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Shaftesbury’s Theory of Art: Substance and Virtue

Let us consider the things which people think they understand most distinctly of all; that is, the bodies which we touch and see […]. Let us take, for example, this piece of wax. [René Descartes, Meditations]¹

[...] therefore nothing can have an Intrinsick Value. [Nicholas Barbon, A Discourse Concerning Coining the New Money Lighter]²

A number of acts of Parliament in the early eighteenth century took up the problem of paper money being blown from ships or eaten by mice.³ In what follows I attend to a body of writing and thought that I want to argue was made, and unmade, as an engagement with what were in this period widespread and fundamental shifts in the apprehension of things, crossing both material and economic or political dimensions, and intimated in this response to the actions of rodents and the wind.

The texts I am concerned with were written by the English philosopher Anthony Ashley Cooper, third Earl of Shaftesbury. They were to have formed a
volume on art that was left unfinished on Shaftesbury’s death in Naples in February 1713. This volume was planned to complement an earlier collection of writings, linking moral philosophy and aesthetics, which in 1711 Shaftesbury had brought together under the title of Characteristicks. The only part of the planned volume on art printed in Shaftesbury’s lifetime was a short essay written in the style of instructions for a painting of The Choice of Hercules (Fig. 1) that around the same time Shaftesbury commissioned from the Neapolitan artist Paolo de’ Matteis (now in the Ashmolean Museum in Oxford). One further short piece, presented as a letter dealing with the dependence of the arts upon political liberty, was completed but printed after Shaftesbury’s death. There are several other unfinished texts, and what would have been the principal essay remains in a long draft outline entitled ‘Plasticks, or the Original, Progress, & Power of Designatory Art’.

Notwithstanding the notional ‘instructions’ framing the Hercules text (quite clearly a rhetorical device, though undoubtedly connected in some way with Shaftesbury’s transactions with the painter), the address of the writings on art was, as with the Characteristicks, towards a broad Republic of Letters, or (as illuminated in
the work of Lawrence Klein) a culture of ‘politeness’. Accordingly, and not without justification, the prevailing approaches to Shaftesbury’s theory of art have foregrounded this kind of implied reader, and the ethical and broadly political determinations of the texts, as opposed to pursuing in any real depth their workings as a theory of art, or any of the more intricate problems that emerge in Shaftesbury’s writing to do with precisely how the image comes about. The reading I set out aims to draw together the political and the artistic questions that are tacitly separated here.

Shaftesbury did in fact develop a rigorous and complex account of the artwork, whose complexity and whose rather contradictory forms were a precise index of the political and ethical demands of his theory. The purpose and address of Shaftesbury’s theory in this sense – the impulse to think seriously about the ethical and political role of the image, as well as the kind of frameworks he drew upon – problematised the procedures and effects of painting to the point that the very nature of the image became open to question in his writing.

Shaftesbury was both a philosopher and, for a short period, an MP. His career in Parliament between November 1695 and July 1698 coincided with the
Recoinage crisis of 1695-6. In broad terms, this crisis occurred through the convergence of a number of immediate pressures (principally to do with military finance and shortages of metallic specie across Europe) with long-standing practices of clipping small quantities of silver from the edges of coins to be melted and turned into bullion. These combined factors occasioned a collapse in confidence and the recall and reminting of virtually the entire stock of circulating coins. Centrally, what emerged in the very extensive debates around the Recoinage was a clear sense of the interconnectedness of the legislative, political, economic issues with quite tangible problems centred on the material of money. As part of this – in a significant sense as the very form in which these debates were played out – the discursive possibilities and positions for thinking about money were interlinked with philosophical conceptions of material substance in the same period. Uncertainties about substance in philosophical writing were recurrently articulated in the form of a binary opposition pivoting on the question of whether matter contains immanent self-moving or self-generating principles, or whether the structuring or (in whatever sense) the animation of physical entities is given extrinsically. Exactly this kind of
opposition structured the debates around the Recoinage, centrally placing a conception of the value of coins as an intrinsic and concrete property of the metal against some non-sensible power conferred on money from elsewhere. Part of my argument is that the echoes and reiterations between these discrete discourses – on the most basic fabric of the physical world, and on the material grounds of social relations – lent to this shared and recurrent opposition a quality of the fundamental or the universal, and, as such, a role across quite diverse spheres in much more extensive redefinitions of how the nature of things could be imagined. Shaftesbury’s own involvement with the problems in play here was direct. On the 12th of December 1695 he was named (then Lord Ashley) in a committee in the Commons to address the state of the coin; he took part in a conference on the same subject on the 5th of December, and on the 18th of the following February on the coining of guineas. Little or nothing of the monetary crisis is voiced in Shaftesbury’s work; and earlier, in the Characteristicks, he had programmatically rejected any engagement with enquiries into the nature of substance or matter within a philosophical framework. Yet one question underpinning my discussion is the
degree to which this rejection of problems of substance may have been transformed, 
by the urgency with which questions of substance re-emerged in the monetary 
debates and more broadly the conjuncture Shaftesbury occupied, into a more active 
(if still implicit) challenge in his later writing and his theory of art.

The concern here is with Shaftesbury’s theory (primarily the Hercules essay 
and the longest of the drafts, on ‘Plasticks’), and the approach follows a close 
reading of the texts. Given the state of Shaftesbury’s writings, this means an 
engagement with the drafts – that is, both drafts as unfinished works, and the 
‘finished’ works as part of an incomplete whole. The purpose of this, to be clear, is 
not the piecing together of something from its fragments, but rather to attend to the 
incomplete state of the work as itself bearing critical and historical significance. 
Shaftesbury’s writing on art remained incomplete, and a conjectural process, for 
different reasons. Partly there is the fact of Shaftesbury’s death. Yet death alone does 
not explain the texts’ state, where incompleteness is tied with fundamental, perhaps 
objectively insoluble tensions, and marks the impossibility of completion except 
though abandoning some of the central questions the texts bring to light. Their state
marks a basic resistance between conventional models for writing about art and the
kind of complex and contradictory functions the artwork took on in Shaftesbury’s
thought, as something enmeshed with pressing and unresolved questions beyond the
artwork. To this extent, interpretation demands an approach that attends to the
indecision and provisionality and contradictions of these writings as a paradoxically
coherent and explicable mode of discourse at a specific moment of crisis.

