

**Japan and the G8 Evian Summit:
Bilateralism, East Asianism and Multilateralization**

Hugo Dobson
School of East Asian Studies, University of Sheffield
H.Dobson@sheffield.ac.uk

**G8 Governance
Number 9
February 2004**

Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank Hosei University in Japan for support provided under the Hosei International Fund Fellowship in the researching and writing of this article. I am especially grateful to Glenn Hook, Christopher Hughes, and Oshima Makiko for their invaluable advice and assistance in the early stages of writing this article, in addition to Heidi Ullrich and two anonymous reviewers in the latter stages.

Abstract

This article has four aims: (1) to supplement an extant literature on Japan's role in the G7/8 summit process by cataloguing events during the 2003 Group of Eight (G8) Summit¹ held in Evian, France, from the Japanese government's point of view; (2) to highlight the main actors involved in this process, their objectives, and the degree of success in their ability to achieve these objectives at Evian; (3) to demonstrate how the Japanese government has instrumentalized a multilateral forum, namely the G8, in order to pursue the resolution of what is essentially a bilateral issue – the abduction of Japanese citizens by North Korean agents (*racchi jiken*) – a strategy that it adopted in the 1990s unsuccessfully to seek resolution of the Northern Territories' dispute, but is becoming increasingly evident in other areas of its foreign policy; and (4) to review Japan's traditional role in the summit as representative of Asia and discuss whether this will come under threat with the limited, but nevertheless precedent-setting, participation of China in the Evian Summit.

Introduction

The twenty-ninth meeting of the G8 summit took place at the Royal Parc Evian Hotel from June 1 to 3, 2003 in the resort of Evian-les-Bains, famed for its mineral water, in France. This was a significant watershed for the G8 summit process as it heralded the end of the previous four cycles of rotation amongst the former seven members and the complete integration of Russia into the summit process.²

On the one hand, over recent years and thanks largely to the Ashgate series of publications on the G8 and global governance, interest has increased in the history, roles, functioning and future of the G7/8 summit process.³ On the other hand, although interest in Japan's role in multilateral forums has traditionally focused upon the United Nations (UN) as the main conduit, recently, and despite having been inexplicably ignored prior to this, attention has similarly been given to Japan's role in the G7/8.⁴ This article supplements this empirical data and continues to deepen the analysis by focusing upon the most recent summit in a constantly evolving process of multilateral diplomacy, in addition to highlighting the increasingly common practices in Japanese foreign policy of instrumentalizing multilateral forums to resolve bilateral issues, playing the role of Asian representative (*Ajia no daihyo*), and demonstrating its commitment to international society.

Japan's Role at the Summit

The Japanese government and its people's ambitions and actions at the previous twenty-eight summits since the process began in 1975 have already been adumbrated and analyzed elsewhere.⁵ Although largely dominated by the prime minister of the day and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), a range of other governmental and non-governmental actors have been allowed a degree of input into the preparations for the summit, including other ministries interested in the issues of the day, opposition parties, business associations and, more recently as a process of 'outreach', groups representing both domestic and international civil society. All of these participants in the summit process has been motivated by a number of norms—defined broadly as ideals or expectations of how an individual actor ought to behave that shape the identity of the actor. In the case of the G7/8 summit, the norms that have molded Japan's role in the summit since 1975 have been bilateralism, East Asianism and internationalism. Thus, in turn, the Japanese government and its people have regarded the summit as an important multilateral mechanism by which to reinforce their key relationship with the US and address a range of bilateral issues; seized the opportunity to promote issues of Asian concern, such as Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), as the region's representative at a multilateral forum otherwise dominated by European and North American leaders; cherished the recognition that membership of a meeting of contemporary great powers accords, whilst also seeking to demonstrate a commitment to international society via this forum and secure its successful functioning. In short, the summit matters to the Japanese government and its people.

The above does not mean that the structure of the international system is irrelevant. As mentioned above, the 2003 Evian Summit represents an important development in the summit's history; namely, the beginning of the fifth round of rotation and the final and full inclusion of Russia. As far as the Japanese government has been concerned, the inclusion of Russia has been

a long and painful process since the early 1990s, yet with the announcement at the 2002 Kananaskis Summit of the award of all remaining privileges associated with a summit member, Russia was entitled at Evian to participate in the economic discussions and will host the 2006 summit.⁶ However, this final decision was greeted in Japan with misgivings and fears that this would lead to a dilution of Japan's influence at the summit through the addition of another European participant. Thus, the collapse of bipolarity and the changing structure of the international system have had a delayed impact on the summit process, which is only now coming to light. During the summit's fifth cycle the nature of Russia's participation will come to the fore and it will become evident whether this will make the summit more of a European affair, thereby excluding Japan, or possibly herald a further expansion of the summit to admit China, thereby emphasizing the Asian region but creating different problems for the Japanese government in playing its traditional role of Asian representative. However, before returning to these and other issues later in this article, it is necessary to understand the role played by the Japanese government in the run-up to and during the Evian Summit.

