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ISLAMOPHOBIA STUDIES JOURNAL
VOLUME 2, NO. 1, SPRING 2014, PP. 10-25.

Published by:
Islamophobia Research and Documentation Project,
Center for Race and Gender, University of California, Berkeley.

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The growing literature on Islamophobia is dominated by empirical studies, the analysis of media representations and socio-psychological approaches, while many of these studies have been valuable in illustrating the range of expressions of Islamophobia; they have been less successful in understanding the phenomena, and mapping its relationship with other forms of discriminatory practices such as racism and anti-Semitism. This article presents a conceptual examination of the category of Islamophobia and the work it is called upon to do in contemporary debates, as prelude to a discussion about what a theorization of this concept could contribute to the field of social analysis and policy.

INTRODUCTION

There is a film that I saw once or twice called Things to Do in Denver When You're Dead (1995). Maybe it was an in-flight movie or on late night TV. What I remember about it, though, is the criminal argot that the filmmakers invented for the demimonde characters of the movie to use. This decision to invent a new slang always struck me as rather curious, since there already exists a rich and well-known slang familiar to audiences of American gangster movies. So why did the filmmakers think it was worthwhile investing in a new vocabulary? The invention of a vocabulary is only useful if it does some work, in other words, if it makes some difference to our practice, if it allows us to say and do things that we could not do previously. The invention of a gangster argot specific to Things to Do in Denver has the effect of placing the movie in a kind of never-never land of crime, turning a rather mundane story into something like a parable or a myth, in which Denver is not really an identifiable place and the characters not really people. In the world of Things to Do in Denver When You're Dead there is phrase that characters use frequently: “Give it a name…”. This phrase is used as means of demanding an answer for any query.

Islamophobia is a concept that emerges precisely to do the work that categories like racism were not doing. It names something that needs to be named. Its continual circulation in public debate testifies to ways in which it hints at something that needs to be addressed. What it names, of course, remains a matter of dispute. This dispute has two sources: philosophical and political. By philosophical I mean that there is lack of clarity about the concept of Islamophobia. Any review of the growing literature on Islamophobia will show that it is dominated by empirical studies, by analysis of media representations and socio-psychological approaches. These ontic studies of Islamophobia do not (and cannot address) the ontology of the category. They cannot provide us with a theoretical clarification. By political I mean that the dispute about Islamophobia is not due to simply its conceptual lack of clarity, but also with the way it appears in a contested field where questions about national security, social cohesion and cultural belonging are played out. It is this field in which the relationship between national majorities and the post-colonial, ethnically marked minorities is being forged.
In other words, Islamophobia is rejected not only because there may be a disagreement about whether a particular practice or behavior meets the criterion of what constitutes Islamophobia, but also because there is a dispute that any such behavior could be considered to be Islamophobic, because the concept of Islamophobia lacks any validity. In what follows, I want to address what kind of phenomena are brought forth by giving them the name of Islamophobia, and what a theorization of this concept could contribute to the field of social analysis and policy.

The tension between policy and philosophy is expressed in a number of ways in social sciences: there is the common assertion that policy and philosophy belong to two distinct realms in which the abstract reasoning and complicated language of philosophers has nothing to add to the work of practical men and women dealing with complex social problems.

In this article I want to focus on one aspect of this general problem: that is, the production of “action-able knowledge”, which is knowledge that policy makers, with sufficient political will and resources, could use to make things better. This is similar in a way to the classic “mirror for princes” literature, which existed in various historical civilizations, for example, Hellenic, Sinic and Indic. To give advice to the prince was the province of the philosopher, who would educate the prince in how to exercise what could be described as something akin to good governance. This conjoining of the speculative with the practical is what Aristotle described as phronesis. It is as contribution to phronetic social science that this examination of Islamophobia should be seen.

Specifically, I want to sketch out some of the possible ways in which we account for Islamophobia so that the exercise of accounting would be a prelude to its reduction.

**DEFINING ISLAMOPHOBIA**

Discussions about the legitimacy of Islamophobia take place in the context of various mobilizations and confrontations centered on the figure of the Muslim. These range from the series of “moral panics” that seem to regularly sweep over mainly Western plutocracies, but also other places in the world in which some cherished universal (or Western) values are threatened by the actions of Muslims (or their extremist fringes). These are values—such as the freedom of expression, gender equality or tolerance—most often brought into play as being threatened by actions of “some” Muslims.

