europe’ requires.\textsuperscript{16} However, the Probation Rules also deliberately set out to establish the institutions of probation as a counterweight to
well-entrenched prison services and thus to provide opportunities for community sanctions and measures to be implemented.

A close reading of the Probation Rules shows that, while they endorse the human rights protections of the European Rules on Community Sanctions and Measures and on occasion even expand on them, for a large part they are a recommendation on how probation agencies should be run and their status protected. One of the ‘basic principles’ of the Probation Rules is that: ‘Probation agencies shall be accorded an appropriate standing and recognition and shall be adequately resourced’ (Rule 10). The emphasis is not on the recognition of ‘community sanctions or measures’, or even ‘probation’ as an activity, but on ‘probation agencies’.

It is of course appropriate for the Council of Europe to attempt to set standards for and generally develop the skills of criminal justice professionals, be they police officers, judges or those involved with the implementation of sentences as prison or probation officers. One of strengths of the Council of Europe as a human rights organisation is that it has good access to the civil servants of its member states. By working with existing national bureaucracies the Council can often achieve greater state adhesion to its human rights objectives. However, the important difference between the Probation Rules and similar recommendations about prisons is that, while the latter makes no case for the increased use of imprisonment, the Probation
Rules seek to make a positive case for 'probation' as the best way of dealing with a large class of offenders.

What the Council of Europe Probation Rules have in common with other recent recommendations on aspects of non-custodial sanctions is their reliance in the on the ‘what works’ approach, which also has considerable support in the CEP. While there are some references to ‘desistance’ (Rules 57, 76, glossary) and to the strength-based ‘Good Lives Model’ (Rules 66, 67), the Rules are heavily influenced by the ‘Risk-Need-Responsivity’ model of ‘what works’ (Rules 66, 71). What is largely absent is recognition that the ‘what works’ movement, with its emphasis on risks, needs and responsivity of individual offenders, has been subject to sustained academic critique of both the narrowness of its specific methods and its indifference to its wider social impact (Mair, 2004). Indeed, Rule 66 requires that assessments ‘shall’ be made using what is essentially the Risk-Needs-Responsivity approach, thus applying concepts that may be literally incomprehensible to officials not schooled in that tradition (Herzog-Evans, 2011: 121).

Missing from the Probation Rules is any systematic attempt to link the Rules to the objective, mentioned in its Preamble, of reducing the prison population. It is likely that expanding probation agencies, which the Rules encourage and promote, will facilitate greater use of particular kinds of community sanctions and measures, but will that necessarily reduce prison numbers? What are the relative costs and benefits both to offenders and broader society of more ‘probation’ as opposed to
non-custodial alternatives that are less interventionist than community sanctions and measures? These questions are not posed directly by the Probation Rules or the Commentary on it.

**Conclusion: The way forward**

Increasingly, pan-European organisations, not only the Council of Europe but now also the European Union, have involved themselves actively in the introduction and implementation of community sanctions and measures (Canton, 2009a, 2009b: 73-74; cf. Baker, 2013). Such sanctions are more interventionist than fines and sentences suspended on the sole condition of not reoffending, which in recent years have not been promoted as vigorously. Pan-European organisations such as the CEP have sponsored the development of Western European style ‘probation’, particularly in central and eastern European countries. The EU has also played a role through its support for large research programmes on community sanctions and measures (cf. McNeill and Beyens, 2013).

With the extra money and resources being invested in community sanctions and measures, pressures to propagate probation are greater than ever. The distance between the 1992 commitment to (mild) abolitionism and the modern state of play in Europe – which is swiftly approaching a state of ‘mass supervision’ (McNeill and Beyens, 2013) - ought not to be understated.
Under these circumstances, the time is ripe to critically re-evaluate arguments from the perspectives of liberal scepticism and radical non-interventionism that were made in the past, as well as those from a human rights perspective, in order to ensure that probation, as it has now evolved, does not become an unnecessarily restrictive response.

