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https://doi.org/10.1080/2158379X.2016.1149309

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Power between Habitus and Reflexivity – Introducing Margaret Archer to the Power Debate

Abstract

This article introduces Margaret Archer’s research on reflexivity to the power debate, alongside Pierre Bourdieu’s already influential concept of habitus. Both offer significant insights on social conditioning in late modernity. However, their tendency to the extreme of social determinism and voluntarism must be avoided. To do so, this article adopts Haugaard’s family resemblance concept of power, describing habitus and reflexivity as an important new binary of power instead of a conceptual zero-sum game. This strengthens the explanatory role of agency, central to the three dimensions of power, without losing sight of constitutive, structural power. It also helps overcome the habitus-reflexivity dichotomy in social theory and provides a starting point to evaluate Archer’s work from a power perspective.

Keywords
Family resemblance, habitus, reflexivity, Margaret Archer, Pierre Bourdieu, late modernity

Introduction

In the 20th century, the transformation of the scientific discussion on power followed wider changes in the social sciences. The debate originally profited from the emergence of modern political science and focused on state-centred forms of power (Berndtson 2014). Today, it is constituted by numerous positions, accounting for more diffuse notions of power (Haugaard and Ryan 2012). This historical context becomes relevant when considering how and why Margaret Archer’s work should be introduced to the
power debate. Thus, this article argues that Archer’s work provides an important and necessary addition, while acknowledging the power literature’s diverse range of normative, ontological, theoretical and empirical positions. In doing so, it focuses on her work on reflexivity, which can be introduced alongside its already established counterpart in social theory, Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of habitus.

Archer developed her account as a response to critical realism lacking an explanation for how structures are mediated through agency. Furthermore, it is a response to conceptualisations of human beings as either autonomous beings of rational choice theory, or as social vessels lacking distinct agential properties. As part of the structure-agency debate, her work can also be seen in opposition to Anthony Giddens’ structuration theory and his work with Ulrich Beck and Scott Lash on reflexivity in late modernity – for the relationship between Archer and Giddens, see Anthony King (Archer 2000, 2003, 2007, 2010, 2012; Beck et al. 1994; Giddens 1979; King 2010). Their differing positions, such as analytical dualism contra duality, and reflexive imperative against reflexive modernisation, have been well documented (Archer 2000, 2003, 2007; Caetano 2015), and cannot be adequately discussed in this article.

Instead, this article focuses on Archer’s research on reflexivity in relation to Bourdieu’s habitus. Reflexivity for Archer describes the capacity of human beings to mediate our environment through internal conversation, prior to action. Habitus in contrast captures the social disposition, of which we are unconscious and which enables us to act in certain ways. Crucially, only Bourdieu’s habitus has had a significant impact on the discussions of power, whereas Archer’s theories remain absent. However, Archer’s recent work provides a comprehensive alternative to the current adoption of Bourdieu’s habitus. Her humanist project of defending a stronger form of agency may thus help overcome Bourdieu’s tendency towards social determinism. This, however,
first requires adopting a position that introduces her account of agency and reflexivity without its tendency towards voluntarism. The aim is not to reproduce the two sides of the habitus-reflexivity debate in social theory.

The argument proceeds in three stages. First, the four dimensional power debate is introduced, identifying both a move to internal and constitutive processes, and a lack of engagement with Archer’s work. Then, this article discusses Bourdieu’s concept of habitus and Archer’s work on reflexivity, as part of the habitus-reflexivity debate and suggests potential criticisms. After establishing both accounts and their respective weaknesses, this article transcends their conflict by adopting Haugaard’s family resemblance concept and the binary signature of power. This opens up the space to explore the link between Archer and the power literature, specifically in relation to the four dimensions of power, and to consider its implications for future research on power distribution in late modernity.

**The development of the four dimensions of power**

The debate on reflexivity aims to understand why people react differently to similar circumstances (Chalari 2009), a question reminiscent of Robert Dahl’s (1957: 202) example at the beginning of the contemporary power debate. He describes how some people are perceived to have the power to direct traffic while his attempt to do so would be perceived as mad. In other words, Dahl considers power by asking why similar actions in similar situations may have different effects. Put together, they exemplify the relatedness of the issues of social and political power with the causal powers and mediation processes of reflexivity. This suggests that to talk about reflexivity is to some extent to be concerned with power.
While Archer is aware of this connection in her work between reflexivity and social power, she and the commentators on her work do not extend that connection to the power debate. Archer offers numerous references to causal, personal, social, and other forms of power, but the existing engagement with works on power is limited and unsystematic (cf. Archer 2000: 265). The scientific debate on power similarly has not considered the value of Archer’s work for power analysis. First, therefore, this section explores the development of the debate on power, to understand how Archer can be introduced into this debate, and the benefits of bringing these together.

The modern debate on power as we know it today started in early 20th century, with Berndtson (2014) providing rare insights on American discussions of power before the 1950s. However, Max Weber and Dahl are arguably the central figures of its beginning. Dahl, for example, famously defines power through its episodic exercise as ‘A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do’ (Dahl 1957: 202-203). This is known as the first of three dimensions of power, with Philip Pettit (2008) and the recent special issue of the Journal of Political Power (Baldwin and Hauggard 2015) considering Dahl’s enduring influence.

