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Right-Wing Authoritarianism and Social Dominance Orientation Predict Outsiders’
Responses to an External Group Conflict: Implications for Identification, Anger, and
Collective Action

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Abstract

Members of groups in conflict may take collective action: actions to improve conditions for their group as a whole. The psychological antecedents of collective action for groups that are party to conflict and inequality are well-established. Comparatively little is known about how uninvolved outsiders respond to an external intergroup conflict. We investigate how personal ideological orientations of Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) and Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) shape outsiders’ willingness to take collective action in support of groups engaged in external conflict. In Study 1, US residents read about conflicts between disadvantaged citizens and an advantaged government in Greece and Russia. In Study 2, US residents read about a similar conflict in a fictional country, Silaria. Path analyses revealed that SDO and RWA shaped psychological appraisals of the conflict contexts, which predicted intentions to take collective action on behalf of either group. SDO and RWA were positively associated with advantaged group identification and anger at a disadvantaged group, and negatively associated with disadvantaged group identification and anger at an advantaged group. Group identification and anger predicted subsequent collective action intentions on behalf of either group. The sensitivity of outsiders’ appraisals to ideological orientations suggests strategies for both advantaged and disadvantaged groups to recruit outsiders as allies in group conflict.

Keywords: Social Dominance Orientation, Right-Wing Authoritarianism, collective action, social identity
Right-Wing Authoritarianism and Social Dominance Orientation Predict Outsiders’ Responses to an External Group Conflict: Implications for Identification, Anger, and Collective Action

The global reach of social and broadcast media enables more people than ever before to encounter information about group conflict and inequality occurring outside their own social context. Advances in technology provide individuals with the opportunity to support groups engaged in external conflicts. Yet surprisingly little empirical work has investigated how uninvolved outsiders appraise external intergroup inequality or conflict, and how they choose which group to support. Theories of collective action have described outsiders as possessing great potential influence on the outcome of a group conflict, realised by intervention on behalf of one group or another (Simon & Klandermans, 2001; Wright, 2009; Subašić, Reynolds, & Turner, 2008). But these same theories specify psychological antecedents of collective action that are bound to a specific instance of group inequality or conflict (e.g., perceived injustice of unequal rights in Russia), and the specific social actors within that conflict (e.g., identification with anti-austerity protestors in Greece). Outsiders are psychologically and structurally positioned outside the context of conflict. How then do they come to make the contextually-bound appraisals that lead to collective action?

Within a given context, group members may take collective action in order to improve conditions for their group as a whole (Wright, Taylor, & Moghaddam, 1990). Collective action may be motivated by the perceived injustice of the inequality or conflict, perceived efficacy of the group in achieving its goals, and strength of identification with the group (for a meta-analysis, see van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008). In this set of studies we investigate how individual, stable and global ideological orientations towards status hierarchies and intergroup relations influence these appraisals of group conflict and inequality across different contexts. Specifically, we examine how Social Dominance
Orientation (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) and Right-Wing Authoritarianism (Altemeyer, 1981; 1996) shape outsiders’ willingness to perceive injustice, perceive group efficacy, identify with, and take collective action on behalf of both advantaged and disadvantaged groups in a conflict. In doing so, we extend collective action theory by examining individual and relatively context-independent motives for collective action, in contrast to the collective and relatively context-specific motives that comprise current theoretical frameworks of collective action (van Zomeren, Leach, & Spears, 2012; van Zomeren, 2013). Groups engaged in conflict or that desire social change often appeal to third parties for support and solidarity in achieving their goals (Simon & Klandermans, 2001; Subašić et al., 2008). Both powerful and marginalized groups would be able to strategically target their persuasive messages to outsiders if they understood the psychological process by which outsiders come to support a group in conflict.

**Ideological Orientations Structure Appraisals of Group Conflict and Inequality**

Ideologies are sets of beliefs that give structure and meaning to the social world. Ideological appraisals of new social situations make salient discrepancies between the world “as it is” and the world “as it should be”, and motivate individuals to rectify that discrepancy (Jost, Federico, & Napier, 2009). As such, ideologies about intergroup conflict or inequality will influence how individuals appraise such conflicts when they encounter them for the first time. Social Dominance Orientation (SDO; Pratto et al., 1994; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) and Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA; Altemeyer, 1981; 1996) are stable ideological orientations that characterize people’s general views about status hierarchies and intergroup relations. SDO describes individuals’ acceptance of group-based status hierarchy, in which some groups are more advantaged than others. RWA characterises individuals’ beliefs about the need for submission and obedience to authority, conformity to traditional norms and values, and aggression towards those who fail or refuse to submit or conform to that
authority. A great deal of work has shown that SDO and RWA predict attitudes that are relevant to intergroup conflict and injustice, such as prejudice towards outgroups (Duckitt & Sibley, 2007; Thomsen, Green, & Sidanius, 2008), willingness to discriminate against outgroups (Sibley, Wilson, & Duckitt, 2007), and opposition to policies that seek to create social equality (Federico & Sidanius, 2002).

According to the Dual Process Model (Duckitt, 2006; Duckitt & Sibley, 2010a), SDO and RWA predict prejudice and discrimination towards different groups and in different contexts as an expression of different motivational goals. This is of relevance to our work because collective action can arise in challenge to prejudice and discrimination (Wright et al., 1990). RWA is grounded in the belief that the world is a dangerous and threatening place and is thus motivated by the desire for personal and collective security, stability, and order. In contrast, SDO is grounded in the belief that the world is a competitive “jungle” where the worthy are rewarded and is thus motivated by the desire for group dominance and power over other, weaker groups. As a result, SDO is more likely to predict negativity towards socially subordinate groups such as the unemployed and disabled, and immigrants framed as economically threatening, while RWA is more likely to predict negativity towards socially deviant groups, such as drug dealers and terrorists, and immigrants framed as socially threatening (Duckitt, 2006; Duckitt & Sibley, 2007; Duckitt & Sibley, 2010b).

SDO and RWA are linked with the general concept of political ideology, which is often conceptualized and measured along a liberalism-conservatism continuum (Jost et al., 2009) and typically consisting of at least two dimensions (e.g., an economic dimension and a social dimension; for a review, see Duckitt & Sibley, 2009). In a nationally representative New Zealand sample, SDO positively predicted support for conservative economic policy, and RWA positively predicted support for conservative social policy (Perry & Sibley, 2013). For conciseness, we refer to the two dimensions of political ideology as economic
conservatism (aligned with SDO), and social conservatism (aligned with RWA). We must stress, however, that the content of each dimension of political ideology is less clearly specified than the content of the ideological orientations SDO and RWA. In the current set of studies we distinguish between an individual’s self-identification as a political conservative and that same individual’s endorsement of the ideological belief that groups’ unequal power relations should be maintained (i.e., SDO) and social deviants should be treated with hostility and authorities with respect (i.e., RWA).