Before Evian

The media coverage in the run-up to and during the Evian Summit focused on both the divisions over the US-led war in Iraq, personified by US President George W. Bush and French President Jacques Chirac, its postwar reconstruction, and the anti-globalization protests that have become a feature of any large-scale, international meeting.⁷

In Japan, Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro mentioned the 2003 G8 summit in his address to the Diet on January 31, 2003 as one in a series of international meetings at which "Japan will play a major role toward the resolution of important issues including sustainable development, poverty and infectious diseases in developing countries".⁸ This desire to play a major role in the Evian Summit became evident at an early stage. Prior to the leaders' meeting at Evian, a G8 environment ministers' meeting was held in Paris from April 25 to 27, 2003. At this meeting a Japanese proposal to create global standards for the accurate measurement of the consumption of natural resources in G8 nations was tabled and discussed.⁹ The Final Communiqué diplomatically avoided mention of the Kyoto Protocol, from which the US had withdrawn, and acknowledged Japan's contribution:

...we note with interest Japan's proposal to launch an international joint research project on economy-wide material flow accounts to develop a common measurement system of material flow, building on existing work at the international level.¹⁰

Since the 1998 Birmingham Summit, the foreign and finance ministers' meetings have been held separately from the leaders' meetings. The Evian Summit was no exception to this trend: the G8 Finance Ministers' Meeting took place in Deauville, France from May 16 to 17, 2003, and the G8 Foreign Ministers' Meeting took place in Paris from May 22 to 23, 2003. The finance ministers' meeting was a relatively low-key meeting, held to review and confirm the general direction of the more regularly held meetings of the G7 finance ministers and central bank governors. Despite much media attention in the run-up to the meeting, the issue of postwar Iraqi reconstruction was deferred until the leaders' meeting. Ministry of Finance (MOF) Minister Shiokawa Masajuro pledged in the finance ministers' statement that, "Japan will continue its structural reforms, including in its financial and corporate sectors, and intensify its efforts to

combat deflation”.¹¹ As regards aid policies, MOF’s position was one of support in principle but with little to contribute concretely in the way of funds.¹² After the meeting, Shiokawa reported to Koizumi on May 20, 2003 before the latter’s departure on an official tour of the US.

MOFA Minister Kawaguchi Yoriko attended the foreign ministers’ meeting, which resulted in a summary that expressed support for the role and work of the UN and highlighted security issues across the globe including Afghanistan, India-Pakistan, Iraq, Iran, Israel, and North Korea.¹³ The meeting and resulting summary were characterized as ‘half full’ by US Secretary of State Colin Powell and Canadian Foreign Minister Bill Graham and led to an initial US-Franco reconciliation after the stand-off over the war in Iraq that would be built upon by the leaders a week later in Evian.¹⁴ In the case of the most pressing security concern for Japan, namely North Korea, the summary expressed support for the various efforts being made to resolve the issue of North Korea’s nuclear weapons’ development program, called on North Korea to uphold its international commitments and behave in a restrained manner, and stressed multilateral approaches to the issue by stating:

The North Korean nuclear issue constitutes a threat to international peace and stability. North Korea’s compliance with its non-proliferation commitments is a matter of concern for the entire international community. The Security Council has been and remains seized of the matter and should play a constructive role.¹⁵

Kawaguchi also successfully sought the support and understanding of her G8 counterparts on the issue of the kidnapping of Japanese citizens by North Korean government agents throughout the 1970s and 1980s (*racchi jiken*), which was eventually acknowledged during Koizumi’s historic visit to Pyongyang in September 2002. To this end, the final summary declared:

They [G8 Foreign Ministers] supported the efforts made by the different parties to seek a comprehensive solution by peaceful means to the North Korean nuclear issue and to other matters including unresolved humanitarian problems such as the abduction issue.¹⁶

This represented the first, clear statement of the abduction issue in documentation resulting from a G7/8 ministerial meeting.¹⁷ According to one satisfied MOFA official, these statements represented ‘full marks’ (*manten*) for Japan.¹⁸

On the issue of SARS, a cause of obvious and deep concern in Asia, the summary called for a collective response, stating that:

The problem posed by the current epidemic in Asia went beyond the regional framework. The entire international community, and especially the industrialized countries, should stand firmly against it. Considering the global nature of this epidemic, Ministers stressed the collective responsibility of the international community, which calls for the joint management of the problem.¹⁹

In addition, Kawaguchi took the opportunity presented by this multilateral meeting to conduct bilateral discussions with her Italian and UK counterparts, Franco Frattini and Jack Straw, on the Middle East peace process and international society’s assistance to postwar Iraq.²⁰ As will be

discussed below, SARS, the issue of North Korea's nuclear weapons' program and the bilateral issue of *racchi jiken* were revisited a week later at the meeting of the leaders at Evian.

The Evian Summit, June 1 to 3, 2003

The immediate vicinity surrounding the tranquil resort of Evian was subject to tight security in anticipation of a "September 11th-type scenario".²¹ As a result, the nearby Swiss cities of Geneva and Lausanne became the target of anti-globalisation demonstrations, some of which were peaceful whilst others were violent in nature. The French hosts continued various trends in hosting a summit by: (1) separating the ministerial and leaders' meetings, as was begun at the 1998 Birmingham Summit; (2) selecting a secluded spot like the mountain retreat chosen for the previous year's Kananaskis Summit; and (3) promoting a policy of "outreach" to embrace non-G8 members. However, the summit agenda was broadly divided into four categories – solidarity, responsibility, security and democracy – and, thus, was much more open-ended than had been the case at previous summits. This resulted in the release of a record number of sixteen declarations constituting more paperwork than at any other summit.²²

