This is a repository copy of *What is a land grab? Exploring green grabs, conservation, and private protected areas in southern Chile*.

White Rose Research Online URL for this paper:
http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/82627/

---

**Article:**

https://doi.org/10.1080/03066150.2014.919266

---

**Reuse**
Unless indicated otherwise, fulltext items are protected by copyright with all rights reserved. The copyright exception in section 29 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 allows the making of a single copy solely for the purpose of non-commercial research or private study within the limits of fair dealing. The publisher or other rights-holder may allow further reproduction and re-use of this version - refer to the White Rose Research Online record for this item. Where records identify the publisher as the copyright holder, users can verify any specific terms of use on the publisher’s website.

**Takedown**
If you consider content in White Rose Research Online to be in breach of UK law, please notify us by emailing eprints@whiterose.ac.uk including the URL of the record and the reason for the withdrawal request.
What is a land grab? Exploring green grabs, conservation, and private protected areas in southern Chile

Abstract
Discussions of land grabs for various purposes, including environmental ends, have expanded in recent years, yet land grabbing remains inconsistently defined and poorly understood. Our ability to assess the extent to which land grabs are occurring, and to identify the mixture of factors driving land and resource acquisition, is limited. This paper assesses whether a land grab for conservation is happening in southern Chile, and identifies the various driving forces that combine to drive land acquisitions in the region, based on a detailed exploration of the recent massive growth in privately owned protected areas in the region. This paper finds that the various dominant definitions of land grabs each apply only partially to southern Chile, that land grabs for conservation need to be understood as the latest stage in a longer process by which the region’s natural resources are incorporated into the Chilean and the global economy, and that green grabs interact in various ways with broader resource grabs, particularly for forestry and hydroelectricity. This case study demonstrates the limitations of some definitions of land grabs, particularly their focus on capitalist accumulation within land grabs, their international nature, and their emphasis on legal processes.

Keywords: land grabs; green grabs; conservation; protected areas; neoliberalism; Chile; landgrabbing

Introduction
In recent years, an increasing amount of academic attention has focused on issues of land grabbing, reflected in journal special issues and conferences. This corresponds to a perceived increase in the volume and intensity of land grabs, and a change in their characteristics, as new land grabs take place, driven by new factors, and as new actors use new tools and techniques to appropriate resources, including green grabs of land and resources for environmental purposes such as biodiversity conservation (Zoomers 2010, Peluso and Lund 2011). As with other land grabs, land acquisition for conservation is often considered problematic, undermining local sovereignty, allowing benefits of resources to be captured by outsiders and causing harm to local people (Benjaminsen and Bryceson 2012). Southern Chile has been viewed as a site of conservation land

---

1 This work was supported by the Leverhulme Trust under an Early Career Fellowship. I thank the many helpful interviewees and research participants in Chile for their vital contribution. An early version of this manuscript was presented at a symposium held at London Zoo, 27th March 2013, hosted by the International Institute for Environment and Development, International Land Coalition, Maliasili Initiatives and Zoological Society of London
grabs (Pearce 2012). This paper draws on detailed research to explore whether a land grab for conservation is taking place there, and what broader lessons on land grabbing can be gleaned from this case study. The paper begins by exploring definitions of land grabs and conservation grabs, their historical precedents, and new and emerging trends. It then sets out the history of land acquisition and land grabbing in southern Chile, before exploring the emerging trend of privately owned protected areas in the region, focusing on the motivations of owners and the role of land markets.

Methodology

This paper is informed by an analysis of public documents, grey and academic literature on private conservation in Chile, and a detailed study of the Chilean private protected areas (PPA) movement. This principally consisted of 47 semi-structured interviews conducted between September and December 2011. Forty of these were either owners of a PPA, or an employee of an individual or organisation which owned a PPA, whilst the remaining 7 worked for a public body, corporation, or NGO interacting with PPAs without owning one, although some owners were also involved in NGO campaigns. Overall, interviews were conducted with owners of 27 PPAs and representatives of an additional 20 PPAs. PPAs ranged in size from less than 50 to more than 300,000 hectares. I also observed a number of key events, such as a workshop on private conservation hosted by the Global Environmental Facility of the World Bank, and a campaign launch by the Chilean PPA association hosted by the Chilean Parliament, as described below.

Defining land grabs and green grabs

Various definitions of land grabbing exist throughout the academic and grey literature. All of them share the idea that land grabbing is about more than just changing ownership or usage rights over large areas of land and attendant resources such as water or forest carbon, yet there are differences over what these additional features might be. The UN’s Food and Agriculture Organisation understands land grabs as land acquisitions which are large scale, involving foreign governments, and which have a negative impact on food security (FAO 2011). This is a narrow definition which excludes private actors and acquisitions with minimal impacts on food security but which might have other impacts on local lives and livelihoods, or which might prompt concerns about broader issues, such as national sovereignty. The International Land Coalition (2011), which campaigns for land rights for the rural poor, emphasises the potential or actual harm done to local people, defining land grabs as acquisitions or concessions that are
in violation of human rights, particularly the equal rights of women; (ii) not based on free, prior and informed consent of the affected land-land users; (iii) not based on a thorough assessment, or are in disregard of social, economic and environmental impacts, including the way they are gendered; (iv) not based on transparent contracts that specify clear and binding commitments about activities, employment and benefits sharing, and; (v) not based on effective democratic planning, independent oversight and meaningful participation.

This definition would exclude transactions where land is sold because of the economic compulsion of poverty, which are consensual yet not fully voluntary (Edelman, Oya and Borras 2013). Four recent papers within this journal use rather different understandings of land grabs. Zoomers (2011, 429) emphasizes their international nature rather than their impact, defining land grabs as ‘large-scale, cross-border land deals or transactions that are carried out by transnational corporations or initiated by foreign governments. They concern the lease (often for 30–99 years), concession or outright purchase of large areas of land in other countries for various purposes’. Such a definition of land grabbing as the foreignisation of space has dominated political and popular discussions of land grabbing in Latin America (Borras et al. 2012). Benjaminsen and Bryceson (2011, 1) are more specific on what constitutes a large area, and are clearer about who is losing and gaining land, defining land grabs as ‘transfer of the right to own or use the land from local communities to foreign investors through large-scale land acquisitions (more than 200 ha per deal)’, describing them as a ‘new colonialism’. By emphasising their international aspects, this definition excludes consideration of grabbing by national elites or outsiders from different parts of the same country, which is relevant to the Chilean case where many PPAs in the far south are geographically, culturally, economically and politically very distant from the political and economic centre of power in Santiago (see also Nelson et al. 2012, Visser et al. 2012). Their paper analyses grabbing of marine as well as terrestrial resources. Fairhead et al. (2012, 238) similarly characterise land grabs by who gains and loses land, referring to the ‘transfer of ownership, use rights and control over resources that were once publicly or privately owned – or not even the subject of ownership – from the poor (or everyone including the poor) into the hands of the powerful’. Within these broader grabs, they identify a sub-set of green grabs, defined as ‘the appropriation of land and resources for environmental ends’ (238).

