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FIELD NOTES

Fighting Commodification and Disempowerment in the Development Industry:

Things I Learned About PCIA in Habarana and Mindanao

Kenneth Bush

Preface 2
1. Introduction 2
2. Sub-Titling 4
3. Logos, Branding and PCIA 7
4. PCIA in Theory 8
6. Outsourcing PCIA 9
7. How not to do PCIA – creating conflict in the name of peace 11
8. What is working? Habarana and Mindnao – “Linking the Cultural and the Technical”: Building a Culture of Peace and Applying PCIA 12
9. Teaching PCIA in the Academic Setting 16
10. Next Steps 17
11. References 19
FIELD NOTES

Fighting Commodification and Disempowerment in the Development Industry:
Things I Learned About PCIA in Habarana and Mindanao

Kenneth Bush

“It is not possible to be a 9-to-5 project officer in a 24-hour war zone.”
(Participant at the Habarana workshop, May 2004)

Preface

Warning: This article is not a delicately rendered diplomatic engagement in an abstract discussion about ideas and practices. Rather, because it builds from the experiences and stories of individuals and organisations who are working heroically in violence-prone regions around the world, the article reflects a low tolerance – impatience even – for the sophistry or politics that distract attention from muddy, life-and-death realities on the ground. The article rests on a belief that constructive change and net positive impact requires more than just doing “more of the right thing.” It also requires that we stop doing the wrong things. For this reason, it speaks in fairly explicit terms about actions and actors that risk undermining the empowering potential of Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment. The absence of such details would leave us speaking a vague language of generalities, and risks creating the impression that a self-described PCIA initiative is puttering along, more or less, on the right path. Sometimes this is true. Sometimes it is not. If PCIA is to stand a chance of living up to its potential, we had better be able to distinguish between when it is working (and why), and when it is not working (and why).

1. Introduction

I welcome the Berghof Research Center’s continued enthusiasm to stimulate critical thinking on Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA). Just as the first round of dialogue (or “debates” as they are known in some circles) created a timely and strategic moment to reflect on the evolution of the idea and practice of PCIA, so does the current round of papers offer an opportunity to consider recent developments. The Center’s genuinely constructive and collaborative approach to the dissemination of applied research is one which is too rare in a development industry where competition between organisations for dwindling or newly available resources too frequently leads to unconstructive competition, duplication (often transparent plagiarism) and sub-optimal outcomes.

The broad parameters of the current dialogue were set out by the Berghof editors as follows: “under the heading “New Trends in PCIA,” each author presents his or her own approach/experience with PCIA or similar methodology.” I find myself in an interesting (and sometimes uncomfortable) position that shapes my analysis and assessment of these “new” trends in PCIA. Having coined the term “PCIA” in 1996, and introduced the concept into the development/
peacebuilding lexicon, I have watched what happens to an idea from the point of release into the real world of politics, bureaucracies, competing interests, and – not to put too fine a point on it – money. It has been an educational experience, to be sure. I should be quick to add that my own role in the development of PCIA has not been restricted to that of passive observer or critic. I have worked intensively with partners to seed, and to grow, PCIA in places and ways that are intended to enable users – especially communities – to develop tools and techniques that are principled, appropriate, and most importantly their own.

I view the Berghof Center’s invitation to contribute to the current debates as an opportunity to build from a position of critique towards a more concrete and useful project that reconnects practice with the original aspirations of PCIA, specifically its desire to contribute to the empowerment of communities – not least their ability to nurture existing peacebuilding capacities that would enable them to assert control over those decisions and initiatives (internal and external) that affect lives and livelihoods in violence-prone regions around the world. To this end, the second half of this paper points to some exciting work taking place in the South that is moving PCIA in what I consider to be the right direction.