Koizumi left Japan on May 29, 2003 to join the other G8 leaders in St Petersburg for the city's 300th anniversary celebration, assisted by his sherpa, Fujisaki Ichiro, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs (*gaimu shingikan*). Fujisaki declared North Korea and a strategy against SARS to be the most important issues for Japan at Evian, in addition to the importance of scientific research that encourages the co-existence of economic growth and environmental preservation, the strengthening of anti-terrorist and non-proliferation policies, and assistance for Africa in fighting Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS) and polio.²³ On May 31, 2003 a "summit of the poor" opened in Mali, and an alternative three-day NGO "Summit for Another World" closed in Annemasse, whilst the leaders assembled in Evian prior to their first meeting – a working lunch on June 1, 2003.²⁴ This summit differed from previous summits in that an unprecedented number of leaders of the developing world were invited to participate on the first day. The G8 leaders met with the leaders of Algeria, Brazil, China, Egypt, India, Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, and South Africa, joined by the heads of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), UN, World Bank and World Trade Organization (WTO), to take part in the enlarged dialogue working session on the afternoon of the first day.²⁵ The G8 leaders and Kofi Annan continued their dialogue with the leaders of Algeria, Nigeria, Senegal and South Africa during a working dinner that evening as part of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD).²⁶ Topics for discussion on Africa included peacekeeping, trade, aid and investment, and AIDS.²⁷ The leaders released an implementation report that reviewed the Africa Action Plan (AAP) agreed a year previously at Kananaskis to define and develop G8 nations' engagement with Africa in support of NEPAD. Japan's level of engagement included the cancellation of US\$4.9 billion in official debts, hosting the 3rd Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD III) in September 2003, aid contributions as part of that process, increased investment and loans, granting trade concessions on agricultural goods, and cooperation in parasite control, food security and clean water provision.²⁸

The second day of the summit consisted of a series of meetings of only the G8 leaders. Economic issues were discussed in the morning session and the end of 2004 was confirmed as the target for the conclusion of the Doha round of multilateral trade negotiations. Security issues, especially anti-terrorist measures, were addressed during a working lunch, during which Koizumi stated to

his fellow summiteers that his government was seeking “a peaceful and comprehensive solution to the North Korean nuclear problem and the abduction issue”.²⁹ A G8 declaration entitled “Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction” was issued that announced the leaders’ willingness to use a range of tools to tackle the threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and “...if necessary other measures in accordance with international law”.³⁰ In reference to North Korea, it stated that:

North Korea’s uranium enrichment and plutonium production programs and its failure to comply with its International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards agreement undermine the non-proliferation regime and are a clear breach of North Korea’s international obligations. We strongly urge North Korea to visibly, verifiably and irreversibly dismantle any nuclear weapons programs, a fundamental step to facilitate a comprehensive and peaceful solution.³¹

The leaders posed for the “family” photograph in the hotel’s grounds in the afternoon, after which Bush left to continue the Middle East peace talks. The afternoon session addressed sustainable development in general and mention was made of SARS specifically within the adopted G8 Action Plan on Health. To support this anti-SARS strategy, Koizumi announced additional contributions to be channeled through the World Bank and Asian Development Bank totaling ¥700 million (US\$6 million approximately).³² Finally, although UK Prime Minister Tony Blair departed beforehand, a free discussion was conducted during a working dinner – a format originally proposed by Koizumi, singled out and praised by Chirac, but somewhat deflated by the non-attendance of Bush and Blair.³³ During this dinner, Koizumi raised *racchi jiken* as a topic for discussion and received the sympathy of his summit partners.³⁴

The final day consisted of a brief session to decide the Chair’s Summary, and a press conference by Chirac at which it was announced. On North Korea, the Chair’s Summary stated that:

We addressed the North Korean nuclear issue in our Statement on non-proliferation [see above]. We support the efforts made by the different parties to seek by peaceful means a comprehensive solution to the North Korean nuclear issue and to other matters, including unresolved humanitarian problems such as the abductions. We also support the Peace and Prosperity Policy pursued by the Republic of Korea.³⁵

Building upon the statement released at the foreign ministers’ meeting a week previously, this represented the first, unequivocal statement of support by the leaders of the G8 nations on the issue of *racchi jiken*.

After the summit was officially concluded and before departing for Japan, Koizumi gave a press conference at which he praised the summit and underscored his efforts to link the two issues of North Korea’s nuclear weapons’ development program and *racchi jiken*:

With regard to North Korea, many countries are more concerned about the nuclear weapons development program of North Korea. As far as Japan is concerned, whilst the nuclear issue certainly is a grave issue, the abduction issue is of paramount importance as well. We believe that the nuclear and other security issues as well as the abduction issues and others need to be dealt with comprehensively and unlike in the

case of Iraq, we shall continue to pursue a diplomatic and peaceful resolution to the North Korean problem. I believe this understanding was shared among all of the G8 leaders.³⁶

Koizumi arrived back in Japan on the evening of June 4, 2003. The next day he reported on the summit to the House of Representatives and (possibly feeling emboldened by his performance at Evian and the support of the international community) referred to *racchi jiken* for the first time as an act of terrorism.³⁷ His return was parodied in an *Asahi Shinbun* cartoon with reference to a recent earthquake in the north of the Japanese mainland registering highly on the scale of seismic activity (*shindo*). Koizumi was depicted striding confidently from his plane having scored a number of points through his diplomacy and declaring that thanks to the G8 summit he had regained his degree of confidence (*shindo*).³⁸

Evian as a Success

The Evian Summit managed to produce a fragile consensus amongst the G8 leaders, so recently divided over the war in Iraq, largely by avoiding such controversial topics and spending only eight minutes of the second day's working lunch discussing Iraq.³⁹ Bush and Chirac were on first-name terms, declared friendship and displayed a tactile relationship to the world's media.⁴⁰ This alone was no small achievement and as Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chrétien stated "[i]t was a good meeting – it could have been a disaster".⁴¹

The G8 Research Group, the independent and international network of scholars of the G8 based at the University of Toronto, have issued grades assessing both the summit's performance on various issues and each country's individual performance after each summit. After the Evian Summit, Japan was awarded a grade of 'A minus', placing it alongside Italy, Russia and the US as the top performing nations. This represented a performance above the average grade of 'B plus' amongst the summiteers, and also an improvement from Japan's 'B plus' performance at the 2002 Kananaskis Summit.⁴² Yet, in what way can the Evian Summit be regarded as a success for Japan?