As a term, Islamophobia has a number of iterations: more consistently developed in French, in the colonial context and around the 1920s in particular. It appears somewhat more sporadically as used in English, with the occasional reference, such as Edward Said’s 1985 reconsideration of Orientalism, before its enduring appearance in 1997 in the Runnymede report. The latter makes no reference to its early formulations, giving the impression that it is a neologism without any historical depth and completely inspired by the contingencies of “race relations” in Britain. In particular, the context for the report is given as mobilizations against the publication of *The Satanic Verses* and the emergence of a Muslim political subject. Conventional uses of Islamophobia, at least in the Anglophonic world, follow the lead of the Runnymede Trust report of 1997. The concept of Islamophobia that appeared in its pages was one that was defined in terms of eight constituent parts. These components ranged from perceptions of Islam as an unchanging monolith, to the view of its inherent violent nature and its fundamental inferiority to the West. Six of the eight components refer to Islam, and the other two refer to Muslims. Muslims are seen as subject to Islamophobia primarily through the transference of hostility to Islam and the
naturalization of that hostility. This definition combines insights from the critique of Orientalism (in particular the Orientalist characterization of Islam) to ideas of racism in Britain that focus on the unjust discriminatory practices directed at ethnically subordinated socio-historical groups. It is possible to read in the Runnymede report, a conceptualization of Islamophobia as a product of the articulation between Orientalism and racism. The report does this by surreptitiously (and perhaps inadvertently) confirming the emergence of new political subjectivity into the discourse of British race relations: Muslim. By translating hostility to Islam into an hostility against those described as Muslims in contemporary society, one can see in the report an implicit recognition of the racialization of Muslims.

Scholars of racism had already moved to the understanding that racism was not predicated on the existence of race as understood in primarily biological terms, but rather that race was the product of the process of racialization. As such, a mix of elements including histories, cultures, geographies and bodies were articulated to forge “race” as the condition of possibility of the exercise of racism. The radicality of the Runnymede report was to point to the way in which religious affiliation could be a sufficient source of group formation. In the context of Britain’s ethnoscapes, which by the time of the publication of the report had come to be organized around three principal subject positions—White, Black and Asian—the introduction of a Muslim identity was disruptive. Muslims could be found along all the spectrum of ethnically subject positions in a significant number to subvert the racial logic of Britain’s ethnoscapes. Contrary to the more frenzied charges of secular-minded critics, the emergence of the category of Muslim was not imposed by the multiculturalist policies of the British state. Rather, its appearance in the pages of the Runnymede report was a reflection of the mobilization that had taken place in Britain against the publication of The Satanic Verses in 1989.

This mobilization ruptured the immigrant imaginary that had governed the settlement and domestication of post-colonial migration to Britain. It was a mobilization that was itself made possible by the phenomenon throughout the Muslim Ummah, in which Kemalist projects were shaken by Islamist advances (Sayyid 2003: 53-83). The conceptualization of Islamophobia that began to circulate in the wake of the Runnymede report shared a general understanding of racism that was positivist and saw racism as primarily a matter of attitudes and beliefs. Thus the report was unable to get across the subtlety of its formulation, and as such, Islamophobia emerged as a rather impoverished concept, uncertain and unclear about what work it was being asked to do. This enabled those who opposed the conceptualization of Islamophobia to see it as a portmanteau expression that had little purpose.

The opposition to Islamophobia has three overlapping strands. Firstly, it is argued that Islamophobia is not a valid category, since the phenomena it seeks to describe does not exist. That is, there is no significant specific discrimination against Muslims because they are Muslims. Whatever discrimination or prejudice that may be said to exist against Muslims can be explained as racism—pure and simple—and as such does not require a special concept. Secondly, there are the set of arguments that maintain the deployment of Islamophobia is a means of stifling debate and free expression. In other words, Islamophobia is (to use popular expression) seen as another sign of “political correctness gone mad”. Thirdly, it is argued that Islamophobia is a legitimate response to the threat, or perceptions of threat, produced by the radicalization of a significant number of Muslims.

What a term comes to mean is related to how it is used, how it is embedded in cultural practices and, in other words, the language game played around the term in question. For a concept as contested as Islamophobia, this means that the politics around its use are
far more visible than the politics around the use of many other terms and an ostensive definition would not work. Nor would an approach that seeks to analyze Islamophobia into its constituent elements, which is a common way of trying to define a category. To have a measure of Islamophobia, we need to be able to sketch out the main frontlines in the politics evoked by Islamophobia. The politics of Islamophobia are constituted by a struggle between the opponents of the concept and its advocates. The opposition to the category straddles the conventional differences between left and right. Similarly, the advocates of Islamophobia cannot be neatly grouped along pre-existing political allegiances and solidarities: in its ranks are included both conservatives and leftists. This rearranging of the normal axis of conflict in Western plutocracies, demonstrates the disruptive effect of the disclosure of a Muslim political subject position.

Those who favor the use of the category of Islamophobia argue that Islamophobia is a means of describing a situation that would otherwise go unreported and unattended. Arguments that support the concept of Islamophobia point to the work done by categories such as anti-Semitism and racism in mobilizing opposition to these forms of injustice. Islamophobia is then prized as the means by which to suggest a mechanism for the reduction of injustice directed at Muslims. Islamophobia is not about the “hatred and fear of Islam” or Muslims. The range of activities covered by Islamophobia exceed its common formulations; rather it occurs as a response to the problematization of Muslim identity. This is similar to the way in which Brian Klug (2013: 474–475) points out that what is important is not that anti-Semitism is simply an expression of intense hostility toward Jews or Judaism, but rather what is at stake is that anti-Semitism defines Jewishness in such way that it impoverished the ability of those designated as Jews to elaborate their sense of what it means to be Jewish. Similarly, more than an expression of hatred or fear, Islamophobia needs to be understood as an undermining of the ability of Muslims as Muslims, to project themselves into the future. The manner in which Islamophobia is expressed and made manifest are diverse. This makes it difficult to say that Islamophobia has one specific feature that is hidden behind all its various occurrences. There is no essence to Islamophobia; instead there is a series of overlapping elements that constitute a coherence based around a notion of what Wittgenstein described as a family resemblance. It is possible to see how a gesture, a speech, and a police action can all be aspects of Islamophobia reflecting not an underlying unity, but a series of overlapping similarities. Thus the definition that this article introduces is to see Islamophobia through the range of its deployments, rather than through its purported essence or its constituent elements. The various ways in which Islamophobia is used to describe situations are conditioned by the specific cultural, socioeconomic and historical factors that have influenced the way in which Islam can be performed.