Gardner (2012, 378) classifies it in terms of policies, not outcomes, and a changing political economy of land and resources, stating that ‘The “global land grab” is shorthand for a growing assessment and critique of current economic and political policies that advocate for the privatization of land and resources in the name of economic growth, job creation and food security’. By focusing on privatisation for economic and food security, Gardner excludes conservation related land grabs which may be more philanthropic than market-based. It is a looser definition that could describe a
number of processes linked to global neoliberalism, rather than land acquisition per se. Like other definitions emphasising privatisation, it excludes grabs in countries such as Chile where land and resources are already highly privatised. Outside of this journal, Borras et al. (2012, 405) understand land grabs in terms of control, defining them as

the capturing of control of relatively vast tracts of land and other natural resources through a variety of mechanisms and forms involving large-scale capital that often shifts resource use to that of extraction, whether for international or domestic purposes, as capital’s response to the convergence of food, energy and financial crises, climate change mitigation imperatives and demands for resources from newer hubs of global capital.

Importantly, using one definition rather than another allows certain processes, actors, and individual acquisitions to be included or excluded. Yet despite such differences, there is a shared sense that there is something new in current land grabs, that they are increasing in extent, and that they will increase further in future (Zoomers 2010, White et al. 2011). The widespread use of the term ‘land grab’ rather than ‘land acquisition’ assumes a negative connotation, particularly an asymmetry of power between those gaining control of land and other parties involved (Margulis, McKeon and Borras 2013).

Table 1 outlines the key features which are used to define land grabs across various characterisations. In defining what constitutes a land grab, there is a tension between a broader definition based on the act of transferring rights to resources from one user, or set of users, to another, and basing it in a narrower fashion on the harm that it does or the unjust or harmful manner in which the transfer of rights occurs. In this paper, I am seeking to understand land grabs which are broadly defined rather than being predicated on the existence of harm, which allow for internal as well as international grabs, which focuses on control of land and resources rather than ownership, which recognises that land grabbing goes beyond privatisation of commonly held resources whilst recognising the inequalities of power involved. Land grabs are defined in this paper as the transfers of control over property and resources over large areas of territory from local control to more powerful outsiders. Green grabs are land grabs undertaken primarily for environmental reasons. This paper does not ignore the other definitions altogether, and they are discussed in the conclusion.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Defining feature</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
There are clear historical precedents to current land grabs and green grabs. Governments have long dispossessed rural people, particularly indigenous groups, of their land and resources to create conservation projects or in the name of sustainable resource management (Brockington and Igoe 2006, Kelly 2011). These precedents are important, as their legacy impacts on current processes, and because they illustrate the power of different actors in tackling land grabs (Edelman, Oya and Borras 2013). Yet the current wave of green grabs has several unique features (for a summary of unique features in current land grabs more generally, see Zoomers 2010, Edelman, Oya and Borras 2013).

Firstly, their scale and intensity is greater than in the past. Although data remains uncertain, it appears that control over greater amounts of land and resources are being transferred than in previous eras (Zoomers 2010). The trend may grow substantially in the future as environmental markets and their supporting mechanisms develop and strengthen (Fairhead et al. 2012, Hill 2013).

Secondly, whilst old drivers of grabs remain, such as the creation of protected areas, new drivers have emerged, including new crops such as biofuels and new resources such as forest carbon. These increase the value not just of agricultural areas but also forests, making them more attractive to speculators (Zoomers 2010, Larson et al. 2013).

Thirdly, global shifts towards neoliberal forms of governance in recent decades have facilitated current land grabs. New laws and structures have enabled new forms of land grabs, such as carbon markets and regulations which allow investors to purchase rights to forest resources through

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Land and resources controlled by foreign individuals/companies/states</th>
<th>FAO, Zoomers 2010, Benjaminsen and Bryceson 2011</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Land and resources moving towards increased privatisation</td>
<td>Benjaminsen and Bryceson 2011, Fairhead et al 2012, Gardner 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of free, prior and informed consent in transfer of control of land and resources</td>
<td>ILC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of adequate planning-democratic oversight</td>
<td>ILC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transfers of land and resources which are significantly socially harmful</td>
<td>FAO, ILC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1. Key features in definitions of land grabs, and some authors who use these in their definition.
schemes such as the UN Collaborative Programme on Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD). Countries have liberalized their land markets and land ownership laws, pushed by organisations like the World Bank, allowing outsiders to purchase large amounts land with relative ease (Zoomers 2010). For example, moves away from socialism in Tanzania in the late 1980s and early 1990s greatly liberalised land markets, allowing national and international elites to gain control over extensive areas of formerly state-owned land (Nelson et al. 2012). Peluso and Lund (2012) argue that whereas in previous decades land grabbers were principally local elites, neoliberal globalisation has meant they are now mainly states and corporations, often with complex ownership structures obscuring who is behind recent land purchases. Reform of property laws has often involved processes of formalising traditional or customary tenure, an opportunity used by elites and states to grab land and resources by defining ownership in ways which allows them to assume control – for example, by classifying land as vacant and empty, allowing states to take control or sell it on, even if these areas have a long history of human occupation (Peluso and Lund 2012, Neves and Igoe 2012). Land grabs involve someone, somewhere, legitimising the transfer of ownership, such as courts recognising property documents or governments reclassifying land (Peluso and Lund 2012). Who does this, and the extent to which this important process is contested, varies greatly. Margulis et al (2013) argue that land grabbing is as much about controlling the institutions of land governance as it is about controlling resources.

Fourthly, green grabs today are more deeply integrated into global capitalism, particularly as environmental markets associated with current green grabs (such as biofuels, carbon credits, and ecotourism) are increasingly seen not just as a solution to environmental problems, but as sources of economic growth and promising new business opportunities (Benjaminsen and Bryceson 2012). Nature is being turned into a derivative to be traded, or reclassified as a provider of services and capital. Green grabs are often based not on transferring land titles, but on the marketization and transfer of rights to benefit from resources. For example, many protected areas throughout the global south remain as state owned land, yet the ability to benefit financially from them is grabbed by companies granted exclusive ecotourism or carbon trading licenses (Benjaminsen and Bryceson 2012, Ojeda 2012). Filer’s (2012) study of attempted REDD projects in Papua New Guinea shows problems that emerge when forest land titles remain as customary property but where disreputable ‘carbon cowboys’ attempt to claim and sell the forests’ carbon value.

Fifthly, neoliberalism has meant that new and powerful discourses and actors have emerged supporting and legitimising land grabs. International NGOs have an increased role in national and
global environmental governance, and have pushed market based environmentalism (Benjaminsen and Bryceson 2012, Neves and Igoe 2012). Support and legitimacy for green grabs is provided by discourses expounding markets in land and resources as a neutral, powerful, and efficient way of increasing agricultural output and human development, whilst solving environmental crises (Zoomers 2010, Benjaminsen and Bryceson 2012, Fairhead et al. 2012). Corson and MacDonald (2012) highlight the role of large international conferences in facilitating land grabs, as sites where quantitative targets on issues such as protected area coverage are set, providing further legitimacy for outsiders seeking to control land and resources for environmental purposes, and as places where actors from different sectors can meet, exchange ideas, and do business in environmental resources.

