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Changing governmentalities of Neighborhood Governance in China: a Genealogical Exploration

XIAOYUAN WAN

Abstract:

This paper addresses the fundamental question about the ‘becoming’ of the landscape of China’s neighborhood governance. Based on a governmentality framework, it carries out a genealogical review on the neighborhood governance in the Feudal dynasties, Maoist era and post-Maoist era and summarises the connection between the historical and current governmental rationalities, government technologies and the formation of subjectivities. The conclusion indicates that spatial practice and social norm have always been regarded by Chinese governors as the main approaches to legitimize and consolidate their regimes at the neighborhood level, although different governments used different technologies to design and organise neighborhoods. The rationality of segmenting urban space into administrative unit was inherited by the Maoist government to design enclosed Dan-wei compounds and used by the current government to demarcate the boundary of She-qu neighborhood as well as implement Wang-ge management. The Feudal rituals and Socialist norms on the other hand, shaped hierarchy-respecting and collective subjectivities and to a large extent regulated Chinese people’s behaviours and facilitated the government’s practices. This paper ends by pointing out that as the fragmenting Chinese society and hybrid government technologies shape diverse, multifaceted and ambiguous subjects, the government will confront more challenges on neighborhood governance.

Keywords: neighborhood governance, governmentality, governmental rationalities, government technologies, subjectivity

1. Introduction

Since the 1990s, the Chinese central government has intensively delegated public administrative functions to the local governments and urban neighborhood becomes a new arena of policy intervention. In the Chinese central government’s 2006 ‘building a harmonious society’ strategy and the Chinese Communist Party’s newest vision of ‘renovating social management mechanism’ on the Eighteenth National Congress (2012), the Chinese government repeatedly reinforced its determination to
consolidate its institutional power at urban neighborhood level and the important role of neighborhood governance in public administration. In recent literature, urban neighborhood has been widely described as the most active interface of China’s state-society interactions (Gui, 2007; Wang, 2009; Chen, 2010; Yue, 2010). Different views have developed about the state’s power exercise at the neighborhood level. Some scholars believe that comparing to Maoist China, the current Chinese government is losing its ability of social mobilisation at the neighborhood level (Lin, 2003; Pan, 2006), while others argue that the Chinese government is actually trying to penetrate its power into the grassroots society by strengthening its administrative control on urban neighborhood according to the institutional reforms (Xu, 2001; Li, 2002; Liu, 2005). However, the burgeoning discussions usually limit their scopes on post-1978 and overlook more fundamental questions concerning the becoming of the political rationalities and government technologies in today’s landscape of neighborhood governance in China. Questions such as ‘To what extent have the historical Chinese political rationalities and technologies been inherited by the current government?’ and ‘How do the Chinese citizens become governed with the influence of both traditional and modern governing technologies?’ need to be discussed in order to fully capture the nature of China’s transitional statehood and the complex dynamics of neighborhood governance.

Foucault’s method of political genealogy, with its idiosyncratic and antiquarian interest in the emergence of political ethics and subjectivity (Szakolczai, 1993: 28), provides a critical reflection on these questions. The influence of historical governing elements on the modern society has been widely discussed in Foucault’s work (Foucault, 1961, 1980, 1982). China’s long history as a centralised political and cultural entity makes it a good candidate for a genealogical review on whether (and how) the
historical governing rationalities and technologies play an implicit, but pervasive role in
today’s governance. As Liu (2002) puts that, ‘it is the through the hierarchized and
dispersed historical forces that organizational and institutional power gain their life in
everyday life in contemporary China.’ In recent years, the proliferating literature on
China’s changing statehood contributes to an increasing number of studies on the
government’s changing governmentalities in the realms of education, environment
protection, religious policies and sexual health (Jeffreys, 2009). However,
‘governmentality’ has not been systematically used as a conceptual tool in the realm of
Chinese neighborhood governance.

This paper carries out a genealogical exploration on how urban neighborhoods
have been used to exercise state power by the historical and current Chinese
governments, and then further explores the correlation between the historical and
current neighborhood governing practices. The analysis framework is based on three
main concepts of Foucault’s governmentality theory, including the rationality,
government technologies and subjectivity. The term of governmentality, defined by
Foucault as the ‘rationalism of governmental practice in the exercise of political
sovereignty’ (2004: 04), has generated proliferating discussions on the ‘how’ of
governing: how we govern, how we are governed and the relation between the
government of the state, the government of others and the government of ourselves
(Dean, 1999:2). It provides a critical perspective to understand and evaluate the
government practices in the modern society from the following dimensions:

- The ‘governmental rationality’ in the published strategies and objectives,
especially in defining some problems and objectives and making them visible to
public and obscuring other problems and making them invisible and ‘not
important’. This dimension looks at the way governments rationalize and legitimize their strategies and objectives with specific knowledge claim.

- The ‘government technologies’, or the ‘distinctive ways of thinking and questioning, relying on definite vocabularies and procedures for the production of truth’. It addresses the questions of ‘what methods does the government use to govern population and to accomplish its specific objectives’.

- The government’s characteristic ways of forming subjects, selves, persons, actors or agents. This dimension concerns the forms of individuals and collective ‘subjectivity’ though which governing operates and which specific practices and programmes of government try to form (Dean, 1999).

The remaining content consists of three parts. In the first part, the neighborhood designed with the feudal ‘Zhou-li’ planning values and the Feudal governing technologies will be reviewed. In the second part, the socialist rationalities and government technologies in the Maoist neighborhood of ‘Dan-wei’ will be explored and in the third part, the hybrid governmental rationalities and technologies in the post-Maoist neighborhood of ‘she-qu’ will be discussed. This paper will end with wider discussions on the impact of historical governing governmentalities on the current and future landscape of urban governance in China.