**Liberal scepticism**

The liberal sceptical argument advanced by Bohan (1989; see 3(a) above) did not reject ameliorative intervention in social problems of the kind offered by traditional social work designed simply to help those in need. What it did challenge was whether this could be done through a regulated system of community sanctions.

That challenge remains. There is a risk that the positive claims made for community sanctions and measures lead to disproportionate interventions. Moreover, taking into account the social vulnerability of many offenders and victims, we should question whether the social work assistance that they require could possibly be better provided outside the penal system.

In particular, the move away from the simple suspended sentence should be re-examined. One needs to ask whether offenders would not be better off if they were routinely given sentences suspended on the sole condition that they not reoffend for a set period. It would then be left to other, external social support systems to assist them during the period of suspension and make it less likely that they will relapse into crime. Such a development would provide a solution where
offenders refuse early release from prison because they find the accompanying conditions of ‘probation’ too onerous, and object to their being enforced for longer than the duration of the prison term.\textsuperscript{19}

\textit{Radical non-interventionism}

In its European guise radical non-interventionism focused largely on prison abolitionism (see 3(b) above). A revival of its ideas would pay much more attention to less interventionist non-custodial punishments such as fines, which in some jurisdictions, such as England and Wales, have been replaced to a significant extent by community sanctions and measures (Cavadino et al, 2013: 120). Such a revival would note that this trend is not universal. In jurisdictions such as Belgium (Snacken, 2007) and Germany (Sevdiren, 2011: 183), fines still play a large part in the overall framework of penal sanctions without any apparent loss of efficacy of the system as a whole. A revived radical non-interventionism could emphasise the contrast between relatively non-interventionist punishments and community sanctions and measures, which restrict liberty to an extent that in some cases can parallel or even exceed the pains of imprisonment. For community sanctions and measures this has been acknowledged by some European scholars (see Boone, 2005) but has not really fed into the European debate about the desirability of the expanded use of community sanctions as opposed to other non-custodial sanctions.

The early critique of rehabilitationism by radical non-interventionists is widely rejected because it allegedly addressed only the straw-man of deterministic forms of compulsory rehabilitation. Defenders of community sanctions argue at
times that a more sophisticated understanding of rehabilitation has now emerged (McNeill, 2009; Canton, 2007, 2011: 41-45; McKnight, 2009). Such an understanding was developed by Rotman (1986, 1989) who argued that the right of the offender to opportunities to rehabilitate himself held the key to constructing forms of community sanctions that recognise offender agency and are both ‘positive’ and human rights compliant.

This argument is not without merit. Certainly for offenders in whose lives the state intervenes by way of punishment, a case can be made for recognizing their right to opportunities to improve themselves. However, such a case is subject to two qualifications. First, there must be recognition that even the rehabilitative measures advocated by supporters of the expanded use of community penalties do involve elements of compulsion. To this extent the original radical noninterventionist critique is still directly relevant.

Secondly, it must be recognised that for offenders to be able to exercise a right to rehabilitation in the positive sense that term is used by Rotman (1986) - or a right to reintegration, as it is sometimes termed (cf. Dwyer, 2013: 10) - appropriate material and social conditions must be in place. As Carlen (2013) has pointed out forcefully, the right to rehabilitation based on rational choices being made by the offender may be illusory, for it often presumes socially competent offenders who were at one stage part of a stable, non-deviant community to which they can return. For many offenders in unequal, class-bound societies, such a community no longer exists – if it ever did (cf. Lacey and Zedner, 1995). Under
such circumstances, which may be far more prevalent than governments or even scholarly proponents of intervention are prepared to recognise, the judicious exercise of the prerogative of mercy leading to unconditional release may still be more effective in giving offenders opportunities to lead crime free lives.