Dahl (1957, 1958, 1961a, 1961b) separates power from resources to show how the US democratic process is pluralist and distinct from the unequal distribution of resources. In contrast, the second and third dimension can be seen as extensions, but also as implicit critique of Dahl’s normative aim (Haugaard 2012b: 354). Instead of the pluralist emphasis, the second dimension of Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz (1962) argues that power may act prior to the democratic process by means of exclusion of topics, intentionally and in favour of actor A against B. Steven Lukes (1974, 2005) challenges the static notion of preferences, suggesting that actor A may influence B’s interests so that B acts against his/her real interests, leading to latent conflict (Lukes
1974: 28). This dimension offers an important move away from the rational choice model of agency, which Archer similarly rejects. However, the move towards extensive considerations of internal processes, e.g. reflexivity, remains underdeveloped and raised concerns about its elitist connotations. As Lukes discusses with Clarissa Hayward (2008), this position overemphasises responsibility and blame for so-called “powerful people”. It also causes difficulties for the empirical focus of the previous dimensions, with John Gaventa (1980) offering a rare empirical study using all three faces of power. More recently, the “powercube” may prove a successful adoption of Lukes and Gaventa for an actor-centred approach to empirical power analysis (Hathaway 2015).

Peter Digeser added a fourth dimension in The Fourth Face of Power (1992), despite Lukes’ claim that his position and the Foucauldian understanding of power are incompatible (Haugaard 2012b: 354). The fourth dimension or “face” of power describes the subjectification of human beings into social beings as part of the system. It became popular in IR scholarship following Michael Barnett’s and Raymond Duvall’s Power in International Politics (2005). In their article, the four dimensions are termed as i) compulsory power, ii) institutional power, iii) structural power, and iv) productive power (Barnett and Duvall 2005: 42). Together with further insights from various debates throughout the social sciences, e.g. feminism, these four dimensions encompass a wide range of claims and developments central to understanding power. Furthermore, as Haugaard together with Kevin Ryan (2012) suggests, the power debate can also be distinguished in the three meta-language games of power: consensual, conflictual, and constitutive. They formulate problems inherent to each of them, albeit that Amy Allen (2014) suggests they are sympathetic to the constitutive.
Situating reflexivity in the context of the four dimensions of power

This short overview of the power literature enables two initial comments central to the argument developed in this article. The first comment concerns the increasing relevance and comprehensive nature of constitutive formulations of power. This move started with Lukes’ consideration of real interests, and was extended through the addition of the fourth dimension, central to continental European thought on power. The potential issues with such a move are exemplified below using Bourdieu's influential conceptualisation of habitus. Despite his insistence on its creative nature, critics have suggested a tendency towards social determinism. Archer also adds the critique of social imperialism, i.e. attempts to reduce all human activities to the social sphere.

Building on this, the second comment concerns the introduction of Archer. As the overview shows, the power debate provides a sophisticated, comprehensive account of the phenomenon of power. This is not to ignore the continued contested nature of these four dimensions. It raises the question, why this connection to Archer’s work is underdeveloped. While Lukes insists on keeping the focus on forms of domination (Hayward and Lukes 2008), Haugaard, in his article on the topic (2012a), suggests a re-interpretation. Power theorists often separate power to and power with, as empowering and intrinsically positive, from power over, as negative opposite domination. Haugaard wishes to transcend such attempts, instead putting forward a more positive, Arendtian understanding of power as acting in concert, taking the metaphor “concert” literally (Haugaard 2012a: 34). In this account, the same empirical process potentially leads to normatively desirable and objectionable forms of power. For example, exclusion can both result in justice or domination (Haugaard 2012a: 51). Thus, Haugaard together with Allen and Rainer Forst (2014) argues for seeing power as normatively Janus faced, where power over can also be positive. Such a complex perspective on power is
arguably best suited to Archer’s work, although she does not provide any judgement of this kind. At best she does not seem to favour any of these, emphasising personal, social, and cultural forms of power equally. As discussed below, reflexivity also seems a neutral capacity concerning its use for power. Combining the two comments, this article explores Archer’s potential contributions to the four dimensions of power and discussion on power more broadly. This first requires introducing Archer’s and Bourdieu’s concepts reflexivity and habitus in their current form as part of the habitus-reflexivity dichotomy.

**Power and habitus: emphasising the social**

Habitus has been discussed in different ways in much of classic sociology, e.g. by Emile Durkheim, Max Weber, or Georg Simmel. Today, it is particularly associated with and popularized by Bourdieu (Archer 2010; Haugaard 2008a). Increasingly, his concept of habitus has been widely used in power literature and analysis, and Bourdieu has become a significant representative of a more constitutive notion of power (Haugaard 2008a; Luckes 2005). For Bourdieu habitus – intentionally distinguished from the term habits – is the ‘durably installed generative principle of regulated improvisations’ (Bourdieu 1977: 78). In other words, it constitutes ‘systems of durable, transposable dispositions’ (Bourdieu 1977: 72). Thus, habitus is, at the same time, embodied, individualised, and inherently reflects shared cultural context. Crucially for Bourdieu’s account, its principles are placed outside the grasp of consciousness (Adams 2006: 514). In more general terms, it refers to our way of being in the world, our ‘predisposed ways of thinking, acting and moving in and through the social environment’ (Sweetman 2003: 532). Giddens (1984) similarly describes practical consciousness as knowledge that allows people to “go on” by reproducing the routine elements of social life. Another
important concept is Bourdieu’s notion of field. It refers to ‘the always existing, obligatory boundaries of experiential context: […] the field instantiates us as subjects and reproduces social distinctions via the enactment of habitus’ (Adams 2006: 514).

