The European Community’s Public Communication Policy 1951-1967

Abstract
From its inception the European Community had a civil aim: the need to stimulate a European civil consciousness. Viewed as a pre-condition for the popular acceptance of increased European integration this provided the rationale for the Community’s public communication policy 1951-1967. The Community pursued this civil aim through two distinct public communication approaches: popularist 1951-1962 and opinion leader led 1963-1967. We conclude that the way the Community undertook its public communication policy cannot be understood without considering the Community’s civil aim. This leads us to question some of the common views held on the significance of European public communication policy 1951-1967.

1. Introduction

The establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) marked the first concrete step in the European integration process. The competences of the newly-founded ECSC institutions – the European Court of Justice, the Common Assembly and the High Authority – were limited to the coal and steel industry though attendant upon this was the introduction of European citizens’ rights for qualified coal and steel workers, namely the right to free movement and establishment which were themselves combined with certain social provisions which extended to the workers’ family. These social provisions included housing projects, holidays, social security and the schooling of the workers’ children (amongst other things). Neunreither and Olsen argue that these citizens’ rights were introduced for pragmatic reasons in order to ensure the smooth running of the common coal and steel market and the immediate economic self-interest of the ECSC.

This view is too narrow and neglects the fact that the ECSC and later the European Economic Community (EEC) never conceived of Europe integration as a purely economic undertaking. Alongside economic aims the Community also had civil aims; these two sets of aims co-existed in a symbiotic relationship. Hallstein alluded to as much when he argued that ‘the danger (...) exists (...) that what we have been pursuing with so much energy and perseverance since the end of the second world war may be misinterpreted as being no
more than a material, or economic, exercise. [These economic aims] are in all truth essential aims, but they are not the only aims. Indeed, the ECSC and EEC were consistently concerned with facilitating a European civil consciousness that would provide the basis for a European way of thinking, European citizenship and with that the acceptance of European citizens’ rights and a sui generis European identity. We argue that the Community realised the importance of a European civil consciousness for European integration and attempted to facilitate its emergence through its early public communication policy. This fact has too often been overlooked. Accordingly, this analysis attempts to rectify this and in doing so corrects four distinct but related arguments on the nature of the Community’s early public communication policy. These four arguments can be characterized accordingly.

First, that European integration was undertaken by ‘proponent[s] of arcane policy’ or ‘spin-doctors’ with a purely ‘technocratic mindset’ and that the early bureaucrats, such as Monnet, Rabier and Schuman, were primarily concerned with stifling debate. They intended to avoid the reporting of European affairs so that integration could proceed through silence. This started ‘a vicious circle of (non-) communication’. Alternately expressed, early European public communication policy was nothing other than an ‘information obstruction policy’, dominated by a distant anti-democratic technocratic or a hypocritically democratic elite and that statements such as ‘Nous sommes les serviteurs de la grande idée de l’Unité Européen [sic]’ were only used as rhetorical flourishes.

Second, that the Community’s early public communication policy was dominated by a concern for persuading elite multipliers of the benefits of European integration. Featherstone argues that Monnet’s ‘strategy for the ECSC clearly involved setting his attention on persuading elites, rather than the mass publics’. Petersson and Hellström insist that the Community addressed, predominantly elite, audiences and Terra emphasises that the ‘sphere of action’ of the Press and Information Service consisted of ‘disseminating information amongst designated ‘multipliers’ drawn from the political, academic, economic and media elites.

Third, that the importance of an effective public communication policy only became recognized by the Community as either a response to the Maastricht crisis (1992/1993) or
the Santer Commission resignation crisis (1999). Thus, Brüggemann argues that ‘information policy became really important for the first time with the ratification problems attached to the Maastricht Treaty [1992]’ 24. Bee notes that the idea of promoting Europe through information and communication campaigns emerged only at the beginning of the 1990s. 25 And Valentini and Nesti add that the importance of information and communication policy started with the Maastricht crisis but became ‘a binding institutional priority’ 26 from 2005. In a similar vein Meyer 27 argues that the disastrous handling of media attention during the resignation crisis of the Santer Commission acted as a ‘wake-up’ call for the Community as regards the importance of media relations.