The most exciting work related to PCIA is not taking place in London or Bern or Ottawa. (A very interesting exception may be found in the work of Janet McGrath, a graduate student at St. Paul University who is working with indigenous communities in Canada to “translate” and “transform” PCIA concepts and tools into forms that are useful in the politically charged and confrontational relationships that have evolved between indigenous communities, settler communities, and the Canadian Government. Technically, these initiatives are not located in the overdeveloped North, but rather in the Southern margins within the overdeveloped North.) The most exciting work, though, is taking place in the South – on-the-ground in the midst, and on the margins, of war zones. However, these Southern stories, lessons, and experiences are not being heard; they are not even being listened for. More often than not, those in the South working with PCIA-like tools in difficult, under-resourced, and violent settings are too busy to contribute to the academicized, English-language, elite-driven, self-interested initiatives driven by Northern organisations. Meanwhile in the North (to only slightly over-state the case), marketer-consultants are jetting between rich capital cities promoting PCIA products in packages that are so far removed from on-the-ground realities, that they are practically (sic) useless. The irony here is that PCIA is not rocket science. It is based on simple ideas that can be applied (and modified for use) in fluid and complex settings. PCIA expertise in interpreting peace and conflict impact potentials rests (currently and ultimately) with those closest to the ground. Indeed, the chances are that they already use a form of PCIA – it is worth remembering that the structure and content of PCIA came originally from hundreds of conversations with field workers in the South. So new approaches should be welcome only to the extent that they build from, and reinforce, existing capacities. Anyone who has worked in the field has heard their fill of stories of arrogant Northerners whose starting assumption is that communities have needs, but limited capacities or expertise.

In some ways, the current discussion picks up from the question that struck me after reading Mark Hoffman’s article in the first round of debates (Hoffman 2003): “where’s the politics” in all of the frenetic activity around PCIA. Everywhere I looked, there was (and is) an obsessive fixation on the technocratic dimensions of “operationalising” PCIA. This is understandable. In fact,
as is evident below in the section on PCIA theory, I view utility as the single most important criterion for assessing the development of PCIA. The central – and fundamentally political – questions here are: Useful for whom? Useful for what? Whose interests are being served (or not)?

The question of politics is epitomized by (but certainly not limited to) the discussions concerning indicators, which focus not on the (highly political) process of defining indicators, but on the search for a cheque book-ready, Holy Grail, one-size-fits-all, list of impact indicators that could be pasted into the full range of country settings from Peru to Papua New Guinea. Such a list may be less useful for measuring an initiative’s on-the-ground impact, than for reinforcing the asymmetrical power relationships between Northern-driven initiatives and evaluations on the one hand, and those Southern communities on which they are “implemented.” So too, is this obsession reflected in the technocratic fetishism and mechanistic checklist approaches being marketed by a growing number of white, Northern, cadres of self-defined peacebuilding “professionals.” One bilateral “peacebuilder”, for example, who was building a compendium of peacebuilding tools insisted that only contributions which could be presented on a single page matrix would be included (The Compendium of Peacebuilding Tools).

The difference between now and the last round of debates is that there are more examples that could be used to illustrate the ways in which PCIA is being “commodified” in a “peacebuilding industry” (which itself is a subset of the “development industry.”) However, in this post-10-7,2 hyper-hegemonic, world, there is a corrosive trend in the overdeveloped world towards the “securitization” of development policy and practice. In this context, any whining and whingeing about peacebuilding industries may well become academic, if all policy, action, and interventions are strained one-dimensionally through the kaleidoscope of the war on terror and hyper-power self-interest. Here, I would expect many of the current self-labelled peacebuilding experts to recast themselves as “development and security experts.” As they say in the advertising world: “watch this space.”

2. Sub-Titling

It is appropriate to begin by disentangling the title of this article.

Field Notes: The following pages draw on years of observation, conversation, and participation in the development of the idea and practice of PCIA. The format of this article more resembles the rough form of anthropological field notes than the polished elegance of academic articles. Further, the term Field Notes is meant to indicate that the ideas and arguments presented here are part of an on-going process. The appendix offers the readers two documents that are more systematic: (1) HANDS-ON PCIA (“HOP”): a handbook for conducting peace and conflict impact assessment (Bush 2003a); and (2) a graduate syllabus on the evaluation of the peace and conflict impact of interventions in violence-prone areas. Both will be discussed further below.

Elsewhere, I have described the commodification of peacebuilding as: “a process in which peacebuilding as an idea and as a set of practices is (to be churlishly provocative) simply