2. Neighborhood governance in Feudal China (221BC-1911AD)

In 221 BC, the first Feudal dynasty was established in China, which was known as Qin. During the following two thousand years, although this territory has seen the rising and falling of tens of Feudal dynasties, it has generally been regarded as a unified cultural entity with a centralized governing origin (Tanner, 2009). Through the long history of Feudal dynasties (221BC-1911), a fundamental governing principle had been
adopted by the emperors was to divide the population into hierarchical social classes, and then to administrate people by spatially segregating them, emphasizing the hierarchy and restraining the mobility between them. The Feudal rulers used a series of population policies, spatial designing approaches and philosophies to maintain a hierarchical social order, meanwhile cultivated citizens to respect the social order and regulate themselves. As the basic units of cities, urban neighborhoods were the ultimate arena where population policies and spatial design were implemented. The neighborhood life directly reflected the governmental rationalities to administrate the society and was also a mirror of the then state-society relation. From a complex of historical materials describing China’s ancient urban life, this section summarizes some representative governmentalities in the Feudal neighborhood governance (Table 1).

Table 1. Some governmentalities in China’s Feudal urban neighborhood governance

| Governmental rationalities                           | • Spatialize authoritarian power according to urban spatial design  
|                                                    | • Legitimate hegemony and social hierarchy on the basis of social norms  
| Governmental technologies                         | • Use gate, wall, curfew and other spatial elements to define social space  
|                                                    | • Hu-kou  
|                                                    | • Emphasizes Confucian rites and family-based social order  
| Characteristics of citizen’s subjectivity         | • Self-identification in hierarchies  
|                                                    | • Self-cultivation according to traditional social norms  

2.1 Governmental Rationalities

Spatializing authoritarian power according to spatial planning was a most widely implemented governmental rationality in Feudal China. Most dynasties’ capitals and big
cities was designed according to a strict guideline system described in Zhou-li, or Rites of Zhou, a book recording the ancient Chinese rituals (141-87BC). In a chapter named Kao-Gong-Ji, or Records of Traders, we can find precise description on the ancient Chinese urban spatial layout as following:

‘The Jiang-ren (craftsman) constructs the state capital. He makes a square nine Li (500 meters) on each side; each side has three gates. Within the capital are nine north-south and nine east-west streets. The north-south streets are nine carriage tracks in width. On the east is the Ancestral Temple, and on the west is the Altars of Soil and Grain. On the south is the Hall of Audience and on the north are the markets.’

This famous paragraph is widely cited in books focusing on Chinese urban planning, as it not only contains detailed description of the ancient urban morphology, but also reflects the traditional ethics, ideals and the ruler’s governing logics behind the spatial layout. The urban space is neatly segregated into pieces in order to emphasize hierarchy and facilitate the exercise of imperial power. All the elements in the spatial layout have a ritual meaning, including the direction, the width of roads the size of gates and so on. From these spatial elements, ancient Chinese cities developed into highly sophisticated, preconceived constructions, which served as a physical manifestation of cosmological beliefs, bureaucratic hierarchies, and the practicalities of daily life (Wu, 2013).

Apart from spatial practices, social norm also played a pervasive role in rationalizing and strengthening state power in ancient China, with the form of a hierarchical ‘ritual system’. As discussed by Foucault and other governmentality researchers, government’s practices and policies designed to engender people’s internalized desire to adhere to social norm are deeply embedded in history (Ewald,
1990; Foucault, 1977; Miller and Rose, 2008; Nettleton elt, 2012). In China, there were records describing how Feudal emperors used norm to legitimize and stabilize their authority early back to the Warring States (3rd Century BC - 1st Century BC). In the famous historical work of *Stratagems of the Warring State*, the role of norm was stated in three main aspects. Firstly, respect for norm was a basis for the legitimacy of emperorship. An emperor must gain the acknowledgement of the ‘heaven’ to gain the formal legitimacy of his/her emperorship and he/she also must respect interstate norms to win majority states’ recognition of his/her authority. Secondly, norms provided the emperors with the legitimacy to use military force. Thirdly, to establish a new regime, it is necessary to change the current norm system to adapt to changes in the society (Yan, 2011). Relating these rationalities to the ‘Zhou-li’ system, we can find very clear expression of social norm in the spatial planning: the important ‘spots’ of a city are especially mentioned in *Kao-Gong-Ji*, including the Ancestral Temple, the Altars of Soil and Grain, the Hall of Audience and the markets. These spots, which respectively represented the royal ancestry, god of land, politics and everyday life, were allocated in specific directions with respect to the hierarchical social norms. The emperors’ ancestors were in a higher rank than the god of land so their temple located on the east. Similarly, the political hall of audience was regarded as more important than citizens’ daily needs so it located on the south. Within the same logic, urban neighborhoods were planned and designed with abundant normative meanings. The following section will move on to explore how Feudal rulers implement their governing rationalities in the neighborhood design and administration.

2.2 Governmental technologies

2.2.1 Wall, gate and curfew
During the last two thousand years, the urban planning principles in *Zhou-li* were repeatedly implemented by feudal governors to build their capitals: the Chang-an of Tang dynasty (current city of Xi’an), Bian-liang of Song dynasty (current city of Kaifeng), Da-du of Yuan Dynasty (current city of Beijing) and Beijing of Ming and Qing Dynasty were all designed with a similar layout of the ‘ideal city’ described in the *Zhou-li*. The wall of these cities kept rural residents out and gate guards strictly controlled the population mobility between rural and urban areas. Within these cities, the gridded road system further divided the city into enclosed blocks, which became the boundary of neighborhoods. Neighborhoods were allocated around the city and took the form of walled and gated wards which, like the cities themselves, could be closed off at night (Wu, 2013: 62). The mainstream justification of the neighborhood walls and gates, as recorded by Guanzi living in the Warring States period (475-221 BC), was that an enclosed residential system could reduce the opportunities for crime. Therefore within the neighborhood, there were even more walls dividing different households and different units within one household. To facilitate surveillance on citizens and maintain social order, the neighborhood gates were guarded at all times by wardens, who needed to keep entering and exiting record and responsible for all overall management. Meanwhile, a strict curfew was declared to prevent residents moving outside their neighborhood in the evening. According to these regulations, urban neighborhood became integral to the everyday policing of social order within the city (Yang, 1993).

