The Passion for Civility

‘In the flourishing city, civility is part of the air we breathe. We no more trouble to analyse it than we take a chemical sample of the atmosphere when we lean out of the window on a summer morning. The mere presence of a debate on civility is therefore a sign that the city is in danger—or at least that people fear so’ (Mount, 1973, p. 31).

There is a passion for civility in everyday life that seems hard to explain. Intuitively, civility seems trivial alongside fundamental political concerns of justice, equality and freedom. And yet civility, or rather its lack, is an object of enduring fascination in modern western societies - it dominates the headlines, tops political agendas and pervades public discussion. But it is not always obvious we fully understand what we mean when we talk about civility, or why it makes sense for us to care about it as we do. In this article, I examine the literature in contemporary political theory to see how it can inform, clarify or challenge everyday thought about civility. I ask, first, what civility is and, then, why it matters. I shall argue that there are good reasons to be concerned by civility’s decline in modern society, though there is also a ‘darker side' to civility that threatens the basic values upon which democracy is founded.

Civility talk is commonplace in democratic politics. The US President, Barack Obama, has made frequent appeals for greater civility in public life, calling on Americans to re-learn ‘how to disagree without being disagreeable’ (quoted in Bejan and Garsten, 2014, p. 18). In the UK, too, civility has been a matter of longstanding concern, though in a rather different sense more to do with public behaviour than with disagreement. In 2006, Tony Blair launched his ‘Respect’ agenda the stated aim of which was to ‘eradicate the scourge of anti-social behaviour and restore respect to the communities of Britain’ (Blair, 2006). That agenda saw the introduction of new legal measures for the control of incivility in the form of ‘Anti-Social Behaviour Orders’ (ASBOs).
The passion for civility is also conspicuous in the scholarly literature. Prompted by the widely-cited ‘broken windows thesis’ posited by James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling (1982) which suggested that minor incivilities attract further and greater incivilities, there has been growing interest in incivility among legal theorists and criminologists (e.g. von Hirsch and Simester, 2006). However, it has also been suggested that preoccupation with the broken windows thesis has had a distortive effect leading to the overemphasis of criminal incivility. Against this tendency, social scientists have stressed the importance of recognising a broader range of lower-level, ‘everyday incivilities’ – queue-jumping, dirty looks, verbal insults, bumps and knocks (Smith, Phillips, King, 2010). These behaviours are generally not considered criminal, and yet their impact on the perceived quality of public life is significant. Viewed in this more capacious way, the enterprise of fostering civility is considered an important strategy for the generation of ‘social capital’ and a revitalised civil society (Putnam, 2000). Civility here describes the complex cluster of rituals and modes of cooperation that characterise the networks of social ties comprising a civic culture (Sennett, 2012).

**The Meaning of Civility**

Civility is an ambiguous concept. The ambiguity stems in part from the fact that the term itself is ‘a member of two kindred conceptual families’ (Meyer, 2000, p. 71). We can distinguish between civility as a political concept and as an ethical concept (Johnson, 2007, see also Boyd, 2004 and 2006; Calhoun, 2000). As a political concept, civility is bound up with the idea of an association of citizens, and includes cognate ideas of the civic, the civil and the civilian; it concerns one’s status and duties as a member of a political community, as a citizen with certain rights and responsibilities. As an ethical concept, civility is bound up with the idea of what it means to be civilised, to be well-mannered or polite; its focus is on standards of behaviour in our dealings with others in everyday life. Thus, it may mean one thing to be politically civil, and quite another to be ethically civil (Lægaard, 2011). But the distinction is hazy: there is clearly overlap between the two concepts and the domains to which they refer, and there is a tendency for the two to blur into one (Daly, 2015, p. 312).²
A further complicating factor concerns civility’s scope. Civility is often identified with a particular mode of deliberation or a particular set of speech constraints: one may keep a civil tongue or one may not. Thinking of civility in this way, some authors interpret it in a narrowly technical sense, as a feature of political reasoning about the constitutional essentials of a democratic order. For example, John Rawls argues that deliberation about basic political or constitutional issues should conform to the strictures of ‘public reason’. Public reasons are those that are intelligible and accessible to all - reasons that do not rest on controversial doctrines. Rawls contends that it is a ‘duty of civility’ to uphold the requirements of public reason (Rawls, 1996, p. 217, p. 236; see also Cohen, 2012). Others interpret the idea somewhat more broadly (though still quite technically), as a constraint on democratic deliberation more generally (e.g. Kingwell, 1995). Others still characterise it in a more familiar sense as a constraint on insulting or disruptive political speech (e.g. Christiano, 2012; Leiter, 2012). The view of civility as speech constraint is particularly commonplace among American authors exercised by a public culture of concern about the depth of hostility and partisanship in US politics (Herbst, 2010), and also by a countervailing concern for the preservation of first amendment protections of free speech.