2 9/11 has been used instrumentally as a rallying call to jingoism; as a commodity; as an excuse to attack civil, political and human rights; as a means of legitimating and institutionalizing racism and xenophobia; and, most obviously, as a justification for applying military responses to social and political problems. But who remembers 10/7? That was the date that the U.S. and the U.K. began their bombing campaign in Afghanistan. Most of the non-Western world is struggling with the post-10/7 world and the political pathologies noted above, not the post-9/11 world. While the horrific attacks in September 2001 may have brought the dangerous world to the heartland of the United States, it has not brought the U.S. into the world in any constructive way, as its go-it-alone-if-necessary militarism illustrates.
stuffed into the standard operating systems of the standard [actors] who do the same old song and
dance to get the cash/funding. When ‘new monies’ are found, or existing monies are reallocated, to
support ‘peacebuilding’ activities, the old wine-new bottle syndrome is as prevalent as the faces at
the funding trough.” (Bush 2004a, 116). This idea is developed further below in the discussion of the
“branding” of PCIA. To be (more) blunt, the commodification of peacebuilding involves the selling
of a product – with the overwhelming emphasis being on the selling, rather than the “product.”
The product is tailored largely to the buyers: development agencies, rather than the communities
themselves who live and die in dirty war zones; who are the objects/subjects/beneficiaries/targets/victims
of both peacebuilding projects and armed stakeholders; and who were there before the
international community arrived on the scene, and will be there long after they leave (which, at the
level of staffing, they do every 3 or 4 years, as ex-pats roll in and roll out of their field postings).
Commodification is obvious in the content, structure, style and marketing practices of the marketers,
as discussed below.

This being said, only a fool would be blind to the stunning exceptions to this pattern.
There are extraordinary individuals and organisations which consistently swim against the current.
This includes colleagues who: extend their postings longer than is good for their careers; naturally
cultivate genuine relationships with local friends and colleagues from every point on the political-
social spectrum; work against those institutional obstacles and incentive structures that inhibit
continuity and learning within Northern Development Agencies, and that subsidise organisational
amnesia and sub-optimal impact; and understand and subvert the development industry while working
within it – a role a colleague in the World Bank once described as a “bureaucratic guerrilla.”

**Disempowerment:** This is a difficult term to define. In common usage, it refers to the
incapacitating impacts of an intervention on a particular group or subgroup – and the consequent
loss of control over fundamental aspects of their lives. However, the term also includes an element
of “overpowering.” That is, it is not simply about taking control away (and undermining existing
authority structures), it often includes the imposition of new structures and processes of control which
serve to decrease internal independence and increase external dependence on resources (broadly
defined) which are supplied in ways that are exploitative. One illustration of the disempowering
impacts of PCIA may be found below in the discussion on the PCIA workshop in Sri Lanka. It is
also interesting to note that while the earliest original writings on PCIA placed significant emphasis
on “empowerment,” neither that term (nor “capacity-building”) are included in the glossary of the
Resource Pack for Conflict Sensitive Approaches to Development, Humanitarian Assistance, and

**Development Industry** refers to organisations, projects, programmes and initiatives that
approach development narrowly as a business, and, as a result, lose sight of the human realities and
consequences of their work.

**The Development Industry is based on:**
- short-term/temporary rather than long-term interventions
- absence rather than presence
- “product” rather than “process”
- external control rather than internal control
- efficiency rather than effectiveness
- mechanistic, recipe book approaches rather than organic, learning approaches
Mindanao is a cluster of islands in Southern Philippines that were sites for a series of unique PCIA workshops with community workers, activists, development workers, as well as local government officials. These workshops were initiated and undertaken by the CIDA-supported Local Governance Support Programme (LGSP) in the Philippines. The level of commitment and enthusiasm by the organisers and participants was as intense as it was humbling. The HANDS-ON PCIA workbook (see appendix) is the product of their willingness, commitment and patience to work collaboratively to create something that suits their particular needs in their particular communities. They have fully appropriated – in the best sense of the word – PCIA, and are using their own versions, in their own languages, in their own islands, in their own realities.

I remember very distinctly the moment in one particular workshop north of Davao City, Mindanao when discussion suddenly intensified and quickened as workgroups applied some of the PCIA Handbook tools to project/programme documents they brought with them. My white ear kept hearing different groups talking in local languages about an island I did not know: “Pikee-yah.” I asked whether it was close to Tawi Tawi. When they stopped laughing, it was explained that Pikee-yah was, in fact, the local word for “PCIA.” It was clear that they had picked up the tools and were running with them. At that point, the tables turned. Since then, I have been learning more from them than they have learned from me.

They have not simply translated foreign ideas and tools into local languages; they have made them their own (more below). I understand that their initiatives (or what they call “Pikeeyah”) include the use of PCIA to guide decision-making and monitoring of services and programmes by Local Government Units (LGUs) in seven selected Zones of Peace3 in Mindanao. PCIA training has also taken place with a very wide range of organisations and actors – facilitated by a growing cadre of Filipino peace activists, completely independent of Northern-defined/controlling PCIA “professionals”.