Domestic Response

As regards Koizumi, Evian can be regarded as a personal success. This was his third summit, thereby making him, alongside Hashimoto Ryutaro, the second most consistent Japanese participant (Nakasone Yasuhiro holds the record of having attended five summits from the 1983 Williamsburg Summit to the 1987 Venice Summit). Koizumi appears comfortable on the international stage of the summit and it was noted that he appeared to be the most relaxed of the G8 leaders.⁴³ Since its inception, the G7/8 summit has been regarded as an opportunity for the leader of any participating nation to improve his domestic standing, and in all likelihood Koizumi gave a strong diplomatic performance with the September 2003 election for the presidency of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), and the November election for the House of Representatives, in mind (he was ultimately successful in both). According to *Asahi Shinbun* opinion polls conducted before and after the summit, the approval rating for the Koizumi administration declined slightly from 48 per cent to 47 per cent, but the disapproval rating decreased more significantly from 37 per cent to 34 per cent; Koizumi's foreign and defence policies were particularly the object of praise.⁴⁴ Thus, there was little correlation

between Koizumi's highly evaluated performance and his marginal position in the official family photograph of G8 leaders taken on the afternoon of the second day of the summit, second from the left between President of the European Commission Romano Prodi and German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder. At Williamsburg, and although Nakasone himself claims it to have been an accident, the Japanese media and public paid great attention to his position in the official summit photography: shoulder to shoulder with US President Ronald Reagan, suggesting Japan's more active position in the world as a close partner of the US. At the time, this was termed 'photograph diplomacy' (*hishatai gaiko*) and thereafter the position of the Japanese prime minister in the summit photograph was regarded in Japan as an index of his success or failure at the summit. Koizumi's position at Evian would suggest that the days of this kind of diplomacy are finally over.⁴⁵

Summit Documentation

In total, eighteen references were made to Japan in the extensive sixty-eight pages of summit-related literature published at Evian, in comparison and contrast to eleven to Germany, thirteen to Italy, fourteen to the UK, eighteen to Canada, twenty to Russia, twenty-one to the US, and twenty-five to the chair and host, France. This places Japan as an upper-middling summit participant and demonstrates a commitment to the norm of internationalism through the summit.⁴⁶

Unlike the UN, the G7/8 has no mechanism for enforcing its decisions and relies upon the moral weight of its communiqués and declarations. This documentation has been described as "the scriptures of the summit, the central achievement whose creation consumes much of the summit preparatory activity during the preceding year".⁴⁷ Although the nature, frequency and lexicon of summit documentation have changed over the years, there is a hierarchy of documents from the foreign and finance ministers' declarations to specially prepared statements on urgent issues to the leaders' final summit statement.⁴⁸ Reference to a particular issue and its position in this hierarchy demonstrates that the leaders of the world's leading economies have reached agreement on its importance to global economic and political stability – an agreement that can range from a "soft consensus" to a "fully, negotiated binding settlement".⁴⁹ Reference to a particular summit member in the documentation is usually a request to do something, an expression of praise or thanks, or is part of a general description of world events. On the one hand, summit documents affect the actions of individual summit members:

Long after the leaders have flown home, their diplomats in dialogue with difficult foreigners, officials engaged in bureaucratic battles with recalcitrant colleagues in other departments, and leaders tempted to backslide in the parochial hear of the political moment, wave these summit documents at their adversaries, have them waved back at them in turn, and see the provisions of those documents having real, continuing political force. Cheat they can and do, but in the cozy world of summitry, they are inhibited from becoming repeat offenders by the knowledge that they are likely to have their transgressions noticed, and by the certainty that they will have to confront, face to face, their powerful peers in less than one year's time.⁵⁰

And on the other hand, summit statements act as the mouthpiece of the summit in providing guidance for the other multilateral institutions that provide global governance:

...they define the parameters, priorities, principles and work programs for the international institutions of the previous two generations. In short, these texts are not just pious expressions of passing politeness from preoccupied politicians but documents that matter in the real world of politics and economics at the national, international and global level alike.⁵¹

Whatever the case, inclusion in summit documentation demonstrates either the importance of an issue or the activism of a government. In short, summit statements do matter, and to have an issue included, although far from a guarantee of its successful resolution, is an achievement.

North Korea

The Japanese government's most obvious success was the inclusion of references to North Korea in the various G8 statements. The US administration was particularly eager to exert pressure on North Korea over its nuclear weapons' development program. Yet, with one eye on the public's reaction at home, the Japanese government managed to link international concern for North Korea's nuclear weapons' program to the issue of *racchi jiken*. This ongoing policy of multilateralizing the essentially bilateral issue of *racchi jiken* is in similar fashion to the way in which the Japanese government multilateralized its entire policy towards the former Soviet Union, including the Northern Territories' dispute, during the early 1990s.⁵² As regards the bilateral, territorial dispute over the four islands of Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan, and Habomai, located off the northern tip of Hokkaido and occupied by the Soviet Union in the last days of World War Two, the Kaifu and Miyazawa administrations were successful in having statements of support made in the declarations of three consecutive summits (1990 Houston Summit, 1991 London Summit, and 1992 Munich Summit). The instrumentalization of multilateral forums in order to resolve essentially bilateral issues has recently become a more salient strategy in Japan's foreign policy. Another example is the Japanese government's successful use of WTO rules as both a "sword" and a "shield" in order to resolve bilateral trade disputes in its favour, when it had previously shied away from the use of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) for similar effect.⁵³