Others suggest a broader scope for civility including not only deliberation, but also wider patterns of norm-governed behaviour. For example, Philip Pettit associates civility with the conduct of citizens in supporting public institutions and pursuing the common good (Pettit, 1997; see also Walzer, 1974). Some authors favour a scope yet broader still wherein civility pertains to the practice of social and political rituals and traditions. As Eoin Daly has it, the claims of civility are to be seen as aspects of a particular ‘habitus’, which conveys a sense of how ‘citizens orient themselves, and ought to orient themselves in the social world’ (Daly, 2015, p. 312). For example, we may in this sense imagine the civility ritual of ‘persons of political experience, looking at each other fiercely across the table’ (Hampshire, 1989, p. 188). When we think of civility in this broader sense, it is not just a matter of keeping a civil tongue; the ‘looks’ matter (gestures, accents, tics, modes of dress and comportment), and so does the ‘table’ (different seating
positions imply different hierarchies and different power dynamics).

While these considerations make it difficult to establish a comprehensive definition of civility, it is still possible to offer a more general and abstract characterisation. The idea of civility has two components: it is (i) a pattern of conduct that expresses (ii) a particular attitude towards others (Shils, 1991, p. 11). I shall consider each component in turn.

Civil Conduct

A first instinct might be to associate civil conduct with conformity to the law: ‘to be civil is to refrain from lawless behavior likely to disrupt the political community’ (Boyd, 2004, p. 26; see also Walzer, 1974, pp. 597-8; Rawls, 1971, p. 355). But it seems implausible simply to identify civility with conformity to the law, and for two reasons. First, we might think civility should allow for certain forms of civil disobedience and political resistance: few today would deem Rosa Parks’ refusal to give up her seat an incivility. ³

Secondly, we might also want to leave space for obedient incivility. As noted, we tend to recognise many ‘everyday incivilities’ which we would not consider to fall within the purview of legal prohibition. As a commuter, I find it annoying and uncivil when a fellow passenger on a busy train decides his bag deserves a seat of its own, but I do not think it should be illegal to store one’s bag in such a way. To associate civility too closely with law-abidingness is to set the bar too low.⁴

A more intuitive approach could be to associate civil conduct with conformity to social norms, where those norms need not correspond directly to the law (e.g. Pettit, 1997, ch. 8). The norms specify behaviour expected of civil persons, and we demonstrate civility by following them. This account allows that civility may be consistent with – may even dictate – law-breaking, and it also allows that civility will often present a more demanding standard than mere law-abidingness.
This view is upheld by many authors, but there is a division between those (e.g. Calhoun, 2000) who interpret civil conduct in formal terms, as consisting in conformity to local norms, customs and rituals whatever those norms, customs and rituals may be (‘when in Rome, do as the Romans’), and those (e.g. Rawls, 1996) who interpret civil conduct in substantive terms, as consisting in conformity to a particular set of civility norms specifiable at least somewhat independently of local customs (‘when in Rome, observe the requirements of public reason’). These two distinct interpretations of civil conduct are often conflated. In a fairly typical formulation, Ferdinand Mount writes that civility is ‘courtesy and consideration towards both individuals and groups, opponents as well as allies; modesty, restraint, and moderation both in speech and action; obedience to established rules of procedure and conduct’ (1973, p. 31). The claim that civil conduct consists in courtesy, consideration, modesty, restraint and moderation is a substantive claim independent of local conditions, whereas the claim that civil conduct consists in obedience to established rules is a formal claim dependent on local conditions. But then we must surely wonder what civility would demand in circumstances in which the ‘established rules’ dictated, say, immodesty, immoderation and the relaxation of restraint - the civility code of a hippie commune, perhaps. Presumably this confusion occurs because the local rules typically do dictate modesty, restraint and the rest, but there is no obvious reason to think they must do so.