Green grabs have complex relationships with rural resource users in the global South. Whilst conservation organisations have criticised land grabs which they see as harmful to the environment and local people, they also stand accused of driving grabs such as biofuel or carbon sequestration projects which can separate local people from essential resources (Larson et al. 2012). Despite the emergence of rights-based approaches in mainstream conservation organisations, there is uncertainty over how to resolve tensions between conservation goals and land rights agendas. For example, WWF propose supporting land rights, with the caveat that they might oppose the claims of local people which they consider as ecologically damaging (Kashwan 2013). Beymer-Ferris and Bassett (2011) cite a case where WWF were complicit in the evictions of local people from a REDD project in Tanzania. Even projects ostensibly aimed to empower empowering rural people to control of natural resources have been undermined and used by states seeking to grab resources (Larson 2012). In contrast, new forms of land use may offer ways for rural communities to strengthen control over natural resources, particularly as states roll back from managing natural resources under neoliberalism (Benjaminsen and Bryceson 2012). For example, local people may use REDD projects to strengthen their sovereignty over land, so long as supporting legal and political structures are in place (Agarwal et al. 2011, Larson 2012).

**Current land grabs for conservation**

Whilst much of the current debate about green grabs has focused on biofuels and REDD, grabs for biodiversity conservation remain important yet understudied. States have long appropriated land and disenfranchised rural people in order to create protected areas for biodiversity conservation, often linked to broader moves to assert state control over rural areas. As with broader green grabs, some current land grabs for conservation share some similarities with past grabs – such as the
(neo)colonial relationships between foreign conservationists and local people, the frequent relative powerlessness of local people, and the continuation of many historic discourses on nature, society, and wilderness (Adams and Hutton 2007) – yet there are several key differences present in some current land transactions labelled as conservation grabs. Firstly, new conservation grabs often use the new tools and techniques available for green grabs. Current conservation land and sea grabs are often linked to other forms of resource grabbing, such as the appropriation of resources for REDD schemes, with biodiversity mentioned as a co-benefit alongside carbon capture and economic growth. Secondly, new actors have become an increasingly important part of conservation land grabs under neoliberal governance. Corson (2011) demonstrates how the increased involvement of international conservation NGOs led to an expansion of state protected areas, enclosing commons land for conservation. Kelly (2012) argues that NGOs have become a new colonial force, acting through Southern governments to establish new protected areas, and controlling how benefits from these are distributed. The boundaries between different actors are often blurred, and multiple actors are simultaneously involved in land grabs. For example, the controversial Grumetti ranch is simultaneously a state owned game area, a private corporation, and an NGO, all funded by the same source (Igoe 2007). Within the Loliondo Game Reserve in Tanzania, certain rights such as hunting rights were granted to an Emirati company in an opaque and allegedly corrupt manner. Whilst the de jure rights granted stopped short of ownership, the Emirati company were able to use their connections to the Tanzanian government to extend their de facto rights and prevent others from entering the property, including locals holding resource use rights (Benjaminsen and Bryceson 2012, Nelson et al. 2012, Gardner 2012). One NGO, the African Parks Network, specialises in taking over all aspects of financing and managing ‘failing’ protected areas from African states, funded by exploiting monopoly rights to tourism income, making it unclear whether these are state or NGO administered parks (Holmes 2012). The African Parks Network have been accused of complicity in a conservation land grab in Nech Sar National Park, Ethiopia, which resulted in evictions and exclusion of indigenous residents (Adams and Hutton 2007). Recent decades have seen increases in the number and extent of privately protected areas, operated by NGOs, businesses, cooperatives, and individuals, some of which are accused of being conservation land grabs (Holmes 2013).

Thirdly, conservation land grabs are increasingly wrapped up with markets, as new grabs are driven by the emergence of new conservation commodities such as carbon credits and the expansion of old ones - for example, private conservation in Southern Africa has increased since the early 1990s, linked to expansion in the tourism and hunting economy, facilitated by new laws which allow landowners to own wild game enclosed within their land (Zoomers 2010, Snijders 2012). These game
reserves are relatively elitist, in that only the wealthy have the resources to purchase land and construct enclosures to take advantage of these markets and laws. Kelly (2012) argues that, more than at any historical point, protected areas and conservation represent sites of primitive accumulation, places where capitalism can expand, and where land and resources are appropriated for profit. This includes state protected areas, where although states may retain land titles, the ability to benefit from tourism, payments for ecosystem services, and other forms of commodifying biodiversity, are captured by elites – following Margulis et al (2013) reframing of land grabbing as control grabbing, conservation land grabbing is not just about who owns land, but who can control and benefit from its resources (Corson 2011, Corson and McDonald 2011, Kelly 2012, Igoe and Neves 2012). For example, Ojeda (2012) shows how elites gained and enforced a monopoly on lucrative contracts to operate ecotourism activities in parts of Tayrona National Park, Colombia, in an opaque manner. Counter-intuitively, the devolution of control of resources in Tanzania through community based wildlife management laid the foundations for land grabs, as communities created Wildlife Management Areas to generate income for themselves, which were later appropriated by the state through subsequent wildlife legislation (Benjaminsen and Bryceson 2012). Powerful parties can take advantage of the creation of new laws on resource use, or the eviction of residents of protected areas, to take control of resources in the name of conservation and benefit financially from it (Timms 2011, Neves and Igoe 2012). In contrast, markets in conservation can also lead to increased tenure security for rural communities, giving them extra revenue and thus empowering them (Gardner 2012). It is important to note that perhaps unlike other forms of green grabs, not all the non-state actors behind conservation land grabs have commercial activity within them – for example, many private protected areas are motivated by philanthropy or are aimed at private recreation, such as Loliondo.

This literature review indicates that any consideration of conservation land grabs should be attuned to historical precedents and the presence of new actors and new market mechanisms. I now explore the case of southern Chile, and how a historical trajectory of land grabbing interacts with new conservation grabs.

**A history of land grabbing in Southern Chile**

This paper explores land grabs for conservation in Chile, which is an excellent case study because it was the first country to enact widespread and deep neoliberal reforms, following the coup of 1973, and therefore it may illuminate trends in other countries which have made similar reforms in recent years. Whilst there is some grey literature exploring land grabbing for conservation in Chile (e.g.
There is as yet no academic literature on it. This paper focuses on the southern third of Chile, from region XIV southwards, for two reasons. Firstly, the majority of the private protected areas in Chile are found in this area—72% (226 from a total of 312) purported private protected areas found in Chile are located here, corresponding to 87% (1,393,331 of 1,607,195 hectares) of the total area under private protection\(^2\). Secondly, whilst the region has been occupied for at least 12,500 years, it has only become integrated into the state since the mid to late 19\(^{th}\) century for the northern part of the study area, and the 20\(^{th}\) century for the southern portion. This paper argues that over the last 150 years, powerful actors have acquired control over the land and resources of the region, often facilitated by the Chilean state, and incorporated them into the global economy. This paper argues that this process continues today, and that PPAs are part of this.