Our focus on personal ideological orientations may appear to represent a radical departure from the extant literature on collective action, which emphasises group-focused predictors such as group identification, group efficacy, and group-directed anger (van Zomeren et al., 2008). However, the dynamic dual-pathway model (van Zomeren et al., 2012) of collective action provides conceptual space for individual beliefs and ideals—to which ideology is related—to help shape individuals’ decisions to participate in collective action. Other research has also considered how willingness to take collective action may be shaped by personal moral convictions, which are defined as strong and inviolable attitudes about specific moral issues (e.g., discrimination against Dutch Muslims, van Zomeren, Postmes, Spears, & Bettache, 2011; van Zomeren, 2013). Because moral convictions are held about specific issues, however, their predictive utility in shaping collective action is likely to be limited to contexts that focus on that particular issue. In contrast, general ideological orientations such as SDO and RWA are more likely to shape interpretations of a wide range of group conflicts. SDO and RWA have been found to predict generalized intentions to reduce global inequality (Reese, Proch, & Cohrs, 2014), and only one study to our knowledge has investigated whether SDO and RWA can mobilize individuals to take collective action (Deaux, Reid, Martin, & Bikmen, 2006). In this set of studies, we seek to extend current social psychological models of collective action by investigating how SDO and RWA as
stable, personal ideological orientations might shape more proximal appraisals of conflict contexts and subsequent collective action. To do so most effectively, we turn to a novel group in collective action research: outsiders.

**The Role of Uninvolved Outsiders**

The present research investigates motives of collective action for outsiders: people who are geographically or psychologically separate from the conflict, without pre-existing opinions about or goals for that conflict. The bulk of collective action research investigates disadvantaged groups taking action against advantaged groups (e.g., van Zomeren et al., 2008), how advantaged group members may take collective action in their own interests (Leach, Iyer, & Pedersen, 2007) or in solidarity with the disadvantaged group (Wright, 2009; Mallett, Huntsinger, Sinclair, & Swim, 2008). Third parties to group conflict—variously referred to as the “majority” (Subašić et al., 2008), “silent majority” (Simon & Klandermans, 2001), or the “population” (Passini & Morselli, 2013)—are theorised to be important potential actors in conflict. Third parties may support either group engaged in conflict, typically by categorizing themselves with one of the groups, identifying with that group, and acting on that groups’ behalf (Subašić et al., 2008).

In contrast, outsiders lack information about a context of group conflict. As such, their psychological experiences of, and responses to, the conflict may be quite different from those outsiders who in our model are truly external to the conflict—not part of the nation, political entity or society in which the conflict is occurring. It is for this reason that outsiders are an ideal population in which to examine stable, individual, and context-independent motives for collective action. Precisely because of outsiders’ structural and psychological separation from the conflict context, their specific judgements about the conflict (e.g., the injustice suffered by each group, their identification with each group) are likely to be influenced by their pre-existing personal ideological orientations. Furthermore, we acknowledge that
outsiders may choose to take collective action in support of either group within a context of conflict. We propose that outsiders’ ideological orientations will shape their interpretations of a particular intergroup conflict, which in turn will predict their willingness to take collective action on behalf of one party or the other in the conflict. This point may seem intuitive. Yet little scholarly research has examined reactions of outsiders to conflict (Wright, 2009). As we elaborate in the next section, such research helps to illuminate the psychological antecedents of group formation, offering a new perspective on the interaction of individual differences and group processes. Existing theoretical models focus on the range of intentions—from weak to strong—to engage in collective action for a particular group: they do not consider individuals’ opportunities to support either side of an existing conflict. Accordingly, the present research adds a new perspective on individuals’ possible responses to conflict.

The Role of SDO and RWA in Shaping Interpretations of Conflict

We examine how outsiders’ SDO and RWA influence their appraisals of specific external conflicts between an advantaged group (e.g., the government) and a disadvantaged group (e.g., citizen protesters who are demanding higher wages). Importantly, outsiders may choose to support either the advantaged or disadvantaged groups within a context of conflict. The degree to which such individuals endorse or reject ideologies of group-based hierarchy and authority will change how they appraise key information about a context of conflict. Specifically, we propose that SDO and RWA will predict proximal motives of collective action in support of each group: felt anger (about injustice), perceived efficacy of each group to create change, and level of identification with each group.

Individuals’ SDO and RWA will positively predict appraisals of group conflict aligned with a dominant, authoritarian advantaged group. Recent work on opinion-based groups and collective action (e.g., Subašić, Schmitt, & Reynolds, 2011; Thomas, McGarty, &
Mavor, 2009) is part of a new wave of social identity work that explores how social identities can emerge from shared beliefs and attitudes, rather than being bound to social categories. Therefore outsiders with a particular ideological orientation may perceive that a particular group in an external conflict holds similar beliefs and values, which may then serve as a basis for an emergent psychological shared group membership (see also, Turner, Oakes, Haslam, & McGarty, 1994; Bluc, McGarty, Reynolds, & Muntele, 2007). For instance, individuals who endorse SDO and RWA ideologies may identify with a dominant and authoritarian group because they recognize that such a group likely shares the belief that subordinate groups should be dominated and force is necessary and appropriate to keep deviants in line. Similarly, the more individuals endorse SDO and RWA, the more they will see disadvantaged groups who struggle and strive for equality to be trying to secure resources or status that they do not properly deserve, or threatening the authority of the dominant and advantaged group, evoking anger at the disadvantaged group. More tentatively, we suggest that endorsing such ideologies motivate individuals to perceive others who share these ideologies (i.e., the advantaged group) as possessing the power to achieve its goals. As such, we predict that SDO and RWA should also positively predict the perceived efficacy of the advantaged group. Each of these appraisals would, in turn, lead to increased willingness to take collective action in support of the advantaged group, consistent with current frameworks of collective action (van Zomeren et al., 2008).

Just as endorsing ideologies of dominance and authority should lead individuals to support the advantaged group in a conflict, rejecting these ideologies should lead individuals to appraise group conflict and inequality in support of the disadvantaged group. Thus SDO and RWA will negatively predict anger at the advantaged group, identification with the disadvantaged group, and perceived efficacy of the disadvantaged group. These appraisals, in
turn, would lead to increased willingness to take collective action in support of the disadvantaged group.