Whichever of these formulations we prefer, this interpretation of civil conduct highlights an important problem for advocates of civility in politics. Morally and culturally diverse societies are likely to exhibit a multiplicity of conflicting systems of social norms and customs. Thus, if we subscribe to the formal interpretation, it is not immediately clear which civility code should be upheld, and if we subscribe to the substantive interpretation, it is not immediately clear why our preferred code should command general assent. This is a problem because, as we shall see, civility is often valued for the role it is thought to play in moderating reasonable disagreement. It cannot be expected to play that role reliably if it, too, is the subject of reasonable dispute.
One response here might be to loosen the connection between civility and conformity, and to think primarily instead about the civil attitude or disposition that conformity to a ‘civility code’ is meant to express (whilst allowing that sometimes one might better express that attitude or disposition by violating the civility code). For example, John Kekes suggests that civility is principally ‘a benevolent attitude, consisting of well-wishing and well-doing, of citizens toward each other’ (1984, p. 442). This attitude will lead ‘people to conduct themselves and treat others according to custom’ (Kekes, 1984, p. 443). And so conformity to custom is normally expressive of one’s civility. But rigid conformity to custom might sometimes fail adequately to signal one’s ‘benevolent attitude’, especially in circumstances where customs clash. In such cases, the willingness to depart from custom might actually serve as a better indicator of one’s ‘benevolent attitude’.

Civil Attitude

But there is also disagreement about the nature of the civil attitude. Some say there is no distinctively ‘civil’ attitude at all. What we term civility is better described as one or a cluster of other more basic attitudes such as ‘tolerance’, ‘considerateness’, or ‘respect’ (Buss, 1999, though cp. Calhoun, 2000; Stohr, 2012; and Kristjánsson, 2006). Others, however, suggest a more distinctive role for the civil attitude, where it is interpreted as something more demanding than ‘mere’ negative tolerance, and yet also less demanding than full-blooded positive respect for one’s fellow citizens and their convictions (e.g. Lægaard, 2011).

A prominent theme in the literature, which seems to support this characterisation, is that of the special relationship between civility and society and, more specifically, the idea that the civil attitude embodies some sort of acknowledgement of society. Several authors suggest an important connection between civility and the city (e.g. Boyd, 2006). Urban life is typically lived in close physical proximity to others who are markedly different from ourselves, and in ways we may not find especially edifying (Levy, 2010). We can think of the civil attitude as involving at least the acknowledgement of that predicament, the sense of oneself as part of a wider collective - as a city-dweller, or as a member of society (see Shils, 1991, p. 13;
Carter, 1998, p. 15). Toleration seems different from this inasmuch as it is thought possible to tolerate another by having nothing to do with her.\(^5\) And while we may still think of civil sociability as involving a degree of respect, it is respect of a kind that is compatible with disapprobation, even perhaps disdain or disgust, for the beliefs and habits of the members of one’s society.

But this superficial agreement about the importance of sociability obscures deep disagreement about the kind of sociability involved. As noted, for Kekes civil sociability consists in a friendly benevolence towards others (Kekes, 1984). Likewise, Stephen Carter characterises civility as ‘an attitude of respect, even love, for our fellow citizens’ (1998, p. xii). But, in contrast, Jeremy Waldron argues that ‘civility is a cold virtue, not a warm one, not really a matter of affection or benevolence’ (Waldron, 2014, p. 49). For Waldron, civil sociability is about ‘staying present’ amid fierce political disagreement (p. 59).

So, while Kekes associates civility with an attitude of warmth and friendliness amongst strangers, Waldron associates it with an attitude almost diametrically opposed: the chill of deferred hostility and bare formality. There seems to be a difference between authors, like Kekes, who see civility primarily as an object of political aspiration – an ingredient of the good society – and authors, like Waldron, who see it as a more preventive orientation – a bulwark against the destruction of society.

**The Value of Civility**

There is a surprisingly heated debate about civility’s value. Teresa Bejan and Bryan Garsten (2014) indicate a distinction between friends of civility – the ‘civilitarians’ – and ‘sceptics’. In the conclusion I suggest some reservations about the ‘civilitarians-and-sceptics’ taxonomy, but for now I shall make use of it to frame the present discussion.