Initial southwards incursions into this region from the 1860s were driven primarily by rising global grain prices, leading the Chilean state to seek fertile land in Mapuche\(^3\) territory, as well as a desire to expand national territory, facilitated by improved transport (Clapp 1998, Armesto et al. 2001, Azocar et al. 2005). The Mapuche resisted integration until subjugation during the Occupation of Araucania (1861-1883), a series of military interventions, treaties and settler incursions. The Chilean government encouraged Chileans and new European immigrants to settle on the frontier, creating a ministry of colonisation, although relatively few colonists arrived (Azocar et al. 2005, Klubock 2011). Much of the land acquired from the Mapuche was done illegally, through deception, fraudulent titles, and appropriation (Clapp 1998, Aageson 1998, Armesto et al. 2001, Azocar et al. 2005). As railroad construction opened up the northern part of the area in the early 20\(^{th}\) century, more powerful actors aligned to the state amassed large estates and forestry enterprises through state grants of land and abuses including fraudulent contracts and land deeds (Klubock 2011). Tensions rose between large landowners and peasants, both settler and Mapuche, resulting in a series of protests, rebellions, and occupations of both private land and state forest reserves. A series of laws were enacted during the 1920s to regularise and clarify land titles, reduce tensions, further colonisation and expand production (op. cit.). Although indigenous populations were originally only very sparse south of Mapuche territory, they were reduced to a few families by the 1950s.

---

\(^2\) This statistic comes from a survey conducted by a Chilean NGO in 2005 (Maldonado and Faundez, 2005), supplemented by data collected by the author during fieldwork interviews in 2011.

\(^3\) The Mapuche are the largest indigenous group in modern Chile, comprising approximately 9% of the current national population. They comprise 4 sub-groups (Huilliche, Pewenche, Picunche, Molunche), united by shared features of culture and language. They historically occupied the area south of the river Bio Bio as far as the island of Chiloé, mostly in Chile but extending also into Argentina.
By the 1960s, the highly unequal patterns of land ownership at a national level led to political movements for land reform. The government of Eduardo Frei Montalba (1964-70) introduced limited land reforms, including some restitution of land to Mapuche communities, but were opposed by the landed elite. The more radical government of Salvador Allende (1970-73) forced through sweeping reforms, including expanding collectively managed farmland (Murray 2002, Azocar et al. 2005). The political and economic crisis resulting from the Allende’s government widespread reforms resulted in the coup of 11th September 1973. The subsequent military regime of Augusto Pinochet almost totally reversed previous land reforms in a process of radical neoliberalisation. Redistributed land was largely restored to original landowners, and state properties privatised. Legal reforms made it very easy for communal land titles to be broken up into private land holdings, including those held by indigenous communities, as individual rights were greatly prioritised over social cohesion and communitarian land management (Azocar et al. 2005). The liberalisation of the Chilean economy greatly benefitted export orientated and large scale farmers, particularly those located in central Chile, over domestic market orientated and small scale farmers (Murray 2002).

Southern Chile was particularly affected by the Pinochet government’s forestry policies. The regime saw the transformation of forestry from a small, domestic, protected industry into a fully internationalised industry as a source of economic growth. The industry grew at three times the rate of industry generally between 1970 and 1996 (Niklitschek 2007), greatly aided by government policies. These included: loosening of environmental regulations; extensive subsidies for creating plantations; land policies, as government sold state land at well below market prices to forestry companies and auctioned off previously communally owned and managed land; and infrastructure development, particularly southwards expansion of the road network (Clapp 1998, Aageson 1998, Newbold 2004, Klepeis and Laris 2006, Nikitschek 2007, Armesto 2009). These policies greatly favoured the three large forestry companies who could access subsidies and acquire land, and led to a homogenised landscape and biodiversity loss as exotic plantations replaced native forests (Armesto 2001, Nahuelhual et al. 2012).

The series of democratically elected centre-left governments which replaced the military government from 1990 have not reversed inequalities of land ownership. Whilst they have promoted economic growth with equity, they have continued the neoliberal project in rural areas, favouring export orientated agriculture and forestry over rural poverty goals, exacerbating the division between successful export-orientated large companies owning ever-increasing amounts of land, and struggling small-scale, domestic-orientated small producers (Murray 2002). Forestry products are the second biggest export after copper, and forestry companies have become the
biggest landowners in southern Chile by taking advantage of government subsidies during 1980s and by buying land from destitute smallholders from the 1990s (Carruthers and Rodriguez 2009, Meza 2009). Environmental regulations are weak, serving the interest of big business, large infrastructure projects are pushed through despite environmental concerns, although recent high profile environmental disasters may have led to a re-evaluation (Tecklin, Bauer and Prieto 2011, Sepulveda and Villarroel 2012). Mapuche groups have been involved in protracted and sometimes violent conflicts with forestry projects, claiming they occupy land unjustly appropriated from the Mapuche, and have lesser and non-violent conflicts with hydroelectricity dams and state and private protected areas (Aageson 1998, Armesto 2001, Azocar 2005, Cisneros and McBreen 2008, Meza 2009).

Aquaculture and forestry continue their southwards expansion, following rising demand for their products. Massive hydroelectric projects are planned for the far south, transferring power through a new high-tension line to the cities and mines of central and northern Chile. Hydroelectricity companies have captured unallocated water rights to a great number of rivers in Southern Chile in anticipation of further expansion. Under the highly neoliberal water code of 1981, water use concessions are allocated separately to land ownership – unallocated concessions can be claimed from the government, and once allocated, can be bought and sold.

Thus there have been a series of land grabs, advancing southwards using different techniques at different times, to allow southern Chile to become gradually incorporated into the Chilean and global economy. The early incidents of land grabbing through violence, deception and theft were followed by laws in the 1920s which regularised and legitimised these grabs. Following the imposition of neoliberalism, property laws, the water code and subsidies and incentives for industry allowed further grabbing of land and resources. Land use and ownership was not subject to planning or democratic oversight, but left to the free market.

*Private protected areas and land grabbing in Chile*

This section explores the rise of private protected areas in southern Chile. It demonstrates how they are embedded within longer trajectories and broader trends of land grabbing within the region, and how they form part of these trends and a challenge to them. In particular, whilst PPAs are often seen as a counter to the increasing incorporation of the natural resources of southern Chile into global capitalism, they should instead be seen as a key part of this trend.
Whist there is no legal definition of what constitutes a PPA in Chile, this paper uses the International Union for the Conservation of Nature's definition, which states that a private protected area is ‘A clearly defined geographical space, recognised, dedicated and managed, through legal or other effective means, to achieve the long-term conservation of nature with associated ecosystem services and cultural values’ (Dudley 2008 p8) which is ‘under individual, cooperative, NGO or corporate control and/or ownership, and managed under not-for-profit or for-profit schemes....where the authority for managing the protected land and resources rests with the landowners’ (Dudley 2008 p26).