Recently, the important role of wall, gate and curfew has been increasingly discussed in China’s urban study. It is strengthened by many researchers that the technologies of gate, wall and curfew played a pivotal role to facilitate rulers defining a neighborhood-based social space and controlling the mobility of residents (Barme and Minford, 1989; Jenner, 1992; Yang, 1994; Bray, 2005). In fact, a broader review on the
historical Chinese urban form shows that the logic of segregating urban space is reflected in various urban elements over time (table 2). The open space, markets and distribution of functions activities are all designed in enclosed patterns with walls, gates and curfew control. These elements, together with neighborhoods, perfectly illustrate the Chinese Feudal rulers’ practices of spatializing the authoritarian power: from the width of streets to the size of residences, from the curfewed neighborhoods to the regulated markets, the state exerts direct control on individuals by regulating their mobility and behaviours.

Table 2 The elements of Chinese ancient urban form (Gaubatz, 1999a)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elements</th>
<th>Early traditional (2(^{nd}) century BC- 10(^{th}) century)</th>
<th>Later traditional (11(^{th}) century - 19(^{th}) century)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Open space</td>
<td>Within walled compounds</td>
<td>Within walled enclosures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Field areas within walls</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Markets</td>
<td>Peddler system</td>
<td>Stalls and shops along streets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Within walled enclosures</td>
<td>Market areas from outside city walls</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monumental structures</td>
<td>Government courtyard compounds</td>
<td>Guide Halls</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distribution of functions</td>
<td>Office in courtyard compounds</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and activities</td>
<td>Residential, administrative and commercial areas contained within walled, separate compounds</td>
<td>Some residential and commercial areas joined, areas differentiated by occupation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.2.2 Hu-kou

Apart from the spatial practices, since Han Dynasty, the feudal Chinese government used a ‘household registration’ (Hu-kou) system to classify citizens into different social classes and govern them by restraining their spatial mobility (Chan, 2008). The technology of Hu-kou was believed to derive from the population statistics system in the West Zhou Dynasty (1046BC-771BC), when the nation-wide population statistics were collected in both cities and rural areas.
to facilitate levy (Lu, 1999). In Han Dynasty (25-220AD) the population statistic system was promoted nationwide and the term ‘Hu-kou’ was officially used as the basic unit of census and a means to implement population control. People from one family were registered as in one ‘household’ (Hu). Once the citizens were registered into a certain household, their personal information was officially recorded and they were forced to live where they were registered. In most of the Chinese feudal dynasties, the household registration system has continually been used by the central government as a means of levy and conscription. The Tang Dynasty (618-907) government developed a sophisticated Hu-kou system, which classified citizens into nine classes (hu-fen-jiu) and levied them in different standards. The following dynasties of Song (960-1279), Yuan(1271-1368), Ming(1368-1644) and Qing(1644-1911) all imitated the Tang’s Hu-kou system and classified citizens according to their land property, social status and career. According to the household registration system, population mobility in feudal China had been kept at a very low level to facilitate sovereign control over different social classes.

2.2.3 Li: Feudal rituals

The strict and hierarchical neighbourhood administration system and social order described above was pervasively supported a hierarchical system of Li, or social rituals (Cook and Powell, 2000; Read, 2003; Gui, 2007). The rituals in Feudal societies, from the statehood-level management to the everyday family life, were described in the Confucius Analects in many famous doctrines. The hierarchical ritual order in sequence was heaven, land, lord, family, teacher and self (Tian, Di, Jun, Qin, Shi). From emperor to ordinary citizens, everyone should respect this ritual order to keep the overall order of the country, as recorded in the Analects that: ‘if for a single day a man could return to
the observation of the rites through overcoming himself, them the whole empire would consider benevolence to be his’ (XII.1).

At neighborhood level, the most influential rites were practiced according to clan rules. In ancient China, family played an important role in people’s social life as most citizens lived in big families with strong sense of belonging to their clans (jia-zu) (Wright, 1962). Within clans there was strict a hierarchy: the clan ancestors had the loftiest status, followed by the clan leaders, family leaders, parents and siblings. One must respect the ethical order meanwhile clearly understand his own status in the family to behave properly. Absolute obedience to parents was required, as recorded in the Analects that: ‘If you see your advice being ignored by your parents, you should not become disobedient but should remain reverent. You should not complain even if you are distressed’ (IV.18). The clan rules to a large extent specified the conduct of individual, family, clan and social life by emphasising the order of kinship and the relationship among members. As Wang Liu (1959) summarised that, the clan rules exercised social control upon the clan’s individual members, and provided moral orientation to them with concrete specifications for proper conduct and desirable and undesirable behaviour.’ In a broader sense, the clan rules regulated the order of families, which were the basic units of the Feudal society, and maintained the social order at grassroots level. Meanwhile, by strengthening the connections among family members, the clan rules to some extent kept citizens from social and political activities outside the clan, which was also believed to consolidate Feudal regimes.