Bourdieu attempts to transcend the traditional structure-agency dichotomy and therefore conceptualises habitus not simply as operating in a rule-like fashion. Instead, he emphasises the creative, active, and inventive capacity that only ‘in the relation to certain structures […] produces given discourses or practices’ (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 135). For Bourdieu habitus as embodied social structures allows for constant improvisation without requiring consciousness of it. Using the analogy of a game, the good player has a habitus that allows him/her to always react the right way simply through the feel for the game.

Potential criticisms
Commentators remain nonetheless concerned with the emphasis on the unconscious and its implications for the explanatory power of habitus. Dave Elder-Vass for example, argues that Bourdieu ‘neglects the role of conscious thought in both the development and the operation of the habitus’ (Elder-Vass 2007: 327). However, to be dismissive about the active, conscious elements of decision making is to make them seem unimportant. This then reduces reflexivity to times of crisis, where habitus and objective environment are at odds – blips, where action has undesired effects. This includes, for example, being made redundant, moving out of the family home, or the extreme case of war, which may require the modification of habitus itself (Elder-Vass 2007: 329). Unfortunately, how this narrow form of reflexivity is possible and what its nature is remain unclear in Bourdieu’s work (Crossley 2001: 117). Thus, he seems for
some critics, despite his insistence otherwise, unable to resist affirming determinism (Alexander 1995: 140).

The implications of this underdeveloped role of consciousness has been especially well documented for the practice of playing tennis (Noble and Watkins 2003; Strandbu and Steen-Johansen 2014). Tennis seems a particularly tempting case of human action as Bourdieu was an avid tennis player. Greg Noble and Megan Watkins therefore argue that without a more reflexive acquisition of skills than Bourdieu allows for in his concept of habitus, playing at such a level would be impossible. They also identify a failure of Bourdieu to account for habituation as distinct from the absence of consciousness.

This tendency to downplay the role of conscious, reflective human processes and action was the starting point for Archer to seek an alternative account of agency. However, Bourdieu’s work is also central to this article because his concept of habitus offers an important, successful attempt to transcend the traditional structure-agency dichotomy in social sciences. By accounting for the feel for the game, i.e. the unconscious embodiment of social and cultural structures, Bourdieu opens the space to consider the mediation between structural and cultural power, and the individual. It is, therefore, in the context of Bourdieu’s work, despite these continuing criticisms, that Archer’s recent work develops its full potential for the power debate.

Habitus in the power debate

Exemplary for the introduction of habitus to the power debate is Haugaard, who has used the concept in numerous publications with one article (2008a) specifically focusing on the relationship between power and habitus. Haugaard also refers to reflexivity in relation to Anthony Giddens (cf. Haugaard 2002: 216). In his article on habitus, he
states that ‘the capacity to put our habitus into discursive rules […] is the source of human reflexivity. Actors can distance themselves from their habitus by making it discursive. In this process, they become “strangers” to themselves’ (2008a: 193). He continues by seeing in reflexivity the possibility of a capacity of humanist agency – the result of turning habitus discursively to become stranger to oneself. While being a step towards Archer’s understanding of reflexivity, the notion of turning into a stranger, or turning habitus discursive, remains distinct to Archer’s (2010) critical, limiting stance towards habitus as the unconscious embodiment of social structures. More importantly, Archer provides a more extensive account of the nature of reflexivity. Building on this example of a power theorist deploying the concept habitus (and reflexivity), a similar analysis of other adoptions of Bourdieu and habitus could be expected. For example, the Journal of Political Power has produced a significant number of articles that, with varying degree, rely on Bourdieu. The analysis of their content would presumably reproduce the impression developed so far – both of the value of Bourdieu’s account and the problem of consciousness. Such criticisms are also not new and therefore not the main focus of this article. Bourdieu’s account has important insights and major problems. The question is therefore to what extent Archer’s conceptualisation of reflexivity as counterargument fares better.

**Archer – Reflexivity through Internal Conversation**

For a long time, reflexivity remained under conceptualised and researched. As Archer (2007: 62) put it, reflexivity is like the dead soldier with unknown identity, which despite much admiration, no one attempts to identify. More recently, it has become increasingly popular as term for an external phenomenon, in the form reflective x… (Archer 2008: 2). Similarly, an extended reflexivity thesis in late modernity has become
commonplace with social theorists as the belief that there is increasing reflexivity in society (Adams 2006: 512). As discussed in the Journal of Political Power, the influential social theorists Zygmunt Bauman, Giddens, and Beck all share this claim of extended reflexivity in late modernity (Dawson 2010). However, the reasons for this transformation are as contested as the notion of reflexivity itself. Giddens and Beck for example, identify the lack of social structure as basic feature of late modernity’s social structure, leading to heightened reflexivity (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 2002; Giddens 1991). Archer, in contrast, rejects this portrayal of the relationship between traditionalism and reflexivity as zero-sum (Archer 2012: 3; Akram 2012: 48). Instead, she turns to the internal processes of agency to find her alternative account of the mediation between structure and agency with clear implications for late modernity.