**Human rights**

Human rights idealism was a key element in the creation of the instruments discussed in this paper. Whatever weaknesses they may have, these instruments all seek to reinforce the position of offenders who serve their sentences in the community. This was true not only in 1992 but also thereafter. Also, the most recent of these instruments, FD 947 and the Council of Europe Probation Rules, express their commitment to human rights values and seek to entrench them. However, at the same time, these instruments encourage interventions in offenders’ lives that may limit their freedom more than is strictly necessary.

How are these negative consequences to be avoided? One way may be by reemphasising one of the longest recognised human rights, namely the right to liberty (Hudson, 2001; Snacken, 2006). Our overview has shown that the 1992 instruments sought to balance the needs for intervention by constantly questioning whether liberty-limiting interventions, whether custodial or otherwise, were required at all. A second way of avoiding negative consequences is to reflect on the range of human rights that need to be considered when developing instruments to shape non-custodial interventions, for the pains of probation may encompass a broader range of human rights than liberty alone (Durnescu, 2011). In this regard
human rights lawyers may seek, for example, to deploy the European Rules on Community Sanctions and Measures to support arguments that community sanctions that stigmatise offenders by making them wear clothing that publicly identify them as person undergoing punishment, are degrading and therefore contrary to Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights.\(^{22}\)

Finally however, old nostrums may not be sufficient. It may be that a broader appreciation of human rights is necessary for the full consideration of the appropriate use of community sanctions and measures in Europe. In particular, overall socio-economic development, underpinned by a recognition of the minimum social and economic and cultural rights that all members of society are entitled to enjoy, is a more effective way of reducing crime than focusing intensively on the individuals, who are convicted of the relatively routine offences that are the target of community sanctions and measures. Consistently asking broader questions of this kind could allow European penologists to engage with broader social developments and to remain critical towards the wide human rights implications of any form of penal intervention (cf. Loader and Sparks, 2013).

**Acknowledgements**

**Notes**

1 The idea was first expressed by the philosopher and orator, Themistius, in a speech to the Christian emperor Jovian (362-363 AD), congratulating him on not seeking to impose his own morality on his subjects by legislation (Lee, 2000).
2 This is because community sanctions and measures, as defined in the European Rules on Community Sanctions and Measures, ‘maintain the offender in the community and involve some restriction of his liberty through the imposition of conditions and/or obligations, and which are implemented by bodies designated in law for that purpose’.

3 See Article 7 of the *Satzungen der internationalen kriminalistischen Vereinigung* recorded in (1890) 1 *Mitteilungen der internationalen kriminalistischen Vereinigung* 3.

4 Decided at the third annual meeting of the International Association for Penal Law at Kristiana (Oslo) 25 to 27 August 1891. See the (1892) 3 *Mitteilungen der internationalen kriminalistischen Vereinigung* 265-266.

5 See also the plea at the same Seminar by Paul Cornil (1952) of Belgium for the establishment of guilt before the results of a social enquiry report that might recommend ‘probation’ was revealed to the trial court that might wish to impose it.

6 This is clearly a reference to Gendreau and Andrews (1990).

7 E.g. Germany (Dünkel and Pruin, 2010); Belgium (Snacken et al, 2010).

8 Para 10 of the Recommendation does provide that: ‘Conditions or supervision measures should be imposed for a period of time that is not out of proportion to the part of the prison sentence that has not been served.’ This is a weak provision and the Commentary makes it clear that the duration of such supervision can exceed the term of imprisonment initially imposed by the court.

9 In Belgium, for example: Robert (2009).
10 Arguably, it was legitimate to focus the bulk of this Recommendation on the more interventionist conditions as release only on condition of not reoffending does not require rules to ensure that implementation is not harsh or unfair. However, the unintended consequence is still the impression that wider conditions are required to make the release ‘conditional’ at all.