2.3 Confucian Subjectivity

In Feudal China, the deeply-embedded hierarchy in social rites had a profound influence on how Chinese people identify themselves within the society and reflect
themselves in everyday life. As Sigley (1996:468) put that: ‘to be Chinese meant to subscribe to a particular mode of living - to engage in certain ritual practices, ranging from the number of times one bathed per day to the position and rank one was accorded in a funeral procession.’ Wright (1962) summarised some classical behaviour patterns of Chinese advocated by Confucianism as following:

(1) submissiveness to authority—parents, elders and superiors
(2) submissiveness to the norms
(3) reverence for the past and respect for history
(4) love for traditional learning
(5) esteem for the force of example
(6) primacy of broad moral cultivation over specialized competence
(7) noncompetitiveness
(8) self-respect in adversity
(9) punctiliousness in treatment of others

The first five personalities described above all required people to identify themselves first in a group, then within specific hierarchies. In their daily interpersonal contacts, people were reminded about the hierarchy in all sorts of relationship: the parent-children relationships, relationship between brothers, marriage relationships, clan relationship, friendship and so on. Similarly, people’s respect for history, norms, tradition and examples all derived from their acknowledgement of hierarchy. The following four personalities on the other hand, reminded people to keep reflecting and cultivating themselves in their contact with others. In Confucianism, self is the always the center and souse of doing things and has the capacity of developing itself according to its interaction with the world (Cheng, 2004: 125). This indicated that one should rely
on himself to improve his personalities, knowledge and then become a better person. Based on this doctrine, individuals became the microcosms of the society: by achieving a perfect moral harmony in person, political harmony can be achieved and by regulating themselves, individuals can contribute to an organized social order (Kupperman, 2004).

The historical review above provided a governmentality-inspired perspective for many well-know governing approaches in ancient China. To summarize, according to explicitly reinforcing social hierarchy, both the widely applied ‘Zhou-li’ spatial planning system and the social norms were used by Feudal emperors to legitimize and consolidate their regimes. At neighborhood level, the Feudal rulers designed enclosed compound neighborhoods and used the technologies of wall, gates, curfew to exert regulation on citizens’ mobility and behaviours. Meanwhile, the Feudal rituals, especially the Confucian doctrines and clan rules played a pivotal role in regulating the citizens’ self-identification and behaviors in their relationship with their families and neighbours. This paper will now move to discuss the governemntalities of the Maoist regime between 1949 and 1977, which is widely recognized as an upheaval of the historical Chinese governing approaches meanwhile still have pervasive influences on nowadays’ neighborhood governance.


After the Chinese Communist Party came into power in 1949, the Chinese government adopted a rigid socialist system for the next three decades and launched massive political movements in attempt to build a completely new social structure. It looked that there was a huge revolution in the government’s governing approach: the government firmly renounced Feudal rites in its discourses and launched all sorts of new spatial practices in urban construction to eliminate the Confucian and other Feudal rites’ influence. However, a deeper exploration showed that some Feudal governmental
rationalities were implicitly inherited by the socialist government to legitimize its regime and facilitate exercising power at neighborhood level. Specifically, although the government adopted some new technologies to design and manage neighbourhoods, these practices still aimed to shape collective-oriented subjectivity (Table 3).

Table 3. Some governmentalities in China’s Socialist urban neighborhood governance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Governmental rationalities</th>
<th>Spatialize authoritarian power according to Hu-kou and urban planning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Legitimate hegemony by breaking the traditional social norms and building a new Socialist norm system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government technologies</td>
<td>‘Dan-wei’ compound</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Street Office- Residents’ Committee (S-R) system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Characteristics of citizen’s subjectivity</td>
<td>Collective-oriented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Political active</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.1 Inherited governmental rationalities

After the foundation of P. R. China, the country was in an urgent need of post-war construction. To facilitate its administration, the Chinese government inherited the Feudal rulers’ rationality to spatialize power in its practice of urban planning—firstly in the population mobility control between the rural and urban spaces, secondly in the spatial design. The Hu-kou Policy continued to be used to restrain the rural-urban population mobility. In January 1958, the first household management law—The People's Republic of China Household Registration Ordinance—was promulgated to implement a city-rural dual management system (Cheng-xiang-er-yuan-guan-li). This ordinance, by following the tradition, classified citizens into two categories according to their places of birth: urban citizens were registered as
‘Urban Householders’ and rural citizens were registered as ‘Rural Householders’. The rural householders were not allowed to seek job in cities and the transfer of households was extremely hard.

Meanwhile in cities, the Feudal logic of demarcating space into compound forms and creating social space with these compounds can be easily found in the appearance of the Socialist neighborhoods of ‘Dan-wei’. As Yang put that:

‘In the past the basic unit of city was the courtyard house, which corresponded to the family; now the basic unit of the city is the compound, which corresponds to the Dan-wei. While these two organisational units in fact represent two different types of social structure, the enclosed compound form and the implication of wall culture have continued in an unbroken historical line’ (1994:254).

The walls demarcated the space of neighborhoods, as in the past they defined the realm of family (Bray, 2005). In many ancient cities, neighbourhoods were designed in very large size with comprehensive functions (Wan, 2013). In socialist cities we found the same planning logic: the Dan-wei compounds were designed into enclosed spaces, which contained factories, commerce and comprehensive infrastructures. Most citizens’ life radius was mainly within the Dan-wei compounds (Chai, 1996). With these demarcated compounds, both the Feudal and Socialist government made to create a social space for citizens and manage them as a group.

Social norms continued to played an essential role in legitimizing hegemony. Following the traditional governing strategy described in the Stratagems of the Warring State, the Chinese government tried to build a new norm system to support its regime. The hierarchy-focused Feudal norms were defined as backward and exploitive and were
dismissed while Marxism and Leninism were attributed as the core values to guide and regulate social behaviors. However, the contents of many advocated Socialist norms actually derived from ancient norms, especially Confucian norms. For example, on the Eighteenth CPC National Congress, the Socialist codes of conduct were defined as ‘patriotism, delication to work, integrity and amity.’ All these codes could be found in the Confucian Analects. As many researchers pointed out that, the specificity of Chinese socialism is that it is built upon a mature Confucian norm system. Therefore many proposed norms were more or less based on some Confucian doctrines meanwhile with Socialist theoretical support (Zhao, 2002).