** Civilitarianism**

It is often said that civility plays an essential role in the containment of conflict. By moderating our
interactions, civility serves as a social ‘lubricant’, functioning to prevent moral and political disagreements from descending into violence (e.g. Boyd, 2006; Waldron, 2014; Shils, 1991; Hall, 2013; Bejan & Garsten; 2014). In this sense, the familiar association of civility with the seemingly trivial concerns of politeness and manners is apt to mislead. The civilitarian contention is that the stakes are far higher than the hurt feelings liable to attend ill-mannered displays. For John A. Hall, ‘civility is a necessary virtue to help us negotiate a world of pain’ (2013, p. 26).

This might sound melodramatic. It is hard to understand how dispensing with the niceties of civility could provoke descent into violence. There are two different responses to this concern. One response is a variation on the broken windows thesis: it might be that the unchecked practice of minor incivilities day after day could contribute in the longer term to the more general degradation of civic culture, thereby fostering much more serious forms of, say, racist or sexist abuse and violence (Boyd, 2006, p. 867).

The second response is more obscure. Relying on the broadest interpretation of civility’s scope I described in the first section, some authors suggest that rituals of civility serve a valuable social function in establishing definite limits on human conduct (Hampshire, 1983; Wollheim, 1993). They specify a kind of non-negotiable bedrock of decency in human affairs – a necessary distinction between that which is acceptable and that which is disgraceful, indecent or base. Largely irrespective of where that line is drawn, the simple fact that it is drawn is a marker of civilisation. Though its demands can seem quaint or trivial, or can even be at odds with moral and political aspirations, a blatant disregard for customary civility can induce uneasiness that may seem disproportionate to the gravity of any particular transgression. The argument is that this uneasiness stems from the recognition that such customs, and the definite limits they acknowledge, convey respect for human life. The alternative, presented by those who run roughshod over all such customs, exposes the terrifying prospect ‘that anything is possible and nothing is forbidden, and all restraints are threatened’ (Hampshire, 1983, p. 89). While this need not end in violence, it can nevertheless leave one with a sense of having relapsed into a state of nature in which arbitrary violence is a permanent
and probable hazard. In this connection, we should not be surprised by the tendency of authors to invoke the experience of Nazism as reflecting civility’s ‘antithesis’ (Shils, 1991, p. 8; see also Mount, 1973; Hampshire, 1989). The Nazis sought systematically to obliterate the bedrock of human decency that civility specifies.

A second civilitarian argument holds that the language of civility provides a useful way of describing the distinctive form of communal belonging that is often experienced by the members of modern societies. It is a familiar communitarian lament that modern citizens can appear to be ‘nothing but a collection of strangers’ with no sense of community (MacIntyre, 1985, pp. 250-51). But, as Joan McGregor writes, civility is ‘an ethic for relating to strangers’ (2004, p. 26), and as such it may be able to capture the odd combination of togetherness and estrangement that marks the experience of the modern city (Ignatieff, 1984, p. 140). Erving Goffman takes this idea to a strikingly high level of sociological specificity in his theory of ‘civil inattention’ in which he offers a precisely calibrated account of the ritual of polite interaction among strangers in the city. Goffman suggests that after a brief glance of mutual acknowledgement up to a distance of ‘approximately eight feet’, looks are to be lowered as two strangers approach and pass one another in the street (Goffman, 1963, p. 84). Too lingering a glance implies either an inappropriate intimacy or a sign of aggression; too fleeting a glance implies a failure to acknowledge the status and personhood of the other. This civil inattention is a world away from the images of warm, civic friendship that fuel communitarian nostalgia, but it is also distinct from the purely self-regarding social atomism that forms the object of their critique.

Scepticism

Scepticism about civility turns centrally on the idea that it represents a particularly pernicious brand of conservatism. In his sociological analysis of the ‘civilizing process’, Norbert Elias challenges the belief, commonplace in the nineteenth century, that European ‘civilization’ was the product of the natural superiority of Europeans over others – especially colonial peoples (Elias, 2000). Elias sought to
demonstrate that European civilization was in fact the product of a complex historical process, traceable to the fifteenth century, of the gradual pacification of society through the repression of individual tendencies to violence. Elaborating on Elias’s thesis, John Keane (1998) emphasises that there is nothing natural or inevitable about the European ‘civility’ that emerged from this process as the antidote to ‘uncivility’, and that it is a fundamentally ambivalent achievement. While civility norms do indeed suppress unwelcome tendencies to violence, they also function as a mechanism of power and domination incentivising conformity to elite standards that may be anathema to democratic purposes and valuable forms of democratic dissent: ‘the rules of civility exist to preserve our hierarchies’ (Hsu, 2014; see also Sparks, 1997).