Private protected areas in Chile can be characterised by their heterogeneity, ranging in size from a few hectares to more than 300,000 ha. They are owned by Chilean and international NGOs, individuals and corporations. Some of them operate on a for-profit basis, whereas others have no commercial activity. PPAs cover 2.12% of Chile, and 4.54% of the case study area. This is much smaller than state protected areas, which cover 18% of national land surface, and 43% of the case study area. Despite this lower coverage of total protection, PPAs tend to be located in places of higher conservation value: a larger proportion of the three most threatened biomes in Chile is contained within PPAs rather than in state protected areas (Pliscoff and Fuentes-Castillo 2011). State protected areas were historically created in remote, vertiginous, places with extreme climates and few competing land uses, such as the mountains of the far south, but these tend to be places facing lower levels of threat. The 10 largest PPAs in southern Chile are listed in table 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Size (Ha)</th>
<th>Owner</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pumalin</td>
<td>310992</td>
<td>Fundación Pumalin (established by Tompkins family)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karukinka</td>
<td>275000</td>
<td>Wildlife Conservation Society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tantauco</td>
<td>180000</td>
<td>Fundación Futuro (established by Sebastian Piñera)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chacabuco</td>
<td>173000</td>
<td>Conservación Patagonica (established by Tompkins family)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corcovado</td>
<td>76700</td>
<td>Conservation Land Trust (established by Tompkins family)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huilo Huilo</td>
<td>60000</td>
<td>Petermann family</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valdivian Coastal Reserve</td>
<td>59700</td>
<td>The Nature Conservancy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yendegaia</td>
<td>40000</td>
<td>Conservation Land Trust (established by Tompkins family)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huinay</td>
<td>35000</td>
<td>Fundación Huinay (established by Endesa S.A. with Pontificate Catholic University of Valparaiso)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cabo Leon</td>
<td>26000</td>
<td>Conservation Land Trust (established by Tompkins family)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Four key factors drive the growth of PPAs. Firstly, since the coup of 1973, the Chilean state has created a system of strong individual private property rights as part of wider neoliberal reforms, providing considerable security and stability for national and international investors. It has also meant that conservationists have seen land purchases as a secure and stable way of preserving biodiversity. Both international and Chilean purchasers of PPAs cited this stability, along with a lack of corruption, as a principal reason either for investing in Chile rather than another country, or for choosing PPAs as a means to conserve, rather than another strategy. One representative of an international business operating for-profit PPAs explained that the company worked in Chile because it is a really good place to do this work. I mean, you have really strong rule of law, you have really good private property rights, you don’t have massive title problems..... And so it is not an accident that if you are going to try and test something like this [our strategy], testing it in a place like this, as opposed to testing it in Brazil, it is obvious.

Secondly, other forms of conservation action such as NGO campaigning are less favoured or viable, partly as a result of the overwhelmingly neoliberal economy and culture which encourages individual actions and market-based solutions, partly because most land in Chile is privately owned, but also because the Chilean environmental movement, like civil society generally, was greatly weakened during the dictatorship.. Thirdly, PPAs in southern Chile can be a profitable enterprise, particularly through land price speculation. As explored below, the rapid sustained increases in land prices in southern Chile are an important factor in why conservationists chose to establish PPAs there as opposed to other parts of Chile, alongside aesthetic factors. Fourthly, as explored below, there is a sufficiently large number of middle class and very wealthy individuals in Chile interested in purchasing PPAs. All but the last of these are directly linked to Chilean neoliberalism, and the broader integration of southern Chile into global capitalism.

The most high-profile actor in Chilean PPAs is Douglas Tompkins, a US entrepreneur who co-founded two large international corporations (outdoor equipment manufacturer The North Face, and clothing company Esprit). Tompkins had a long connection with southern Chile from his days as a mountaineer, and upon retiring from business and selling his stakes in the early 1990s, he began purchasing land for conservation in Palena Province at very low prices. These purchases were initially done through a series of intermediaries and without declaring his intentions, in order to keep prices down. By 1994, he had spent approximately US$25 million purchasing over 270,000 hectares, and publically announced the creation of Parque Pumalin, a PPA divided into two sections of non-contiguous temperate rainforest. The project was hugely controversial (Humes 2009, Nelson and
Geisse 2001). Pumalin stretched from the Pacific coast to the Argentine border, cutting Chile in two. This was considered a threat to Chilean sovereignty and territorial integrity, particularly as Tompkins was a foreigner and because there have long been tensions in southern Chile over sovereignty and the location of the frontier with Argentina. Conservation philanthropy was unknown in Chile, and Tompkins’ motives were challenged, with various conspiracies circulating that Pumalin was secretly a nuclear dump, a CIA base, a gold mine, a new Jewish state, or a plot to control the region’s water resources (Humes 2009). The project was considered a challenge to national development, because it locked up forest resources which could otherwise be exploited, as Tompkins rapidly became an outspoken critic of Chile’s exploitation of natural resources, and because of fears that he would prevent key national infrastructure such as electricity lines and highways being built on his property. Tompkins was also accused of coercing smallholders into selling their land, and not respecting the rights of smallholders who lacked legal title. These are descendants of pioneers encouraged to settle in northern Patagonia by the Chilean government in the 1930s, but whose titles were never regularised. Politicians from President Frei downwards criticised the project. Concern over the perceived threat posed by Tompkins to national security, sovereignty and development led the signing of an agreement in 1997 between Tompkins and the Frei government, in which Tompkins agreed to refrain from purchasing more land in the region, and promised to allow nationally important infrastructure to pass through his property. As Nelson and Geisse (2001) note, such a restrictive agreement contrasts enormously with the strengthening of private property rights under neoliberalism in Chile, and with the welcome given to foreign forestry and mining corporations. The agreement has since been annulled, and Tompkins has since purchased a total of 634,622 hectares for conservation in southern Chile (Maldonado and Faundez 2005), alongside a similar amount in Argentina, although he has gradually transferred ownership to Chilean foundations controlled by his family. In an ironic twist, the 35,000 ha Huinay property bisecting the two sections of Pumalin, which also stretched from the Pacific to Argentina, was originally owned by the Catholic University of Valparaiso. The Frei administration encouraged them to sell to Chilean electricity corporation Endesa, rather than Tompkins, who then turned it into a PPA. Endesa has subsequently been

---

4The 2008 James Bond film “Quantum of Solace” revolved around a conspiracy by a shady foreigner using a private conservation project as a front to control Bolivia’s water supply. The Bolivian scenes were filmed in the Chilean Atacama.