3.2 New Government technologies

The 20th century saw a population proliferation and persistent urbanization process in China. The urban form became more diverse and irregular in pattern. Many walled neighborhoods compounds were replaced by open and street-form neighborhoods. As the urban economy prospered and urban life became more diverse, the government gradually lost direct control over the neighborhood. After 1949, the government launched new many practices to strengthen the neighborhood-level administration. Spatially, the Dan-wei compounds were planned to replace the ancient gated neighborhoods and created new social spaces for citizens. Institutionally, the state-owned enterprises (Dan-wei) and a two-tier administration system, namely Street Office-Residents’ Committee- together took on the role of public administration at neighborhood level.

3.2.1 Dan-wei compound

In Maoist era, the state-owned enterprises (Dan-wei) took charge of providing accommodation and public services for their employees. To enhance productivity, they
usually constructed the residences close to the factories and basic idea formed the predominant form of neighborhood in Maoist China- Dan-wei compound. The planning logic behind was to create a neighborhood environment that combined citizens’ daily life with collective labour. Typical Dan-wei compounds were designed into enclosed neighborhoods with comprehensive functions. Factories and working areas were usually the functional centres of the compounds. Living areas and other supporting facilities were allocated around the compound. The Socialist planners believed that spatial forms could operate like machines for the transformation of culture. Therefore when designing the Dan-wei compounds, they arranged the workshop, dormitories, canteen, kindergarten and sports grounds within a symmetrical and handy space to facilitate the daily needs of a working community, with the hope of formulating a new social order on the basis of social class (Bray 2005: 93). Indeed, the Dan-wei compounds to a large extent broke the cosmological and hierarchical order of the Confucian family and formulated a new neighborhood-based social order. The spatial arrangement of the living and working spaces in Dan-wei compounds easily enhanced the social network among the residents as they had highly similar social and life circle. For the citizens, the traditional family-based social lives were shattered and replaced by the intimacy with their colleagues, neighbours and leaderships. Therefore, many domestic researchers described the Dan-wei compounds as ‘mini-societies’ as they were not only merely a spatial unit, but also contributed to the foundation of a collective culture and created a strong sense of belonging for citizens (Huang and Low, 2008).

3.2.2 Street Office- Residents’ Committee system (S-R system)

As the Dan-wei played the predominant role in delivering public goods and social welfare to citizens, most citizens had their housing, medical care and education services provided by their Dan-weis for free. There were only a small number of urban
residents could not enjoy these welfares such as the disabled, unemployed and some socially disadvantaged groups. To administrate them, the government established a delegated organ, namely Street Office (jie-dao-ban-shi-chu), at the street level as a stopgap measure to organise urban residents who do not yet belong to any Dan-wei (Bray, 2006: 533). The official institutional functions of the street office defined by the 1954 Urban Street Office Organisation Regulation were: (1) Help municipal government and district government implement correspondent policies. (2) Supervise Residents Committees with their daily work. (3) Reflect the multitude’s opinions to higher level government. Meanwhile, at a more grassroots level, a neighborhood-based resident self-governing organisation, called ‘Residents’ Committee’ (Ju-min-wei-yuan-hui), was established to work with the Street Office at the urban neighborhood level. The Residents’ Committee was defined as a ‘mass organisation founded by residents and has its members democratically elected by the multitude to coordinate with the Street Office to implement policies and accomplish relevant work targets’ (1954 Urban Street Office Organisation Regulation). The members of Residents’ Committee worked full time as ‘representatives of residents’. The Street Office and the Residents’ Committee formed a grassroots administration system – S-R system (jie-ju-zhi) – which as a supplement of Dan-wei system.

In Maoist China, the Dan-wei had comprehensive functions and developed with strong local influence (Lu & Perry, 1997:176). The S-R system however, worked at neighborhood level with very limited authority and power. The disparity of power between the Dan-wei and the S-R system lasted through the Maoist era. In 1957, the central government postponed local governments’ urban planning schemes and enhanced the Dan-wei’s administrative function. Dan-wei substituted most functions of local governments to administer the urban residents. During the Cultural Revolution
(1966-1976), the central government further strengthened the administrative power of Dan-wei and the S-R system was transferred into a pure political institution called the ‘Revolutionary Committee’ (ge-ming-wei-yuan-hui). The Revolutionary Committees were nominally in charge of urban neighborhood affairs but actually handed most resources over to Dan-wei and the government power was almost vacant at the street level in cities (Murphey, 1980; zhu, 1999).

3.3 Dan-wei subjectivity

Although the Maoist government’s spatial practice of Dan-wei compound broke the traditional family-based social order and formulated a working class-based social order, these practices still concentrated on producing collective rather than individual modes of subjectivity. Like the Confucian clan rules which specified clear roles and statuses for different family members, the Socialist Danwei organize its members by allocating them specific work and roles. Civil affairs such as labour training, education, housing distribution and the management of personal information were all carried out in unity in specific time and space. The life circle and life style of citizens, from the costume to the everyday food, were all highly unified. The standardization of living and working spaces within Dan-wei reinforced the principles of egalitarianism and the residents’ common identity (Bray, 2005). From this perspective, both the feudal clan and Socialist Danwei worked towards producing a disciplined, collective and loyal urban population.