The performance of Islam is staged in four distinct theaters (Sayyid, 2010: 3). Firstly, there is Muslimistan, which is a group of countries socially and culturally dominated, either informally or formally, by the Islamicate. For all practical purposes, this means countries in which a very large percentage of the population would define themselves as Muslim. Very often Islam would have some constitutional privilege accorded to it; for example, Islam defined as a state religion. Muslimistan approximates the membership of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) with one or two anomalies, such as the inclusion of Mozambique, but the exclusion of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The second theater is formed by territories in which Muslims are a clear minority, marginal to the national narrative, even though their presence is simultaneous to or predates the formation of the state; for example, the Muslim populations of India, Russia, China and Thailand. The third theater where Islamophobia is performed, is in territories where Muslims are represented mainly as
immigrants. Many of these countries are Western plutocracies, but this not exclusively so. The fourth theater, is one in which the Muslim presence is negligible and the Islamophobia that is performed is vicarious or virtual. Countries in large parts of Central Africa or most of South America would be included in this group. These four theaters condition the range of contexts and variety of forms that Islamophobia can take. The different ways in which Muslims are disclosed is crucial to the way in which Islamophobia is articulated.

THE REPERTOIRE OF ISLAMOPHOBIA

In my discussion of *Things to Do in Denver When You're Dead* I said that when characters use the phrase “Give it a name” it is a call for an explanation. I came to this conclusion by seeing that various times throughout the film when the characters use the phrase, the response is an explanation. The meaning of the term could not have been understood analytically (by breaking it down its constituent parts), it could only be understood by seeing the range of its uses. In this section, I want to try and describe the various actions and attitudes that are most commonly described as being covered by the term.

The list is not exhaustive but indicative, and there is no claim that all these actions occur with equal intensity, or are comparable in terms of the level of harm that they may inflict. They are simply the types of things that can get described as being Islamophobic. The use of multiple examples of what is described as Islamophobia is a useful way of explaining (as opposed to just trying to define) this concept. Wittgenstein’s discussion of family resemblance occurs as he gives one example after another of the meaning of the concept “game”. He shows by a multiplicity of examples that even though there is no common property to various uses of the term, it is possible to see a network of associations by which we can understand that chess, solitaire, soccer, football and hop-scotch are all games. The purpose of drawing out the repertoire of Islamophobia, is to elucidate the kind of behaviors that can potentially be understood through deployment of the category. It is possible to group the activities described as Islamophobic in six main clusters.

Firstly, there are manifestations of Islamophobia through attacks on persons perceived to be Muslims. These attacks can be committed by random individuals or by semi-organized or organized groups acting together. These can include: shouting abuse, pushing, spitting, pulling hijabs from Muslim women, various forms of beating and, of course, can culminate in murder. What is common to all these incidents is that they target Muslims, the violence is unprovoked and that they occur in public settings such as the street or the park. Secondly, one can identify Islamophobia in attacks on property considered to be linked to Muslims: mosques, cemeteries, business premises. These attacks may include vandalism (broken windows, hurling pig’s heads into mosques, graffiti), arson, desecration of Muslim graves. Thirdly, there is the Islamophobia represented by acts of intimidation. These actions would be organized since they would involve a number of persons acting in concert to intimidate a population that is perceived to be Muslim or friendly to Muslims.12 The form of intimidation may include marches through areas with large Muslim populations. It may include advertising campaigns warning of the danger of Islam, as well as, the burning of Qur’an or demonstrations against building of mosques or cultural centers. What distinguishes these sets of actions is the degree of coordination requiring the expenditure of social and financial capital. The fourth cluster of Islamophobia can be described as that which may occur in institutional settings, in which those perceived to be Muslims receive less favorable treatment than their peers in comparative positions within the same
organizations. Such behavior may take the form of harassment, bullying, pointed jokes, distribution of tasks, and assessments of performance in which those considered to be Muslims are subject to adverse treatment or comment. The range of examples could include (but would not be restricted to) the serving of ham sandwiches for Muslims in a university research center tasked with understanding Islam, or an implemented dress code that places greater burden on those perceived to be Muslims than other staff in the same organization. It can occur when the rationalization for decision-making in organizations includes elements that arise from tropes associated with Islam and its cognates. Thus, a Muslim may be refused promotion and the rationalization may be that he or she is radical, or does not know how to behave in a mixed gender workplace. Some of these organizations may be part of an institutional ensemble that makes up the state, while others may be private. Again, this cluster of Islamophobia is not necessarily directed or coordinated by a state project, rather its occurrence is a subject of absence of robust anti-discrimination legislation or culture, or the inclusion of Muslims within the ambit of such measures even if they exist. The fifth cluster of Islamophobia refers to incidents in which there is a sustained and systematic elaboration of comments in the public domain that disparage Muslims and/or Islam. This disparagement could be more or less subtle. For example, publishing the Qur’an with Muhammad listed as the author or recycling medieval Christian polemics as the “truth” about Islam or reading specific crimes as being motivated by Islam or Muslim culture. This form of Islamophobia could be articulated on internet hate sites, newspapers, magazines, or other media. It may be in factual or fictional programs. The form of Islamophobia can also inform policy and opinion, and may be the ground for state interventions and regulations. It could also be part of the common sense of a society—that set of unexamined assumptions and beliefs that circulate in any society.