The Present Research

We investigated the role of personal ideological orientations in shaping outsiders’ willingness to take collective action to support either party in an external conflict. In two studies, participants read a description of real (Study 1) or fictional (Study 2) group conflicts to which they were clearly outsiders. Study 1 examined the relationships between ideological orientations, group identification, perceived efficacy, felt anger, and collective action intentions in a cross-sectional design. Study 2 used a two-stage design to test the role of ideological orientations as pre-existing antecedents of outsiders’ responses to external group conflict.

We hypothesised that SDO and RWA would be positively associated with appraisals in support of the advantaged group: advantaged group identification, felt anger towards a disadvantaged group, and perceived efficacy of an advantaged group. We also expected, in line with the Social Identity Model of Collective Action (SIMCA; van Zomeren et al., 2008), that appraisals in support of an advantaged group would each be significantly and positively associated with intentions to take action on behalf of the advantaged group. Broadly, we expected the direction of the effects of ideological orientation on contextual appraisals to be reversed for appraisals in support of disadvantaged groups. We hypothesised that SDO and RWA would be negatively associated with appraisals in support of a disadvantaged group: disadvantaged group identification, felt anger towards an opposing advantaged group, and perceived efficacy of a disadvantaged group. We also expected that appraisals in support of a disadvantaged group would each be significantly and positively associated with intentions to take action on behalf of the disadvantaged group.
Study 1

Method

Participants and Procedure. We sought to recruit 200 US residents to complete the study using Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk). Participants received USD$0.50 as compensation. One hundred and eighty one MTurk users initially accessed the online questionnaire, of which 170 answered at least one question. Eight participants were then excluded: four who had more than 50% missing data, three who failed to complete any item on at least one scale (e.g., left the whole SDO scale blank), and one who failed to follow instructions. The remaining missing data were not missing completely at random (MCAR) as Little’s MCAR test was significant, $\chi^2 (2332, N = 162) = 2493.74, p = .010$ (Little, 1988; Little & Rubin, 2014). However, no variable was missing more than 5% of its cases and no pattern in attrition was observed after conducting a series of separate variance t-tests. As such, the missing cases were classified as missing at random and were replaced using expectation maximisation (EM) estimation (Mazza & Enders, 2014). The final sample of 162 participants ranged in age from 18 to 73 years ($M = 35.55, SD = 13.03$), and included 93 (57%) women and 69 (43%) men. Most ($n = 123, 76\%$) participants listed their race as White / European American. Other participants were African American ($n = 15, 9\%$), Asian ($n = 10, 6\%$), Hispanic/Latino ($n = 4, 2\%$), Native American / American Indian ($n = 4, 2\%$), described themselves as mixed-race ($n = 5, 3\%$), or did not report their race ($n = 1$). Two percent of participants reported that they did not complete high school, 35% that their highest qualification was a high school diploma, 20% held an associate’s degree, and 43% reported that they held a bachelor’s degree or higher. Participants read about two external group conflicts occurring in other countries. After reading about each group conflict, participants completed a series of measures assessing their responses to the conflict and their ideological orientation$^1$. 
Materials. Participants read two descriptions of external group conflict, one occurring in Greece and one occurring in Russia. In both contexts, the actors in the conflict were the government (advantaged group) and citizen protestors (disadvantaged group). The Greek conflict focused on the government’s introduction of strict austerity measures that would cut minimum wages and public services. Greek citizens were described as opposing the unpopular measures by engaging in protests that included throwing rocks at police and setting fire to buildings, and the government as seeking to break up these protests using police action and tear gas. The Russian conflict was described as sparked by recent government elections that were perceived to be fraudulent. Citizens participated in unsanctioned demonstrations to protest the elections and demand the resignation of the President, while the government responded with heavy fines and arrests to punish the protesters.

Measures. All responses, except where indicated, were provided on a seven-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree).

Social dominance orientation (SDO). The 16-item SDO scale (Pratto et al., 1994) was used to assess participants’ social dominance orientation. The 16 items were averaged such that higher scores indicated higher levels of support for intergroup status hierarchies (α = .93).

Right-wing authoritarianism (RWA). Drawing on a recent factor analytic study (Mavor, Louis, & Sibley, 2010), a sub-set of the original 30-item RWA measure were selected for inclusion in the present study. Three items measured aggression (e.g., “What our country really needs is a strong, determined leader who will crush evil, and take us back to our true path”); three items assessed conformity (e.g., “There is no ‘ONE right way’ to live life; everybody has to create their own way”, reversed); and three items assessed submission (e.g., “Obedience and respect for authority are the most important virtues children should
learn”). The nine items were averaged such that higher scores indicated higher levels of support for authoritarianism ($\alpha = .86$).

**Collective action intentions.** One item (adapted from van Zomeren, Spears, Fischer, & Leach, 2004) assessed intentions to take collective action to support each party (government or protesters) in each context. For example, in the Greek context, participants indicated their willingness to “take action to support the Greek government,” and their willingness to “take action to support the Greek protestors” ($1 = not\ willing\ at\ all$, $7 = extremely\ willing$). These items were then reworded for the Russian context.

**Group identification.** Two items (adapted from Doosje, Ellemers, & Spears, 1995) assessed group identification with the government and protesters in each context, for instance: “I identify with the Greek government,” and “I feel strong ties with the Russian protesters.” The relevant items were averaged to form reliable measures of identification with the Greek government ($r = .87$), Greek protesters ($r = .81$), Russian government ($r = .84$), and Russian protesters ($r = .92$; all $p \text{'s} < .001$).

**Anger towards different groups.** Two items assessed the extent to which participants felt anger and outrage (Iyer, Schmader, & Lickel, 2007) towards the government and protesters in each context ($1 = not\ at\ all$, $6 = extremely$). The two items were averaged to form a reliable measure of anger towards the Greek government ($r = .75$), Greek protesters ($r = .82$), Russian government ($r = .86$), and Russian protesters ($r = .84$; all $p \text{'s} < .001$).

**Perceived efficacy.** One item (adapted from van Zomeren et al., 2004) assessed the degree to which participants believed each target group in each context had the power to achieve its goals, e.g., “The Greek government is able to achieve its goals without help from outside Greece.” The item was reworded for each target group and context.

[Table 1 about here]
Results

**Preliminary Analyses.** Descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations for all variables are presented in Table 1. Overall, participants’ mean scores fell significantly below the mid-point on SDO ($t[162] = -17.08, p < .001$) and RWA ($t[161] = -8.07, p < .001$). Univariate tests of skew and kurtosis suggest that the skew ($|0.03| \text{ to } |1.87|, SE = 0.19$) and kurtosis ($|0.02| \text{ to } |2.60|, SE = 0.38$) of the data were sufficiently low to avoid bias in path analysis statistics (Curran, West, & Finch, 1996).