Fourth, that the Community had in the first two decades of European integration neither a systematic or organised public communication policy nor a regard for communicating and explaining itself to a general European public. Nesti argues that in the 1950s and 1960s, ‘no specific act was published, occasional information campaigns were indeed targeted at a selected elite audience (…) while leaving outside the general public’ 28. Terra misleadingly claims that only since the 1970s, ‘information programmes (…) have emphasised the need to transmit “the European message” to the general public in each member state’ 29, whilst Petersson and Hellström 30 see the beginning of a public communication policy which addressed a general European public as late as the 1980s.

We argue that all these four arguments fail to recognise that the Community had a persistent concern from the 1950s for a public communication policy addressed at an inclusive general European public exemplified in both a popularist approach to public communication policy 1951-1962 and an opinion leader approach 1963-1967 31 and, consequently, that it realized the importance of a public communication policy which included media relations as a vehicle for its civil aims. A further point of difference from these four arguments needs to be briefly noted concerning the historiography adopted in this paper. First, we rely heavily on primary sources and archive material and second we treat speeches as having, to borrow from J. L. Austin, both an illocutionary (performative) sincerity and a clear perlocutionary (persuasive) intention. For example Rey believed that Commission officials should speak as prophets, Rabier describes himself as a ‘missionary’
and Baisnée\textsuperscript{32} argues that those who worked for the European institutions at the very beginning were ‘militants’ and ‘pioneers’ for the European cause – that is ‘prophets’, ‘missionaries’, ‘militants’ and ‘pioneers’ who through, in part, the use of speeches, sought to state the benefits of an economically integrated and civil Europe and to persuade a European public of them. Such speeches were taken very seriously, carefully crafted\textsuperscript{33} and consistently deployed the same essential civil narrative. Indeed Commissioners ‘should be regarded as prime movers in an identity-construction enterprise\textsuperscript{34}. As such the narratives and representations\textsuperscript{35} that are used in speeches (and other primary sources) are important in understanding the meaning of a civil and integrated Europe. Consequently, we do not accept the view that these speeches can be disregarded as mere political rhetoric insincerely made for ulterior motives.

In this paper we wish to show four things. First, that the Community’s public communication policy had an explicit civil aim. It wished to stimulate a European civil consciousness in a public conceived of as European and inclusive (see section 2). Second, that the Community realised the value of public communication in attempting to achieve this civil aim. Third, that this civil aim provided the rationale for the Community’s public communication policy efforts 1951-1967. Fourth, that throughout this period the Community adopted two different approaches to public communication and the achievement of its civil aims – first a popularist approach (1951-1962) and second an opinion leader approach (1963-1967)(see section 3).

2. A European civil consciousness

The Community’s conception of an inclusive European public was grounded in the federal possibilities attendant upon the Schuman Declaration (1950) which had unhesitatingly and unambiguously endorsed the view that the ECSC was the ‘first step in the federation of Europe’.\textsuperscript{36} It was an understanding that did not restrict itself to economic and corresponding social policy competences which, if followed literally, would only cover a European public that comprised of workers (and their families), trade unions and employers. On the contrary, the Community was concerned with the idea of an inclusive European public comprised of all Europeans and not one simply conceived of as consisting of ‘homo oeconomicus and homo faber’\textsuperscript{37}. This inclusive conception of the European public was
envisioned through press articles, TV, radio, cinema, pamphlets, brochures and most notably in speeches given by High Authority (1952-1957) and Commission officials (1958-1967). Walter Hallstein, President of the EEC Commission 1958-1967, used terms such as ‘a new society’\textsuperscript{38}, a ‘Europe of free and equal men’\textsuperscript{39}, ‘citizens’\textsuperscript{40}, ‘men and women’\textsuperscript{41}, ‘every man’\textsuperscript{42}, ‘citizens of the European Community’\textsuperscript{43}, ‘individuals and peoples’\textsuperscript{44}. Specifically, he hoped (many years before ‘citizenship’ became part of the official EU discourse through the Maastricht Treaty) that one day Europeans would say “Civis Europaeus sum” – “I am a citizen of Europe”\textsuperscript{45}. Jean Monnet, President of the High Authority 1952-1955, and his successor René Mayer, President of the High Authority 1955-1958, used similar terms including a ‘European civilisation’\textsuperscript{46}, ‘Europeans’\textsuperscript{47}, ‘citizens’\textsuperscript{48}, and ‘men and women’\textsuperscript{49}. In other words, the Community envisioned the European Community as a ‘human Community’\textsuperscript{50} and a federation ‘in progress’ and correspondingly imagined the future European public as consisting of citizens, democratically active, participative in and supportive of such a European federation. To this end the Community also articulated a belief in the need for an active European civil society and distanced itself from being a technocratic and remote entity\textsuperscript{51}. Accordingly, the Community expressed on several occasions that it hoped to involve European citizens actively in the process of Community-building\textsuperscript{52}. In other words, the Community was aware that ‘to create a living, breathing [democratic] Community of man it [was] not enough to put words down on paper it is not enough to affix seals’\textsuperscript{53} and that in order for a solidary European public to emerge a specific civil aim needed to be achieved, namely the stimulation of a European civil consciousness amongst the European public.