Archer developed her account of reflexivity in a trilogy of books (2003, 2007, 2012), building on two series of qualitative, explorative interviews. Their aim was to identify patterns of reflexivity and their transformation in late modernity, with one focusing on the students in her department at the University of Warwick, and the other on residents of the city of Coventry. She conceives reflexivity as a mediation process between the internal and external world, defining it as ‘the regular exercise of the mental ability, shared by all normal people, to consider themselves in relation to their (social) contexts and vice versa’ (Archer 2007: 4). Internal conversation thus becomes ‘reflexivity’s modality’ (Chalari 2009: 5) and the talk ‘all normal people have with themselves, within their own heads, usually silently and usually from an early age’ (Archer 2007: 2). Furthermore, as Archer (2008: 2) emphasises, reflexive deliberation diverges extensively and significantly between people, unlike common assumption. This becomes clear as she describes different modes of reflexivity.
Dominant modes of reflexivity

Archer concludes from her explorative interviews the existence of four exhaustive modes of reflexivity: communicative, autonomous, meta-, and fractured. All participants not only exhibited all of these modes of reflexivity – in varying degrees – but also possessed one distinctive dominant mode of reflexivity with a small number having two dominant modes (Archer 2007: 94).

Communicative reflexives externalize elements of their internal conversation, choosing a more intra-personal “thought and talk” process, as they mistrust their private deliberation (Archer 2003: 167). They are surrounded by numerous reciprocal relations with social institutions, e.g. family, church, school/university, partners, and friends (Archer 2012: 135). They aim for contextual continuity and show ‘smooth dovetailing of concerns’ (Archer 2003: 169) by prioritising family and friends over other concerns or contentment. Thus, only circumstantial, but not personal, changes are considered and the identified social horizon is maintained. Communicative reflexives identify with their natal context from which they gained high relational goods and, as they value these highly, they wish to reproduce these in their own family (Archer 2012: 164). They tend to be apolitical as they believe they have already established their desired micro-cosmos (Archer 2003: 184).

In contrast, autonomous reflexives are decisive, self-assured, and see their deliberative process as self-sufficient, not out of arrogance but rather, suspicion, as they are willing to include other’s expertise in their own consideration (Archer 2003: 210). Their reflexive process is task-oriented. They are also good at dove-tailing their concerns (Archer 2003: 213), but are individualist and search for contextual discontinuity and ‘supra-contextual knowledge’ (Archer 2003: 251). The autonomous reflexive was shown to have articulate social concerns and lack relational goods – they
were ‘parented by two individuals rather than by a couple’ (Archer 2012: 168). They attach less value to social order, instead investing heavily in the practical order, for example, by learning instruments, sports, or languages (Archer 2012: 169). As a result, making friends is not a high priority, is of low interpersonal intensity, and expression of their practical interests (Archer 2012: 179). This utility-friendship seems therefore to be a partnership rather than a friendship (van Hoef 2014: 69). In contrast to the other groups, autonomous reflexives are uncritical of employment in corporate enterprise or governmental bureaucracy, but see the employment as a means to an end, as ethical concerns are incorporated in personal agendas (Archer 2012: 188).

Finally, meta-reflexives use their reflexive deliberation to question not only propositions but also themselves (Archer 2003: 255). The meta-reflexives problematise the social order instead of normalizing or internalizing it (Archer 2012: 207). Their reflexive process is value-oriented, neither replicating their natal background nor accepting normative conventionalism (Archer 2012: 208). They receive relational goods (Archer 2012: 245), but also mixed messages concerning normative claims about the social order, leaving them to find their own position from a young age (Archer 2012: 246). Their actions are characterized by volatility, both recurrent contextual incongruity and tendency to frequently re-qualify, leading to a voluntarily chosen sideways mobility and gravitating towards work in the third sector (Archer 2007: 252).

Potential Criticisms

Archers humanist aim is to strengthen the role of agency by describing more clearly what this agency and its powers actually entails – as opposed to, for example, the rational choice model of agency – and comes with costs. Where Bourdieu has been shown to tend towards social determinism, Archer in turn has been criticised for
overemphasising the reflexive, intentional aspects of social conditioning. It may seem therefore ‘that Archer enthrones reflexivity while Bourdieu condemns it to servility’ (Elder-Vass 2007: 325). Thus, while the account of both sides put forward does undeniably favour Archer in her rejection for example of Bourdieu’s social imperialism (Archer 2000; 2010: 292), scholars of power should be aware of some of the recent criticisms.

As the only empirically founded sociological approach on reflexivity through internal conversation, it has become ‘paradigmatic in the sociological field’ (Caetano 2015: 2). Criticisms, therefore, are often of a more theoretical nature, as in the structuration-realist debate that preceded Archer’s research on reflexivity. Where commentators once questioned her understanding of structuration theory (King 2010; Piironen 2014; Stones 2001), critics now focus on her description of Bourdieu’s habitus. However, the critique also focuses on the reduced role of the causal power of structures and their temporal pre-existence to action, particularly in Archer’s empirical research (Caetano 2015: 4). Ian Burkitt (2012: 464) furthermore rejects Archer’s positioning of reflexivity in the private sphere and sees her statement of reflexivity as relatively autonomous property of agency as a big step down from the original realist position, where structures and agency are seen as analytically distinctive. Thus, doubts remain to what extent Archer was able to sufficiently characterise the interplay between structure and agency at reflexivity level. Ana Caetano (2015: 5) also doubts that the empirical evidence sufficiently supports Archer’s theoretical claims, particularly concerning the reflexive imperative through contextual incongruity, which will be discussed below. Other critiques have suggested that Archer’s perception of emotion is too limited, with Archer missing the role of relational emotions, i.e. the way humans emotionally identify with others and how this affects their internal conversation (Burkitt
Emotions and feeling are not simply ‘attendants to reflexivity, they are the basis and motive of reflexive thought, […] our thoughts are always coloured by emotion so that we never see the world in a neutral way’ (Burkitt 2012: 469). Indeed, the relational dimension seems extensively lacking. King therefore pushes British sociologists to look sideways against the vertical dualism of structure and agency, and towards collective action. He describes a potential new book title for Archer as ‘Being Social: Collective Action and the Public Conversation’ (2010: 259), in reference to her book Being Human: The Problem of Agency (Archer 2000). Archer, together with Pierpaolo Donati, seems to have followed this train of thought, as visible in her new publication The Relational Subject (2015). Lastly, Philip Walsh (2015: 73) identifies a difficulty for Archer, when developing a more extensive historical account. He also adopts Arendt to identify in Archer’s work a biased connection of reflexivity with action which cannot sufficiently account for the non-active features of reflexivity.