In previous summits, the issue of *racchi jiken* has been alluded to and both Japanese prime ministers and foreign ministers have over the last few years, raised the issue with their counterparts either within the summit discussions or the accompanying bilateral meetings. The 1999 G8 Foreign Ministers Meeting in Cologne resulted in the declaration of a series of conclusions including one stating, "[w]e urge the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) to act constructively on security and humanitarian issues", which was thought to be a veiled reference to the issue.⁵⁴ However, the Evian Summit provided the first clear statement on *racchi jiken* within the documentation resulting from the leaders' meetings. As one MOFA official was quoted as saying, "our behind-the-scenes consensus-building (*nemawashi*) has been successful both bilaterally and multilaterally [*author's translation*]"⁵⁵ The inclusion of references to *racchi jiken* in the summit statements was also well received in Japan, especially amongst the five Japanese citizens kidnapped by North Korea and repatriated on October 15, 2002, and their families, who issued a number of statements welcoming the news.⁵⁶ Koizumi highlighted the consensus achieved amongst summit leaders on the issue in his post-summit press conference:

This question of North Korea became one of the major focal points of our discussion. President Putin of Russia and the leaders of other countries showed very strong interest and concern in North Korea, especially with the abduction question. Some of the leaders expressed that they really found it very difficult to understand the abductions. I also find it very difficult to understand the abductions. Why did they have to kidnap Japanese nationals? I certainly understand the pains and the grief of the parents who had their children abducted. It is utterly inhuman. But these acts did take place. So, there is strong interest in the Japanese people in the abduction issue and we have to take up the abduction issue and the nuclear issue at the same level in parallel and we need to have these problems resolved comprehensively. I gained very strong support for this matter from the Japanese stance from the leaders of the other G8 countries. Especially from President Putin. As a country that has friendly ties with North Korea, he shared with us very valuable remarks and advice. His perception of Chairman Kim Jong Il [*sic*]. He was very candid in sharing his thoughts with us.⁵⁷

Chinese Participation and East Asianism

Chinese President Hu Jintao's participation in the enlarged dialogue meeting on the first day of the summit represented another development in the summit process and set an important precedent. At the 2000 Okinawa Summit, Prime Minister Obuchi Keizo's desire to invite China as an observer and the consequent discussion ultimately came to naught.⁵⁸ However, as a result of the appointment of Hu Jintao as Chinese President in March 2003 and his participation at the Evian Summit, it appeared that the Chinese government was beginning to shed its traditional stance of coolly rejecting the role and work of the G7/8 summit process and preferring to emphasize the UN Security Council. As Jia Qingguo of Peking University stated, "China is a more and more active member of the international community – and the G8 stands for prestige".⁵⁹

An *Asahi Shinbun* editorial welcomed China's participation as a sign of its new leadership acting as a responsible member of international society and an opportunity for the deepening of Sino-Japanese relations.⁶⁰ Moreover, there are expectations that the Chinese government could in the future instrumentalize the G8 as a form of outside pressure (*gaiatsu*) in order to implement economic and political reforms at home.⁶¹ The Japanese government's reaction was one of support for China's participation in the enlarged dialogue meeting and, especially in light of attempts to resolve issues surrounding North Korea, it welcomed China's willingness to engage with international society generally, and the summit process specifically. MOFA was also supportive of Chinese participation as part of the outreach initiative to include developing nations, and welcomed Chinese representation insofar as it places a greater focus on Asia in the summit.⁶² One official was quoted as saying that "it appears that China's position is one of participating actively in regional and global problems. It will now be possible for Japan and China to expand their cooperative relationship [*author's translation*]"⁶³ What is more, the Japanese people have expressed clear approval for China's participation in the summit; according to a *Yomiuri Shinbun* opinion poll published in September 1999, 68.7 per cent of respondents were in favor of China's participation, whereas 12.5 per cent were against it. 14.9 per cent were uninterested and 3.9 per cent unable or unwilling to answer.⁶⁴

However, this may well prove to be one area of future concern for the Japanese government. Admittedly, China's participation is so far highly limited and its invitation appears to have been the unilateral initiative of the host nation.⁶⁵ Yet, it may in the future come to be the ninth member of a G9 summit, in a similar fashion to the Soviet Union/Russia's steady and incremental participation throughout the 1990s from 'guest' at the 1991 London Summit to 'participant' at the 1994 Naples Summit, and eventually its current fully-fledged membership. As regards this scenario, MOFA is strongly against China's future membership as it does not regard it as sharing the same commitment to democratic and free market principles as the other summit nations.⁶⁶ It may be ominous that this opposition once again recalls that expressed towards Russia's membership in the 1990s, which ultimately failed to prevent its inclusion and the birth of the G8. The Japanese government's concerns are also based on the fear that if in the future China does join to create a G9, it might be directly challenged for its traditional summit role of Asian representative, informed by the norm of East Asianism. As the only Asian member of the summit, this is a role that the Japanese government has cherished since the first summit meeting at Rambouillet, France in 1975 and has since then been manifested in pre- and post-summit tours of the Asian region conducted by either the prime minister or foreign minister in order to solicit opinions to be discussed at the summit and thereafter report on discussions and decisions. Although China's membership of the summit would begin to address the imbalance in the G8's membership by according the Asian region greater representation, it would also provide Japan with a direct rival to this traditional summit role. It remains to be seen whether the US, as summit host in 2005, will decide to invite the Chinese president once again and, if so, in what capacity, but it might be the case that China's eventual membership of the summit was set in motion at Evian, and it will eventually be included for the polar opposite reasons to Russia, namely, due more to its economic strength than political influence.