**Analytic strategy.** To investigate the hypothesised relationships between ideological orientations, identification, anger, perceived efficacy, and collective action intentions, we conducted separate path analyses for each context (i.e., Russia and Greece) and to predict collective action in support of each target group (i.e., government and protesters) using AMOS 21.0 (Arbuckle, 2012). We chose to test the structural model in path analysis with Structural Equation Modelling software rather than multiple regression for three reasons. First, path analysis allows for simultaneous parameter estimation in a model that contains multiple intercorrelated predictors. Second, this method allows us to assess whether the relationships in the hypothesized model are similar across conflict contexts and across groups. Third, path analysis in SEM allows us to compare the fit of the hypothesized model to plausible alternatives.

Separate models were tested to predict collective action intentions in support of each target group (i.e., the government or protesters). The hypothesized model specified SDO and RWA as exogenous predictors of identification with the target group (i.e., government or protesters), anger at the opposition group (i.e., protesters or government), and perceived efficacy of target group. Group identification, anger, and perceived efficacy were specified as predictors of collective action intentions to support the target group. Current theoretical frameworks of collective action suggest that group identification is associated with both
anger and perceived group efficacy (Thomas et al., 2009; van Zomeren et al., 2008). Thus, group identification and anger were allowed to covary, as were group identification and group efficacy. The exogenous predictors were allowed to covary, but were not expected to predict the outcome variable directly. Thus, the relationships between ideological orientations (SDO and RWA) and collective action intentions were constrained to be zero.

**Predicting collective action to support the government.** We used a multiple group comparisons approach to assess whether the relationships in the hypothesized model were equivalent in the two conflict contexts (i.e., Rusia and Greece). The multiple group comparisons included fully unconstrained models (i.e., where every direct effect and correlation was allowed to be estimated), so that every estimated parameter could be compared across contexts. A non-significant loss of fit would indicate that participants’ appraisals of the government in the Greek context was shaped by the same processes as participants’ appraisals of the government in the Russian context.

A fully unconstrained model, where all direct effects and correlations were estimated independently in the two contexts, had perfect fit: $\chi^2 (0, N = 162) = 0.00, p < .001, \text{CFI} = 1.00, \text{AGFI} = 1.00, \text{RMSEA} = 0.00, \text{SRMR} = 0.00$. A model where all direct effects and correlations were constrained to be equal in the two contexts met thresholds for good fit: $\chi^2 (14, N = 162) = 18.93, p = .168, \text{CFI} = 0.99, \text{AGFI} = 0.94, \text{RMSEA} = 0.04, \text{SRMR} = 0.04$. There was no significant loss of fit in the constrained model compared to the unconstrained model, $\Delta \chi^2 (14, N = 162) = 18.93, p = .168$. The pattern of relationships in predicting collective action supporting the government was thus equivalent across the Russian and Greek contexts. Participants’ responses to each measure were thus averaged and were used to construct the final hypothesized model, which assessed appraisals in support of the government across conflict contexts.
This hypothesized model met thresholds for mediocre fit (Byrne, 2010): $\chi^2 (3, N = 162) = 8.44, p = .038, \text{CFI} = 0.97, \text{AGFI} = 0.88, \text{RMSEA} = 0.11, \text{SRMR} = 0.04$, and explained 53% of the variance in collective action intentions to support the government. Parameter estimates for this model are presented in Figure 1. Both SDO and RWA were associated with higher identification with the government and anger towards the protesters, but not perceived efficacy of government. Identification and anger, in turn, each positively predicted collective action intentions to support the government. Perceived efficacy of the government marginally positively predicted intentions to support the government.

We tested an alternative model that allowed a direct path between ideology and collective action intentions. This model met thresholds for mediocre fit: $\chi^2 (1, N = 162) = 4.62, p = .032, \text{CFI} = 0.98, \text{AGFI} = 0.80, \text{RMSEA} = 0.15, \text{SRMR} = 0.04$, and did not improve fit over the more parsimonious hypothesised model: $\Delta \chi^2 (2, N = 162) = 3.82, p = .148$. This indicates that the specification of additional direct paths did not improve the explanatory power of the hypothesized model, which was thus retained.

**Predicting collective action to support the protesters.** We again used a multiple group comparisons approach to assess whether the hypothesized model was equivalent across the Greek and Russian contexts. The unconstrained model, which allowed direct effects and correlations to be estimated separately in each context, necessarily had perfect fit: $\chi^2 (0, N = 162) = 0.00, p < .001, \text{CFI} = 1.00, \text{AGFI} = 1.00, \text{RMSEA} = 0.00, \text{SRMR} = 0.00$. The model constraining the direct effects and correlations to be equal across contexts met thresholds for excellent fit: $\chi^2 (14, N = 162) = 5.74, p = .973, \text{CFI} = 1.00, \text{AGFI} = 0.98, \text{RMSEA} = 0.00, \text{SRMR} = 0.03$. Again, there was no significant loss of fit when comparing the unconstrained and constrained models, $\Delta \chi^2 (14, N = 162) = 5.74, p = .973$. This indicates that the pattern of relationships in predicting collective action supporting the protestors was equivalent across the Russian and Greek contexts. We therefore averaged participants’ responses to each
measure across the two contexts, and tested the final hypothesized model in support of the protestors.

The hypothesized model met thresholds for good fit: $\chi^2 (3, N = 162) = 5.82, p = .121$, CFI = 0.98, AGFI = 0.92, RMSEA = 0.08, SRMR = 0.03, and explained 40% of the variance in collective action intentions to support a protestor group. Parameter estimates for the hypothesised model are presented in Figure 2. Only SDO negatively predicted group identification with protestors and felt anger towards the government. SDO and RWA each predicted perceived efficacy of protestors, however their effects were in opposite directions: SDO negatively predicted efficacy, whereas RWA positively predicted efficacy. Group identification with protestors significantly and positively predicted intentions to take collective action in support of the protestors. Anger towards the government marginally and positively predicted collective action intentions. Perceived efficacy of the protestors did not significantly predict collective action intentions.

Once again, an alternative model allowing direct paths between ideological orientations and collective action intentions was tested. This model met thresholds for good fit: $\chi^2 (1, N = 162) = 2.05, p = .152$, CFI = 0.99, AGFI = 0.91, RMSEA = 0.08, SRMR = 0.03. However, it did not provide a significant improvement in fit over the more parsimonious hypothesized model: $\Delta \chi^2 (2, N = 162) = 3.77, p = .152$. This provides additional support for the hypothesized model, which was retained.