Any reading that seriously entertains incompletion or the sort of
contradictions I am signalling is difficult to square with the prevailing view of
Shaftesbury’s theory of art as a simple programme for the immediate presentation of
legible meanings, a condition of the texts’ supposed function as a transparent
expression of Shaftesbury’s particular ideological standpoint.¹³ Shaftesbury’s
painting of Hercules standing between the figures of Virtue and Pleasure and
choosing virtue might in this respect be taken as the emblem of recent interpretations
of Shaftesbury’s theory – and their end point, I would suggest, in a critical model
defined and limited by ideas of representation that are quite different from what I
want to address here, in the clear (if not distinctly formulated) questions in
Shaftesbury’s theory about the more basic make-up of the artwork. Therefore, while
the significance of much of the recent work on Shaftesbury’s art theory (particularly
that of John Barrell) has been in positioning these writings within a larger political
framework, and while this broadly forms the basis for the reading that will be set out
here, what I want to pursue are the ways in which the painting’s very function as a
representation of an ethical or political narrative is in Shaftesbury’s writings
interlined with fundamental uncertainties about the painting’s substance, and about
its ‘virtue’ in the more complex implications of that term – as at once an ethical term
of conduct, a power to move or effect change, and something (as will become clear)
in a distinct relation to notions of monetary value. The artwork, precisely in so far as
it was conceived in terms of a political function, takes shape as something that could
not be definitively formulated, something crossed-out and overwritten in
Shaftesbury’s drafts, in a still-open process of thinking about the ways in which
images might assume force.

At one point in ‘Plasticks’, Shaftesbury writes: ‘That w’ we most admir’d even in the
Turn of outward Features was but a misterious Expression of something inward &c’. The projection into the past (‘w’ we most admir’d’) of some sensed connection between the manifest features of the image and something ‘inward’ is one expression of the tensions in Shaftesbury’s thought between a desire to affirm the artwork as a vehicle of moral meanings and uncertainties around the form this might take. These uncertainties are linked here with notions of movement and change in Shaftesbury’s theory, both as traits of what is depicted, and in the process of viewing or apprehending the image. Elsewhere in the same draft Shaftesbury writes:

the Moral Part in Painting, lies but little in ye Forms. (For Socrates, a Silenus, whom he resembled. A Triton, the Centaur Chiron or any other less specious Form corporeal, may be principally moral.) But is express’d in the Air, Feature, Attitude, Action, Motion; and is therefore wholly lodgd in that Part of Painting calld the Movements where Action Passion & the Affections are shewn. By ‘Forms’ here Shaftesbury meant outward appearances taken to be static, as distinct from processes of appearance that offer some sort of index of inner
transformations. Shaftesbury’s reference to a Triton is to a composite half-human half-fish (as for instance in the bizarre, supposedly factual, descriptions in Pausanias), and perhaps also to more animated transitions such as Pindar’s poetic depiction of the Triton’s disguised appearance to the Argonauts in the shape of a man. In an enduring tradition, the figure of the centaur had been used to represent a divergence between outward appearance and moral being. The same tropes of drunkenness that stood to emphasise the conflict between civilized and barbarous in centaurs (a race on the periphery of the cultivated world) registered the fluidity of states in conventional associations between Silenus with Socrates. Shaftesbury’s line of thought here complicates any fixed connection between the visible and the true nature of things by identifying truth with unfolding and hidden dynamics.

The centaurs and other composite creatures at this point should be seen as drawing together the classical imagery that appears throughout Shaftesbury’s texts with what were more current questions, brought to bear through a direct (although imprecise) reference elsewhere in the draft to John Locke’s Essay Concerning Humane Understanding. Shaftesbury writes:
Philosophers [who] woud confound the very Notion of Species, specifick Ideas […] See Mr L… Book. Chapt …). But had not the Creatrix […] or soverain Plastick Nature set the Boundarys the Caprice (i: e Wantoness & Bestiality) of the a corrupt Man woud long since have gon beyond any of the worst Painters, Grotesque θπαθοχαυοι [ryparographoi: painters of filth] &c as well as beyond any of the Poets in composing new F complicated Forms of Satyrs Centaurs &c. into wch the breed woud have run out and been lost.19

The reference is to book 3 chapter 6 of Locke’s Essay, ‘Of the Names of Substances’, where Locke’s concern was with the mismatch between our grasp of things and their real nature.20 For Locke, ‘Species’ are not real entities (he equates that term merely with the word ‘sort’), but rather are nothing more than linguistic constructions, merely the ‘ranking [of things] under distinct Names’.21 Locke underlines the remoteness of what is always an arbitrary and contingent collection of our ideas from the real properties of things, which flow from their ‘true internal Constitution’.22 In one example, Locke separates the common notion of gold’s essence – as merely a
collection of attributes that we happen to be able to discern – from the ‘real Essence’
on which all the properties of gold depend, and which lies, as he puts it, in ‘the
insensible parts of that Body’.  

Locke’s discussion discloses what were widespread difficulties in
identifying the nature of ‘substances’, a category that stood generally, and across
quite different strains of seventeenth-century philosophy, to define what is
constitutive of reality. His observations bore equally on enduring scholastic and
Aristotelian ‘substantial forms’ as they did on newer modes of experimental enquiry
that, as Locke put it, ‘however made with the greatest diligence and exactness, we
are capable of’ fail to bring to our knowledge ‘that Texture of Parts’ that constitutes
lead, iron, or anything else. Substances, if they are anything in the Essay, are open
to doubt. At different points, Locke speaks of them as a tacit conjecture, ‘an
uncertain supposition of we know not what’, a ‘Substratum’ that we have to
‘suppose’, ‘An obscure and relative Idea’, something of which ‘we have no Idea of
what it is, but only a confused obscure one of what it does’.  

In a number of ways, the kinds of doubts or limits mapped here affected
Shaftesbury’s theory of art. The section in ‘Plasticks’ that refers to Locke’s discussion of substance is headed ‘Instinct. natural Ideas &c.’ and offers a premise of some inviolable and enduring qualities dividing distinct categories of created beings, and, as Shaftesbury goes on, some sort of an innate capacity to recognize these. In this way Shaftesbury’s remarks on ‘species’ were supposed to draw a line between his own ideas and the chapter from the Essay, but at the same time they mark what were pervasive uncertainties around the possible connections between traces on the surface of an object, a body, a person, and some inferred but essentially ungraspable properties within.

The larger configuration within which these uncertainties emerged – linking the kind of epistemological problems articulated in the Essay and more concrete social practices in this period – was illuminated in criticisms made by the Scottish writer James Hodges of some texts Locke published on the topic of money. These, with hundreds of related pamphlets written around the same time, were occasioned by the Recoinage crisis. In the first official scheme to address this crisis, a paper drawn up by William Lowndes (as Secretary to the Treasury) and printed in late-
1696, it is made clear that the problems involved directly a question around the status of the material of money, the relations between metal, the stamp on the coin’s surface, and its value.\textsuperscript{29} Lowndes proposed to alter these relationships, a procedure he referred to as ‘raising’ the coin, that is, raising its denominative value – what Lowndes calls the ‘Extrinsick Value’ and ‘Extrinsick Denomination’ – without any corresponding change in the quantity or purity of silver it contained.\textsuperscript{30} In a reply to this proposal, a short pamphlet entitled Further Considerations Concerning Raising the Value of Money, Locke compared Lowndes’ scheme itself to the clipping of coins that had been one of the immediate causes of the Recoinage.\textsuperscript{31} The argument Locke himself put forward was based on a notion of monetary value as something embodied and immediately present in the metal of coins – something material, and therefore basically unaffected by their denominations.\textsuperscript{32} As he put it (using a form of typographical emphasis reserved for a small number of terms in his pamphlet, perhaps intended to convey a kind of plain speaking): ‘an equal quantity of Silver is always of equal value to an equal quantity of Silver’: the denominations of money are only ‘empty sounds’.\textsuperscript{33} Echoing the distinction in the Essay between merely
linguistic ‘species’ and the real constitution of things, Locke dismissed (as