While all these points provide useful starting points for extending or amending her concepts and insights, they do not take away the groundbreaking nature of her research on reflexivity through internal conversation. What we are left with is two (Bourdieu’s and Archer’s) highly influential and comprehensive accounts of social conditioning, each providing a significant step forward from the traditional structure-agency problem, and each struggling to describe consciousness appropriately. As one tends towards social determinism and imperialism, and is unable to describe the role of consciousness sufficiently, the other moves towards a voluntarist, acting individual without drawing on the rich insights of the power debate. This raises the following crucial questions for this article: how can both frameworks be implemented as part of the power literature, without simply replacing the structure-agency dichotomy with a
reflexivity-habitus dichotomy? What then are the insights on power that Archer’s account can provide in this new approach to mediation between structure and agency?

Hybridisation – a way forward?
Several social theorists have tried an alternative approach to habitus and reflexivity: hybridization (Adams 2006; Elder-Vass 2007; Mouzelis 2007; Sweetman 2003). Unfortunately, their sophisticated attempts cannot be adequately described or rejected here but deserve a brief consideration. A short discussion must suffice prior to offering another, potentially better solution. Archer also acknowledges their accounts’ sophisticated nature and aim to go further than statements of “sometimes the one, sometimes the other” by attempting to specify the where, when, and under what conditions. Nonetheless, she rejects any such attempt, stating that aiming ‘to short circuit this specification by performing a shotgun wedding between habit and reflexivity and calling its offspring “hybridization” achieves nothing of theoretical utility’ (2010: 277). In hybridization, she identifies an attempt ‘to put a label on this complexity [of historical transformations] rather than to understand and explain what is going on’ (2010: 278).

The hybrid accounts diverge according to the extent to which theoretical concessions are made, leading to an empirical combination, the concept of reflexive habitus, or even an ontological and theoretical reconciliation through emergent social theory of action (Caetano 2015: 4 fn5). For example, Fleetwood and Sayer do so at an empirical level, asking Archer to be more generous towards continuous socialization without expecting major theoretical changes (Archer 2010: 287, Fleetwood 2008; Sayer 2009). Archer challenges this empirical hybridization by identifying the importance of habitus and reflexivity as distinguishable at a historical level – as discussed in relation
to late modernity. Similarly, it is doubtful that Bourdieu would have accepted such an approach, even though it would protect him from the claims of determinism. More importantly, there may be disagreement between Archer, Sayer, and Fleetwood on the extent to which modern transformations leave room for habitus and how this is expressed. The bigger issue is hybridization at a theoretical level, which constitutes concept stretching (Archer 2010: 288). Any such attempt has to incorporate Archer’s positional transformations into Bourdieu’s dispositional analysis without favouring one over the other. Paul Sweetman’s (2003) hybrid argues for a continuous disjunction between habitus and field which allows for reflexivity as reflexive habitus. Archer (2010: 288) questions if this constant expectation of change, the awareness of having to think, can still be grasped by a notion of habitus and if reflexive habitus explains anything about people’s deliberation and what they do. Similarly, Mouzelis’ solution of reflexivity as a result of socialisation and not crisis, that can be especially experienced in religious communities emphasising the inner life, cannot explain widespread transformation of reflexivity and habitus in late modernity, particularly in the context of contemporary secular socialization (Archer 2010: 289).

Finally, Elder-Vass’ hybrid aims for a combination through an emergentist theory of action. However, Archer objects to Bourdieu’s conflation of action and social action, his failure to identify different orders of reality, and his rejection of the dualism between objectivity and subjectivity (Archer 2010: 290). Against the ‘epistemological hegemony in every order of reality’ (Archer 2010: 290) of habitus, Archer emphasizes that the co-determination varies extensively between orders, with the social order particularly being the most reflexive and least habitual (Archer 2010: 293). This, among other criticisms of Elder-Vass’ account, shows the complexity and difficulty facing such
attempts and Archer’s central objection that co-determination does not equate to approximate equal determination by habitus and reflexivity.

**Habitus, reflexivity, and the family resemblance concept of power**

The American three-dimensions-of-power debate concluded with Lukes’ (1974) short but influential book *Power: A Radical View*, and the declaration that the conceptualisation of power was essentially contested (Connolly 1983, Lukes 1974 2005). However, Haugaard (2010) reframed the power debate as describing a family resemblance concept. He questioned the interests behind declaring power as essentially contested, especially as Lukes nonetheless maintained the superiority of his own definition (Haugaard 2010: 420). Instead, Haugaard proposed the adoption of Ludwig Wittgenstein to define power as constituting a family resemblance concept of which the constitutive concepts are in turn changing, depending on the adopted language game. This shift is of particular relevance for the introduction of the habitus-reflexivity debate – as put forward in this article – as a complex contextual relation rather than a clear dichotomy favouring one over the other.