[Figures 1 and 2 about here]

Discussion

Across contexts, we found that personal ideological orientations of SDO and RWA predicted outsiders’ appraisals of injustice, efficacy, and identification with each group in a conflict, and shaped individuals’ willingness to take collective action in support of each group. The more participants endorsed SDO and RWA, the more they identified with the
advantaged (government) group and the less they identified with the disadvantaged (protestor) group. Similarly, the more participants endorsed SDO and RWA, the more anger they felt towards the disadvantaged group, and the less anger they felt towards the advantaged group. Importantly, this pattern of relationships was consistent across the two contexts of Greece and Russia. Multiple-group comparisons of the Greek and Russian path models showed that the stable ideological orientations of SDO and RWA influenced contextual-focused appraisals of conflict across multiple contexts. This result extends previous work on individual differences and collective action (e.g., van Zomeren et al., 2011) by showing that pre-existing and stable personal ideological orientations of SDO and RWA can shape individuals’ responses to different contexts of conflict.

Across contexts and across targets, collective action to support a target group was predicted by identification with this group and anger towards the opposing group, but not perceived efficacy of the target group. This latter non-significant effect is surprising, since perceived group efficacy is well-established as a key predictor of collective action (van Zomeren et al., 2008). At face value, outsiders would plausibly take a more objective cost-benefit approach when deciding to engage in collective action compared with individuals who are part of a conflict. The conflict is appraised as less self-relevant for outsiders and so we might expect that the decision to take action would rely on the individual’s expectation of positive outcomes (van Zomeren et al., 2012). However, the data suggest that the role of efficacy is less motivating in this context, perhaps because outsiders are not invested in concrete outcomes of the conflict. Instead, outsiders may have been motivated to act by injustice and identity concerns, possibly to achieve symbolic outcomes (Hornsey et al., 2006).

Study 1 is an important empirical demonstration of outsiders’ responses to group conflict and inequality, and the antecedents of their collective action. However, we note three limitations. First, the cross-sectional design does not allow us to infer that SDO and RWA
directly influence outsiders’ responses to an external conflict. Second, ideology’s role in shaping action intentions was not consistent: while both SDO and RWA played a distal role in predicting intentions to support advantaged groups, only SDO was a distal predictor in shaping action intentions on behalf of disadvantaged groups. Finally, we did not control for the effect of political ideology (i.e., liberalism-conservatism), which is theoretically linked to personal ideological orientations (Duckitt & Sibley, 2009).

We conducted a second study to provide a more rigorous test of the role of SDO and RWA in shaping appraisals of external conflict, replicate the general pattern of results found in Study 1, further clarify the role of RWA for action in support of disadvantaged groups, and further investigate the role of perceived group efficacy. Study 2 used a two-stage design. At Time 1, we measured participants’ personal ideological orientations (SDO and RWA). We also measured two dimensions of general political ideology: economic and social conservatism. At Time 2, two days later, participants read about a fictional group conflict and completed the dependent measures used in Study 1. The advantage of a two-stage design is that it allows us to demonstrate the role of pre-existing ideological orientations in shaping outsiders’ later appraisals of group conflict. The fictional conflict also reflects a truly novel context about which participants have no existing knowledge.

**Study 2**

**Method**

**Participants.** We sought to recruit 200 U.S. residents to complete a two-part study through Amazon Mechanical Turk. Participants were offered USD$1.00 as compensation.

**Time 1.** In total 220 participants accessed the study website, but only 200 participants answered at least one question. One participant did not follow instructions and was excluded. The remaining 199 participants provided responses to all measured scales. The remaining missing data were not missing completely at random (MCAR) as Little’s MCAR test was
significant, $\chi^2 (653, N = 199) = 819.86, p < .001$. However, no pattern was observed after conducting a series of separate variances t-tests, and no variable was missing more than 5% of its cases. The missing cases were therefore considered missing at random and replaced using expectation maximisation (EM) estimation.

**Time 2.** After two days, participants were invited to participate in Part 2 of the study. A total of 179 people accessed the study website, and 163 answered at least one question. The remaining data were classified as missing at random, as Little’s MCAR test was significant, $\chi^2 (289, N = 163) = 360.43, p = .003$, no variable was missing more than 5% of its cases, and inspection of separate variance t-tests revealed no pattern of missing data across the dataset. The missing cases were replaced using EM estimation. A non-identifying code was used to match participants’ responses from Part 1 and Part 2. In total, 154 participants were successfully matched. This final sample ($N = 154$) ranged in age from 18 to 65 years ($M = 29.17, SD = 9.61$), included 61 (40%) women and 93 men (60%), and 107 (70%) of participants reported their race as White / European Americans. Other participants reported their race as Asian American ($n = 28, 18%$), Hispanic / Latino ($n = 14, 9%$), African American ($n = 3, 2%$), and Middle Eastern ($n = 1$). One percent of participants reported that they did not finish high school, 34% reported that their highest educational qualification was a high school diploma, 12% held an associate’s degree, and 51% held a bachelor’s degree or higher. Most participants described their stance as liberal or centrist on social (75% liberal, 14% centrist) and economic (47% liberal, 25% centrist) issues.

**Materials and Measures.** All responses, except where indicated, were provided on a seven-point Likert scale ($1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree$).

**Time 1.** As in Study 1, participants completed an adapted version of the 16-item SDO scale (Ho et al., 2012; $\alpha = .91$). Due to the inconsistent findings for authoritarianism in Study 1, we elected to use the full 30-item scale to measure RWA in this study (Altemeyer, 1996; $\alpha$
We also measured political conservatism on separate social and economic dimensions, with one item per dimension: “In terms of social [economic] issues, how would you describe your political attitudes and beliefs?”, 1, very liberal, to 7, very conservative.

**Time 2.** Participants read about a group conflict between the government and citizens of a fictional country, Silaria. Participants were instructed to imagine how they would think and feel if the conflict were real when reading the manipulation, and when completing each set of measures about the conflict.

**Fictional conflict scenario.** The fictional Silarian conflict was sparked by unsafe working conditions for citizens, and unequal pay for citizens and government officials. Citizens were described as protesting in the capital city by marching on the government parliament and stopping business from taking place in the capital. The government was described as considering a law that would allow for indefinite detention of citizens it deemed to be threatening the peace, and having used the military and police to arrest citizen protestor “ringleaders.” Immediately after reading the scenario, participants were asked a series of questions to check their comprehension of the study materials. All participants answered the questions correctly.