The above five sets of Islamophobia tend to be carried out by individuals or organizations (private or public). The state may facilitate them through benign neglect or refusal to provide adequate safeguards, or to challenge such actions, but it is not actively or openly involved in the perpetuation of these incidents. The state could also be used to restrict expression of Muslimness—for example, limiting the building of mosques, regulating Muslim dress (bans on the burqa). What makes these sorts of activities appear to be Islamophobic is the degree to which they place extra burdens on sections of the population which are mostly Muslim.

What is clear about these performative clusters of Islamophobia is that most of the actions that constitute the repertoire of Islamophobia are not exclusive; they can be found in performances of anti-Semitism and racism in general. This raises the question about the exact relationship between Islamophobia, racism and anti-Semitism. To map out the contours of this relationship it is necessary for me to sketch out my understanding of racism.

The category of racism (as distinct from the category of race) first emerges in the 1930s to describe the experience of primarily people of Jewish heritage living under Nazi rule. Why was the concept of racism needed to describe these experiences? The Nuremberg
Laws and the associated legal and extra-legal practices were very similar to what was going on throughout the rest of the world, in which European settlers or administrations regulated the conduct of what were deemed to be non-European peoples. One way of describing this ensemble of practices and institutions would be colonialism. The colonial frame refers not only to the empires of the British, French, and Dutch but also the “inner empires” in which European settlers confronted indigenous peoples of the Americas and Australasia. All the techniques of social exclusion, segregation and marginalization were already operating under the heading of colonialism: concentration camps, discriminatory legal codes, repression through native collusion, semi-official systems of violations—none of these were new to European practice or the innovation of the Nazis, so why not use the concept of colonialism to describe the phenomena, why the need for racism? One way of understanding Nazism is to understand it as the application of European colonial rule to the interior of the European continent. Racism emerges to account for the application of colonial rule in the heartlands of Europe, while still maintaining the difference between West and non-West, which was constitutive of the colonial world order.

This conceptualization of racism has a number of consequences. Firstly, it extrapolates from the policies of the Nazi regime the range of racist expressions and in doing so helps to foster a notion of racism as the antithesis of liberalism (Hesse and Sayyid, 2006: 13–31). Liberalism can be presented as an antidote to racism so that its complicity with racial logic is disavowed. This not only exceptionilizes racism, but also ideologizes it; that is, racism emerges as an abhorrent belief system, the product of an abhorrent regime that has ceased to exist (Hesse, 2007: 643–63). Thus the racism inherent in the European colonial enterprise—be it British, Spanish, French, Portuguese, Dutch, Russian, Belgian or American—is elided. The second consequence of this conception of racism is that it establishes the scientific and biological foundation of racism. Racism becomes centered on the existence of race understood as a biological phenomenon (this explains the effort made by biologists and others to deny that the category of “race” had any basis in science).

The split between racism and colonialism means that Islamophobia appears to be different from racism. It cannot be contained within the field of domestic policy, since one of the particularities of Muslims is that they are a transnational people. Thus, the borders of the nation-state are not adequate to contain all of them. Furthermore, it is difficult to find a biological locus for Muslims. Muslims are not a ‘race’ and being a Muslim is not the same as having a biological identity that cannot be easily changed. Thus Islamophobia, unlike classical assumptions of discriminatory practices such as anti-Semitism, sexism, homophobia, racism and so forth, seem to rest upon a subject that is not given by nature. Therefore, being Muslim is considered to be a matter of choice in a way that being a Jew, a woman, a Roma or gay is not (The conundrum of Islamophobia is that despite its expressions, which echo those found in anti-Semitism and racism in general, there is a degree of uncertainty about the construction of the subject of Islamophobia. If Muslims are not a race or even a lineage (which they clearly are not) then what are they? Is not being a Muslim similar to being a communist or liberal, that is, a matter of belief rather than fate? It is true that one may have a great deal of investment in a position one adopts, and this investment may seep into other aspects of one’s life, but it is a position that can be abandoned or changed, it is not hardwired in human biology. The contrast with other forms of discriminatory practices and Islamophobia rests, to large extent, on the degree of voluntarism in being a Muslim that is perceived to be absent in racism or anti-Semitism. If there is mutability to being a Muslim, then many of the acts that are presented as manifestations of Islamophobia can be seen as being expressions of other kinds of violations. The category of Islamophobia depends on the
existence of a Muslim subject position. Muslims are not only targets of Islamophobia, but also those conscripted into resisting it. What exactly is a Muslim?