Russia

As mentioned above, the Evian Summit represented the full integration of Russia within the G8 summit after over a decade of assuming a variety of statuses. However, its steady and incremental inclusion in the summit process was not wholly welcomed by Japan. At the time of the 1997 Denver Summit of the Eight, Emeritus Professor Kamiya Fuji of Keio University suggested that by adding another European state in the form of Russia to the summit membership, Japan's voice might be weakened:

Japan's position in the G7 was not so bad. The US, Germany and Japan were once called locomotives of the world economy. But Japan's position in the G8 is extremely vulnerable. It could become isolated in the G8 if it makes a bad move.... I would not rule out the possibility that the G8 could give Japan trouble instead of helping it.⁶⁷

However, these fears have not yet been realized and at Evian, "Putin seemed to take a position of observation, basically of listening".⁶⁸ In general, Russian representatives have so far behaved in a discrete and low-key fashion, preferring to learn the ropes of summitry, especially before Russia acts as host in 2006.⁶⁹

Bilateralism

Previous summits have provided an opportunity for the Japanese prime minister and his foreign and finance ministers to conduct bilateral meetings, especially with their US counterparts, on the fringes of the official summit meetings. In fact, the degree to which these meetings have become institutionalized has been made clear when their timing has been tampered with, as was the case at the 1995 Halifax Summit when the Japanese government expressed opposition to any rescheduling. However, at Evian these bilateral meetings were noticeable by their absence. The main reason for this was that Koizumi undertook an extensive series of official foreign visits before the summit, including Europe, the US, the Middle East, and also conducted meetings with his Chinese and Russian counterparts in St Petersburg during the tricentennial anniversary. During these visits in the run-up to the Evian Summit, Koizumi pledged support for the US-led “war on terrorism” (possibly as a strategy for securing US support in a crisis on the Korean Peninsula), in addition to raising the issue of *racchi jiken* and seeking the support of his hosts on a number of occasions. Thus, the practice at previous summits was continued of blurring the line between the conduct of foreign policy on the bilateral and multilateral levels.

Conclusions

In a number of ways, the summit process appears to be functioning, necessary and useful as it enters its fifth cycle. After the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the G8 nations were essentially united in their efforts to combat terrorism. Divisions appeared over the war in Iraq and were played out upon the stage of the UN, thereby damaging its reputation. The Evian Summit provided an opportunity for the G8 leaders to make-up in public, fashion a tentative return to the unity of the immediate post-9/11 period, and assert once more the importance of the summit process.⁷⁰ Bush’s early departure in order to participate in the Middle East peace process caused some concern as regards US intentions towards the summit process. However, Bill Clinton arrived late for the 2000 Okinawa Summit and, after attending all the summit meetings, left slightly earlier than originally planned in order to participate in similar peace talks. A more reliable barometer of both US unilateralism and attitudes to the G8 will be the preparations it makes for the 2004 summit to take place from June 8 to 10 at the Sea Island resort, Georgia. The summit also resulted in a wider dialogue with developing nations, brought China into the G8 fold in some capacity and resulted in a record-breaking 207 commitments.⁷¹ It could be argued that the summit process enters its fifth cycle in reasonably good health.

A US-hosted summit will provide an opportunity for the Japanese government to reinforce its close bilateral relationship with the US generally, and for Koizumi to reassert his personal and intimate relationship with Bush, especially as Japanese personnel may well be operating in Iraq whilst the summit takes place despite domestic misgivings about their dispatch. Yet the Japanese government will not instrumentalize this multilateral forum purely to pursue bilateral means, and can be expected in the short-term to continue to play its traditional roles of “batting for Asia” regardless of China’s participation, and seeking to make the G8 a central and effective mechanism of global governance. Events on the Korean Peninsula between June 2003 and June 2004 will shape the Georgia Summit’s agenda and reaction to North Korea, and it would be no great surprise if the Japanese government continues to instrumentalize this multilateral forum to promote the resolution of the bilateral issue of *racchi jiken*. However, a note of caution needs to

be struck, as a similar policy did not prove to be effective in the resolution of the Northern Territories' dispute.

Notes

¹ The members of the G8 are Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

² Summit cycles are simply one way of making sense of the twenty-nine years of summit history. The French government acted as both host and chair of the very first summit held at Rambouillet château in November 1975. Thereafter, the roles of host and chair continued to be conflated and the order evolved in an *ad hoc* fashion amongst the original members through to the 1981 Ottawa Summit, but was thereafter confirmed as France, US, UK, Germany, Japan, Italy and Canada. From 2003, the summit cycles will now follow the order of France (2003), US (2004), UK (2005), Russia (2006), Germany (2007), Japan (2008), Italy (2009), and Canada (2010).

³ As of January 2004, the series stood at eleven volumes. See <www.g8.utoronto.ca/ggs/index.htm> for more details and updates.

⁴ For example, on the former, see Ronald Dore, *Japan, Internationalism and the UN* (London: Routledge, 1997) Reinhard Drifte, *Japan's Quest for a Permanent Security Council Seat: A Matter of Pride or Justice?* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000); and Akiko Fukushima, *Japanese Foreign Policy: The Emerging Logic of Multilateralism* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999); on the latter, see Shima Nobuhiko, *Shuno Gaiko: Senshinkoku Samitto no Rimenshi* [Prime Ministerial Diplomacy: A Behind-the-scenes History of the Summit of the Most Industrialized Nations], (Tokyo: Bungeishunju, 2000); Takase Junichi, *Samitto: Shuyo Shuno Kaigi* [Summit: the Meeting of the Main Heads of State], (Tokyo: Ashi Shobo, 2002); Hugo Dobson, *Japan and the G7/8, 1975-2002* (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004); Hugo Dobson, "Japan, Global Governance, and the G7/8 Summit," in Glenn D. Hook, ed., *The Political Economy of Governance in Japan* (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004).