‘specious’) any alteration of the bond between denomination and value of the coin as

an abuse of words and simply a misunderstanding of the nature of money:

\[
\text{Raising of Coin is but a specious word to deceive the unwary. It only}
\]

gives the usual denomination of a greater quantity of Silver to a less, (v.g.
calling Four Grains of Silver a Penny to day, when Five Grains of Silver

made a Penny yesterday) but adds no worth or real value to the Silver

Coin, to make amends for its want of Silver. That is impossible to be

done. For it is only the \text{quantity} of Silver in it that is, and eternally will be,

the measure of its value.\textsuperscript{34}

Hodges, more than other critics of Locke’s arguments on the Recoinage,
drew out some direct links between the writings on money and those on human

understanding. He did so principally by pursuing Locke’s discussion in the Essay of

‘identical Propositions’. As Locke described them, these are propositions that

(though they may certainly be true) mark merely an already-known identity, and

offer no way of increasing our knowledge.\textsuperscript{35} Locke took it as a conventional view,
though one that is misplaced, that identical propositions are fundamental to knowledge as the foundation on which all demonstration and reasoning must be based.\textsuperscript{36} Against this, the emphasis in his own account of such propositions falls on a kind of dumb stasis, or repetition of a purely verbal kind, amounting to nothing more than empty utterances of what is already known, which Locke ridicules with parrot phrases – ‘a Soul is a Soul; a Spirit is a Spirit; a Fetiche is a Fetiche’ – and with an image of a monkey switching an oyster from one hand to the other, as if the action brought about any change in its object.\textsuperscript{37} Hodges’ point was that Locke’s theory of value amounted exactly to this sort of empty assertion of the equivalence the same.\textsuperscript{38}

Like other critics of Locke’s writing on money, Hodges’ pursuit of these arguments was concerned chiefly with Locke’s formulation of ‘intrinsic value’.\textsuperscript{39} Locke had written that ‘The intrinsic value of Silver consider’d as Money, is that estimate which common consent has placed on it, whereby it is made Equivalent to all other things, and consequently is the universal Barter or Exchange which Men give and receive for other things they would purchase or part with for a valuable consideration […]’.\textsuperscript{40} In this Hodges saw a logical contradiction between Locke’s
identification of an ‘estimate’ of value, derived from ‘common consent’ – that is, something conferred, from outside, on money by some tacit or open agreement – with a notion of the ‘intrinsic’, which, as Hodges put it in rather laboured argument, must be understood as ‘of necessity one way or another [...] in the thing of which it is spoken, either in its Nature, Constitution, native Properties, or in or within its Substance [...] as if we should say Inward or Internal, or what is in, or within a thing’. 41

These criticisms may have been grounded in quite precise terminology in scholastic philosophy. There an intrinsic denomination was a characterization of a thing involving only the thing itself, and without reference to its relations with, or operations on, other things. 42 Locke’s own sense of the terms of his writing on money may have shifted from such definitions. Certainly, what Hodges’ reading or misreading brought to the fore was a difficulty manifest in Locke’s dual, simultaneous insistence on value as something entirely self-contained, and – at the same time – as something constituted in an unfolding series of interactions and exchanges. One effect of Hodges’ objections was to disclose more general
difficulties in defining what the ‘intrinsic’, ‘Inward or Internal’ might actually mean
at this point.

Some of the difficulties connected to such notions were addressed directly
and systemically about this time in a number of writings by Gottfried Wilhelm
Leibniz. In one short text written in 1690 (a ‘demonstration against atoms’), Leibniz
goes through a rehearsal of the scholastic definition of intrinsic denominations (‘a
consideration of the thing alone, with no operation on the thing and no change
brought about by the thing’), and examples (a fake coin that can be distinguished
‘extrinsically’ by the blow of a hammer). But he then proceeds, against the standard
view he has just set out, to argue that there are really no purely extrinsic
denominations, and that all distinctions between things derive only and wholly from
within their own internal compositions. This was one instance of a recurrent idea in
Leibniz’s writing, conceiving substances as at once entirely self-contained (‘without
windows’, in his later phraseology), and yet as expressions of the entire universe.

As he put it in another short text written around the same time:

Every Individual substance contains in its perfect notion the entire
universe and everything that exists in it, past, present, and future, for
there is no thing on which one cannot impose some true denomination
from another thing, at very least a denomination of comparison or
relation. Moreover, there is no purely extrinsic denomination.46

Leibniz’s formulations – perhaps the rather blank assertion of the last
sentence here – signal what more generally were unresolved questions about the
intrinsic and the extrinsic, both in metaphysics and in more mundane kinds of things.

Leibniz himself returned to the same opposition in a text written in 1696 on lotteries,
and, in a letter of 1699 to Thomas Burnett, to the question of intrinsic and extrinsic
value in Locke’s writing, where Leibniz concurred with Locke’s view on the
unreality of extrinsic value.47 Within the monetary theories in the debates around the
Recoinage, quite specific questions of the ‘internal’ or ‘external’ constitution of
value emerged very plainly, as is clear in one central text, A Discourse Concerning
Coining the New Money Lighter by Nicholas Barbon, which was printed in 1696 as
an answer to Locke’s Further Considerations:

The Question betwixt us here will be, Whether Money has its sole Value
from the Quantity of Silver in each piece of Coin? Or whether Money has
not some Value from the Authority of the Government where it is Coin’d,
above the Value of the Silver in each piece.\textsuperscript{48}

Barbon’s answer (as, broadly speaking, with Lowndes’ initial scheme) was
that the stamp imprinted on money is simultaneously the mark and the instantiation
of its value, both its sign and its substance. This view lighted on what was an
opposed a category of ‘Vertue’, and the difference between this category and that of
value occupies much of Barbon’s argument.\textsuperscript{49} Value, as Barbon saw it, cannot be
intrinsic, and is by definition determined without reference to the coin’s physical
properties.\textsuperscript{50} It is instead the effect of a network of external factors – ‘Plenty or
Scarcity’, ‘occasion and usefulness’ (money is more useful than silver, so has greater
value), and the ‘Rarity’ that in ornament is the chief reason for value, rather than
‘any excellent quality in the things themselves’.\textsuperscript{51}