5This argument is problematic. Pumalin’s extremely mountainous and landslide-prone terrain effectively prevents development, and attempts to create road and electricity infrastructure on neighbouring properties have failed, with undersea cables a preferred option for planned electricity developments. This illustrates the somewhat limited contribution that Pumalin makes to Chilean conservation – like several other Tompkins properties, there are few if any alternative land uses. The land is protected by its own topography and remoteness.
The Tompkins controversy long dominated broader understandings of PPAs, and shaped political responses. Whilst the 1994 Environmental Framework Law, the foundation for environmental regulation and governance in Chile, states that the government will recognise and encourage PPAs, no laws were enacted until 2012, partly due to bureaucratic and legal hurdles, but also because the Pumalin controversy had made PPAs a toxic political issue. Tompkins has publically committed to donating all his property to the Chilean state. In 2005, he donated around 85,000 hectares to help create the Corcovado National Park, but further donations have not occurred. This was partly due to bureaucratic hurdles, but also a lack of political will amongst Chilean politicians, who often view conservation as restraining economic growth, and who are antagonistic towards Tompkins himself. A senior official within Tompkins’s NGO noted that political and business leaders consider that setting aside areas for conservation is a loss of economic opportunities. There are some who consider that it is a jail sentence. Because they always see in a property the commercial or extractive use. But it is more difficult. Because in political terms, in the sense that Doug doesn’t meddle in politics but gives his opinion, on the model of development of Chile, he has a critical opinion, he expresses it. And often the established powers don’t like this.....and this means that it is not easy to reach agreements

Other interviewees commented that Tompkins may not trust the state to continue to conserve these areas as he has been, due to lack of will or resources. Political opposition has lessened over time, so that when billionaire and (subsequently victorious) presidential candidate Sebastian Piñera created Tantauco, a 118,000 hectare PPA on Chiloé in 2005, he cited Pumalin as an inspiration, and Kris Tompkins, Doug’s wife, attended the opening ceremony.

Alongside the Tompkins properties, there are two other large, foreign-owned conservation projects. The Valdivian Coastal Reserve (60,000 hectares) is located in the north of the study area. When the original owners, a Chilean forestry corporation, went bankrupt, a coalition of the three biggest conservation NGOs in the world formed (WWF, The Nature Conservancy (TNC), and Conservation International ) to purchase the property from the creditors. TNC now manage it as a PPA. Karukinka Natural Reserve (270,000 hectares) on Tierra Del Fuego emerged from the Rio Condor forestry

---

6 After years of campaigning, Pumalin was declared a “national monument”. This is a cultural heritage designation managed by the Ministry of Education, rather than the body managing state protected areas. The same designation is applied to the building housing Tompkins’ foundations in Puerto Varas, which has high architectural and historic value.
project owned by Trillium, a US company. The project started in 1993, but the expensive logistics of logging meant it entered bankruptcy in 2002, at which point ownership of the forests passed to Goldman Sachs (GS) as creditors (Klepeis and Laris 2006). GS sought to donate it to a US conservation NGO, initially selecting TNC, but rejected this as TNC were going through a high-profile public relations crisis (Stephenson and Chaves 2006), and because of possible conflicts of interests as GS’s CEO also sat on TNC’s board, and instead it was donated to the Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS) in 2004. Mindful of concerns over sovereignty of PPAs, WCS created a predominantly Chilean advisory board for Karukinka, comprising academics, conservationists, and business leaders to, as WCS’s former president explained, ‘create a strong sense of the Chilean-ness of the project... in order to address the issue of it being owned by an organisation that wasn’t predominantly Chilean’.

As part of wider WCS and TNC strategy, both Karukinka and the Valdivian Coastal Reserve aim to self-finance their operations. Karukinka aims to sell carbon credits from its considerable peat reserves, a decision influenced by their long term association with GS, whilst the Valdivian Coastal Reserve is to create a trust fund seeded by profits from felling the remaining plantations on the property. There are some properties owned by Chilean NGOs, such as the 184 hectare Punta Curiñanco reserve owned by Codeff, but these tend to be much smaller.

Other properties have emerged which combine conservation and capitalism. Huilo Huilo, a 60,000 hectare forestry property, is responding to declining logging revenues by making a gradual transition to a PPA operating tourism and hydroelectricity projects. The Cliffs Preserve is a 5,000 hectare PPA and very high end tourist resort on the coast of northern Patagonia established by a US property entrepreneur. Patagonia Sur (corporate slogan ‘for profit conservationists’), established in 2007 by a US social networking entrepreneur alongside Chilean businessmen and lawyers, owns 6 PPAs totalling 36,000 hectares. Income comes from a tourism operation, selling limited housing lots, carbon credits from reforestation properties with native species, and a real estate brokerage for individuals purchasing properties in the region. There are numerous smaller initiatives which seek profit from creating limited housing developments within a privately protected landscape (Sepulveda 2004). There are other ways PPAs have been established in response to business opportunities – major forestry corporations have created native forest reserves largely to get sustainability certification, and to improve public image. Whilst some forestry companies, such as Masisa, have no commercial activities within these reserves, the Oncol Reserve, owned by Arauco, has some commercial activity such as an entry fee, camping sites, and a cafeteria, although revenues do not cover costs.
Other PPAs have been created following rising property prices in Patagonia, which have risen around 20% per annum since 2005 in response to increased investment from hydroelectricity and conservation (Jose Tapia and Muñoz 2012). A number of wealthy Chileans have purchased properties of up to 36,000 hectares in the south, partly for recreation but largely as a reliable investment (De la Fuente 2010, San Cristobal 2012). Various specialist brokers have recently been established to facilitate this growth, businesses which might come under Borras and Franco’s (2013) concept of ‘land grabbing entrepreneurs’ who make money from anticipating and facilitating increased global demand for land. One representative of a large brokerage specialising in southern Chile explained that ‘when there was the global crisis around property in the USA, people were scared and brought their money which was abroad back into Chile, to invest in secure areas. And we thought, what is more secure than buying land. It doesn’t lose value, you can live there’. Other interviewees in the NGO sector commented on the ‘fashion’ for rich Chileans to buy forests in Patagonia over recent years, although interviewees working for brokerage were clear that conservation was not a significant motivation in most purchases, and so it difficult to label them as PPAs. There are also numerous middle class families purchasing land for small PPAs, either individually or by forming cooperatives, motivated by a mixture of conservation philanthropy, property investment, recreation and business opportunities. For example, the Katalapi reserve (56 hectares) was established as a family property and conservation project by an environmental educator, who covers part of the running costs by running environmental education events. Another interesting example is Ahuenco, on the island of Chiloé (800 hectares), which was initiated in 1994 by a group of environmentally minded individuals to save a patch of coastal forest, and which is now collectively owned by 45 members. The variety of projects is illustrated in table 3.