Political activeness was another product of the Socialist government practices. Differing from the feudal governors who kept the citizens away from political issues, the Maoist government actively involve citizens in political lives to strengthen their political loyalty. Political activism was attributed a high-rank virtue of citizen in the government discourses (Solomon, 1969). According to massive neighborhood-based
political campaigns and propagandas, the Communist Party cultivated a group of activists in neighborhood who worked between the government and residents as mediators. Theses activists were regarded as key operational figures in political mobilisation and surveillance (Read, 2003): they passed down political orders to residents and mobilised political participation from bottom according to frequent private contact with their neighbours. This approach was totally contradictory to the Feudal neighborhood governance.

To summarize, the socialist Chinese government, although made clear claims for rebellion against the Feudal governing approaches, actually inherited the fundamental historical rationalities of legitimising and consolidating its regime by explicit population mobility control and normative regulations. With the new technologies of Dan-wei compounds and the street-level S-R administrative system, the government attempted to break the family-based social order in neighborhoods and establish working class-based neighborhood social networks. All these new technologies were applied on the basis of a population which was fundamentally shaped by traditional Chinese values, and still aim to reinforce its collectivism. This paper will now move to explore the governmentalities in post-Maoist neighborhood governance, which present both inheritance of history and introduntion of western experiences in front of the challenge of rapid social transition.


Since 1978, the Chinese central government began to reform the economic structure and embraced a more liberal ‘market economy’ system due to serious financial deficit. To stimulate urban economy, the government loosened its Hu-kou policy control on population mobility and allowed rural residents to seek job in cities. The following
three decades saw a massive urbanization process, in which the number, size and population of city proliferated around China. For the Chinese government, administering an opening society with a huge and increasingly fluid population is an unprecedented challenge. The diversifying social stratification, increasing population mobility and influx of rural-to-urban migrants has brought about huge pressure for urban governance. The socialist administration system which relied heavily on the Dan-wei turned out to be unsuited to the transitional urban society as many state-owned enterprises bankrupted with the shock of market economy.

In the 1990s, a series of reforms were adopted in the realm of urban neighborhood governance, from which we can see the government’s transforming rationalities. Firstly, space played a much weaker role than before in regulating population mobility, as the government’s urban spatial practices became market-oriented. Secondly, the government handed over the public services which used to be delivered by the Dan-weis to local governments, meanwhile devolving a part of this responsibility to private sectors, social sectors and individuals due to western influence. Thirdly, the government brought back the traditional Chinese rituals to maintaining social cohesion meanwhile cautiously brought in western institutional experiences and discourses in the hope of steadily reform the neighborhood administration system from a rigid socialist to a more diverse and liberal system, without harming the Communist Party’s political stability. With the new technologies of ‘She-qu’ and ‘wang-ge’, the post-Maoist government worked towards implementing more soft control over citizens’ thoughts and conduct and shaped more multifaceted subjectivities (Table 4).

Table 4. Some governmentalities in China’s post-Maoist urban neighborhood governance

| Governmental | • Market-oriented spatial practices  
|              | • Delegate administrative function |
4.1 Transforming rationalities

In the post-Maoist era, the Chinese government’s spatial practices differed largely from the Socialist era. After bringing market economy system, the government’s overall strategy of urban planning changed from evenly distributing industries and facilities in compounds to flexibly developing urban lands according to market forces. To stimulate urban land economy, the government reformed the land ownership in the 1982 Constitution and declared the state’s ownership of urban lands (ibid). The 1990 Provision Regulation on the Granting and Transferring of Land Rights over State-owned Land in Cities and Towns for the first time, recognized the ‘land use rights’ as a commodity and allowed the transfer of land use rights. It meant that the use right of urban land within built up areas could be temporarily ‘transferred’ to enterprises and individuals by local governments. The ‘land use right transfer fees’ then became an important aspect of local revenue. To increase land income, local governments launched massive construction projects in cities since the 1990s. The Socialist urban form which was based on Dan-wei compounds was quickly shattered and replaced by market-oriented urban form which could be widely found in western countries. The government still demarcated neighborhoods into gridded administrative units but it had very limited
control over the neighborhood’s land use development as the property rights diversified in urban development.

As the socialist Dan-wei quit the stage in national economy, the central government devolved increasing fiscal independence and administrative discretion to local governments to strengthen the local government’s ability to govern and provide public services. The delegation of power was promoted between the municipal government and lower levels of public institutions in many big Chinese cities during the 1990s. At the neighborhood level, a new administration system –namely She-qu – was promoted by local governments to replace the Dan-wei system and deliver public services. The Street Office- Residents’ Committee system, which used to play a marginal role, was delegated to take charge of the She-qu system. Meanwhile, as the Chinese society became increasingly fragmented within the high-speed development, the Socialist values and norms were strongly shocked by influences of international trends of thought. To maintain the social order in neighborhood, the government on the one hand brought back the Confucian norms which emphasized family-based ethical order and self-cultivation (Hoffman, 2010), on the other hand began to bring in the western values of ‘public participation’ in attempt to cultivate more responsible and self-governed residents (Hoffman, 2014). The government’s ‘She-qu’ and recent ‘Wang-ge’ practices demonstrated its changing rationalities.

4.2 Hybrid government technologies

4.2.1 She-qu:

The term ‘She-qu’ refers to a both sociological concept and a geographical concept in Chinese: firstly, it is a demarcated spatial unit with clear geographical boundaries; more importantly, it refers to a street-level administration system (Bray, 2006). In most cities, the two-tier S-R system plays the administrating body of She-qu.
In 2000, the Ministry of Civil Affair officially demarcated the territory of She-qu as ‘the area under the jurisdiction of the enlarged Residents Committee.’ (2000). Unlike Dan-wei compounds, the new She-qu neighborhoods take a variety of spatial forms. The most common form of them are the gated ‘Xiao-qu’ enclaves which are built by private developers. In the Xiao-qu enclaves, a new form of community-based organisation named ‘property-owner committee’ (ye-zhu-wei-yuan-hui) began to play an active role in rights protection and many public affairs in recent years. The S-R system on the other hand, took on the function of delivering the social insurance, part of medical care and some public services to residents.