Linda Zerrilli (2014) presents a forceful version of this argument, noting that ‘throughout American history, disenfranchised minorities, such as women and African-Americans, have been regularly accused of incivility just by virtue of daring to show up in public and press their rights claims’ (p. 108). As she puts it, ‘the charge of incivility was a way of masking and managing disruptive demands to inclusion in the public realm’ (p. 116). Historically, civility norms have invariably been coded by race, gender and class, and have therefore seriously undermined the democratic commitment to political equality (see also Harcourt, 2012; Mongoven, 2009, p. 29).

And these problems are thought to persist (albeit in subtler form) in the appeal to civility to be found in contemporary political theory. Zerrilli’s scepticism reflects a longer-standing body of work primarily in critical and feminist political theory highlighting the ways in which conventional liberal modes of political discourse can function in fact to depoliticise argument and to disarm political dissent. For example, Iris Marion Young emphasises the way in which civility codes in democratic deliberation, characterised by norms of ‘articulateness’, ‘dispassionateness’, and ‘orderliness’, serve to privilege ‘specific styles of expression’ thereby creating what she terms the ‘internal exclusion’ of certain parties to the deliberation (Young, 2000, pp. 53-8; see also Young, 1990, 136-41).
More generally, there is concern among the sceptics about the way in which civility norms function to calm and pacify political disagreement (e.g. Sandel, 1996, p. 9). Randall Kennedy puts this point especially starkly:

The civility movement is deeply at odds with what an invigorated liberalism requires: intellectual clarity; an insistence upon grappling with the substance of controversies; and a willingness to fight loudly, openly, militantly, even rudely for policies and values that will increase freedom, equality and happiness in America and around the world (1998, 85).

This concern is harshly illustrated by the 2015 attack on the offices of French satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo after it published cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad. Many have argued that the right to speak freely, to mock and ridicule, must be balanced against the need for civility, which might bid us refrain for the sake of society. But others detect something profoundly anti-democratic in the suggestion that while (of course!) there is a right to free speech, it would be somehow improper or uncivil actually to exercise that right.

There is a moral judgement implied here, too. Civility is a pretence - we pretend not to detest our political enemies; we pretend not to disagree with them as sharply as we really do. This is self-censorship, the argument goes, and self-censorship is, as Salman Rushdie asserts, ‘wimpish’ (quoted in Jeffries, 2008). But this aspect of the argument is particularly questionable. Even if it is self-censorship, we need not accept Rushdie’s diagnosis of ‘wimpishness’. Sometimes refraining from saying everything we might want to say is more courageous than speaking out (Horton, 2011). Clearly we can agree with the likes of Zerrilli and Young that civility can be depoliticising without labelling those who pursue it as ‘wimps’. Indeed, that sort of disparagement is liable to arouse suspicion that instead of challenging all anti-democratic hierarchies (as intended), the ‘sceptics’ are really just trading one kind of anti-democratic hierarchy for another.
While this first line of sceptical thought holds that the civilitarians go too far in the effort to defuse open hostility, a second line suggests they do not go far enough. ‘Mere’ civility, and the frosty, formal relationships it presupposes are not conducive to a flourishing civil society which demands a warmer and more authentic solidarity. Something of this argument is evident in Ann Mongoven’s book, Just Love, in which she argues for a form of civic virtue that expresses ‘passionate care’ for fellow citizens (2009). By comparison, the appeal for civility in public life seems pretty thin gruel. In a similar vein, Danielle Allen has advocated the cultivation of a civic ‘habit’ of political friendship the demands of which significantly outstrip the superficial formalities of civility (Allen, 2004).

Summary and Prospect
My aim has been to examine the literature on civility in contemporary political theory and to draw from it a broad understanding of the concept’s meaning and of debates about its value. I organised those debates around the distinction between civilitarians and sceptics, but also noted unease about that distinction. To speak of civilitarians and sceptics, defenders and critics, in this way may give the impression of a coherent and polarised debate, with dedicated advocates on one side and clear opposition on the other.