⁵ Dobson, *Japan and the G7/8*; Daizo Sakurada, *Japan and the Management of the International Political Economy: Japan's Seven Power Summit Diplomacy* (Centre for International Studies: University of Toronto, 1988), at <www.library.utoronto.ca/g7/scholar/sakurada1988>.

⁶ Dobson, *Japan and the G7/8* ; see also Dennis T. Yasutomo, *The New Multilateralism in Japan's Foreign Policy* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1995), pp. 151-176.

⁷ On the former, see Komaki Katsuhiko, "Samitto de Beio Kankei ga Shufuku Dekiru ka [Can US-European Relations be Repaired at the Summit?]", *Sekai Shuho* June 3, 2003, pp. 6-8; and Kishida Yoshiki, "Beiei Shudo no Iraku Fukko Tsuranuku Bushu Seiken [The Bush

Administration Pushes through Iraqi Reconstruction under US-UK leadership]”, *Sekai Shuho* June 3, 2003, pp. 9-10. On the latter, see André Klopmann, Enrico Gastaldello, Steeve Iunker and Olivier Vogelsang, eds., *G8: enèrve rit jaune* [G8: angry laughs in yellow] (Genève: Éditions Slatkine, 2003).

⁸ *The Japan Times*, February 1, 2003.

⁹ *The International Herald Tribune/Asahi Shinbun*, April 26, 2003.

¹⁰ “G8 Environment Ministers Communiqué, Paris April 25-27, 2003”, at <www.g8.utoronto.ca/environment/2003paris/env_communique_april_2003_eng.html>.

¹¹ “Finance Ministers’ Statement, Deauville, May 17, 2003”, at <www.library.utoronto.ca/g7/finance/fm030517_communique.htm>.

¹² Interview with senior MOF official, May 22, 2003.

¹³ See “Summary of the G8 Presidency, G8 Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Paris, May 22-23, 2003”, at <www.g8.utoronto.ca/foreign/fm230503.htm>.

¹⁴ John J. Kirton, “Impressions of the G8 Foreign Ministers Meeting, Paris, May 23, 2003”, at <www.g8.utoronto.ca/evaluations/2003evian/assess_formin_kirton.html>; Pierre Marc Johnson, “Impressions of the G8 Foreign Ministers Meeting, Paris, May 23, 2003” at <www.g8.utoronto.ca/evaluations/2003evian/assess_formin_pmj.html>.

¹⁵ “Summary of the G8 Presidency, G8 Foreign Ministers’ Meeting”.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ On the issue of *racchi jiken*, see Christopher W. Hughes, *Japan’s Economic Power and Security: Japan and North Korea* (London: Routledge, 1999); Christopher W. Hughes, “Japan-North Korea Relations from the North-South Summit to the Koizumi-Kim Summit,” *Asia-Pacific Review* 9:2 (2002), pp. 61-78.

¹⁸ *Yomiuri Shinbun*, June 1, 2003.

¹⁹ “Summary of the G8 Presidency, G8 Foreign Ministers’ Meeting”.

²⁰ *Mainichi Shinbun*, May 24, 2003.

²¹ See *The Japan Times*, May 25, 2003; and *The Japan Times*, May 28, 2003.

²² Nicholas Bayne, “Impressions of the Evian summit, June 1-3, 2003”, at <www.g7.utoronto.ca/evaluations/2003evian/assess_bayne030603.html>.

²³ *Asahi Shinbun*, May 29, 2003. Since the first summit, the Japanese sherpa has always been the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, thereby rendering the role of MOFA central in summit preparations.

²⁴ *The Japan Times*, June 2, 2003; *Mainichi Shinbun*, May 31, 2003.

²⁵ Moroccan King Mohammed VI was invited as Chair of the Group of 77 but did not attend.

²⁶ Egyptian President Mohamed Hosni Mubarak was unable to attend as he had to leave in order to prepare to meet with Bush after the summit.

²⁷ See “AIDS, Africa and the G8: the Right Direction,” *The Economist*, June 7, 2003, p. 71; Hoken [Socio-Health], “Ebian Samitto to Kaihatsutojokoku Enjo [The Evian Summit and ODA]”, *Shukan Shakai Hoshō* 57: 2237 (2003), p. 30.

²⁸ “Implementation Report by Africa Personal Representatives to Leaders on the G8 Africa Action Plan.

Evian, June 1, 2003”, at <www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/summit/2003/africa.pdf>. Koizumi met with the ambassadors to Japan of thirty-two African countries on the evening of May 14, 2003 at the prime minister’s residence in order to discuss Japan’s initiatives and contribution towards the African continent, see *Mainichi Shinbun*, May 15, 2003.

²⁹ *The Japan Times*, June 4, 2003.

³⁰ “Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: A G8 Declaration”, at <www.g8.fr/evian/english/navigation/2003_g8_summit/summit_documents/non_proliferation_of_weapons_of_mass_destruction_-_a_g8_declaration.html>. Despite several official denials, the media reported this statement as justifying the use of force.

³¹ Ibid.

³² *Asahi Shinbun*, June 3, 2003, evening edition.

³³ *Asahi Shinbun*, June 3, 2003; *Mainichi Shinbun*, June 5, 2003.