The Community articulated the belief that the stimulation and development of a European civil consciousness would act as a solidarisin g force on a neonate European public in which there was to be developed an understanding of the workings of the Community, its objectives, its ethical and pacific values and its commitment to the principles of democracy, freedom, the rule of law, human dignity and the equality of man\textsuperscript{54}. Moreover, the Community hoped that a European civil consciousness would lead to a new European way of thinking and acting\textsuperscript{55} based on mutuality of interests, common bonds, collective association and a common heritage. Alternatively expressed, an ideal inclusive European public was perceived of as a ‘solidary sphere’ which ‘unites individuals dispersed by class, race, religion, [or] ethnicity’\textsuperscript{56}. Correspondingly, such an ideal European public united
through such a European civil consciousness was envisaged as being able to reconcile the simultaneity of holding both national and European interests together in a non-contradictory manner. This view was particularly expressed in speeches given by High Authority and Commission officials. For example, Mayer in an address at the New York Council on Foreign Relations, said: ‘Tonight I address you as a European. It is not to say that I have ceased being a Frenchman – indeed that would be quite impossible – but rather I am a Frenchman and something more’. A point endorsed by Hallstein who argued that ‘no one is asked to disown his country’ but that instead ‘a double allegiance is required of our citizens, so that the new Europe may be built with the nations for its foundation’. Accordingly, an inclusive European public with a European civil consciousness could and should be comfortable with the multiple attachments and loyalties associated with having both national and European citizenship. In other words, a European civil consciousness would enable the European public to ‘think and act as multiply situated selves’. In turn, such a self aware European public capable of understanding itself in its own universalising solidary terms would ultimately be able to bestow political legitimacy on a federal Europe. As such the Community understood European civil consciousness as a civil aim that was symbiotically linked to the Community’s economic and political aims.

However, the Community’s ‘ideal’ inclusive European public and the actual European public were poles apart. Whereas the Community had hoped (and believed) that a European civil consciousness would spread quickly amongst the European public, Rabier admitted that the Community had been naïve to think this could be achieved quickly and did not realise how difficult it was for Europeans to see the benefits of the Community for their daily lives. The reason for this lay mainly in the Community’s predominant technical and economic characteristics. Hallstein, for example, believed that ‘the average citizen (...) feels somewhat lost when confronted with an edifice whose structure appears to him complicated; he easily imagines that Europe is a matter exclusively for technicians, economists and a few political figures upon whom it is difficult for him to exercise any influence. This opinion is obviously erroneous, but it has the advantage of showing us where we must apply our effort’. Because of the Community’s apparent irrelevance for the ‘man on the street’, the European public lacked curiosity about the European project and did not seem keen on learning more about it.
The challenge the Community had to face was to bring the Community closer to the European public, to show its relevance and that Europe was not just an ‘abstract idea’ or a merely technical and economic entity but had civil potential. In the hope of facilitating a European civil consciousness, the Community turned to public communication policy.

3. Stimulating a European civil consciousness through a public communication policy

Public communication policy

The Community believed that it ‘will only come to true realization [i.e. fulfil its federal aims] if the actions it takes are made public, and explained publicly (...) to the people of our Community’. Conforming to this belief the Community developed its own public communication policy, namely the Community’s efforts to inform the European public about the benefits (materially and affectively) that it could gain from the Community and thereby to evoke interest for the Community’s objectives and workings. As such, public communication was understood by the Community as being helpful in building a relationship between the Community and the European public and as essential to successful European integration.

Institutionally, it was the Information Service of the High Authority (which became the Press and Information Service in 1955 and eventually the Common Press and Information Service of the European Communities in 1958) which publicly communicated on behalf of the Community.