Barbon’s concern in the Discourse was with the nature both of money and
of sovereign power. He placed the authority of the government, ultimately a
declaration of the King, as the constitution of a coin’s value, and, as Barbon
understood it, this is a function of the image imprinted on money as distinct from the material of coins. 52 A transparent image on the surface of the coin becomes opposed to ‘Vertue’, which Barbon regards as some hidden or occult power within material substances, a view of materials that he associates with Locke’s theory of value, as in the loadstone or the drugs that serve in the Discourse as examples. 53

The separation that Barbon sought to instate was unstable, however. To begin with, Locke’s annotations in his own copy of Barbon’s text indicate that he understood the ‘intrinsic Vertue’ described there to mean just the same as his own sense of intrinsic value. 54 More than this, I would argue that there is running through Barbon’s text a residual fascination with the material of money, and this forms particles of resistance to the theory of value he sets out. The process of emptying the material of coins of any value in Barbon’s theory begins with a question about the qualities of that material which then draws him into a detailed, virtually microscopic analysis. He attends to the ‘innumerable Fractions of Grains’ of silver used in the different mints across Europe and elsewhere, in this regard going beyond the concern with material shown in Locke’s writing, since for Locke silver is taken as essentially
a uniform material, consistent between bullion and money, and lacking any of the kind intricate textures that Barbon’s account brings to mind. The different alloys of gold and silver, the different internal compositions of coins emerge in Barbon’s argument as ‘a mystery that belongs only to a small number of men that deal in it’. Coins assume a density and complexity that causes even those acquainted with the ‘Chymical part of the mystery’ to fall back on the simpler methods of using the touchstone and the colour of the metal.

Barbon’s method of demonstrating the incommensurability of coins’ material properties with a proper theory of value thus in part works paradoxically through a heightened attention to the material properties of coins. In this regard, the balance of Barbon’s argument – its positioning of metal as something at once negated and magnified in the text – intersects with a quite central model in philosophical accounts of substance in the mid-seventeenth century. Apropos a piece of wax, in part of the second ‘Meditation’, written around the early 1640s, Descartes had asked his reader to consider materials in this way:

Let us consider the things which people think they understand most
distinctly of all; that is, the bodies which we touch and see. [...] Let us take, for example, this piece of wax. [...] it has not yet quite lost the taste of the honey; it retains some of the scent of the flowers from which it was gathered; its colour, shape, and size are plain to see; it is hard, cold, and can be handled without difficulty; if you rap it with your knuckle it makes a sound. In short, it has everything which appears necessary to enable a body to be known as distinctly as possible. But even as I speak, I put the wax by the fire, and look: the residual taste is eliminated, the smell goes away, the colour changes, the shape is lost, the size increases; it becomes liquid and hot; you can hardly touch it, and if you strike it, it no longer makes a sound. But does the same wax remain? It must be admitted that it does; no one denies it, no one thinks otherwise. So what was it in the wax that I understood with such distinctness? Evidently none of the features which I arrived at by means of the senses; for whatever came under taste, smell, sight, touch, or hearing has now altered – yet the wax remains.58
The description serves in the Meditations equally to underline the failings of sensory perception, and to pursue a foundational explanation of material substance. What can be known distinctly is removed from the senses in the same movement that sets out a reduction of matter, as Descartes’ text unfolds, to something lacking any real properties except ‘extension’. This was part of a basic separation of material substance from thinking substance as two radically separate constituents of the world, and, with this, a conception of material substance as inert and passive and therefore secondary to an entirely external principle of movement. Various arguments that radiate through Descartes’ system – on the relation between the soul and the body, between matter and thought, and on the existence of God – take as their condition this separation and the emptying of material substance of any active principle. Yet the wax remains. What emerges in Descartes approach here is a distinct attitude towards material involving a process of negation, and a necessary alternation between emphasis on sensory perception and then the liquefying of any distinct knowledge sensory perception might be supposed to bring.

If such movements in the text could be viewed simply as paradoxes of
method which resolve themselves in the course of Descartes’ writing, or merely as rhetorical scaffolding outside his argument, the real problems around the composition, and potentially the dynamics of material substance that Descartes was treating nonetheless remained (for one pressing instance, on the relation between thought and matter in his late work in The Passions of the Soul) and flared up elsewhere in philosophical discourse from the mid-seventeenth century.59

Reflecting on Descartes’ account in 1695, Leibniz, halfway through his ‘Système nouveau de la nature et de la communication des substances’, noted that he was ‘as it were carried back into the open sea’.60 The unresolved questions were to do both with the nature of, and the possible ‘communication’ between material and thinking substance (if these were, as Leibniz averred, following Descartes, separate kinds of being with no common medium of causal connection).61 As was the case with a number of other more or less direct engagements with Descartes in the second half of the seventeenth century, Leibniz’s thinking on these problems here generated the elaboration of a system in which matter itself carries some immanent force.62 Shaftesbury is likely to have known Leibniz’s ‘Système nouveau’. He was certainly
aware of Leibniz himself at the time he was working on ‘Plasticks’ because via Pierre Coste, an Huguenot writer and translator who assisted with the publication of the Hercules text in French, Leibniz had in 1712 sent Shaftesbury some remarks on the Characteristicks. Leibniz mostly went along with the cast of the Shaftesbury’s thought, but he did challenge the disregard in the Characteristicks of questions of matter, substance, and space, which in Leibniz’s view were as vital to Shaftesbury’s stated concern with a true moral philosophy as they were to metaphysics. Leibniz’s response converged with related questions about the principles of substance and matter that appeared at other points on Shaftesbury’s intellectual horizon. For instance Shaftesbury had read Ralph Cudworth’s True Intellectual System of the Universe (1672), which developed a common topos of a ‘plastic nature’, a vital force shaping the forms of creation, but removed in Cudworth’s account from ‘any Sense or Conscious Understanding’. There is also a notable work in Shaftesbury’s library catalogue, by the surgeon Francis Glisson, on ‘energetic’ substance – that is, substance as an animated, generative, but unconscious force within the tissues of bodies. Locke’s concern with uncertain suppositions and relative and obscure ideas
in his descriptions of substance in the Essay, as well as his speculation there on
‘thinking matter’, were occupied with similar questions, some of which emerged too
around 1690 in correspondence with Shaftesbury concerning matter and the soul.67
As I have suggested, in rather complex ways, the treatment of substance in the Essay
intersected with Locke’s and the other theories of money.