Any answer to this question has to begin with an acknowledgment that being a Muslim is an over determined subject position; being a Muslim cannot mean being nothing else, and thus whatever a Muslim is, she is also many other things including racial or ethnically marked in various ways. The “thrownness” of humans, however, is not simply reducible to the biological. For example, our diets are not based exclusively on what we can physically eat, but rather are culturally conditioned so that consumption of foods that are considered distasteful in particular cuisines can produce a visceral reaction. Human bodies are read through culture, history, science, geography—they never appear directly totally unmarked. Sometime during the long sixteenth century, a particular type of marking emerged as one of the main ways in which social identities were constructed. This social construction of collective entities began to take the form of races, a category that began to be dominated by scientific discourse. The discovery of races, however, remained rather imprecise and repeatedly failed to correspond to the idea of distinct species to be found in zoology. Not only were there frequent taxonomic disagreements, but the establishment of various miscegenation laws and taboos pointed to the difficulty of policing the frontiers between different ‘races’. Thus from the very beginning the category of ‘race’ (like most other categories) was implicated in social and cultural imaginaries. Racial marking does not arise from a distinct biology. The process of forming a ‘race’ is not akin to the process of discovering new species of wildlife, races were not found but created. Racialization does not depend on biology. It is precisely the impossibility of biology to make races that makes it possible to see the construction of ‘races’ as collective identities produced by social processes.

The idea that Muslims have a choice to be Muslim or not, and that their failure to make the correct choice is based on fear or ignorance is a popular belief. The idea of choice, however, does not take into account why Muslims should, en masse, choose not to be Muslims. There have been three major instances of the de-Islamization of Muslim populations, that is, Muslim communities, en masse, ceased to perform as Muslims and often lost any sense of being Muslim or awareness of Islam. The first such instance refers to the conversions and expulsions carried out by the Iberian monarchs following the fall of Granada in 1492. Most Muslims became converts to Catholicism and, under the watchful eye of the Inquisition, lost most of the distinctive practices associated with Islam (e.g. prohibition on the consumption of pork). The Islamicate traces in Iberia are largely (but not exclusively) to be found in the language and architecture. The second instance refers to the process of de-Islamization among the enslaved of the Atlantic plantation economies. It is estimated that perhaps one third to half of all enslaved Africans taken from Africa to the Americas were Muslim (Diouf, 1998:46-48). Under the harsh conditions of the plantation-slavery, assemblage of the traces of this Islamicate inheritance were erased; so much so that as Sherman Jackson points out, the emergence of the African–American Muslim community in the early twentieth century had no direct relationship with even the “memory” of its previous Islamicate traces (Jackson, 2005: 38-45). The third major instance of de-Islamization was carried out by communist authorities with varying degrees of success. In some countries, such as Albania, the secularization drive was able to produce a population in which the awareness of being Muslim was lost or marginal. Historically, the mass de-Islamization of Muslims has tended to only occur in the context of regimes that were inherently violent, and authoritarian.
RACIALIZED GOVERNMENTALITIES

David Theo Goldberg’s conceptualization of the racial state might be useful in understanding the institutional ensemble through which Islamophobia is disclosed. Goldberg’s Althusserian reworking of Gramsci (Goldberg, 2002: 105) allows him to conceptualize a racial state as state that “defines populations in racially defined groups” (Goldberg, 2002: 110). These definitions are then used for the purposes of regulation (social, legal, economic, cultural registers) that make possible the shift from government to governmentality, which comes to define the modern state. Goldberg goes on to distinguish racial states from racist states. He argues that the former are basically state formations that have emerged in modernity and racial logics and are hardwired into the very infrastructure of these entities:

Modern states and racial states are deeply entwined, the conditions of the latter bound up with possibilities of the former, the histories of the former at once accountable in terms of the projected spatialities and temporalities of the latter. Modern states are racial in their modernity, and modern in their racial quality, their raciality. (Goldberg, 2002: 7)

In contrast, racist states are those in which racist logics are “…explicitly defined as the principal (and ‘principled’) state project” (Goldberg, 2002: 114). With the end of the formal apartheid regime in South Africa we saw the dismantling of the last major racist state. The post-racial appears in the space vacated by the racist state. The end of racism that the post-racial announces is a reconfiguration of racial rule by abandonment of racist logics as a principle state project. Goldberg’s emphasis on the state as the engine of racist rule is an important corrective to the view of racism that focuses on its emergence and regulation as an affair of civil society.