**Group identification.** Three items (adapted from Leach et al., 2008) measured group identification with the government, and separately, the citizens. For example, “I identify with the Silarian government.” The three items were averaged to form a reliable scale of group identification with the government (α = .91) and citizens (α = .89).

**Anger towards different groups.** Three items measured anger (adapted from Iyer et al., 2007) towards each group in the conflict. As in Study 1, participants were asked to indicate the extent to which they felt angered and outraged towards the government and, separately, the citizens. In the current study we also asked participants the degree to which they felt
furious towards each group. The three items were averaged to form a reliable scale for government ($\alpha = .87$) and citizens ($\alpha = .87$).

**Perceived efficacy.** Three items (adapted from van Zomeren et al., 2004) measured the degree to which participants believed each group had the ability to achieve its goals in the conflict. For example, participants indicated their agreement with “I think that the Silarian citizens have the power to achieve their goals,” and “if they work together, the Silarian government can achieve its goals.” The three items were averaged to form a reliable scale of perceived efficacy for government ($\alpha = .86$) and citizens ($\alpha = .92$).

**Collective action intentions.** Three items (adapted from van Zomeren et al., 2004) assessed intentions to take collective action in support of the government, and separately, the citizens. Participants indicated their agreement with items such as “I am willing to take action on behalf of the Silarian government,” “I believe I would take action on behalf of the Silarian government,” and “I intend to take action on behalf of the Silarian citizens.” The three items were averaged to form a reliable scale for intentions to support the government ($\alpha = .94$) and citizens ($\alpha = .95$).

[Table 2 about here]

**Results**

**Preliminary analyses.** As in Study 1, participants’ mean scores fell significantly below the mid-point (4) on SDO, $t(153) = -12.43, p < .001$, RWA, $t(153) = -15.00, p < .001$, economic conservatism, $t(153) = -2.764, p = .006$, and social conservatism, $t(153) = -10.96, p < .001$. Descriptive statistics and correlations between focal variables are presented in Table 2. Univariate tests of skew and kurtosis revealed that two variables were skewed: anger at citizens (Skew = 2.43) and intentions to support the government (Skew = 2.35). All other variables fell within acceptable ranges with skew of |0.28| to |1.87| (SE = 0.20) and kurtosis of |0.25| to |5.27| (SE = 0.39; Curran, West, & Finch, 1996).
Analytic strategy. As in Study 1, we assessed the hypothesized relationships between ideological orientation and collective action variables using path analysis conducted in AMOS 21.0. Separate models were specified to predict collective action supporting the government, and collective action supporting citizens. The hypothesized models from Study 1 were adapted for this purpose. SDO and RWA were specified as exogenous predictors. Group identification with the target group, anger towards the opposing group, and perceived efficacy of the target group were specified as endogenous predictors. Intentions to take collective action in support of the target group were specified as the outcome variable.

We hypothesised that SDO and RWA would each uniquely and directly predict the endogenous predictors, which in turn would each uniquely and directly predict the outcome variable. We further hypothesized that all the exogenous predictors would covary, and that they would not directly predict the outcome variable. Building on the results of Study 1, we predicted that group identification and anger would covary, and that group identification and efficacy would covary.

Predicting collective action to support the government. The hypothesised model met thresholds for excellent fit, $\chi^2 (3, N = 154) = 2.73$, $p = .436$, CFI = 1.00, AGFI = 0.96, RMSEA = 0.00, SRMR = 0.01, and accounted for 71% of the variance in participants’ intentions to take collective action in support of the Silarian government. SDO and RWA each uniquely and significantly positively predicted group identification with the government, and anger at citizens. In turn, group identification and anger each uniquely and significantly positively predicted collective action intentions. Parameter estimates for this model are presented in Figure 3.

We tested an alternative model that included the direct effects of SDO and RWA on collective action intentions to test their distal, rather than simultaneous, role in predicting
responses to group conflict. This model met the criteria for excellent fit, $\chi^2 (1, N = 154) = 0.00, p = .950, CFI = 1.00, AGFI = 1.00, RMSEA = 0.00, SRMR = 0.00$, but did not fit the data significantly better than the hypothesized model, $\Delta \chi^2 (2, N = 154) = 2.72, p = .257$. The more parsimonious hypothesized model was thus retained.

**Predicting collective action to support the citizens.** The hypothesized model met most criteria for good fit: $\chi^2 (3, N = 154) = 8.62, p = .035, CFI = 0.97, AGFI = 0.87$, RMSEA = 0.11, SRMR = 0.05, and accounted for 33% of the variance in participants’ intentions to take collective action in support of the Silarian citizens. Similar to the findings for government support, SDO and RWA each uniquely and significantly negatively predicted group identification with citizens, and anger at the government. In turn, group identification and anger each uniquely and significantly positively predicted intentions to take collective action in support of the citizens. A marginal negative effect of SDO on the perceived efficacy of citizens was also found, though efficacy itself did not predict intentions. Parameter estimates for this model are presented in Figure 4.

As with government, an alternative model that included the direct effects of ideological orientations on collective action intentions was tested. This model did not meet thresholds for good fit, $\chi^2 (2, N = 154) = 4.81, p = .003, CFI = 0.98, AGFI = 0.79$, RMSEA = 0.16, SRMR = 0.05, and did not fit the data significantly better than the hypothesized model, $\Delta \chi^2 (2, N = 154) = 3.81, p = .149$. As such, the more parsimonious hypothesized model was retained.

**Discussion**

Study 2 replicated the major findings of the first study. Outsiders’ ideological orientations influenced their judgements about a specific conflict context, which in turn were associated with intentions to take collective action. SDO and RWA were positively associated with government group identification and anger at citizens, which in turn were
associated with increased collective action intentions in support of the government. In contrast, SDO and RWA were negatively associated with citizen group identification and anger at the government, which in turn were associated with increased collective action intentions in support of citizens.

Overall, the results of Study 2 suggest that both SDO and RWA can shape outsiders’ collective action in support of both the advantaged and disadvantaged group. However, the effect of RWA was less stable than that of SDO. One possibility is that because RWA includes an element of valuing conformity, the association between RWA and collective action in novel contexts will be more unstable, as individuals attempt to discern what other group members and group authorities feel about the novel context. Future work should seek to determine more conclusively whether RWA plays a differential effect in predicting outsider appraisals of disadvantaged groups in conflict. Alternatively, SDO and RWA may differentially shape appraisals of group conflicts across contexts, depending on how the nature of the conflict is perceived by outsiders. We return to this point in the general discussion. In sum, the two-stage design of Study 2 provided further evidence that personal ideological orientations play a meaningful role in shaping outsiders’ responses to group conflict.