Table 3: Examples of private protected areas with different ownership structures and levels of commercial activity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ownership Structure</th>
<th>For-profit PPA</th>
<th>PPAs with some commercial activity</th>
<th>PPAs with minimal commercial activity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Owned by individual or family or foundation linked to one individual</td>
<td>Huilo Huilo</td>
<td>Katalapi</td>
<td>Tantauco</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Owned by corporation</td>
<td>Patagonia Sur/The Cliffs</td>
<td>Oncol</td>
<td>Masisa properties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO owned</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Karukinka</td>
<td>Punta Curiñanco</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ahuenco</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The trend to create PPAs emerged some time before organised movements supporting them. Global Environmental Facility projects created regional associations for small PPAs in 2003 on the island of Chiloe and the region around Valdivia, and a subsequent project led to the creation of a national association, Asi Conserva Chile, in 2009\(^7\). Asi Conserva Chile have lobbied for the creation of structures supporting US-style conservation easement rights, that would allow landowners to put permanent restrictions on land uses within their properties, even after ownership has changed, albeit without the tax and other benefits that apply to US easements. This effort was led by TNC, who were looking for ways to conserve the highly threatened Mediterranean biome of Chile, where intense agricultural production has led to highly fragmented ownership and high land prices, neither conducive to state nor private protected area creation. Initial opposition centred on the challenge posed by permanent land use restrictions for Chile’s extremely strong private property rights. An extensive campaign by TNC and the well-connected directors of Patagonia Sur carefully presented easements as politically neutral, gaining cross-party support, and as compatible with economic growth. One campaign member commented that:

> With some sectors of society, it is not good enough to say [PPAs] are good for frogs.... they haven’t got into this new paradigm where conservation is a necessary part of growth. They still believe that conservation is against economic growth, you either conserve or you grow.

At a reception held at the Chilean parliament to launch the easement right, supporting politicians emphasised how PPAs promote economic growth through tourism and payments for ecosystem services. The easement law passed the first parliamentary stages 2012, and if signed into law, would grant PPAs some legal status for the first time.

*Is there a land grab for conservation in Chile?*

\(^7\) The full title of this organisation is “Asociación de Iniciativas de Conservación en Áreas Privadas y de Pueblos Originarios de Chile”, or the Chilean Association of Conservation Initiatives on Private and Native People’s Land, a title which reflects indigenous desires that their land is seen as community owned and integral to indigenous identity, and thus very distinct from private protected areas.
Whilst it is clear that there has been a huge increase in conservation related land transactions in southern Chile, it is less clear whether this constitutes a land grab. This paper defined land grabs as transfers of control over property and resources over large areas of territory from local control to more powerful outsiders. Many PPAs were already in the hands on powerful organisation based outside of southern Chile, notably forestry companies with headquarters in central Chile, before they became conservation projects. In the case of the Valdivian Coastal Reserve, Huinay, the Cliffs, and a number of properties controlled by Douglas Tompkins, control has been transferred from a Chilean organisation to a foreign one. Complicating matters, Tompkins has donated several large properties to the Chilean state, and has publically committed to donating the rest, although several interviewees were cynical about whether this would ever happen, given the slow pace of donations, the lack of clear legal frameworks for public donations of land to the state, and the mutual lack of trust between the government and Tompkins. However, if these donations occur in full, then it could be considered a counter to land grabs, as large landholdings would be transferred from private ownership to the state acting on behalf of the Chilean people. Karukinka has gone from one foreign organisation to another, whilst Tantauco has gone from one Santiago-based organisation to another. Patagonia Sur is Santiago based, but its capital and directors come from a mix of US and Chilean sources. Some PPAs, such as some Patagonia Sur properties as well as many PPAs owned by middle class families such as Katalapi, were purchased from locals, but there is no indication that this was done through anything other than open and transparent market transactions. Indeed, rising demand for conservation properties may ensure small landowners receive good prices for land, in a context where economic challenges are driving rural depopulation (Diaz et al. 2011). Furthermore, many middle class families are motivated to get involved in PPAs in southern Chile because they have historic family ties to the region, even if they currently reside in Santiago, and so it is difficult to characterise them as powerful outsiders. An interesting case is Huilo Huilo, which has been owned by the same wealthy family for many years, except during the Allende government when it was subject to land redistribution, only to be restored to the family during the Pinochet era. Whilst the land purchases by wealthy Chileans in the south for property speculation may represent a land grab, there is not enough evidence to classify these as PPAs. Overall, there is no indication that any transactions were forced, compelled, or unjust, except for the bankruptcy of forest companies in the case of the Valdivian Coastal Reserve and Karukinka, and allegations that some smallholder farmers have been coerced or intimidated into selling land to Doug Tompkins for the creation of Pumalin. There have also been tensions between local residents and both Huinay and Tantauco, where although none have been forced from their lands, the respective owners of these PPAs concede that
locals have expressed that they feel pressured to abandon land, and feel their access to resources are under threat.

PPAs have become part of conflicts over the historic legacy of previous land grabs, most notably when they were created on forestry or agricultural properties which were part of earlier land grabs from indigenous communities. For example, Huilliche communities claim that Tantauco occupies land stolen from them which should be returned, although such contests with smallholders and indigenous communities afflict state protected areas and particularly forestry properties to a greater degree than PPAs (Meza 2009). As such, it is difficult to say that PPAs in southern Chile have been involved in land grabs as defined here, with the possible exception of Pumalin, although many other PPAs could be said to be the beneficiaries of earlier land grabs which established large landholdings. In any case, land and resource acquisition by forestry and hydroelectricity companies in southern Chile is easier to classify as a land grab under the definition used here, and is happening to a much greater extent than land acquisition for conservation.

Other definitions, as outlined in table 1, consider landgrabbing as transnational transactions in land and a loss of sovereignty (Zoomers 2011). Again, this applies to some Chilean PPAs to a limited extent. Whilst many large PPAs were purchased by foreign capital, in almost all these cases there is some Chilean identify, either because title lies with an organisation registered in Chile (Pumalin and other Tompkins’ properties, Patagonia Sur) or because local staff are all Chilean and there are local advisory organisations (Valdivian Coastal Reserve, Karukinka). Nevertheless, ultimate control of PPAs in these cases lies with a foreign individual or organisation. Definitions which hinge around transnational land transactions ignore the fact that whilst many other PPAs may be owned by Chileans, often these are wealthy individuals from Santiago who are economically, culturally, and (by several thousand kilometres) geographically distant from rural southern Chile, which can cause tensions (San Cristobal 2012). Jones (2012) reports that local people living around the Chacabuco PPA owned by Tompkins’ foundations feel their Patagonian gaucho culture and connection to the land is threatened by a wilderness project. Again, land and resource acquisitions in the region, such as forestry or hydroelectricity, involve foreign capital and companies to a greater extent than PPAs. There is no evidence that definitions which consider land grabs as being predicated on harm, particularly in creating food insecurity, are relevant to the Chilean case (Echenique 2011). Conversely, definitions such as that of the ILC which consider land grabs as transactions lacking
democratic planning or oversight could be applied to virtually any land transaction in rural Chile since the imposition of neoliberalism, where regulation has been left to the open market and the government has almost no role in land use planning.