Islamophobia is a form of racialized governmentality. It is more than prejudice or ignorance; it is a series of interventions and classifications that affect the well-being of populations designated as Muslim. This does not mean that there are no emotional, cultural or religious investments and expressions in the articulation of Islamophobia, but rather that Islamophobia is a language game directed toward the undermining of a distinct Muslim identity. In other words, if we understand Islamophobia as the regulation and disciplining of Muslims by reference to a Westernizing horizon (Sayyid 2010, 15-17), it means accepting that this hostility to Muslims is neither necessarily emotional (“hatred”) nor religious (“Muslims as infidels”) or cultural (“Muslims as outsiders”) but rather political.

Islamophobia has so far not been disclosed as the principal state project of any current state formation. This, however, does not mean that Islamophobia has not been integrated into the racial state. There is no reason why the incidence, range and intensity of Islamophobic phenomena cannot be calibrated. The logical extreme of Islamophobia would be the elimination of Muslims. This elimination can occur in two forms: one would be physical destruction of Muslims, which would be genocide. The other form would be what would be described as de-Islamization, which would involve the erasure of a Muslim identity. Based on the historical precedents mentioned above, it should be possible to isolate the various institutional arrays geared toward the elimination of a distinct Muslim identity. The degree of de-Islamization would help demarcate a number of stages of Islamophobia, allowing it to be measured in ways that provide policymakers with milestones against which they could assess the efficacy of measures to combat Islamophobia. In what follows, I provide thumbnail sketches of the manner in which Islamophobia has been crystallized in terms of its principal agents, arguments and attitudes.
i. One can imagine a society in which de-Islamization is explicitly proclaimed and practiced. The de-Islamization policy is institutionalized in the machinery of the state as well as the organs of civil society. This would analogous to Goldberg’s racial state. Such an entity would approximate the post-Granada regimes in Spain, or the policies pursued in communist countries like Albania. Islamophobia is official policy.

ii. A state in which policies and practices are implemented that are deemed to be Islamophobic, even though the state denies that charge.

iii. A country in which there are significant and vocal organizations demanding measures that are considered to be Islamophobic. These organizations are no longer simply marginal and their opinions are echoed by senior politicians.

iv. A country in which there are demands for Islamophobic measures to be implemented, but these demands are continually challenged and organizations and opinions exist that challenge Islamophobia.

Let us recap: in this article, I started by arguing that the act of naming is essential to the process of problem formation. I then went on to show the way in which the invention of Islamophobia enables the analysis of various forms of violence, violations, discriminations and subordinations that are directed toward Muslims. By referring to the multiplicity of examples and contexts, I showed the range of experiences that can be marshaled by the category of Islamophobia. I then went on to draw a taxonomy of Islamophobic institutional ensembles. There remains, however, a lacuna between this taxonomy and the various experiences that can be described as Islamophobic. If I were of a foundationalist persuasion, I would either not see the lacuna or more likely, not consider it a problem. Alas, my faith in anti-foundationalism does not allow me this luxury. I want to draw out the dimensions of this lacuna by referring once again to the article by Brian Klug (2013). To show us the problem of identifying anti-Semitism, Klug imagines a bus journey where a number of characters witness a bus conductor asking a rabbi to get off the bus. The question arises as to whether such an act is anti-Semitic. Is the rabbi thrown out for infringing some rules (e.g. not smoking) or for being identified as a Jew or being misrecognized as a Muslim (Klug, 2013: 476–478)? The point of the parable is that there is “no algorithm” that determines for us whether the actions of the bus conductor were anti-Semitic (ibid: 477). Reading anti-Semitic behavior, like reading any behavior, is a doggedly interpretive activity that has to be learned. An example of this arises when people arrive in racial societies where they are ethnically marked. It can take years for them to make sense of the way in which others react and respond to them and understand those ways as being aspects of racism. How can we say with certainty that such an act is Islamophobic or racist or anti-Semitic? The short answer—and this is how I read Klug—is that we cannot. Often the first response to discovering the meaning of an action is to seek the intention behind it. An Islamophobic act is one behind which there is Islamophobic intent. This, however, not only defers the problem from action to intention, but also moves it to the terrain where there is no apodictic way of understanding anyone’s intention. Imagine a murderer who claims that his actions were motivated by the orders he received from his neighbor’s dog. It is unlikely that in contemporary society such an explanation would be considered valid. We would not accept that the motivation behind the murder was obedience to a demonic dog. Imagine, however, that these murders took place in medieval European society, in which case possession by a demonic dog would be a sufficient explanation. In contemporary Western society, the medicalization of “deviant” behavior would require an explanation that would emphasize
perhaps psychic trauma and childhood abuse as motivating factors (and cunning murderers often resort to this sort of reasoning as a means of mitigating their guilt). Accounts of motivation and intention are culturally conditioned. As result of the anti-colonial struggles, the Holocaust, and the Civil Rights movement in the United States, there have been transformations in large parts of the world where anti-Semitism and racism have been recognized as forms of cruelty and there has been a general socialization about how to read these behaviors. For example in the United States, 300 years of racist rule has forced African–Americans and to some extent others to be able to read racism in its multiple complex and subtle forms. Racism has to be socialized, its conventions and constructions are internalized in the enunciation of particular forms of subject formation. To know whether the bus conductor who evicts a rabbi is endorsing anti-Semitism depends on the arguments that are made, the network of associations in play in the event; in other words, the occurrence of anti-Semitism is a rhetorical activity. This does not mean it does not have effects or that it is somehow trivial. Rather, in the absence of algorithms, only persuasion and interpretation can help us in understanding what is or is not anti-Semitic. There are some people who will always see anti-Semitism and there are those who will never see it. In between are those whose understanding of what actions constitute anti-Semitism would depend on being able to navigate the cultural codes and conventions that suggest whether a particular act is anti-Semitic or not. Learning to see anti-Semitism, racism or Islamophobia requires a skilled familiarity with particular language games. Reading racism or anti-Semitism (and I would argue Islamophobia) is the skilled following of networks of associations and making arguments; in other words it is a rhetorical activity.\(^{19}\)