**General Discussion**

We investigated how personal ideological orientations of SDO and RWA shaped outsiders’ appraisals of group conflict. In two studies, we found that SDO and RWA positively predicted support for advantaged groups and negatively predicted support for disadvantaged groups across contexts. Endorsement or rejection of these ideologies predicted outsiders’ identification with each group in a conflict, and their felt anger at the opposing group. This, in turn, predicted intentions to take collective action in support of the target group. The finding that SDO and RWA shaped individuals’ appraisals of disparate conflict
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contexts (e.g., Greece, Russia, and a fictional group conflict) is compelling evidence that individuals’ ideological orientations have real implications for the groups they will come to support in any external group conflict. In addition, these findings contribute to the growing body of work extending contextually-focused models of collective action with more stable, general beliefs.

We focused on uninvolved outsiders in the current research as their distance from a context of group conflict made them an ideal population for examining more stable predictors of collective action. Extant frameworks of collective action have theorized about the potential for third parties to intervene in group conflict, typically conceptualizing these groups as audiences to a context of conflict (e.g., Simon & Klandermans, 2001; Subašić et al., 2008; Thomas, McGarty, & Mavor, 2010). The results of the present research are thus an important first step in understanding how and when outsiders may choose to intervene in others’ conflicts.

**Implications for Collective Action Theory**

Most frameworks of collective action focus on group-relevant motives (e.g., group identity) that are bound to a specific context of conflict or inequality (van Zomeren et al., 2008; Thomas et al., 2009). This group-focused analysis reflects the important and multifaceted role of social identity in intergroup conflict. But many individuals who could take collective action are less likely to engage in group-focused appraisals predicated on an existing and salient shared group identity if that shared identity does not exist or the individual lacks information about the content of that identity. Non-activists within a group, or members of a third party within or outside the conflict context may fall into this category. Thus the key theoretical contribution of this work is that stable, context-independent variables can shape less-involved individuals’ willingness to take collective action by affecting proximal and contextual appraisals.
Our findings are aligned with and extend recent work describing how personally-held moral convictions about conflicts and inequality can motivate collective action (van Zomeren et al., 2011; van Zomeren, 2013). Moral convictions, like ideologies, are described as affecting appraisals of injustice, identification, and efficacy about a context and provide an explanation for why individuals may choose to intervene on behalf of another group. Van Zomeren and colleagues (2011) describe moral convictions as transcending group boundaries, and thus as more context-independent than other antecedents of collective action. We expand on this growing body of work by showing how ideological orientations can affect appraisals not only across groups within a context, but across contexts. This is especially important for understanding how less-involved individuals (e.g., non-activists or third parties) may appraise and respond to group conflict and inequality. Future work could also investigate whether ideological orientations shape appraisals and subsequent collective action for members of groups already engaged in conflict.

Although we have here followed the majority of collective action work in describing groups in a context of conflict as either “advantaged” or “disadvantaged”, it is important to recognise such labels are themselves contested (Reicher & Hopkins, 1996; Leach, Snider, & Iyer, 2002) and that collective action may occur in an intergroup context but without intergroup conflict (e.g., Tewari, Khan, Hopkins, Srinivasan, & Reicher, 2012). The extent to which an individual’s ideological orientations are shared with different groups in conflict can structure the boundaries and define the content of a social identity of solidarity with one or more groups, possibly across two or more conflicts. Such an identity is not bound by social category (e.g., “protestors” or “women”) but is instead defined by a shared ideology (Thomas et al., 2009; Thomas et al., 2010). Because ideologies are prescriptive, identifying with a group defined by an ideology carries with it a compulsion to act. Thus, further investigation of individual, context-independent variables such as ideological orientations and moral
convictions will lead to more powerful and comprehensive models of collective action for new intergroup contexts.

We simultaneously assessed individuals’ collective action antecedents and intentions for both advantaged and disadvantaged groups. To our knowledge, little research has empirically considered the possibility that individuals may support either the advantaged or disadvantaged group in a given context. Previous work has instead focused on disadvantaged group members’ collective action to assist their own group (van Zomeren et al., 2008), advantaged group members’ collective action in support of the disadvantaged group (Iyer et al., 2007) or advantaged members’ collective action to assist their own group (Ellemers, Doosje, Van Knippenberg, & Wilke, 1992). We suggest that future collective action work investigates support for each group that is party to conflict or inequality. By measuring responses only in support of the hypothesized group, researchers risk failing to capture participants’ ambivalence about taking action, or participants’ support for other groups.

**Implications for Policy and Practice**

The current work provides insight into why groups that subscribe to differing ideologies may disagree on when and how to intervene in conflicts within or between foreign countries. Members of groups who endorse SDO and RWA (e.g., US Republicans, Ho et al., 2012) may be more likely to support an advantaged authoritarian government group. Such individuals may perceive agitating or protesting disadvantaged citizen groups as attempting to usurp established and legitimate differences in power and status among groups. In contrast, members of groups that reject SDO and RWA may be more likely to support a disadvantaged protesting group against what they perceive to be unjust persecution or withholding of resources or status.

Our findings corroborate previous theorizing about third parties’ potential to intervene in group conflict (e.g., Simon & Klandermans, 2001). Such individuals, including outsiders,
may be recruited to action by groups engaged in conflict. Our findings suggest that these groups’ recruitment efforts will be most successful when they emphasise the shared ideological orientation between outsiders and groups in conflict so as to foster a shared identity and a sense of injustice. As an example, the Occupy movement seeks to create an inclusive shared identity with the slogan “We are the 99 percent” and to recruit like-minded outsiders by explicitly communicating an ideological orientation: “We no longer want the wealthiest to hold all the power… to write the rules governing an unbalanced and inequitable global economy” (Occupy Together, 2013).

More broadly, the present research provides an interesting theoretical lens for understanding how policies and systems of government may spread. Peoples or governments of a nation who recognise similar specific attitudes in other nations (e.g., rejection of refugees, support for climate change action) may use this initial similarity to forge the foundations of a richer shared identity. Such an identity would facilitate the transnational dissemination and adoption of novel views and norms, including policy. However, the salience of differences among the multiple groups or nations within a movement has the potential to paralyse as well as energise activists (see also McDonald, Fielding, & Louis, 2012; 2013). How far the processes relevant to single-group, single-issue models of collective action also serve to predict and explain multiple-group or international social movements remains to be explored in further research.