What brought to a point Shaftesbury’s otherwise contingent encounter with
both the philosophical and monetary questions here was a larger shift, effected
through quite practical reasons, in which a model of opposition between intrinsic and
extrinsic causality (or force or ‘virtue’) assumed in this period a common structural
role in very diverse forms of knowledge and social practice. The opposition as it had
come to define philosophical questions about substance was taken up in the
Recoinage (quite speculatively, I would suggest, as an existing conceptual
framework in the absence of other means) as a way of acting on ‘concrete’ economic
crisis; and in turn, and through a kind of retrospective action, the application of this
metaphysical model at the level of the concrete lent to it a reality in its concrete
effects. Philosophical debates on the nature of substance and more practical
instabilities around the substance of money thus interlocked in a mutually

constitutive relation that both privileged a certain form of opposition between

intrinsic and extrinsic; and, to the extent that substance and money were themselves

understood as constitutive of basic physical and social realities, lent to the opposition

itself a kind of already-known priority in the framing of approaches to things more

broadly. 68

In Shaftesbury’s writing on art, this model of opposition was tied with different

conceptions of temporality in the image. At some points, meaning is presented as

fixed on the surface of the painting, instantly legible, as something static, imparted

from outside – from theory, philosophy, instructions to a painter. Elsewhere,

meaning emerges in an open series of mental images that separate themselves from

what is on the surface of the painting through an immanent production of forces

registered, in time, in an unfolding sequence of effects.

Most clearly in the Hercules essay, in order to give some definition to this,

Shaftesbury developed a theoretical device of ‘Anticipation’: 
How is it therefore possible (says one) to express a Change of Passion in any Subject, since this Change is made by Succession; and that in this case the Passion which is understood as present, will require a Disposition of Body and Features wholly different from the Passion which is over, and past? To this we answer, That notwithstanding the Ascendancy or Reign of the principal and immediate Passion, The Artist has Power to leave still in his Subject the Tracks or Footsteps of its Predecessour: so as to let Us behold not only a rising Passion together with a declining one; but, what is more, a strong and determinate Passion with its contrary already discharg’d and banish’d. The image here is a complex of traces marking the causes of some movement that will unfold beyond the moment of the painting, or the effects of some passion that has passed. The painting’s surface registers merely one instant within a largely invisible process. The same way of thinking of the image was reframed in different ways elsewhere in the drafts, for one instance in a short text written weeks before Shaftesbury’s death (a detailed outline for a portrait of himself as a dying
philosopher, which was not completed), where he described painting’s objects in similar terms, as expressions that have past but ‘qui ne sera pas tout-à-fait chassée même du Visage [which will not be completely chased away from the countenance]’.

The exact wording of such formulations was significant to Shaftesbury. This becomes evident in his reaction to a number of more or less conspicuous changes made by Pierre Coste, who edited Shaftesbury’s French manuscript of the Hercules essay before it was printed in the Journal des sçavans. Coste’s changes had the effect of blurring or erasing something that, both prior to and after his editing of the text, was underlined by Shaftesbury as key. Where Shaftesbury had written: ‘par la même voye qu’on rapelle en memoire le passé, on anticipe l’avenir [in the same way as one recalls to memory the past, one anticipates the future’], in Coste’s version this is changed from emphatic and precise designations into a more prosaic kind of diction: ‘On anticipe encore l’Avenir par les mêmes moyens qu’on emploie pour rapeller le souvenir du Passé [One anticipates the future by the same means that one employs to recall a memory of the past].’ The removal of the underlining of
‘rapelle’ and ‘anticipe’ obscures their role as theoretical definitions (as well as their co-relation with each other) – something that Shaftesbury marked first in the original version, and again in his own later translation into English, made after its publication in the Journal des sçavans. To similar effect, Coste removed a short paragraph that in Shaftesbury’s French and again in his later English version consists simply of the definition of this technique, naming and fixing it as an object of theory (‘Cette Operation diverse peut être distinguée par les deux Noms d’Anticipation et de Rapelle’ [This particular operation can be distinguished by the two terms Anticipation and Repeal]). Together, these changes follow a repeated back and forth movement from Shaftesbury’s French drafts, to the blurring or erasures in Coste’s editing, and then to Shaftesbury’s reassertions when he himself came back to the text to translate it into English.

Shaftesbury’s use specifically of ‘anticipation’ in these passages (that is, as distinct from an interest more generally in the kind of technique he was describing) is significant because, as far as I can see, that word had not had any career in earlier sources on the question of how change may be depicted in painting. Rather, the
sense in which Shaftesbury uses ‘anticipation’ here seems to have been drawn primarily from his own works in moral philosophy – this as part of the larger, principally Hellenistic, tradition in which those works may be placed – and secondly, perhaps indirectly, from a number of related early modern discourses, from rhetoric and literary theory to a broad category of economic and legal thought, in which notions of ‘anticipation’ figure in a related manner.

In the Characteristicks ‘Anticipation’ is used to refer to a form of innate knowledge. At times Shaftesbury presents this as uncomplicated, but clearly the term was subject to contradictions both within his own writings, and in its wider contexts in seventeenth century England and the earlier texts Shaftesbury knew. Instabilities around the use of this word in relation to knowledge were conveyed, for example, in the derisive tone of Francis Bacon’s use of phrases like ‘Anticipatio Mentis’ and ‘Anticipationes Naturae’, meaning ungrounded reasoning opposed to the true goal of science in ‘Interpretatio Naturae’. Anticipation here marks a gap in knowledge or a flawed presumption about the nature of the world. Others, including Locke, used the word in a similar vein, and in this way it marked out some broader
tensions in epistemological theories in this period.\textsuperscript{78}

Centrally among the Hellenistic works in moral philosophy that Shaftesbury

was responding to, Cicero had used ‘anticipatio’ to signify an innate idea.\textsuperscript{79} While

this presented the word rather neutrally as a translation into a Latin philosophical

vocabulary of the word πθερωσις [prolepsis] as it had been used by Epicurus,

Cicero’s account in fact involved a complete inversion of his source, shifting the

term from a theory of knowledge accrued through sensations and experience, as is

clear in Epicurus, to one based on the pre-given, the untaught, and instinctive.\textsuperscript{80} The

shift reflected at an epistemological level what were more directly ethical

problematics within the same network of texts, perhaps most clearly drawn out in the

works of the Stoic Epictetus (the subject of very intensive readings on Shaftesbury’s

part), who returned in his works to the problem that, while we are born with prior

moral principles – ‘πθερωσις’ – they are often applied inappropriately to particular

things, or are corruptible, and in their use subject to ambiguity.\textsuperscript{81}

What are, in certain senses, related problems to this emerged in theories of

anticipation in rhetoric and poetics. In rhetorical theory anticipatio or prolepsis was
in simple terms the unravelling of an opponent’s argument before it has been uttered.