Although gaining increasing functions and financial independency in recent years, both the property-owner committees and the S-R systems have very limited control over the residents’ individual lives and much weaker capacity of social mobilisation than the socialist state-owned enterprises. To maintain social order, the government begins to embrace more hybrid technologies to govern urban neighborhoods. In the central government’s 2006 ‘building a harmonious society’ strategy, the Confucian ideal of ‘harmony’ was officially reintroduced by the government to reinforce social stability. The term ‘harmony’ plays a key role in Chinese thoughts through long history and by reintroducing the concept of ‘harmonious society’, the government portrays a different world in which the Chinese traditional virtues such as filial piety, patriotism and collectivism are attributed as the dominating values rather than the ‘Western model of a neoliberal market society which is shaped by profit maximization, wealth idolization, and consumer culture (Heberrer, 2011:58). According to its discourse of ‘harmony’, the Chinese government brings back the Confucian norms of self-cultivation and ethical orders in order to encourage citizens to regulate
themselves and behave properly in their family, neighbourhoods and careers (Hoffman, 2014).

At the neighborhood level, She-qu is targeted as a pivotal arena to ‘build a harmonious society’ and to cultivate responsible, moral and self-regulated citizens (Liu, 2005: 213-221), as the former vice-chairman of P. R. China Zeng Qinghong (2003-2008) states that: ‘She-qu (community) is the cell of society. The harmony of She-qu is the foundation of social harmony. We should regard building harmonious She-qu as the accessing point of our work to build a harmonious society’ (2007). Wan’s research (2013) on Beijing’s neighborhoods indicates that the Confucian norms of ‘filial piety’ and ‘self-dedication’ are reintroduced by the administrative bodies to advocate family-based social tie in neighborhoods and to encourage individual sacrifice for ‘public interest’. Interestingly, in everyday practices, these traditional social norms are demonstrated and advocated by a groups of community activists, including the Residents’ Committee members, wardens and volunteers, who are usually mid-age or elderly Communist Party members, in other words, a heritage of the Maoist activist culture (Read, 2003; Gui, 2007; Heberer, 2011). In Chinese cities there are volunteers and wardens working in different types of neighborhood: in the Xiao-qu neighbourhoods they are named as ‘building warden’ (lou-zhang) while in the traditional house neighborhoods they are called ‘courtyard warden’ (yuan-zhang). Read’s (2003) and Gui’s (2007) empirical research indicated that the Residents’ Committee members, wardens and volunteers played an bridging role between the government and residents, to spread out announcement and collect information. With these community activists, the interactions between residents and governments were transferred into personal contacts, which in many cases avoided conflict. The wardens intended to mobilise residents in persuasive rather than a mandatory manner and make use of their personal
relationships with residents to accomplish political assignments. Meanwhile, residents would express their opinions to the wardens in peaceful ways out of private respect to them. As a matter of fact, when government orders are passed down through the wardens, the political instructions are transformed into personal requests in a narrow scope and the abstract interactions between the government and citizens are transformed into concrete face-to-face conversations between individuals.

4.2.2 ‘Wang-ge’

Since early 2000s, the western discourse of ‘public participation’ were promoted in Chinese government documents with the rationality of handing over a part of public services to the private sector, NGOs and individuals. Following this new strategy, governments around China began to involve the private sectors and NGOs in the areas of property management, public health, rights protection, population management and so on. From 2006, the local governments across China began to adopt a ‘Wang-ge’ (grid) approach to promote electronic technology for urban neighborhood management and further involve non-governmental actors in public service delivery (Xu, 2007). Visually, the Wang-ge looks like an exact regression to the Zhou-li city: a demarcated She-qu is segmented into 100*100 square meters grids and each grid is coded as a basic administrative unit (Jiang & Ren, 2007). Meanwhile, as the Zhou-li city, each grid is assigned with a supervisor who takes charge of inspecting public assets and reporting problems to the government (Jiang, 2009). The difference between Wang-ge and Zhou-li city is that rather than creating enclosed residential compound and restraining mobility, the Wang-ge approach aims to facilitate information exchange and involve more social actors in public service delivery. In each She-qu the government establishes a community service centre. With the help of GIS devices, the Wang-ge supervisor can quickly register problems with each public asset on e-maps and report them to the
community service centre (Yuan, 2007). The staff members in service center will then forward these problems to the professional institutions for fix.

Recently, the wang-ge management was further used to facilitate residents’ daily needs and create jobs for local residents. In Beijing, the community service centers directly took phone calls from the residents and forward their needs such as takeaway order, healthy care and appliance repair to local enterprises and NGOs. In Ningbo, the Residents’ Committees organised unemployed residents to provide property management to the other residents according to the Wange-ge management and created many community-based jobs. By the year of 2008, 52 Chinese cities had adopted Wang-ge management (Wang et al., 2007).

4.3 Post-Maoist subjectivity

Living in the high-speed developing era, the post-Maoist Chinese citizens’ lives are put on a fast track: the older generation experienced a radical urbanization process in the last thirty five years which took the U.S a hundred years to accomplish while the Maoist influence had not totally vanished; young people received very broad and dynamic trend of thoughts from all over the world while some traditional Chinese values were still embedded in their subjectivities. As the Chinese society becomes so heterogeneous, the questions of ‘formation of Chinese people’s subjectivity’ can only be discussed with respect on the dynamic influence of hybrid government technologies and governmental power on individuals, and the hybrid, multifaceted and even ambiguous outcomes. As Hoffman (2014) put in her research of Chinese urban professionals and volunteers that: ‘By focusing on how specific technologies of governing are integrated into subjectivity, we may also see how such elements may combine with a diversity of political ends… In terms of the urban professionals, for instance, at the same time they were enmeshed in governmental regimes and modes of
self-regulation that we could identify as neoliberal, their identities referenced a collective ethos around the nation and a more Maoist-era politics of building the country through labor. Similarly, as volunteers enmesh themselves in processes of responsibilization that reference neoliberalism, the practice of volunteering by individuals and communities also draws on more collectivist Confucian and socialist ethics.’