**READING ISLAMOPHOBIA**

If being an Islamophobe (or if you prefer, committing Islamophobic acts) is a learned activity, then so is detecting it, pointing to it and condemning it. If it is a learned activity then there is something to be said for the level of proficiency an individual may acquire. One analysis of the way in which humans learn sets of skills is based is the so-called Dreyfus model. This model has gained wide acceptance in various fields including medicine and the military. The model is based on Heideggerian recasting of phenomenology. According to Dreyfus and Dreyfus, the process of learning a skill has five identifiable discrete stages: novice, advanced beginner, competent performer, proficient performer, and expert. Within each of these levels are not only differences in skills, but also differences in the way in which skills are acquired. The movement from one level to the next is neither certain (in some tasks very few will become proficient—such as playing a musical instrument, in others most people who undertake them will—such as driving), nor is it linear, that is being an expert is not a quantitative extrapolation of skills required at novice level, but rather a qualitative jump. The Dreyfus model makes a major distinction between the first three skill levels (novice, advanced beginner and competent performer) and the final two skill levels (proficient performer and expert). The first three levels are based on distinction among those whose acquisition of skills is increasingly skilled but explicit rule-following. The final two levels are based on distinction among those whose skill levels are based on intuitive, holistic mastery of context (Flyvbjerg, 2001: 21). The response to racism illustrates these two means of learning. Individuals and organizations become aware of racism through often crude and clumsy check-lists, which often leave those who are proficient in reading racism unsatisfied, since their understanding of racism and its effects is not based on rule-following but on a *coup d’œil*. Setting up a rubric for assessing the configurations of
Islamophobia does not (cannot) evade the necessity of interpretation. Interpreting Islamophobia (or anti-semitism or racism) is not a subjective practice, but rather a skilled one in which there has to be a sufficient degree of overlap between one’s reading and the other readings in play in the culture at the time. One way to understand the different responses to the occurrence of Islamophobia is to focus on variations in skill levels of the reading on offer. Some people who have had intensive and frequent experience of Islamophobia can often detect it with great acuity, and share that knowledge with similarly skilled readers. This expert understanding of Islamophobia, however, is not the result of individual qualities, since what counts as Islamophobia is what a particular framing considers to be Islamophobic. This, of course, is a historically situated understanding.

I have indicated that the performance of Islamophobia is a complex multi-faceted operation that is simply not reducible to questions of the representations or whether images of Muslims and Islam reflect closed or open views. Islamophobia is not just idiosyncratic eruptions reflecting social or psychological profiles of the perpetrators, but rather its occurrence has to be seen in specific assemblages. By identifying these assemblages it should be possible not only to take a measure of Islamophobia, but also to take counter-measures against it. Conventional strategies for diminishing Islamophobia often take the well-intentioned but also well-worn form in which authoritative speakers are asked to make declarations along the lines that “Islam is a religion of peace” or that “Muslims are not homogenous” or “the majority of Muslims are moderates”. While in a moment of urgency such declarations may have some part to play, on their own they are unlikely to counteract Islamophobia. These declarations apparently challenge the idea that Islam is a religion of violence, or all Muslims are extremists; but this exchange takes place in a context in which Muslims continue to be narrated in subaltern positions, and thus, are easily countered by assertions that Muslims are extremist or Islam is violent. The logic of Islamophobia in its various forms is a relationship of domination.

The end of Islamophobia will come about when the hierarchy that makes it possible dissolves. Countering Islamophobia requires the dismantling of the assemblages that make it possible. These assemblages are specific, and while any strategy would need to be as granular as the circumstances of the occurrence of Islamophobia, it may be useful to suggest that the most successful means of ending a relationship of domination – is to facilitate and empower those who are its subjects. Counter-measures against Islamophobia have to be more than just refutation of the claims made by Islamophobia; ultimately, they have to tell different stories not just in words but also in deeds. These alternative stories need to abandon a Westernizing horizon as a common destiny.