11 Rules 2.6-2.7 of the Tokyo Rules, above at 1(b).

12 See 3(C) above.

13 All member states had undertaken to transpose FD 947 by 6 December 2011. See the Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the implementation by the Member States of the Framework Decisions 2008/909/JHA, 2008/947/JHA and 2009/829/JHA on the mutual recognition of judicial decisions on custodial sentences or measures involving deprivation of liberty, on probation decisions and alternative sanctions and on supervision measures as an alternative to provisional detention (SWD (2014) 34 final). In this report, released on 5 February 2014, the European Commission threatens to take legal action against EU member States who have not transposed (or transposed appropriately) FD 947 and other Framework Decisions by 1 December 2014.

14 See art. 10(4), Protocol to the Treaty of Lisbon on Transitional Provisions

15 See the comment by the Head of the Prison and Probation Unit of the Council of Europe that ‘the CEP will be involved in every step of the process’ of drafting the recommendation that became the Probation Rules: Reported on the CEP website on 3 June 2008: [http://www.cep-probation.org/news/65/40](http://www.cep-probation.org/news/65/40) accessed 16 February
2014. According to the report, on 26th and 27th of May 2008 the participants, that is the Head of the Prison and Probation Unit of the Council of Europe, the CEP Secretary General, and the two expert advisers on the Probation Rules to the Council for Penological Cooperation, the organ of the Council of Europe most intimately involved in the drafting process, met at the CEP offices and ‘agreed on a structure for the outline of the future draft recommendation, as well as on its definitions and its basic principles’.

The Secretary General of the CEP, which has observer status with the Council for Penological Cooperation, also attended most of the subsequent official meetings of the Council where the Probation Rules were discussed in Strasbourg. The Secretary General’s role there went beyond that of observer. He was actively involved in consulting probation agencies across Europe about their views and feeding into the drafting process to make sure that the new Rules were ‘relevant’ to them: Canton, 2009c.


17 However, the Commentary goes on to make the sound point that countries should conduct their own research and remain ‘aware that “what works” in one country may not work as well in another’ (Official Commentary on Rule 104). For the CEP, see the proceedings of the CEP conference ‘Probation Works’ in Malaga, 28–29 May 2010, available at http://www.cepprobation.org/ accessed 20 March 2012.

19 See also American studies of ‘punishment equivalencies’, which have used quantitative surveys of offender opinion to demonstrate that those with experience both of imprisonment and its alternatives often prefer incarceration (Crouch, 1993; Wood and Grasmick, 1999).

20 This is so even in jurisdictions that require the offender’s consent as a prerequisite for the imposition of community sanctions or measures (cf. van Zyl Smit, 1993: 324-326). At the core of any rehabilitative order is the issue of compliance, that is, of ensuring that the requirements of the sanction or measure are adhered to (Canton, 2011: 123-126). Whilst compliance must be secured on a number of levels (Bottoms, 2001), it is ultimately mandated by law. Failure to engage with the requirements imposed in the name of rehabilitation can lead to onerous consequences, potentially including incarceration (cf. Durnescu, 2011: 538). Under such circumstances the right to receive rehabilitative assistance easily becomes a duty to rehabilitate oneself. The more intensive the order, the more onerous that compulsion becomes. By contrast, unconditionally suspended sentences impose only the same compulsion that criminal justice places upon all citizens: not to offend, although the consequences of refusing to obey will be harsher for the recidivist offender (cf. Tonry, 2010: 104).
21 Some of this sentiment remains at the pan-European political level: See Resolution 1938 (2013) ‘Promoting alternatives to imprisonment’, adopted by the Standing Committee of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, acting on behalf of the Assembly, on 31 May 2013. This Resolution carefully stresses that ‘non-custodial sentences should be imposed as a replacement for prison sentences and not as a way of further widening the scope of criminal punishment. Thus, minor offences which have hitherto not given rise to any criminal sanctions should not be punished by non-custodial sentences.’

Unfortunately, the resolutions of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe have far less impact than recommendations of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe as the latter represent the consensual views of the governments of member States.

22. The European Prison Rules have been used very effectively in this way to spell out what should be regarded as degrading treatment of prisoners, contrary to Art 3 of the ECHR: Van Zyl Smit and Snacken 2009.

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