As it was put in an English handbook printed in the mid-seventeenth century,

anticipation is a matter of an orator’s perceiving and confuting ‘before it be spoken’

whatever might ‘hurt him as to what he is about to deliver’. 82 However, as in the

more thorough and critically subtle analysis set out, for example, by Gerar dus

Joannes Vossius in his Commentariorum rhetoricorum (published in a number of

ditions from 1606, and a work Shaftesbury owned), anticipatio or ποιμι could

have further implications, beyond simply saying first one’s opponent’s argument,

and involved a peculiar sort of speech in which one more properly assumes the role

of opponent, and speaks, in a sort of dialogue, alternately occupying the different

personae of opponent and self. 83

In an overlapping tradition of literary analysis, certain passages in Virgil’s

poetry figured centrally in the theoretical construction of anticipation (as well, for

reasons that I will come to, as exercising a wider fascination in the late seventeenth

century). In one important discussion of the mid-sixteenth century, Julius Caesar

Scaliger in the Poetices libri septum (again a work Shaftesbury owned) outlined two
conventional definitions of anticipation in the Aeneid. He notes first, in the first few lines of the poem, that Virgil’s narrator speaks of Aeneas landing on ‘Lavinian shores’. This is called an anticipation because when Aeneas landed there the place had not yet been named Lavinium. The second instance is from the sixth book, when Aeneas, having travelled to the Underworld, meets his dead helmsman Palinarus who had been torn from the ship by the god of Sleep, and, after drifting on the waves for three nights, was killed on reaching the shore. At this point Palinarus speaks of a place using a name (Velinos) which it would not bear until some later time, asking that his remains be buried there.

Scaliger’s reading, in part, and to the extent that it separates these two types of anticipation, followed an established line, as notably in Servius’ fifth-century commentary on the Aeneid. Servius and the other earlier commentators discriminated between the two kinds of anticipation, essentially in ethical terms, with reference to the difference between the voice of the poet and that of characters within the poem. The first kind of anticipation is understood as acceptable (Servius’ word is ‘tolerabilis’), where it is the narrator – understood to be the person of the poet – who
uses the future name of the place in a veiled indication of the history that will unfold
in the poem’s future. With the second kind, however, when it is the voice of
Aeneas’ dead helmsman who speaks, the technique becomes rather more problematic
(‘vitiosissima’) in terms of the integrity of the poem and its demands on the reader.
The dead Palinarus could not know of the place where he asked to be buried; and
even if one were somehow to accept that he could – by some power of divination
given to the dead, for example – then (as spelled out by Aullus Gellius, one of the
authorities cited by Servius) one would still not be able to account for Aeneas
understanding these utterances.

Yet around this same point, Scaliger’s sense of the poem, and of
‘anticipatio’, marked an important shift from the earlier commentators. Scaliger
admits anticipation as a device with which the poet, through the voice of a character,
is able to disclose to the reader things that the poet in his own voice has not explicitly
described. The effect of Scaliger’s interpretation is to acknowledge a definite force
in the poem through a separation of the voice from the personification of meaning,
where the voice comes to exist precisely between and separate from either the person
of the poet or that of any character in the poem. Here, as with the fluidity of personae
and the dissolution of arguments and their speakers in the rhetorical techniques
elaborated by Vossius, anticipation problematises both the objective identity of the
work and, through its operations, the identity of the subject facing the work.

These were technical issues, and (as is the case more broadly with rhetorical
and literary theory) could certainly be seen to have offered some points of reference
for writing on painting in this period. More significantly though, these reflections on
‘anticipation’ appeared – as technical issues centring on the relation between
meaning and the voice – as one face of a much larger set of uncertainties in this
period about thought and the body, spiritus and materia, the forces in play within
physical entities. Anticipation, as these texts brought it to light, offered the work a
nuanced, indirect effect – a virtue that, at the same time, is superimposed on the kind
of doubts about the status of the artwork, the threat and difficulty and the unexpected
force that Servius had dimly sensed in the helmsman’s speech in the Aeneid, ‘quasi
dictum ab umbra [as something spoken by a shadow]’. 

92
Leibniz remarked in the ‘Sistème nouveau’ that when he came to think of the union between the soul and the body he was cast out on an open sea. The image perhaps calls to mind the figure of Palinarus in Virgil’s ironic reversal of that character’s role as helmsman in the sixth book of the Aeneid which, in fact, Leibniz did turn to in his later Essais de theodicée. There Virgil’s lines, the pantheist notion of a world sustained by an inner spirit (‘Spiritus intus alit’), were placed by Leibniz in relation to questions about individuation, and in an argument against what he saw as the view (centrally Spinoza’s) that souls are nothing but ‘modifications passagères’ of a single substance, like drops briefly separated from an ocean and then reabsorbed and lost.

These questions were, clearly, closely identified with those that Leibniz had turned over in the ‘Sistème nouveau’, even if there he put them in terms of the persistence of souls in a folding and refolding of matter in the experiments of Swammerdam, Malpighi, and Leeuwenhoek, and the coming back to life of drowned flies. More broadly, the kind of interest Leibniz showed in the cosmological picture set out in the sixth book of the Aeneid may be seen elsewhere (as I indicated above),
and seems to have assumed a quite concrete topicality in this period. Shaftesbury himself at one point in the ‘Plasticks’ draft refers sketchily to the same lines of Virgil’s poem with a note to include these ‘philosophical Theistical-Hypothesis-Passages’ somewhere in the finished essay.\(^6\) In a number of works Shaftesbury knew – for example Cudworth, Charles Blount (who translated Spinoza), Edward Stillingfleet – the attention given to Stoic and Platonic doctrines of death and rebirth in the Aeneid perhaps formed a means of admitting more recent unresolved questions around the nature and limits of conscious existence.\(^7\) And as questions of existence, they crossed between the rarefied and the down to earth: Leibniz was thinking through – in the most rigorous and imaginative fashion – what emerged more widely as correspondences between the souls haunting the pages of Virgil and more mundane and quite historically specific forms of experience, in what Leibniz called ‘a commerce between mortal and immortal persons’, in a draft on annuities.\(^8\) In the same place, Leibniz developed an intricate theory of value and property precisely around a concept of ‘anticipation’, which thus assumed a position both within fundamental theories of knowledge, and in the operations of finance.\(^9\) In this latter
sense, the term clearly had currency in England in the last years of the seventeenth

century – for example with a project ‘which may raise annually enough to carry the

Charges of the War, on equal and easie Terms, with little or no Anticipation’, or

elsewhere (in a text responding to Locke on the Recoinage) in the view that ‘We

have no way in the World to maintain our selves but by settling some Funds or other,

as we have done of late Years, and borrowing the money upon it by way of

Anticipation’. Where Shaftesbury introduces ‘Anticipation’ in the Hercules essay, this and its

complementary term ‘Repeal’ are woven into a narrative that seems unconnected

with the painting the essay describes. Evoking a quite separate image, generated

during entirely within the text, he writes that a change of passion may be shown

As for instance, when the Plain Tracks of Tears new falln, with other

fresh Tokens of Mourning and Dejection remain still in a Person newly

transported with Joy at the sight of a Relation or Friend, who the moment

before had been lamented as one deceas’d or lost.
The image is separate, yet the tropes of loss and pleasure within which Shaftesbury’s critical terms appear, the latent charge of desire, in a movement between tension and relief, between disappearance and reappearance are, still, effects of the formation and dissolution of the artwork in Shaftesbury’s theory. Without resolve, Shaftesbury’s writings on painting work through a movement between immanence and what is given elsewhere, in a meditation on the substance of things and their force, coins melted and remade.
Earlier versions of this essay were presented at Caltech, the Courtauld Institute, the University of Leeds, and the Marxism in Culture seminar at the Institute of Historical Research. Among the many people who have responded to these presentations and various drafts, I would like particularly to thank John Brewer, Iain McCalman, Aaron Garrett, Jonathan Lamb, Martin Myrone, Charles Ford, Tom Gretton, Pete Smith, David Solkin, Rose Marie San Juan, Nina Dubin, and Christine Stevenson. Hanneke Grootenboer and the editors of the Oxford Art Journal have made innumerable invaluable suggestions for clarifying and improving the argument. Finally I am grateful to the late Michael Podro, Gail Day, Steve Edwards, and Alex Potts for discussions of this and related material over a number of years.