The family resemblance concept approach sees power as a positive-sum game where concepts complement each other instead of a quest for one exhaustive definition of power (Haugaard 2010: 420). This approach allows for significant differences in underlying general commitments – in the case of Archer, a commitment to critical realism – as each position is seen to potentially provide significant observations about the complex phenomenon of power. As a consequence, essential contestedness is limited to the normative dimension of power (Haugaard 2010: 422). Keith Dowding (2012: 121) even proposes having as few normative assumptions as possible in key definitions.
Instead of essential contestedness, confusion and conflict now arise from moving between language games (Haugaard 2010: 427). This is visible in the works of Lukes and Foucault, and exemplified in the exchange between Pamela Pansardi and Peter Morriss (Morriss 2012; Pansardi 2012a 2012b). For Morriss (2012: 91), conceptual analysis provides clarification of terminology rather than more substantive claims. However, he (2012: 93) identifies Pansardi’s (2012a:81) claim about the distinction between power to and power over as falling into the latter category. Pansardi (2012b: 495) in turn suggests that her aim was to leave the language game of power to and power over behind altogether, for the less qualified notion of social power. Such discussions at different conceptual levels are particularly visible in relation to the just discussed attempts of hybridisation.

All the different expressions of power matter, and although they are not rivals, they can be seen as better fit for a specific case or analysis, or for theoretical and normative reasons. Thus, to adopt a family resemblance notion of power is not to succumb to relativism. Instead, Haugaard (2010: 426) emphasises as criteria, the principles of best fit for theory, the dependence on the phenomena to be discussed, and the necessity as conceptual tool to relate to common use allowing the reader to follow the argument. This is similarly valid for adopting Archer alongside Bourdieu, as the following example makes clear. Colette Harris’ (2012) post-conflict case study of gender-age relations in northern Uganda uses Bourdieu to identify the local habitus. This, according to Harris, allows addressing gender from the local habitus’ perspective and is essential to this article’s aim to understand the prevailing power relations and to suggest positive change (Harris 2012: 476). In response, it might be claimed that by introducing the concept of reflexivity as a more fluid, intentional account of agency, one may be better adapt at grasping the intentional way in which the current power relations
are maintained, including the vested interests of each position. Similarly, a focus on fractured reflexivity may enhance the description of how the social transformation left some people inactive and thus powerless. At the same time, habitus is arguably a better fit with this specific phenomenon as Archer’s account focuses on modes of reflexivity in late modernity of capitalist societies. She even emphasises that Bourdieu’s account may be more relevant for other periods of time. The adoption of habitus and reflexivity as conceptualised by Archer and Bourdieu is therefore, case sensitive. This interpretation seems to fit better with Archer’s aims than hybridisation or an essentially contested dichotomy. The insight from the power debate for this relationship can however be extended even further.

The binary signature of power

Traditionally, the power debate has developed in binary, most notably as power to and power over (Dean 2012: 106). Furthermore, these binaries have conventionally been interpreted as dichotomies. The classic example for a dichotomy is Arendt’s distinction between violence and power as mutually exclusive (Arendt 1970; Walsh 2015: 86), although Haugaard (2012a: 35) offers a more nuanced interpretation. Power as a binary concept can be attributed to structures/systems and agency. It can be dispositional, relational and exercised, ubiquitous, obscure and immeasurable, measurable and visible, consensual and conflictual, zero- and positive-sum, power to, power with, and power over, and empowering and dominating (Dowding 2012: 119).

A particularly useful reinterpretation of the binary signature of power describes power as a force field where these two parts of a binary, as polarities, attract and repel each other and where the power theorist has to account for both (Dean 2012: 108). This interpretation, therefore, rejects the conceptualisation as dichotomies. It also supports
reading habitus and reflexivity if introduced as such a binary of power, as polarities, rather than the common interpretation as somewhat mutually exclusive. Archer (2010) seems open for such an interpretation, maintaining that particularly in the social sphere of human affairs, reflexivity is more present whereas in others habitus plays a more decisive role. With a suitable approach found to accommodate for Archer alongside Bourdieu, the final question remains what Archer’s contribution to the literature on the four dimensions of power could be.

**Power and reflexivity: considering active agency in late modernity**

The overview on the four dimensions of power suggested a close relationship between reflexivity and power, by connecting Dahl’s traffic example with the central question for research on reflexivity, why people react differently in similar situations. This connection may seem obvious, and yet striking if put in a more radical form: to conceptualise reflexivity is to consider power. This is striking, especially, as a reading of the Journal of Political Power suggests that reflexivity is seldom mentioned extensively, and often in relation to the thought of Foucault, Bourdieu, but also Anthony Giddens. However, it is in Archer’s work that reflexivity becomes central to agential capabilities and the crucial link between structure and agency, that is inherently subjective but nonetheless sufficiently patterned, and which significantly constraints and enables how human beings access power in society. Her conceptualisation of reflexivity is about power, and adds a different dimension to accounts of agential power. Exemplary, Steven Lukes’ clearly favours agential power in both editions of Power: A Radical View (Lukes 1974, 2005). The second edition also offers an extensive analysis and critique of Bourdieu’s account of habitus (2005: 139-144), while his own preferred alternative remains elusive. In what follows, this article therefore offers a consideration
of the link between power and Archer, focusing on three key areas: active agency, reflexivity as four-dimensional power, and transformations of reflexivity in late modernity.