However, it needs to be noted that the ECSC had no explicit public communication policy mandate. Article 5 of the Treaty of Paris (1951), which refers to informing the public, reads: ‘The Community shall accomplish its mission, under the conditions provided for in the present Treaty (...). To this end, the Community will (...) enlighten and facilitate the action of the interested parties by collecting information, organizing consultations and defining general objectives.’ Such a wide ranging and ambiguous ‘brief’ gave the High Authority sufficient scope to ensure that its public communication policy efforts were unrestrained by matters of competence. According to Jacques-René Rabier, Director of the Press and Information Service 1955-1973, and Jacqueline Lastenouze, founder of the Jean Monnet programmes in the university sector, and Paul Collowald, a senior official in the
Commission’s spokesperson’s group 1959-1972, the Community frequently tried to take a wider approach to public communication policy than that prescribed in the Treaties in order to reach a wider European public\(^6^6\). Correspondingly, the ECSC\(^6^7\) notes that the Community’s public communication policy efforts ‘had long ceased to be confined to the admittedly most important fields of economic and social information work and of daily press releases, and was bringing all appropriate technical sources to bear in an endeavour to reach the various circles which make up European public opinion’.\(^6^8\) Indeed, Monnet thought that in order for the High Authority to fulfil its legal obligation of consulting with interested parties it needed to develop a public communication policy directed at all interested parties\(^6^9\) and that meant in practice the requirement to address a European public comprised of 160 million people\(^7^0\) and to target ‘all levels of the population’\(^7^1\). He believed that only if the European public was informed about the Community, could a European civil consciousness emerge amongst this public. Accordingly, the Community attempted to explicitly and systematically address an inclusive European public through its policy efforts 1951-1967. In order to meet the challenges of adequately addressing such a large European public the Community adopted two distinct public communication approaches: a popularist approach 1951-1962 and an opinion leader approach 1963-1967.

**The popularist approach 1951-1962**

The Information Service of the High Authority was created in 1952 and then became the Press and Information Service in 1955. Structurally, it was divided into two divisions. The first was responsible for public communication policy addressed at the trade union sector (as requested by the trade union sector itself\(^7^2\)) and the second was concerned with providing information to the European public ‘in its widest extension’\(^7^3\) to which end they used a popularist approach to public communication policy.

The popularist approach (1951-1962) had three characteristics: first having a mass public as a target and using the mass media to reach this mass public; second, ensuring that the information disseminated was straightforward and widely comprehensible through the deliberate use of simple language and third, fostering direct relationships between the Community and the European public through visits to the Community institutions and its representation offices in the member states.
With regard to the first characteristic, the Community defined its target mass public as all Europeans, meaning all citizens of member states, youth and to some extent children\(^74\). Accordingly, the budget allocated to the second division of the Information Service was consistently higher than the budget for the specialized public communication policy addressed to trade unions:

*Insert table 1*

It was this budgetary priority that enabled the Community to build, what we would call today a multi-platformed approach to communications. Indeed, it developed a routinised and consistent use of the mass media (as well as its own publications) which was based upon the Community’s belief that ‘public opinion [needed to be] kept informed of the political significance of the Community\(^75\) via all aspects of the mass-media – Press, TV radio and cinema\(^76\). It was Monnet in particular who realized that it was important for the Community to develop relationships with news agencies and journalists in order to manipulate their views\(^77\). Monnet was not secretive\(^78\) rather he wanted positive publicity for European integration and in this was instrumental in his dealings with the press. As such it is incorrect to say that he wanted to avoid press reporting on Community affairs. Monnet feared that reports in the press could seriously misrepresent ongoing decision-making processes and could risk the success of European integration. Consequently, he used to invite journalists to the High Authority in an attempt to explain why decisions had been taken. According to Rabier, Monnet wished to establish a relationship of trust between him and the journalists\(^79\). How successful Monnet was is impossible to determine, nevertheless press relations developed steadily. In 1955 the first association of the Community’s accredited journalists was formed. The number of accredited journalists increased from 23 in 1956 to about 100 in the 1960s and to 813 in 1999. With the creation of the Joint Press and Information Service in 1958 the Community believed it was necessary to create the post of a spokesperson. This spokesperson (Giorgia Smoquina 1959-1961 and Beniamino Olivi 1961-1968) was to explain the Community’s positions and its decisions to the press. Weekly midday meetings on Thursdays with journalists were introduced. According to Bastin\(^80\) the Thursday press briefing became very important as they ensured a continuous exchange of
information between the Community and journalists. Journalists who would attend these press briefings had office space at their disposition with phones, fax and stationary. Attendance at the mid-day briefing increased from about 400 journalists in the 1960s to 1400 in 1995.\textsuperscript{81} Further, the Community ensured that information about the Community was given to the press agencies in the form of press releases, statements, press kits and press conferences, monthly newsletters, special issues or pages dedicated to the European Community in national newspapers such as Le Monde or Süddeutsche Zeitung and in magazines such as Ihre Freundin (300,000 ex.) and Heimat und Familie (100,000 ex.). Further, the representation offices in the member states were used to foster contacts with local media.