Limitations and Future Directions

In both studies, we did not find that outsiders’ perceptions of a group’s efficacy in achieving its goals predicted their subsequent intentions to take collective action on behalf of that group. Although perceived group efficacy is a robust independent predictor of collective action (van Zomeren et al., 2008), this same work has indicated that the type of intergroup conflict can moderate the effect of efficacy. Others have argued that efficacy does not predict
collective action independently of group identification (Stürmer & Simon, 2004), or that efficacy is not separate to group identification but “encapsulated” within the social identity of a group member (Thomas et al., 2009). In the present data, perceived group efficacy appears not to be a key or even salient determinant of outsiders’ collective action. Instead, outsiders who appraise the conflict as self-relevant are mobilized to take action via identification and emotion pathways (van Zomeren et al., 2012). Understanding the variables that moderate the role of efficacy (if any) for outsiders thus remains as an interesting direction for future research.

In this work we defined outsiders as individuals who are entirely separate from a group conflict. This rarefied definition was convenient for the purposes of the current research, since it allowed us to investigate how stable ideological orientations shape appraisals of conflicts when individuals encounter those conflicts for the first time. However, this physical and psychological boundary is not always so clear-cut. For instance, extant work has conceptualized “audiences” as those who are not directly involved in a group conflict, but who still physically exist within the context of the conflict (e.g., Subašić et al., 2008). And, of course, even members of disadvantaged groups must overcome physical and psychological barriers before they engage in collective action (Klandermans & Oegema, 1987). Future work should explore how complexities of (physical or psychological) distance may moderate third parties’ responses to group conflicts in which they are not directly involved.

Two more general limitations of the current work are founded in the level of analysis that we chose for SDO and RWA. First, we must acknowledge that SDO and RWA may differentially influence appraisals of group conflict depending on the nature of the conflict or inequality. Second, we also recognise that personal ideological orientations are more complex than the straightforward unidimensional conceptualisation we have used here.
The Dual Process Model (Duckitt, 2006; Duckitt & Sibley, 2010b) specifies that SDO and RWA differentially predict (negative) attitudes and behaviour towards outgroups depending on the type of perceived threat that the group represents. We would extend this reasoning to suggest that SDO and RWA may differentially predict conflict appraisals depending on the type of group conflict that an individual is encountering. In the current set of studies, we examined the unique effects of each ideological orientation on appraisals supporting both disadvantaged and advantaged groups in a variety of conflict contexts. However, we did not control or account for the variability in how a given conflict may be perceived. This lack of control may provide an explanation for why SDO more consistently predicted contextual appraisals compared to RWA, especially in Study 2. This conflict context made salient an economic and competitive threat to authority by portraying citizens protesting for increased wages, possibly enhancing the predictive power of SDO (Duckitt & Sibley, 2010b). In contrast, a context that instead made salient a social and security threat to authority may have instead enhanced the predictive power of RWA. Future work is necessary to test the Dual Process Model more formally with collective action as an outcome variable. Of particular interest would be to explore how SDO and RWA might influence appraisals when the group most aligned to a given ideological orientation is not also in a position of advantage, such as members of the US Tea Party who advocate for strong military and traditional family values (Tea Party, 2015).

SDO and RWA are each more internally nuanced than examined in the present studies. SDO has been shown to have two distinct factors: dominance and (anti)-egalitarianism (Ho et al., 2012). Similarly, recent factor analytic work has revealed three distinct components to RWA: aggression towards deviants, conformity to conventional norms, and submission to authority (Mavor et al., 2010). Future research could explore how
the individual factors of SDO and RWA may play differing roles in shaping outsiders’ responses to group conflict.

In this set of studies we propose generally that outsiders to conflict may come to take collective action. However, participants in each study were sampled from a paid participant pool of Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) users. Data from MTurk has been found to be as reliable as that obtained from undergraduate university students (Burhmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011). However, MTurk users are less attentive than student samples (Goodman, Cryder, & Cheema, 2013). Experienced users who have participated in many—even thousands—of studies are clearly less naïve than the ideal participant, which can influence responses (Chandler, Mueller, & Paolacci, 2013). This attentiveness issue has been shown to be ameliorated by comprehension checks (Crump, McDonnell, & Gureckis), which all Study 2 participants successfully completed. Nevertheless, it is important that future work replicate these results in other cultural contexts to strengthen our argument that outsiders more generally may choose to intervene in external group conflicts.

**Conclusion**

We extend current frameworks of collective action by investigating stable, context-independent predictors: personal ideological orientations of SDO and RWA. We show that these orientations influence uninvolved outsiders’ interpretations of a group conflict, including their identification with, and anger towards, the parties involved. Further, we show that uninvolved outsiders are willing to respond with collective action when they encounter group conflict, and that they are capable of supporting either the advantaged group or the disadvantaged group. It is clear, then, that outsiders are not passive observers to external conflict, but in fact ideologically motivated actors who can mobilize to take collective action.
Footnotes

1These data were part of a larger study that included measures of beliefs about society and identification as an American. We also measured perceptions of the conflict for each context. Details are available from the corresponding author on request.

2We conducted a path analysis of the hypothesized model after reducing the skew of anger at citizens and intentions to take action in support of the government variables using a non-linear \( \log_{10} \) transformation. This model with transformed variables, \( \chi^2(3, N = 154) = 6.58, p = .254, \) CFI = 0.99, AGFI = 1.00, RMSEA = 0.05, SRMR = 0.02, did not differ substantively in fit from the model with untransformed variables. In addition, there was no difference in the pattern of significance across the model paths. We report the results of path analyses using untransformed variables in the main text.

3The pattern of correlations between SDO, RWA, and the focal variables were maintained after controlling for the effect of both economic and social conservatism.

4Although the RMSEA value here does not meet the criteria for good (< 0.05) fit, it has been argued that for samples smaller than 250 cases, RMSEA tends to be inflated (Hu & Bentler, 1999).
References


Table 1

Descriptive statistics and intercorrelations for Study 1.

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Note. All variables measured on a 1-7 scale, except Anger, which was measured on a 1-6 scale. † p < .10.  * p < .05.  ** p < .01.  *** p < .001.
Table 2

Descriptive statistics and intercorrelations for Study 2.

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Note. All variables measured on a 1-7 scale, except Anger, which was measured on a 1-6 scale. † p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001.
Figure 1

Study 1 hypothesized path model with standardized regression weights for collective action in support of the government, aggregated across Russian and Greek contexts.
Figure 2

Study 1 hypothesized path model with standardized regression weights for collective action in support of the protestors, aggregated across Russian and Greek contexts.

Note. † $p < .10$. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$. *** $p < .001$. 
Figure 3

Study 2 hypothesized path model with standardized regression weights for collective action in support of the government.

Note. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$. *** $p < .001$. 
Figure 4

Study 2 hypothesized path model with standardized regression weights for collective action in support of the citizens.

Note. † p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001.