³⁴ *The Japan Times*, June 4, 2003.

³⁵ “Chair’s Summary, Evian, June 3, 2003”, at <www.g8.fr/evian/english/navigation/2003_g8_summit/summit_documents/chair_s_summary.html>.

³⁶ “Press Conference, June 3, 2003”, at <www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/summit/2003/press.html>.

³⁷ *Mainichi Shinbun*, June 6, 2003.

³⁸ *Asahi Shinbun*, June 4, 2003.

³⁹ See “Special Report: George Bush’s Travels,” *The Economist*, June 7, 2003, pp. 20-22; Jiji Tsushin Tokuhain Zadankai [Jiji Press Correspondents’ Discussion], “Ebian Samitto no Butaiura: Soten Sudori, Kankei Shufuku o Enshutsu [Behind the Scenes at the Evian Summit: Avoiding Disputes and Repairing Relations]”, *Sekai Shuho* June 24, 2003, pp. 6-9.

⁴⁰ John J. Kirton and Ella Kokotsis, “Impressions of the G8 Evian Summit,” June 3, 2003, at <www.g7.utoronto.ca/evaluations/2003evian/assess_kirton_kokotsis.html>.

⁴¹ Bayne “Impression of the Evian Summit”. It could be argued that the media attention on the discord between summit leaders in the run-up to the summit created an unrealistic impression of tensions. After all, the leaders who attended Evian were the same leaders who had attended the 2001 Genoa Summit and the 2002 Kananaskis Summit – a level of consistency and intimacy amongst the leaders never witnessed before in the history of the summit process.

⁴² See “G8 Research Group Announces the Release of Assessment Scores for Evian Summit, June 3, 2003”, at <www.g8.utoronto.ca/about/news_releases/2003-5.html>.

⁴³ Jiji Tsushin Tokuhain Zadankai, “Ebian Samitto no Butaiura”, p. 8.

⁴⁴ See *Asahi Shinbun*, May 26, 2003; and *Asahi Shinbun*, June 30, 2003.

⁴⁵ Nevertheless, attention was given to Koizumi’s position (next to Blair, both behind Bush) in the official photograph of the enlarged dialogue meeting on the first day of the summit, see *Mainichi Shinbun*, June 4, 2003. On Nakasone, his position in the summit photograph, and *hishatai gaiko*, see *Yomiuri Shinbun*, June 1, 1983, evening edition; Shima, *Shuno Gaiko*, pp. 53-4; Nakasone Yasuhiro, *Tenchi Yujo: 50-nen no Sengo Seiji o Kataru* [Universal Sentience: On Fifty Years of Postwar Politics, third edition], (Tokyo: Bungeishunju, 2002), pp. 434-5.

⁴⁶ For more on the importance of internationalism in Japan’s participation in the G7/8, see Chapter 6 of Dobson, *Japan and the G7/8*.

⁴⁷ John J. Kirton, “Introduction: The Significance of the Seven-Power Summit,” in Peter I. Hajnal (ed.) *The Seven-Power Summit: Documents from the Summit of Industrialized Countries, 1975-1989* (Millwood, New York: Kraus International Publications, 1989), p. xxxi.

⁴⁸ For further discussion of the importance, development and hierarchy of summit documentation, see Hajnal, *The G7/G8 System*, pp. 73-100.

⁴⁹ Quoted in *ibid.*, p. 75.

⁵⁰ Kirton, “Introduction,” pp. xl-xli.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. xli.

⁵² Yasutomo, *The New Multilateralism in Japan's Foreign Policy*, p. 151.

⁵³ See Saadia M. Pekkanen, "Sword and Shield: The WTO Dispute Settlement System and Japan," in Ulrike Schaede and William Grimes, eds., *Japan's Managed Globalization: Adapting to the Twenty-first Century* (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2003), pp. 77-100.

⁵⁴ "Conclusions of the meeting of the G8 Foreign Ministers, Cologne", June 10, 1999, at <www.library.utoronto.ca/g7/foreign/fm9906010.htm>.

⁵⁵ *Asahi Shinbun*, June 4, 2003.

⁵⁶ *Yomiuri Shinbun*, June 4, 2003; *Mainichi Shinbun*, June 4, 2003.

⁵⁷ "Press Conference, June 3, 2003".

⁵⁸ On China's possible participation in the G7/8, see John J. Kirton, "The G7/8 and China: Toward a Closer Association," in Kirton, Daniels and Freytag, *Guiding Global Order*, pp. 189-222.

⁵⁹ *The Japan Times*, May 31, 2003.

⁶⁰ *Asahi Shinbun*, May 10, 2003.

⁶¹ *Asahi Shinbun*, May 28, 2003.

⁶² *Mainichi Shinbun*, April 30, 2003.

⁶³ *Asahi Shinbun*, May 27, 2003.

⁶⁴ *Yomiuri Shinbun*, September 30, 1999.

⁶⁵ *The Japan Times*, April 27, 2003.

⁶⁶ Interview with senior MOFA official, May 29, 2003.

⁶⁷ *The Japan Times*, June 30, 1997.

⁶⁸ *The Japan Times*, June 4, 2003.

⁶⁹ Interview with senior MOF official, May 22, 2003.

⁷⁰ See Nakajima Wataru, "Kurashikku he no Kaiki [A Return to the Classic]", *Gaiko Foramu*, no. 181 (August 2003), pp. 92-95. Nakajima argues that the leaders' reaffirmation of the importance of the summit process was even reflected in their sartorial appearances.

⁷¹ Bayne, "Impressions of the Evian Summit".