Reflexivity as active agency and its effects on social mobility

Archer describes a society of active agents who act and thus shape their environment based on their patterned reflexive responses to the socio-cultural context. She consequently replaces Bourdieu’s dispositional concept habitus with a more dynamic positional and above all conscious account of social mediation. The dominant modes of reflexivity identified in her studies are shown to access power and resources in society differently as they seek or choose not to seek opportunities of social mobility. Dominant communicative reflexives are shown to adopt an evasive, self-sacrificial social stance, autonomous a strategic, self-disciplinary, and meta-reflexives a subversive, self-transcendent social stance (Archer 2003: 316, 342). Stances in Archer’s account ‘constitute the macro-micro link’ (Archer 2003: 343) as human beings’ basic means of orientation towards society.

Archer’s work does limit reflexivity in that it is not to be conflated with personal identity, and can only show tendencies of social behaviour (Archer 2007: 133). Humans have a combination of modes of reflexivity, albeit that the dominant mode is crucial to how we react to situations. This limitation corresponds to Archer’s critical realist commitments, which assume an open society with continuously emerging properties and complex, intransitive causal mechanisms. Modes of reflexivity are thus not statically linked to socio-occupational backgrounds as a continuous thread from birth onwards. Instead, Archer identifies a link as tendency to the current socio-economic position (Archer 2007: 146). She proposes a dialectical connection between concerns
and context as acceptance (or rejection) of dialogical partners from natal contexts, which becomes refined and reinforced until a particular modus vivendi is established. In the case of the communicative reflexive, this modus vivendi is continuous with the subject’s original contexts and leads to social immobility. Human beings’ reflexivity develops over time into stable modus vivendi which allows them to become active agents, constantly mediating the external and internal world and responding to it accordingly. Reflexivity as modus vivendi thus becomes a crucial, emergent personal property. For Archer it has genuine interiority, ontological subjectivity, and causal efficacy, which secure its role as central to any ‘adequate conceptualisation of social conditioning’ (Archer 2003: 16).

Reflexivity patterns how power resources are exploited, in addition to, how, as a result, power may be unevenly distributed in society. Archer claims that reflexivity develops into modus vivendi that are linked to specific social stances which offer an ‘overall pattern of response to the totality of structural powers’ (2003: 343). Combined with her past work on structure and agency, Archer’s conceptualisation of active agency through reflexivity provides a full account of the interrelation between all forms of power, i.e. structural, cultural and personal powers, as one of the most comprehensive accounts of power.

Reflexivity as four dimensional power

This article has thus far bridged the gap between Archer’s work on reflexivity and the power literature by emphasising that dominant modes of reflexivity shape how someone can access socio-economic and cultural resources. This insight can be extended by considering how reflexivity fits into the schemata of the four dimensions of power. Archer is a critical realist and therefore her work can be seen in line with previous work.
on critical realism and the four dimensions of power (Bates 2010; Isaac 1987). However, the insights on reflexivity as crucial agential capacity to mediate and shape our external world go beyond a specific philosophy of social science, as visible in relation to each dimension of power.

The first dimension of power considers how actor B’s actions are changed through coercion to suit the needs of actor A. Modus vivendi can be the source and means of coercion, and provide the potential for overcoming or resisting coercion through active agency. It can be a tool for coercion as, for example, in a society of predominantly communicative reflexives someone can easily make an autonomous reflexive assimilate their behaviour and thought. Otherwise, the diverging concerns and thirst for social mobility will lead to conflict and repercussions. Similarly, for communicative reflexives, family and friends can use the reflexives need for “thought and talk” to convince them to act in different ways. Archer thus offers us an account of reflexivity where differences in and characteristics of modes of reflexivity can become a form of power at an individual, micro, or macro-level, and dependent on the context.

The second dimension considers the use of social and political values and institutional practices to limit the issues considered in the public sphere. The example above applies here, too: A specific dominant or ruling mode of reflexivity may be implemented to the disadvantage of other forms of dominant modes of reflexivity. In more concrete terms, a government that portrays or supports the stereotype of the hardworking citizen, with specific education and concerns, may thus favour autonomous reflexives over communicative or meta-reflexives. This then leads to a society where sacrificing social mobility for the sake of the family, or continuous requalification in line with other social concerns is made increasingly difficult and costly.
The third and fourth dimensions of power, concerned with cognitive and ontological processes in society, seem the most obvious for introducing Archer’s account – although, as so far suggested, each dimension can be extended by considering reflexivity as separate agential capacity. The third dimension remains problematic because it accounts for the change of internal processes by others without a sufficient account of their nature. Instead, Lukes’ claim to false consciousness presupposed true consciousness (Haugaard 2012a: 46). Archer provides a comprehensive account of consciousness and this opens the possibility to assert that someone’s reflexivity is being influenced to make someone act against his/her real interests. More research on this link needs to be done. However, that this is possible seems particularly evident in her account of fractured reflexivity, which presupposes that we can say that these humans are lacking in reflexivity as they are insufficiently active agents. Of particular interest then is how these fractured reflexives may overcome this impediment. More generally, Archer’s work should be extended by considering how understanding modes of reflexivity may help develop a stronger agent, capable of overcoming situations of powerlessness and domination. This is of interest also in the context of the fourth dimension of power. This dimension concerns the subjectification of humans as they become objects of knowledge and are constrained by norms of normality or abnormality.