2 A Discourse Concerning Coining the New Money Lighter. In Answer to Mr. Lock’s Considerations about raising the Value of Money (London: Richard Chiswell, 1696), 6.

4 Characteristicks of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times, 3 vols (London: [John Darby] 1711).


6 ‘A Letter Concerning the Art, or Science of Design: Written from Italy (On the Occasion of some Designs in Painting) To My Lord * *****,’ in Second Characters, 36-61.


though after the death of his father he did sit in the House of Lords.

9 For discussion of the Recoinage see Kelly in Locke on Money, especially 1:55-67 and with extensive bibliography.


12 See Characteristicks, 1:299-301; I discuss this point below, p. 26. On the absence or near-absence of any reference to the monetary crisis in Shaftesbury’s writing cf. Characteristicks 2:50, where Shaftesbury’s term ‘Denomination’ in the context of ethical questions seems to play on an allusion to monetary usage; see also the monetary metaphors at 1:320-1 and 2:202.

Shaftesbury, ‘Plasticks, or the Original, Progress, & Power of designatory Art’, in Second Characters, 167 (in my quotations from this I have occasionally departed from the editors’ conventions for transcribing the text). Shaftesbury is referring to an earlier text, ‘Sensus Communis: An Essay on the Freedom of Wit and Humour. In a Letter to a Friend’ [1709], in Characteristicks, 1:137-138.


Shaftesbury, ‘Plasticks’, 188.


For instance, Shaftesbury, ‘Plasticks’, 190; 217.

Oldham Appleby, ‘Locke, Liberalism and the Natural Law of Money’, in Past and Present, 71 (1976), 43-69. Horsefield, British Monetary Experiments (37) notes that there are still extant from 1695 and 1696 at least two hundred and fifty pamphlets dealing with the Recoinage, and the ephemeral nature of these texts makes it likely that many more were printed during this single year.


30 Lowndes, Report, for example 56; 58-59; 61-67.

31 Locke, Further Considerations Concerning Raising the Value of Money. Wherein Mr. Lowndes’s Arguments for it in his late Report concerning An Essay for the Amendment of the Silver Coins, are particularly Examined. I use the ‘second’ (actually the third) edition of 1696 printed in Kelly (ed.), Locke on Money, 2:402-481. For Locke’s comparison of Lowndes’ scheme with clipping see, for instance, 417.

32 Cf. Further Considerations, 429: Locke notes here the potential for a very small difference between the value of bullion and coined money, given that the former can more easily be exported.

33 Locke, Further Considerations, 415; also 442 on ‘bare Sounds’.

34 Locke, Further Considerations, 416.

35 Locke, Essay, 4.8.1, under the heading ‘Of Trifling Propositions’.
36 Locke, Essay, 4.8.3.

37 Locke, Essay, 4.8.3; also: ‘Substance is Substance, and Body is Body; a Vacuum is a Vacuum, and a Vortex is a Vortex: a Centaure is a Centaure, and a Chimæra is a Chimæra, etc.’.

38 Hodges, Present State, 153.

39 For other responses to Locke see especially Kelly in Locke on Money, 1:35-7; and Appleby, ‘Locke, Liberalism and the Natural Law of Money’.

40 Locke, Further Considerations, 410.

41 Hodges, Present State, 132.

42 See for instance Rudolph Goclenius, Lexicon philosophicum, quo tanquam clave philosophiae fores aperiuntur (Frankfurt: Typis viduae Matthiae Beckeri, impensis Petri Musculi & Ruperti Pistorij), 260-261.


44 Leibniz, ‘Demonstratio contra Atomos’, 284; trans., 119.

45 For ‘without windows’ see, for example, ‘Principes de la philosophie ou la monadologie’ [1714] in Principes de la nature et de la grâce fondés en raison.
Principles de la philosophie ou la monadologie, ed. André Robinet (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1954), 71. For useful accounts of the wider contexts in which ‘expression’ in this sense was formulated see Gilles Deleuze, ‘Conclusion: The Theory of Expression in Leibniz and Spinoza: Expressionism in Philosophy’, in Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza, trans. Martin Joughin (New York: Zone Books, 1992), 321-335; also Daniel Garber, Leibniz: Body, Substance, Monad (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 206-224 (which, however, argues that Leibniz’s understanding of ‘expression’ was subject to significant revision between the writings of the 1680s and later works such as the ‘Monadologie’).

46 Leibniz, ‘Principia logico-metaphysica’ [1689?], in Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe, eds Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin, multiple volumes in 6 series (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1923–) series 6, 4:1646; trans. as ‘Primary Truths’ in Roger Ariew and Daniel Garber (eds), Philosophical Essays (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1989), 32-33. See also, for instance, ‘Monadologie’, 73-75.


48 Barbon, Discourse, 12 [as in note 2, above].

49 Barbon, Discourse, especially 6.

50 Barbon, Discourse, 6-7.
Barbon, Discourse, 5; 27; see also 43.

Barbon, Discourse, for example 91-92; 28.

Barbon, Discourse, 6-7.

See Kelly in Locke on Money, 1:82.

Barbon, Discourse, 19-22; 20 for ‘innumerable Fractions of Grains’.

Barbon, Discourse, 22.

Barbon, Discourse, 22-3.

Descartes, Meditationes, 30; trans., 20 [as in note 1, above].

Descartes, Les passion de l’âme [1649] in Adam and Tannery (eds), Oeuvres, 11:327-488; trans. in Cottingham, Stoothoff, and Murdoch (eds), Philosophical Writings, 1:328-404. For useful discussions of substance see Woolhouse, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz; Steven Nadler (ed.), Causation in Early Modern Philosophy: Cartesianism, Occasionalism, and Pre-Established-Harmony (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1993); Daniel Garber, ‘Mind, Body, and the Laws of Nature in Descartes and Leibniz’ in Descartes Embodied (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 133-167; as well as his Leibniz: Body, Substance, Monad. For one important reading that rejects any separation of Descartes’ thought from ‘rhetorical’ aspects (in particular the use of metaphor), see Antonio Negri, Political Descartes: Reason, Ideology, and the Bourgeois Project,


61 ‘Sistème nouveau’, 301–2; trans., 17.