With regard to TV, radio and cinema, the Community released its own cinema productions: the documentary ‘Histoire d’un Traité’ (1954) which was translated in several Community languages. In France, it was shown in approximately 500 cinemas reaching an audience of two million viewers. According to the ECSC\textsuperscript{82} three other documentaries were produced in 1956, two more in 1958\textsuperscript{83} and between 1958 and 1963 at least five more short films were produced. High Authority and Commission officials, such as Monnet and Hallstein, regularly gave interviews on national and regional TV shows and radio programmes\textsuperscript{84}. In addition to the use of mass media, the Community also released its own publications mainly in the form of brochures addressed to the general European public.\textsuperscript{85} These brochures had a two-fold purpose. First, they were supposed to inform the European public about the Community and its workings, the institutions and current successes/challenges. In short: the status quo. Second, the brochures were seen as a means to show the European public where the Community was heading, to talk about its (federal) aspirations, its efforts to increase living standards amongst the European population and its commitment to secure peace. Only if, so Monnet believed, information was not confined to technicalities would the European public be likely to feel part of a common destiny and to eventually develop a European civil consciousness.

The second characteristic of the Community’s popularist approach of this time was the deployment and systematic use of a simple, straightforward and readily comprehensible language in publications. For example brochures utilised a pithy style of writing, cartoons, information boxes, simple and clear statistics, diagrams to illustrate historical developments and photographs.\textsuperscript{86}
Photographs and the widespread use of pictorial representations of Europe in pamphlets and brochures were especially important since, as Foret says, they ‘painted a political panorama within which each player has a given place and is provided with an understanding of the world which shows the necessity and importance of integration’. Overall these popularist publications constantly emphasized a ‘United Europe,’ ‘Europe to unite its strengths,’ ‘Uniting of Europe,’ ‘an ever closer union,’ ‘closer union of the people,’ ‘benefits,’ ‘confidence,’ ‘peace’, ‘reconciliation’ and even the Community’s contribution to a ‘new European way of thinking.’

Insert Picture 1 with the following description:

The third characteristic of the popularist approach to public communication (1951-1962) was the Community’s attempt to foster a direct relationship between the European public and the Community institutions through fairs, exhibitions, workshops and visits. The fairs and exhibitions included the Parisian book fair (1958), the Universal Exhibition in Brussels (1958) and the ‘Grüne Woche’ in Berlin (1960) amongst many others. Further, the Community organised travelling exhibitions, one of which toured for a year in Germany. The Community also encouraged public visits to the European institutions and organized seminars and conferences all of which were seen as occasions to inform the public about the European Community. According to the EEC in 1960 about 150 groups with a total of over 5000 people were received in Brussels, Luxembourg and Strasbourg. In addition to fairs, exhibitions, workshops and visits, the Community increasingly acknowledged the importance of representation offices in the member states (in West Germany, Italy and
From the popularist approach to opinion leaders (1962/1963)

In the year 1962 the Gallup Institute undertook the first Community-wide opinion poll. It revealed that public levels of information about Europe were low. Three survey questions were concerned with the level of information that the public had about the Community. The first asked people to name one of the European institutions, the second to name a topic of current debate and the third, to name an achievement of the European Community. In terms of European averages, 18 per cent of those polled were able to answer all three questions, 24 per cent were able to answer two of the three questions, 24 per cent provided an answer to only one of the questions and 32 per cent could not answer any of the questions and two per cent gave an inexact or vague answer. The same survey also revealed that that only 11 per cent of the European population surveyed thought often about the problems of European unification, against 29 per cent who answered ‘rarely’ and 27 per cent who answered ‘never’. Such figures revealed Coppé’s prescience when he said of the European public: ‘The first obstacle lies in the indifference of public opinion’ to which the Commission some years later added that the ‘European public shows little passion and little curiosity for the European project’ although information was widely disseminated via the mass media.