In fact, matters are more complex. The scepticism of the ‘sceptics’ rarely goes all the way down. Even Zerrilli, and despite her polemical title (‘Against Civility’), insists that her intention is not ‘to defend incivility or to contest the worry about a lack of civility tout court’ (2014, p. 130). Likewise, the civil libertarianism of the advocates is seldom full-throated. As Waldron writes, it ‘seems unlikely that civility is an absolute requirement or an unconditional virtue … Sometimes hostility and combativeness are what a situation requires’ (2014, p. 49). Indeed, the two sides seem often to be talking past each other. We may agree with the civilitarians on the formal value of procedures for ‘staying present’ amid deep, persistent and hostile disagreement whilst retaining a degree of scepticism about any particular instantiation of those procedures and the exclusions they engender.
I conclude by noting three limitations of the existing literature, and thus three priorities for research. The first concerns the problem of civility in cyberspace. Many of the most pressing questions of civility today relate to on-line interactions. A recent case in point is that of the scholar Steven Salaita, whose job offer at the University of Illinois was withdrawn on grounds of the alleged ‘incivility’ of a series of inflammatory remarks criticising Israel that he had posted on Twitter. If our central justification for civility is that it functions to prevent violent conflict, then it may seem the need for civility is obviated by the internet. Irrespective of how heated our disagreements become, the ‘virtual’ character of on-line disputes means they are less likely to descend into violence. One can readily imagine objections to that view, but it probably does go some way to explaining the often much greater intensity of on-line disagreement. We need to think harder, then, about how the arguments I have outlined may apply in cyberspace.

The second limitation of the existing literature concerns the politics of civility. There is little discussion of the proper role of the state in ‘legislating for civility’. We need to consider more fully to what extent it is permissible for the state to prohibit incivility through, for example, the implementation of ASBOs in the UK, or the ban on public face covering implemented in France. We also need to consider to what extent it is permissible for the state to foster civility through, for example, programmes of civic education or ‘nudge’ initiatives. There are difficult normative questions here which have not received much attention.

Finally, and perhaps most surprisingly, we have only a very limited sense of civility’s failure – of bad citizenship, of incivility. While occasional reference is of course made in the literature to the notion of incivility, it is typically conceived negatively, as a falling away from the antecedent ideal of civility, an absence rather than a presence. But to think of incivility in this way may be to miss much of its character. I led off with Mount’s observation that the very existence of a debate about civility is a sign that ‘the city is in danger’, but we have in fact only the cloudiest sense of what that danger consists in, or whether indeed there is really any ‘danger’ at all. Only by engaging more directly and assertively with the phenomenon of
incivility will we fully understand the passion for civility.

References


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1 More recently, the ‘Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill 2013-14’ sought to replace ASBOs with new, and yet more controversial, ‘Injunctions to Prevent Nuisance and Annoyance’ (IPNAs).

2 There is a related question of the relationship between civility and manners. It is tempting to say that civility is the domain of specifically political manners, or, more broadly, of manners in the public sphere.
But we should be reluctant to distinguish too sharply here, for what counts as political or public in this context is not clear and is certain to be contested.


4 My argument here is that the theoretical identification of civility with law abidingness is at odds with ordinary usage. However, the theorist might be undeterred by this, preferring to embrace the revisionary implications of the theory. But it is usually considered a valid (if not decisive) objection to a theoretical conception that it fails to capture ordinary beliefs about the subject.

5 The distinction between toleration and civility is nicely illustrated in Elijah Anderson’s (2011) study of ‘cosmopolitan canopies’ in American cities where races mix on civil terms beyond mere tolerance.

6 I am grateful to Simon Thompson for drawing my attention to Goffman’s theory of civil inattention.

7 This rather objectionable macho posturing is surprisingly commonplace among civility’s critics. While Rushdie disdains the civilitarians as ‘wimps’, Randall Kennedy calls them ‘crybabies’ (1998, p. 87). It seems there is something about the plea for civility that brings out the bully in its opponents.

8 On this last as an instance of legislating for civility, see Daly (2015).

9 There is some discussion of the political question in Pettit (1997, pp. 251-60).

10 An apparent exception here is Thomas Christiano (2012), who explicitly characterises civility as a ‘negative virtue’ oriented to the avoidance of incivility (p. 109).