In neighborhood life, we see the divergence of subjectivity between residents with different age, career and social class. The most obvious divergence is between the community activists and ordinary resident characterized by the generation gap: Read (2003) and Heberer’s (2013) research show that only the older residents, who have been through the Maoist era, have comparatively strong collective consciousness and contribute more to the neighborhood management; the young professionals and migrant residents on the hand, usually feel little responsibility for the maintenance of their neighborhoods (Heberer 2013). Wan’s (2013) research in Beijing features the divergent affect of the governmental power on different residents: while the activists, which only take 1 per cent of the neighborhood’s population, actively involve in the government’s new programs of self-governance, most of the rest residents choose to live with them at a critical distance. Meanwhile, although the government brought back a series of traditional virtues in attempt to cultivate citizens’ social responsibility, these efforts barely worked on young people.

5. Conclusion

This paper explores the connection between the Feudal, Maoist and post-Maoist governmentalities in the realm of urban neighborhood governance. To summarise, spatial practice and social norm have always been regarded by Chinese governors as the
main approaches to legitimize and consolidate their regimes at the neighborhood level. In terms of spatial practices, the Feudal rulers design enclosed compound neighborhoods and use the technologies of wall, gates, curfew to exert direct regulation on citizens’ mobility and behaviours. The rationality of segmenting urban space into administrative unit is inherited by the Maoist government to design enclosed Dan-wei compounds and used by the current government to demarcate the boundary of She-qu neighborhood as well as implement Wang-ge management. The difference however, is that the contemporary government no longer exert direct control over the neighborhoods’ spatial form and the residents’ mobility, but implements more pervasive surveillance over citizens according to modern technologies. Meanwhile, according to spatial demarcation, the governors not only specify a physical living space, but also create a social space for citizens and establish a neighborhood-based social order. In Feudal dynasties, this social order is supported by the hierarchical clan system. In Maoist era, this order is kept by the state-owned enterprises and in the post Maoist era, this order is supposed to be maintained by the neighborhood but is strongly shattered by the fragmenting society. As for social norms, the Feudal rituals, especially the Confucian doctrines and clan rules play a pivotal role in regulating the citizens’ behaviors in their families, neighborhoods and all sorts of relations. These rituals shape collective and hierarchy-respecting subjectivities and still have very fundamental influence on how Chinese people identity themselves in the society nowadays. The Maoist government, although denies the Feudal rituals in vocabulary, is actually pervasively influenced by the traditional norms and worked on cultivating collective subjectivity. The post-Maoist government on the one hand combines the Feudal and Maoist norms and kept cultivating collective and self-regulated residents, on the other hand brings in western
values of ‘public participation’ in order to encourage citizens take over some responsibilities.

As the Chinese society becomes increasingly fragmented in the high-speed development, the government adopts more diverse and hybrid technologies to maintain the social order in neighborhoods. The traditional values are brought back into the government discourses to reinforce the social order in neighborhoods and encourage residents to cultivate and regulate themselves. The Maoist heritage of an intimate neighborhood-based social network and a group of activists are also used to implement social mobilisation. At the same time, western liberal values of ‘public participation’ and ‘self-governance’ quickly take their rise in recent government discourses to devolve part of service functions to the private sector, NGOs and individuals. With these hybrid technologies, the government organises a mixture of hierarchical and regional neighborhood governing system. On the one hand, the community wardens are organised in a hierarchy to pass down the government orders and mobilise participation from local residents. These wardens use their private relations to transfer political assignments into personal requests to their neighbours, which to a large extent avoids conflicts (Sun & Guo, 2000; Zhang & Yang 2003; Gui, 2007). On the other hand, in the new government technology of Wang-ge, increasing non-government institutions and individuals are invited by the government to deliver public services and they formulate a neighborhood-based regional governing network. The co-existence of the hierarchical system and the regional system is caused by the specific context of China’s social transition, but more importantly, it is maintained by the Chinese people living in it, whose subjectivities are shaped by Confucian, socialist, liberal and many other values. This mixed characteristic of the current landscape of Chinese neighborhood governance clearly rectifies the previous literatures on neighborhood governance, which focused
only on the Chinese state’s top-down administrative control over neighborhood or the emerging self-governing network at the bottom level.

The legacy of traditional and Maoist norms to a large extent regulate Chinese people’s behaviours and facilitate the government’s governance. Some values such as patriotism, collectivism, self-dedication and filial piety are still more or less embedded in citizens’ subjectivities (Hoffman, 2010). But in the fast-changing and globalizing society, Chinese people confront increasing cultural shock from all over the world and the traditional values are rapidly supplanted by modern thoughts. The Chinese government is inevitably loosing its control over the citizen’s conduct. In contemporary neighborhoods, the neighborhood relationship is much more remote than in Dan-wei compounds. When the Maoist generation pass away in two or three decades, the government will find it more difficult to cultivate community wardens. On the other hand, the Dan-wei system is likely to totally retreat from China’s urban administration in the next few decades. By that time an important legacy of Dan-wei society – a well-development social network in neighborhoods –will totally to be supplanted by a heterogeneous neighborhood population and bring more challenges to neighborhood governance. As a matter of fact, more empirical research need to be carried out to explore the changing landscape of neighborhood governance, especially the increasingly active participation of non-governmental actors and the formation of citizens’ subjectivities (Hoffman, 2014).

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