3 Zones of Peace (ZOPs) constitute a people-initiated, community-based response to the situation of raging armed conflict in the country. Peace Zones contribute to the building up of a peace constituency in the grassroots and work to immediately relieve local communities, especially the civilian population, of the burden of war. Through Peace Zone action, communities seek to create a “social space” in which to address and resolve community issues as well as to explore alternative modes of conflict resolution, in accordance with their local culture and traditions. Peace Zones are geographical areas which community residents declare themselves to be off-limits to armed conflict. They range in size from the area covered by a purok or neighbourhood to that of a province. Based on terms and conditions set by the people themselves, Peace Zones are maintained and reinforced by the community's sustained, creative expressions of commitment to peacebuilding, which are expressed and managed through community-based implementing structures. Peace Zones are actual and operational community-managed entities that are gaining ground in the effort to halt armed hostilities and lay the groundwork for pluralism and dialogue immediately on the local level; to intervene in situations that threaten the security of life, property, and livelihood of the civilian population; as well as to pursue a local development agenda on the community's own terms. Peace Zone builders all over the country comprise a major constituency for the pursuit of peace processes on the national level. ZOPs are not simply gun-free zones. They are much more than spaces free from the visible tools of violence. They are defined by the active presence of the tools to build relationships of tolerance, respect, understanding and peace.
Habarana is a small village in North Central Sri Lanka, which was the site of a PCIA workshop supported by OXFAM UK (Sri Lanka) and the Asia Foundation (Philippines & Sri Lanka Offices), as well the Local Governance Support Programme in the Philippines. Expanding the mentoring process/relationships that were built explicitly into the Mindanao workshops, the Habarana workshop was co-facilitated by three Filipino colleagues and myself. Participants were primarily local Sri Lankan NGOs and partners of OXFAM (including two Nepali partners). Drawing on Filipino experience, the workshop rooted PCIA self-consciously in work being done on Culture of Peace (COP). As far as I am aware, this is the only initiative which has created the space for genuine Southern-led, South-South, PCIA capacity-building. There are other instances where Southern organisations have been stuffed into Northern-defined, and Northern-driven agendas.

3. Logos, Branding and PCIA

One of the striking features of what is quickly becoming a PCIA cottage industry is the effort of marketers to distinguish their particular brand of PCIA from other brands. In other words, these “PCIA-NGOs” and consultants have figured out what the private sector corporations learned long ago: to be successful, you have to produce brands, more than products (obviously, Klein 2000). In the current context there are three essential dimensions in the branding process: (1) the fashioning of a unique term or label that distinguishes one PCIA brand from another; (2) a re-writing of history so that the producer of a particular brand is seen to be located “there at the beginning” and/ or leading the PCIA charge; and (3) a systematic marketing of a brand that includes the active exclusion (erasing) of other brands and conspicuous labelling with the producer’s logo.

A short list of PCIA-derivative labels would include:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conflict Impact Assessment</th>
<th>Conflict Sensitive Programming</th>
<th>Peace and Conflict Development Analysis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Impact Assessment System</td>
<td>Conflict Sensitive Approaches</td>
<td>Local Capacities for Peace (LCP) – “Do no Harm”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Assessment</td>
<td>Conflict Risk Analysis</td>
<td>Peace &amp; Conflict Assessment Model (PCA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic Conflict Assessment</td>
<td>Conflict Development Analysis</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thus, the PCIA market is characterized by a proliferation of terms and labels created by organisations selling their wares (i.e., consulting expertise that delivers a PCIA product for a given price on a given date) to buyers in the development-peacebuilding market.

To illustrate this point, let’s look at two examples where there has been a conscious and explicit effort to generate brand recognition in ways that are simply unconstructive. The first is the Resource Pack for Conflict Sensitive Approaches to Development, Humanitarian Assistance, and Peacebuilding produced by a consortium led by International Alert, Saferworld, and FEWER (Resource Pack 2004).

In the production of this Resource Pack, it appears that a conscious decision was made to systematically eliminate all references to “PCIA” in order to shine the spotlight on their own term...
“Conflict Sensitive Approaches” – at least, this was how it was explained by a researcher involved in the preparation of the document. The complete absence of the term “PCIA,” and its omission from the summary of “Conflict Analysis Tools,” is all the more conspicuous given (1) the “PCIA”-specific programmes and projects (qua PCIA) that had been undertaken by at least four of the six sponsors of the pack – that is: each of these organisations had already successfully used PCIA to attract donor funding for specific “PCIA initiatives”; and (2) the centrality of PCIA in orienting International Alert and Saferworld’s “review of literature and practice” (Leonhardt 2000). While oversights may be idiosyncratic, branding is very systematic.