The results of the Gallup opinion poll were taken as evidence by the Community that the popularist approach to public communication had been largely ineffective. Furthermore, the Community’s public communication structures lacked adequate financial and human resources to satisfy the increasing demand for information of specialised groups such as academics, teachers’ associations and journalists, trade unionists, industrialists, farmers’ leaders and agricultural associations and the third sector. The combination of both the disappointing results of the Gallup opinion poll and the lack of resources led to a change in the Community’s approach to public communication. It made the prioritisation of a public communication policy targeting opinion leaders a necessity. Or as the EEC puts it: ‘[opinion leaders] could take over part of the load which the information officials of the Community can no longer carry alone’, to which the Commission adds that because it is not possible...
to address a public of 185 million people directly it is necessary to target the most influential opinion leaders – not exclusively but primarily. However it is important to note that turning to opinion leaders was still seen as a way to address a European public at large and to enable the Community to continue its efforts to stimulate a European civil consciousness amongst a European public.

*Opinion leader approach (1963-1967)*

From 1963 the Community turned to opinion leaders with the objective of using them as multipliers and subsequently as a means to reach a European public at large. The Community understood opinion leaders to include those who had a direct relationship with or interest in the Community\(^{101}\) and who in many cases identified themselves (especially academics and teachers) to the Community when asking for information about its institutions and their workings as well as specific policies. Others were identified by the Community when it actively looked for people who had a cultural or political vocation, politicians, CEOs, trade unionists, professors\(^{102}\), public and private managers of large-scale information media organisations\(^{103}\), national governments and big private organisations which had influence in the cultural and educational domains\(^{104}\), ‘influential persons’\(^{105}\), leaders in politics, trade union sector, commerce and business sector, media and information sector, university information, youth and popular education sector\(^{106}\). Primary and secondary schools were particularly important for the Community and provided an opportunity for teachers to hand out material on European integration\(^{107}\). Finally, journalists and pro-European civil society associations such as the European Movement were understood as channels to get ‘the European message’ out. In short, opinion leaders embraced all those who were regarded by the Community as having the most direct influence on the European public when it came to disseminating information and influencing behaviour and attitudes. Notably, these were those who held the ‘psychological’ and ‘technical’ keys of communication\(^{108}\), public figures likely to act as ‘multipliers’ in the intense task of making Europeans aware of, and of informing them as to, developments in Europe\(^{109}\). In fact these opinion leaders were regarded as constituting part of what was known as a ‘eurosphere’\(^{110}\) of influential people occupying significant positions in a variety of institutions.
From 1961 onward the Joint ‘Press and Information’ Service (created in 1958) was subdivided into eight units: General Affairs, Fairs and Exhibitions, Publications, Radio TV and Cinema, Trade Union, Agriculture, University information, youth and popular education and Third Countries. Adopting an opinion leader approach to public communication made it necessary to rebalance the budget allocation away from general public activity to opinion leader activity. In 1963, 78 per cent of the public communication policy budget was allocated to activities addressed at opinion leaders with the remaining 22 per cent reserved for public communication activities addressed directly at the European public at large.\textsuperscript{111} We do not have corresponding figures 1964 – 1967\textsuperscript{112}, however the Commission did state that between 1963-1967 an opinion leader approach was financially prioritized because, as they noted, there was insufficient financial resources to target 185 million people.\textsuperscript{113}