62 For some related approaches see following discussion and note 66. Leibniz’s solution to the incommensurability of material- and thinking substance was a notion of ‘pre-established harmony’. This meant that, without any casual relation between the two, each substance was moved by an inner principle caused by God to correspond exactly with that of the other (more broadly within a system of correspondences between all substances in the universe).


64 Leibniz, ‘Remarques’, 427-428; trans., 632. For Shaftesbury’s comments see Characteristicks, 1:299-301.

65 Cudworth, *The True Intellectual System of the Universe: The First Part*; wherein,
all the Reason and Philosophy of Atheism is Confuted; and its Impossibility Demonstrated (London: Richard Royston), 131. For Shaftesbury’s reading of Cudworth, see Characteristicks, 2:262. The notion of ‘plastic nature’ is perhaps directly invoked by Shaftesbury in the discussion of ‘species’ cited above (‘soverain Plastick Nature’) as well, indirectly, as in the draft’s title.


68 My thinking here makes use of Pierre Bourdieu’s account of the mutually
constitutive effects of the ‘cognitive’ and the ‘practical’ in Outline of a Theory of Practice, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 96-97, an analysis that draws directly on Marx’s Theses on Feuerbach.

69 Shaftesbury, ‘Judgment’, 82-84.

70 Shaftesbury, ‘Projet D’une Espece de Portraiture Moderne’, in Second Characters, 424. Immediately after these comments Shaftesbury refers to the discussion of anticipation and repeal in the Hercules treatise.

71 For discussion of the different versions of the Hercules text in its original French, see the editors’ comments (Second Characters, 301) preceding the transcriptions of Shaftesbury’s manuscripts (in two variants) and that prepared by Coste for publication. Shaftesbury’s version carries the title ‘Raisonnement sur le Tableau du Jugement d’Hercule: Selon l’Histoire de Prodicus, au Second Livre des Mem: de Xenophon’; and the version edited by Coste, ‘Le Jugement d’Hercule, ou Dissertation sur un Tableau, dont le Dessein est pris de l’Histoire de Prodicus qu’on Trouve dans les Choses Memorables de Xenophon, Liv. II’.


73 Shaftesbury, ‘Raisonnement’ 318; ‘Judgment’, 84.
The word does not figure in this sense in either of the two books on art from which Shaftesbury drew most closely: Roland Fréart de Chambray, *Idée de la perfection de la peinture* (Le Mans: Jacques Ysambart, 1662); and Franciscus Junius, *De pictura veterum libri tres* (Rotterdam: Regneri Leers, 1694). Very broadly (again without those terms emphasised by Shaftesbury) the kind of technical questions Shaftesbury was addressing were commonplace in the art theory of the preceding generation: see for instance Giovan Pietro Bellori, *Le Vite de’ pittori scultori e architetti moderni* [1672], ed. Evelina Borea, 2 vols (Turin: Einaudi, 2009), 55 and 48 (on Annibale Carracci’s use of ‘anacronismo’; and, in a description of his painting of the Hercules theme, on the foreshadowing of the outcome); also the sixth of the French Academy’s Conférences (published in various formats from 1666), principally in the exchanges after Le Bruns’s lecture on Poussin’s painting of The Israelites Gathering the Manna, in Alain Mérot (ed), *Les Conférences de l’Académie royale de peinture et de sculpture au XVIIᵉ siècle* (Paris: École nationale supérieure des Beaux-Arts, 1996), 110-112.


For useful analysis of tensions in Shaftesbury’s writing around this point see Esther A. Tiffany ‘Shaftesbury as Stoic’ in *Proceedings of the Modern Language Association* 38, no. 3 (September 1923), 642-684, especially 663-665.

Francis Bacon, *The Instauratio magna* Part II: *Novum organum* and Associated Texts, ed. Graham Rees and Maria Wakely (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 58; 74-76. I am grateful to Aaron Garrett for bringing this to my attention.
For Locke see, for example, Posthumous Works of Mr. John Locke (London: W. B. For A. and J. Churchill, 1706), 41: ‘And ’tis not the evidence of Truth, but some lazy Anticipation, some beloved Presumption […]’. For discussion of Locke’s epistemology within this context see especially John W. Yolton, Locke and the Way of Ideas (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1956).


Shaftesbury’s engagement with Epictetus see especially the notebooks transcribed by Benjamin Rand in his Life, Unpublished Letters, and Philosophical Regimen; and in a much more reliable edition, though with the text translated into French, by Laurent Jaffro: Exercises (Paris: Aubier, 1993).


84 Scaliger, Poetices libri septem (Lyons: Antonium Vincentium, 1561), 126-127. For Shaftesbury’s copy of this work see Catalogus Librorum Graecorum & Latinorum, fol. 71.


86 Virgil, Aeneid 6.337-366 for the meeting and Palinarus’ description of the events leading to his death; the death is described by the narrator at 5.838-871; Mynors (ed.), 237-238 and 225-226.

87 Servii Grammatici Qui Feruntur in Vergilii Aeneidos Libros VI-VIII Commentarii,

88 Thillo (ed.), Servii Grammatici, 59.

89 Thillo (ed.), Servii Grammatici, 59.

90 See Aullus Gellius, Attic Nights, 10.16, 254-255.

91 Scaliger, Poetices, 127.

92 Thillo (ed.), Servii Grammatici, 59.

93 Leibniz, Essais de theodicée, 55-56; trans., 78-79.

94 Leibniz, Essais de theodicée, 56; trans., 79. For the point in Virgil Leibniz is alluding to see Aeneid, 6.724-728; in Mynors (ed.), 250. Useful commentaries on this can be found in Eduard Norden, P. Vergilius Aeneis Buch VI (fourth edn, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1957), 17-20; and R. G. Austin, P. Vergili Maronis; Aeneidos Liber Sextus (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), 220-222.


97 Cudworth, Intellectual System, 168; Charles Blount, Anima Mundi: Or, an Historical Narration of the Opinion of the Ancients Concerning Man’s Soul After

98 Leibniz, De Reditibus ad vitam aliisqae pensionibus singularibus, specimen inquisitionis mathematicae in negotio politico [1680], in Akademie edn, Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe, series 4, 3:441; French trans. in Parmentier (ed.), L’Estime des apparences, 375.

99 Leibniz, De Reditibus ad vitam, 441; trans. 375.

100 John Cary, An Essay on the State of England, in Relation to its Trade, Its Poor, and its Taxes, for Carrying on the Present War against France (Bristol: W. Bonny, 1695), 175.

101 Anon., Some Considerations about the Raising of Coin. In a Second Letter to Mr.

102 Shaftesbury, ‘Judgment’, 84.