The second example of branding may be found in the literature developing Peace and Conflict Assessment (Paffenholz and Reychler 2004). Considerable effort is spent trying to differentiate the term “PCA” from PCIA. Even a cursory review of A Measure of Peace (Bush 1998) or HANDS-ON PCIA reveals that every “difference” identified by the author is, in fact, already present in the original PCIA. The question of the originality of the content of a brand – though significant – seems less important than ways in which the brands are being marketed and sold.

To the extent that control (so-called “expertise”) is monopolized by groups of Northern elites, it subsidizes (and reflects) the massive power imbalances whereby Southern participation is reduced to a kind of puppetry by Northern ventriloquists. Reflecting on the dialogue encouraged by the Berghof Center, this observation suggests another facet of the PCIA debates: the ethics of PCIA, in addition to on-going discussions of the methodologies and politics of PCIA.

4. PCIA in Theory

I must say that I was struck in the first round of the Berghof dialogue (Austin, Fischer and Wils 2003) by the call for a more explicit theoretical grounding of my work on PCIA – though in retrospect perhaps I should not have been, given the academic predispositions of the contributors. At the time, I countered this (feebly) with the observation that experience suggests that practical work in war zones is generally better served by looking at interests rather than theory. I suppose with the luxury of time, one might develop a theory of interests in war zones – perhaps drawing on some of the stimulating research being directed by people like David Malone, Mats Berdal, Paul Collier on interests and grievances in the political economy of violent conflict. However, I would need to be convinced that communities on the ground felt that such theory construction was more useful (or at all useful) compared with the bare foot inductivism that enables survival – even peacebuilding – in violence-prone realities.

Nonetheless, the question of theory kept lurking at the jungle’s edge throughout the Habarana workshop. Listening to colleagues working in exceptionally difficult conditions in Sri Lanka, Mindanao, and Nepal, I realized that in war zones, theory is either useful or useless. There is no middle ground. And there is rarely the luxury of time or space to mull over and contemplate abstractions, however erudite, parsimonious, or elegant. If PCIA works for you in the field, use it. If not, throw it out. We all have much more important things to do with our very limited and precious time. This much I can tell you, though: where PCIA has been used, and where it appears to have been successful, it was because PCIA was fully appropriated by communities themselves. They took it; they changed it; they used it so that it worked for them in their communities, in their realities.

5 This includes assertions that PCA is unique in its: comprehensiveness and inclusiveness (which is also challenged by the narrow donor focus of the PCA model); unique as a pre-intervention planning tool (see HO PCIA, p.6); application to all kinds of interventions, conventional development and humanitarian as well as “peacebuilding” (HO PCIA, p. 6, 9); multi-level, multi-sector applicability (HO PCIA 2003, and Measure of Peace 1998).
Perhaps sometime in the distant future – when whatever will work, has worked – university-based academics will wade in to excavate theories. But for now, the distance between the academy and the field suggests that it may be a long while before we see useful theory.

5. “User-Friendly” PCIA: for whom?

It has been observed that *A Measure of Peace: Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA) of Development Projects in War Zones* (Bush 1998) was not sufficiently user-friendly; that it lacked user-ready tools. This is true – with two points of elaboration. First, as pointed out repeatedly, the reason for writing that study was to chart the conceptual boundaries of an area of activity which, up to that point in time, had not been systematically defined or explored. Criticisms that *Measure of Peace* was not user-friendly misunderstand the intentions and context of its writing. Second, it strikes me as logical that the development of anything seeking to be user-friendly needs to employ an iterative process which begins with the conceptual – problem identification, a survey of existing theories, responses, tools, and so on – usually drawing from research, conversations, and experiences related to a particular problem. This process generates ideas and suggestions that might then lead to “prototypes,” testing, rethinking, more conversations, re-testing, and so on. It strikes me as premature (if not foolhardy) to jump into the fashioning of “user-friendly” tools without having (1) explored the nature of the set of problems to be addressed; (2) discussed existing and possible responses with those most affected by these problems.

In the appendix, I have included my modest effort to develop a “user-friendly” tool called “HANDS-ON PCIA.” As with *A Measure of Peace*, this is the product of intensive collaboration with colleagues in the field (in this case, Mindanao). It is written in English for non-English speakers, using a “PCIA for Dummies” format that includes quick references, examples, question-answer sections, illustrative tables, diagrams, and so on. In an effort to be user-friendly, the handbook includes “Worksheets” that may be used in capacity-building exercises with cases of the user’s choice, or directly in the field. It is still too technical and mechanistic, but it is moving in the right directions. More on this, shortly.