\textbf{Insert Table 2}

What we can see from the above table is that specific public communication tools were almost exclusively used to target opinion leaders and other tools to target the European public at large. For example, public communication tools to address opinion leaders were based in the administrative units: ‘General Affairs’ publications and the University information, youth and popular education sector. The ‘General Affairs’ Unit was responsible for the organisation of conferences, visits to the Community institutions, workshops and study trips. However, following increasing scrutiny and concern for cost effectiveness the EEC\textsuperscript{114} states that ‘funds were too limited to allow spectacular operations’ and accordingly, study trips, conferences and visits became almost exclusively reserved for opinion leaders, notably from the University sector with 60 per cent of the people on study visits to Luxembourg and Brussels in 1964 coming from this sector.\textsuperscript{115} Indeed, in the previous year the EEC had prioritised training lecturers in the various milieux on the occasion of their visits (opportunities which extended to ‘several hundred sessions a year’\textsuperscript{116}) to become opinion leaders. However, the Commission had to limit the reimbursement of travel expenses to those visitors who showed ‘a direct relationship with/interest in the Community and could be considered opinion leaders’\textsuperscript{117} and that had directly been invited by the Porte-Parole group, the external Community office or the ‘Direction du Service’.
With regard to publications, the Commission\textsuperscript{118} had to restrict (again for financial reasons) the dissemination of brochures and folders to institutions, governmental organisations and key multipliers like libraries in Universities or professors and to seek collaboration with the media as a multiplier. The EEC\textsuperscript{119} gives the example of collaboration with ‘the European Association of Producers of Publications for youth (Europressjunior), which represents 240 publications reaching some thirty million readers monthly’. With regard to the European public at large, the mass media, fairs and exhibitions were the main public communication tools used to address this general public.

The financial priorities set out above and the re-prioritisation of information tools would provide the template for information activities until 1967. After which and following the guidelines laid down by Merger Treaty (1967) the public communication policy budget was to be increased and the Common Press and Information Service reorganised\textsuperscript{120}, which was to become DG X.

4. Conclusion

We have attempted to show four things. First, the Community had an explicit civil aim which consisted of trying to stimulate a European civil consciousness consistently through 1951-1967. Concomitantly, judgements of the ECSC such as ‘no political or bureaucratic institution could be further away from the citizens than one dealing with regulations on the production and distribution, including prices, of steel and coal and their derivatives’\textsuperscript{121} are misrepresentative of the stated civil aim of the Community. Second, the Community realised the value of public communication for the achievement of this aim: an aim which, third, provided the rationale for the Community’s public communication policy efforts 1951-1967. Fourth, that throughout this period two different and consecutive approaches to public communication are discernible: first a popularist approach (1951-1962) and second an opinion leader approach (1963-1967) and that both equally attempted to stimulate a European civil consciousness.

As such those arguments that persist in describing this period of European integration in terms of the Community consisting of a secretive elite or elitist bureaucrats who had little regard for public communication and the general public, no interest in diverse forms of outputs and content and who only ever thought of public communication as a marketing tool or a public relations strategy for handling a crisis are somewhat jejune. Such
arguments as these mostly ignore the Community’s civil intentions. This is not to suggest that the Commission was successful in stimulating a European civil consciousness - countless Eurobarometer findings record its failure. Nor is it to suggest that the Community has spent its time effort and resources wisely. Perhaps they did overestimate the European public’s readiness for a civil Europe and perhaps it was also beyond its ability to facilitate a European civil consciousness. Equally it is possible to see public communication as a form of compensatory activity which attempts to redress the European public’s lack of interest in European integration. Nevertheless, it was also meant to inform, inspire and to persuade. It is what was said and intended rather than its success that is important. Simply put: European integration needs to be understood as a project that was from the start meant to go forward with the European people and not without them or in spite of them, the scale of the public communication effort and what was affirmed and promised testify to this. These public communication efforts have continued and involved more and more members of staff, from a handful of High Authority officials, to currently about 1200 members of staff in the Commission’s Directorate Generate for Communication. Civil Europe has its own history, albeit a little appreciated history and yet it has, we would suggest, in equal measure, the same importance as the purely economic and political histories of European integration. It is a history that merits to be looked at in its own right.

1 1967 saw the Merger Treaty ratified and the Common Press and Information Service was renamed DG X which marked yet another change in public communication policy. The authors wish to thank Jacques-René Rabier and Sven Carnel for their helpful insights and two anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments.