The effect on power through transformation of reflexivity in late modernity

The discussion so far has shown the clearly sophisticated nature of Archer’s description of modes of reflexivity and how well these link to considerations of power. To conclude this section on reflexivity and power, it seems possible to step beyond the theoretical discussions of habitus and reflexivity by turning to Archer’s work on late modernity.
The move towards late modernity comes for Archer with increasing, almost continuous cultural and social transformation: double morphogenesis (Archer 2012: 4). Crucially, her account suggests that this comes with significant implications for the distribution and access to power in society in relation to modes of reflexivity.

Her account stands opposed to the institutionalised individualism supported by Beck and Beck-Gernsheim (2002) as previously suggested. It also opposes Bourdieu’s thought by claiming that habitus becomes increasingly unimportant, particularly for the social realm. Thus, Bourdieu ‘may have been more or less right in practice for the period to which the bulk of his work relates’; however, ‘the young of the new millennium are no longer Bourdieu’s people because they no longer live in Bourdieu’s world’ (Archer 2010: 287). As no equally extensive alternative research on reflexivity is currently available, these claims are difficult to challenge. More importantly, making such claims is, as previously shown, compatible with adopting Haugaard’s family resemblance concept. Of particular interest to power theorists in Archer’s extended reflexivity thesis is the insight that increasing transformation of given social and cultural structures affects modes of reflexivity differently and affects their social mobility and distribution in society. This provides a clear micro-macro link between structural transformation and modes of reflexivity and connects access to power to the individual’s reflexivity. For example, communicative reflexives with their aim for contextual continuity and dovetailing of opportunities are particularly disadvantaged and unprepared. They can no longer rely on their habits or habitus with the increase in social transformation, as change has become too fast to be responded to by intergenerational socialisation. As this process is seen as unstoppable in advanced societies (Archer 2012: 305), communicative reflexives will decline and leave space for an increase in autonomous reflexives, albeit only for a transition period towards
reflexive imperative. Autonomous reflexivity becomes a personal power for social mobility (Archer 2007: 190).

The effects become especially clear in the attempts to protect oneself from change, which in late modernity become themselves a result of reflexive deliberation and come with costs (Archer 2012: 305). Put differently, to keep the current socio-economic and cultural context, a person can no longer rely on habitus and instead has to constantly reflect upon the changes in society and attempt to stop or undo them. The continuation of the status quo is therefore no longer unconsciously maintained over generations. Instead, it has to be constantly and consciously maintained, which leads to higher risks and costs. The contextual incongruity and extensive requirement to deliberately reflect will finally lead not only to the morphogenetic social order’s dominant form of reflexivity, the meta-reflexive, but also to an increase in fractured reflexives. Archer argues that they are not a transitional phenomenon and should lead to an acceptance and integration of this new variety of modalities of relational association at the level of civil society (Archer 2012: 291). This is necessary as their increase coincides with the decrease of communicative reflexives, leaving fractured reflexives with a double negative effect: internal anxiety and disorientation without external, collective support which traditionally was provided through communicative reflexives’ social solidarity (Archer 2012: 190). Archer’s research into reflexivity in late modernity opens up a new dimension to power in society and of problems that the power debate may wish to tackle. Her account of reflexivity does not only link reflexivity to the distribution and access of power, but also offers concrete claims on how they change in society to the disadvantage of communicative and fractured reflexives. It certainly warrants further research into these claims but also potential solutions or alternatives, for a functioning society with active agents and predominantly meta-reflexives.
Conclusion - power between habitus and reflexivity

The connection between Archer and the power literature remains underdeveloped and this article therefore considered Archer’s potential contributions. In particular, it focused on the successful adoption of Bourdieu for power analysis, Archer’s counterpart in the habitus-reflexivity debate in social theory. Both offer significant accounts of socialisation, while Bourdieu tends towards social imperialism and social determinism. Archer’s humanist emphasis in her research on reflexivity through internal conversation comes in turn with problematic commitments. This article therefore suggests going beyond an incorporation of the habitus-reflexivity dichotomy of social theory into the power debate. The task is instead to find a way to access both Bourdieu and Archer without reproducing their weaknesses and especially their conflict.

This article turns towards Haugaard’s family resemblance concept and the binary signature of power for a new perspective. By adopting this framework instead of attempting the discussed empirical or theoretical hybridisation, habitus and reflexivity are considered in a complex binary relationship. This acknowledges Archer’s arguments against Bourdieu, e.g. the historical relevance of their arguments, while it nonetheless leaves space for the dispositional account of Bourdieu’s habitus. Building on this complex introduction of Archer, this article suggests the following three areas for further research; each provides a central link between Archer’s concept reflexivity and the power literature: (i) the agential power of active agency, based on Archer’s dynamic, positional account of reflexivity as modus Vivendi, that affects social mobility; (ii) reflexivity as source or means of four-dimensional power, with active agency also providing potential means for resisting or overcoming unfavourable forms of power; research on reflexivity thus can become a tool to increase the power of the powerless; and (iii) the transformation of reflexivity in late modernity and its
implications for the distribution and access of power in society. It is along these lines, and by building on the family resemblance approach, that this article proposes the introduction of Archer’s work into the power debate.
References