CONCLUSION

In this paper I have made three main claims: (1) that ontic approaches to Islamophobia cannot do justice to the concept, (2) that a Heideggerian–Wittgensteinian approach to Islamophobia is better than what is currently in play, (3) that it is possible to use such an approach to open a conversation with public policy. To describe a phenomena as Islamophobic is not to disclose a pre-existing pattern of behavior. To name something as being Islamophobic is a constitutive act; it enables the gathering of disparate elements into recognizable formations of cruelty and injustice, which is the first task of making demands for their rectification. To account for Islamophobia in a way that can make a difference in social policy requires an understanding of it that sees it as a definite issue, not simply as an amorphous mass of tangentially related attitudes and beliefs. The implicit demand is that
Islamophobia should be measurable in ways that produce evidence, which could be the basis of a rational policy. The difficulty, of course, is that Islamophobia is so contested as a concept that any evidence for its occurrence is unlikely to be forthcoming as such. This is simply because there is little agreement on what Islamophobia entails and therefore what evidence would support or undermine it. In this article, I have argued that it is important to clarify the conceptual haze surrounding Islamophobia so as to better understand what kind of ameliorative measures can be taken. To this end, I have suggested that it is important to understand Islamophobia as belonging to the family of racism. I have also suggested a Heideggerian phenomenological understanding of knowledge acquisition, which ties in with a Wittgensteinian-inspired understanding of the language game, played around the category of Islamophobia which allows a us to measure Islamophobia phronetically. The emergence of Islamophobia points to two key developments: firstly, Islamophobia posits a post-racial subject that is subjected to exclusionary practices. Secondly, Islamophobia marks the transformation in the balance of power and anxieties generated by the de-centering of the West. Naming something 'Islamophobia' is a way of alerting us to the persistence of the racial in the post-racial. Much of the opposition to the deployment of Islamophobia reminds us of the post in the post-racial.20

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank Abdooolkarim Vakil, Ian Law and Brian Klug for their comments and encouragement, like wise I would like to thank Shvetal Vyas-Pare for assistance in preparation of the manuscript.

ENDNOTES

1 To what extent cinematic representations mirror the actual use of slang by American criminal fraternity or to what extent American criminals use the language of fictional gangsters to sound like authentic gangsters is not that clear cut.

2 For details about phronetic social science see Flyvbjerg (2001).

3 It’s not always clear whether it is some Muslims or potentially all Muslims who are the source of threat. One of the common tropes of Islamophobic discourse is the slippage from the few and the some to the many and then the all.

4 See Vakil (2010:23-44) for more details about the genealogy of Islamophobia.

5 The Runnymede Trust is registered charity and was founded in 1968 as independent think-tank dedicated to producing research for the furtherance of race equality. It has produced a number of landmark reports and research on the challenges of multi-ethnic and multi-cultural Britain.

6 See Khan 2006 for a succinct description of the interplay with international and national mobilizations which facilitate the opposition to the publication of The Satanic Verses.

7 For details of the immigrant imaginary see Sayyid (2004).

8 This position is most forcibly argued by Kenan Malik on many occasions and across many platforms, see Malik (2009). See also Hasan (2009) for similar critique of multiculturalism as facilitating conservative Muslim practices and groups.
See the discussion by Baker and Hacker on the prevalence of this analytical approach to the definition, which they trace within Western philosophy from Plato to the early Wittgenstein (2004: 184–190), as they suggest the legitimate use of a definition maybe no more than to circumscribe the range of an enquiry.

For an elaboration of the concept of family resemblance see Baker and Hacker (2004: 191).

Recently the OIC has declared that in future its membership will be restricted to countries in which at least fifty percent of the population is Muslim. This would halt attempts by India and Russia to seek full membership.

The Muslim–Marxist–Multiculturalist alliance that Brevik railed against to justify his massacre against young members of the Norwegian socialist party was not a just a personal delusion. The existence of such a *convergence is one of the key tropes of Islamophobic discourse found among neo-conservatives and their fellow travellers.

Websites such as Jihad Watch, Bare Naked Islam, Campus Watch, Atlas Shrugs, Gates of Vienna, just to name a few, are replete with these kinds of stories, allegations and assertions.

See Hatem Baizan’s (2012) comparison of the FBI clandestine operations against Civil Rights organizations and individuals and recent counter-intelligence operations against those they consider to be Muslims terrorists.

See Meer and Modood (2010) for an elaboration of this argument.

I do not mean that all Muslims oppose Islamophobia but rather that most of them experience its effects, and that makes it difficult for them to be indifferent to it. The existence of Muslims who repudiate the concept of Islamophobia should not be more surprising than the existence of highly problematic liminal figures that are said to inhabit worlds produced by racialized hierarchies: the ‘self-hating Jew’, ‘Uncle Tom’ or ‘vendidos’…

Diouf (1998) details the spirited manner in which enslaved African Muslims tried to maintain their religious identity in the Americas, thus the de-Islamization that occurred was not because of a weak attachment to Islam, but rather the enormous effort made to prevent these Muslims from being Muslim.

Francois Soyer (2013: 408–410) draws a chilling parallel between the quest of Philip II and his advisors for “a final remedy” to the Morisco problem and Nazi designs for a final solution.

I am using rhetoric in the sense that Stanley Fish deploys as being synonymous with anti-foundationalism, see Fish, 1990, 343–340.

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