4 Walter Hallstein, ‘The Unity of European Culture and the Policy of Uniting Europe’, 1958, available at:
5 Other terms used by the ECSC and the EEC included ‘a European consciousness’, ‘a ‘European civil spirit’, a ‘Community conscience’, a ‘European public spirit’. We use the term ‘European civil consciousness’ as a synonym throughout and mean by it those feelings and values that stress an, in this case, imagined European social solidarity as an ‘us’ or a ‘we’ with all the prerogatives and anxieties of a collective identity and where, as Habermas notes, private people are motivated to come together as a discursive and inclusive public irrespective of status or power (see Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere (Cambridge: Polity, 2003)). It is also interesting that the Community referred to this in constructivist terms as requiring ‘a European way of thinking’ and a ‘European mentality’. On this see: Europäisches Parlament, ‘Bericht im Namen des politischen Ausschusses über die Probleme der Information in den Europäischen Gemeinschaften (Berichterstatter Schuijt)’, Dokument 89, 18. November 1960, thereafter Europäisches Parlament 1960. Europäisches Parlament, ‘Bericht im Namen des politischen Ausschusses über die Tätigkeit der Informationsdienste der Europäischen Gemeinschaften (Berichterstatter Schuijt)’, Dokument 103, 14. November 1962, thereafter Europäisches Parlament 1962. Both reports were written in unofficial collaboration with the Commission (Rabier, face-to-face interview, Brussels, 22.2.2012) and as such can be used to support our argument.


10 We follow Rye 2008 and use of the term ‘Community’ to refer to the executive of the ECSC, EEC and Euratom.


16 Gramberger 1997.


18 Gramberger 1997;


24 Brüggemann 2005, 66.


29 Terra 2010, 49.

30 Petersson and Hellström 2003.

31 According to C Wright Mills elites are derived from the economic, political or the military sphere. They operate at what Mills referred to as their ‘coincidence of interests’, and possess social power which they use to achieve their usually corporatist aims. They do not have communicative power nor do they possess any totalizing control over the channels of communication. Opinion leaders, however, are invariably connected to the means of communication in some form and interpret messages on behalf of other media users. Katz puts the matter clearly: opinion leaders essentially work through inter-personal relations which are ‘(1) channels of information, (2) sources of social pressure, and (3) sources of social support’. His view coincides with the Community’s definition of opinion leaders as those holding the ‘psychological’ and ‘technical’ keys of communication. In other words, as public figures likely to act as “multipliers” with regard to making Europeans aware of, and of informing them as to, developments in Europe’. See C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (New York: Oxford University Press, 1957), 276; Elihu Katz, ‘The two-step flow of communication: An up-to-date report on an hypothesis’, Public Opinion Quarterly 21,1 (1957), 61–78.

33 Monnet and Hallstein both relied on specific members of their teams to prepare their speeches. Monnet would practice the speeches in front of staff and family to ensure that they were simple and clear.

34 Petersson and Hellstroem 2003.


45 Hallstein 1964a, 26.


54 Hallstein 1959.


58 Hallstein 1964b, 7.


61 Rabier, personal communication via e-mail, 26.05.2013.

62 Hallstein 1959, 200.


68 Also Baisnée 2007.

Haute Autorité 1954.

ECSC 1957, 49.


Rabier, personal communication via e-mail, 12.12.2011.


All figures from Bastin 2007.

ECSC 1957.

ECSC 1958.


According to M. Giuseppe Caron, ‘*Comment informer l’Europe des problèmes du marché commun?*’, 1963, available at: [http://aei.pitt.edu/14287/](http://aei.pitt.edu/14287/) as of 1962 the circulation figure of publications such as brochures and leaflets was 3,125,000 ex., for other publication and circulation figures see also ECSC 1957, 1958 and CCE 1962, 1963, 1964.


Haute Autorité 1954.


ECSC 1958: 98.

Published in Sondages – Revue française de l’opinion publique, 1963 no. 1. It should be noted that the High Authority’s use of public opinion polls began as early as 1955 (Rabier 1966).

Ludlow 1998.

See endnote 91.


CCE 1963a, 3.

See Ludlow 1998.


CCE 1968.

CCE 1962a.

CCE 1962a; CCE 1962b; CCE 1963a.


CCE 1965.

It was envisioned the eurosphere would become a communicative space whereby opinion leaders could come together through a network of specialist publications, colloquia, seminars and conferences. These communicative relationships were supposed to produce, as Sidjanski argued, a ‘ripple effect’ of wider influence. See Jean Meynaud and Dusan Sidjanski, eds., *Science politique et intégration européenne* (Genève: Institut d’Études Européennes, 1965) and Dusan Sidjanski, ‘Eurospère – Dirigeants et groups européens’, in François D’Arcy and Luc Rouban, eds., *De la Ve République à l’Europe. Hommage a Jean-Louis Quermonne* (Paris: Presse de la fondation nationale des sciences politiques, 1996).

The financial reports 1964-1967 do not explicitly disaggregate the general public and opinion leader budget in any detail, rather they show high level financial allocations.