Definitions which consider land grabs in terms of capitalist activity (e.g. Gardner 2012) apply in only some cases – whilst some PPAs are for-profit enterprises, the majority are not. PPAs such as Karukinka, Huilo Huilo, Patagonia Sur, the Cliffs and others are dependent on market activities such as tourism, real estate, or carbon credits to a greater or lesser extent, but in these cases such activities is not the first way in which these properties have been integrated into global capitalism, as they have previously been used for forestry and agriculture. Some PPAs, from large properties such as Tantauco and Pumalin down to many small middle-class owned PPs, take an anti-market position, having no commercial activities but instead are funded through their owners’ largesse. Douglas Tompkins is an open critic of global capitalism and an advocate of steady state economics.

Similarly, definitions which see grabs in terms of transfer of land from state or common to private ownership do not apply, as land in the case study area was privatised prior to the emergence of PPAs, either during the expansion of the Chilean state during the late 19th and early 20th centuries, or following the sale of state land during the early period of military rule. PPAs may not have been involved in land privatisation, but they have benefitted from decades of gradual, and not so gradual, shift towards private ownership, and thirty years of neoliberalism. Counter to this, properties such as Ahuenco represent a move towards communal ownership, and Tompkins donations as a move towards public ownership. Public access to many PPAs is greater than under previous land uses, and some PPAs (Ahuenco, the Cliffs) have formal agreements with local fishing communities guaranteeing them access to their foreshore, following concerns that the transition from previous land uses to conservation would restrict local access. Indeed, if conservation of biodiversity is considered a public good, then all PPAs could be considered as increasing public benefit.

Various indigenous communities have declared parts of their territory as community protected area, in some cases as part of the process of getting land returned from private to indigenous community ownership (McAlpin 2008). In the case of the Mapu Lahual territory in the northern portion of the study area, WWF published a call for partners to help them conserve a highly biodiverse area of the coastal range, which coincided with some Huilliche communities’ desire to reclaim part of the range which they considered their ancestral lands. Working together, the two secured the restitution of a
60,000 hectare portion of this land to Huilliche communities, of which 1,000 hectares operates as an indigenous protected area. In interviews, both representatives of these communities and WWF were clear that it was a limited partnership based around one project, given historic distrust between conservation and indigenous organisations. WWF representatives explained that they were wary of becoming involved in broader debates about indigenous rights. Representatives of the communities were wary of conservationists’ protectionist agenda, stating that ‘NGOs generally have a vision of conservation which is of preservation, of not touching anything’, but that they preferred sustainable use of the forest for livelihoods and culture ‘If they say that you can’t exploit anything, not even medicinal plants, you lose culture. This is our fight, for our culture and dignity’. This case is important because it can be seen as conservation allowing a partial reversal of past land grabs, a restitution of private property to community ownership. The communities at Mapu Lahual now form part of Asi Conserva Chile, although they are adamant that they are an indigenous community protected area, and thus are distinct from private protected areas.

It is worth emphasising that any role that PPAs may have in the privatisation of land and resources, and their integration into global capitalism, is dwarfed by the role of other industries, particularly the forestry and hydroelectricity sectors, in privatising resources and expanding globalised capitalism into the region.

**Conclusion**

The major key features of land grabs, green grabs, and conservation grabs are present in Chilean PPAs, though they are not universally relevant to all areas. PPAs have expanded greatly in recent years, partly facilitated by the shift towards neoliberalism in Chile, which has emphasised private property rights and greatly reduced restrictions on capital flows. Some cases reflect the emergence of new drivers of green grabs such as carbon credits, and new actors such as international conservation NGOs, with an increasing engagement with global capitalism through the chains of forestry produce, carbon credits, global philanthropy, and ecotourism. Yet the heterogeneity of PPAs in Chile belies any crude generalisations, and highlights the difficulties in defining land grabs and green grabs. It shows how a narrow focus on international transactions, global circulations of capital and on privatisation of land and resources excludes internal purchases and those for not-for-profit activities. Definitions such as those of the International Land Coalition, which focus on exploitative or illegal transactions, neglect cases where current transactions may be done legally and transparently,
but where these same properties had been acquired in a contested manner in recent history, such as the case of Tantauco. Likewise, it does not address situations where land is transferred legally, but where laws, regulations, incentives and subsidies greatly favour some parties over others, such as measures introduced by the Pinochet regime to favour private over communal land ownership. The focus on legality does not address whether or not such laws are widely considered as legitimate or just. Whilst PPAs, particularly Chilean ones, have been labelled as land grabs (e.g. Zoomers 2010; Pearce 2012), the heterogeneity of private conservation in the Chilean case challenges such monochrome descriptions.

In addition, the case illustrates two important features of how conservation land grabs should be understood. Following Edelman, Oya and Borras (2013), it demonstrates how contemporary grabs may be an extension of historical processes, particularly relating to capitalism. Over the last century or so, southern Chile has gradually become integrated into the Chilean state and the global economy, a process starting with the wheat fields and forests of the temperate region, which has extended all the way to Tierra del Fuego and through a much broader range of resources and commodities. Speculators have long sought profit at the frontier in this region, and private conservation is just one way of finding it in the 21st century, through property speculation, tourism, or carbon credits. Secondly, it shows how land grabs for multiple resources coexist and interact. Land grabs for conservation occur alongside grabs for forestry, hydroelectricity, and carbon resources, all facilitated and driven by some combination of commodification of nature, infrastructure developments, Chile’s ongoing engagement with neoliberalism, and the increasing tendency to see southern Chile’s natural resources as a reliable investment for national and international capital. Conservation can benefit from some of the failures in these other land grabs, such as the case of Karukinka and the Valdivian coastal reserve. The rise in land prices driven by these grabs leads to both new PPAs, as wealthy speculators purchase forest properties, and constrains them, as high prices limits the actions of conservation organisations. Overall, the case of Chilean private protected areas shows two key features; how the complexities in land transactions for conservation belie any simple declaration of whether they should be considered a land grab, and how land transactions for conservation are affected by historical trajectories and other contemporary processes of land and resource acquisition.


De la Fuente, A. 2010. El nuevo mapa de la conservación. Que pasa.11th June 2010. Santiago


Holmes, G. 2013. What role do private protected areas have in conserving global biodiversity? SRI working papers, Sustainability Research Institute, University of Leeds.


Jose Tapia, M. and M. Muñoz 2012. Tierras en Aysen duplican en valor por conservacionismo y proyectos electricos. La Tercera. 30th October 2011

Kashwan, P. 2012. The politics of rights-based approaches in conservation. Land Use Policy 31(1) 613-623


**George Holmes** is a lecturer in Critical Environmental Social Science at the Sustainability Research Institute, University of Leeds, UK. His research considers political ecology approaches to conservation and protected areas, particularly the social impacts of protected areas on local populations. He has conducted fieldwork in Chile and the Dominican Republic.

Email:g.holmes@leeds.ac.uk