Given the lamentations over the lack of user-friendly tools, one might reasonably expect to have seen the development of a variety of nifty instruments in the years since the publication of *A Measure of Peace*. Unfortunately not. With the exception of some very exciting work being undertaken by communities and peace activists in Mindanao, the “tools” in the tool kits are overwhelmingly academic and tailored narrowly for donors in the North. Interestingly, the fact that there are not collections of competing PCIA tools floating around in cyberspace does not seem to have inhibited donors and development agencies from finding consultants to conduct Peace and Conflict Impact Assessments. The fact that this kind of grey literature is not circulating freely is itself a hindrance to the accumulation of a body of material that would allow a more systematic analysis of the idea and application of PCIA.

6. Outsourcing PCIA

In mid-2004, I was approached by UNICEF Sri Lanka to undertake a PCIA of its programme (Bush 2004b). I offered my now-standard response: “You don’t want me to ‘do’ a PCIA for you. What you should want is to develop the capacity within UNICEF and among your
partners to undertake PCIA themselves. That way, in the future you won’t have to rely on outsiders to do what should be part of the project cycle, from beginning to end.” The UNICEF response was telling, and explains the lack of much systematic awareness of the peace and conflict impacts of that organisation’s work in Sri Lanka: “Of course, we probably have the capacity to do a PCIA, but we are out-sourcing all of our evaluations.” While my assessment in Sri Lanka did not find much internal PCIA capacity within UNICEF, the point – which applies to most organisations in the development industry – is that the reliance on outside “expertise” to “do” PCIA (read “one-shot-forensic-evaluation”) short-circuits the development of the necessary capacities to integrate PCIA throughout the project cycle.

The “out-sourcing” of PCIA (and evaluation in general) may create a number of problems.
1. The transactional cash-for-product relationship between the buyer (development agency) and seller (consultant-evaluator) may exercise a strong dampening impact on critical findings – and thereby inhibits operational changes that may be necessary to genuinely mainstream PCIA.
2. It allows the managers of the project or programme to “plausibly deny” or bury any negative assessments.
3. As noted above, it inhibits the development of PCIA capacity with organisations and their partners.
4. For the most part, it excludes genuine participation of those affected by the interventions being evaluated.

I decided that if an organisation is not interested in cultivating its own PCIA capacity, then perhaps there are ways for an external Northern “expert” to cultivate local capacities by insisting on undertaking PCIAs in a team composed of local partners. In the UNICEF Sri Lanka case, there was no particular interest in such an approach. It just wanted a PCIA product, not a process – particularly one that might entail additional financial or logistical costs, even if it made sense in the longer term.

This orientation was not really that different on a UNDP-supported PCIA in Solomon Islands (Bush 2004c). One of the conditions I put on my participation in a “team” was that the division of labour would have to be one where I contributed to the development and application of an appropriate methodology (drawing on twenty-four years of work with colleagues in Sri Lanka and, more recently, the Philippines), while the rest of the team would be composed of Solomon Islanders who would provide the substantive “stuff” (the political context, the grounded analysis, the historical nuance, and so on). In the end, the “team” consisted of two Australians, one Brit, an American, one Solomon Islander intern, and me, a Canadian – certainly not the local team that I had argued was needed for the exercise.

While some development organisations may “talk the talk” regarding PCIA or “conflict-sensitive” programming, they do not “walk the walk” in terms of efforts to systematically integrate peace and conflict impact issues into standard operating procedures of the organisation. No doubt there is a variety of reasons for why this might be the case. It may be a matter of “operational habitus,” that is, it may be a function of the rigidity and inherent conservatism of all bureaucratic organisations which tautologically assert, “we do it this way, because that is the way we do it.” It may be a function of the perceived efficiency of out-sourcing work. Or it may be rooted in the feudal in-fighting within organisations as sub-groups try to assert control over policy and programming territory while blocking the efforts of others. The fact that such pathologies exist in some organisations should not be taken to imply that it is so in all organisations.
7. How not to do PCIA – creating conflict in the name of peace

In Sri Lanka, so-called “PCIA workshops” were held both in rebel-controlled and government-controlled areas. By most accounts, they were disorganised, confused and ill-prepared. They were led by foreigners who knew next to nothing about the conflict, very little about PCIA, and absolutely nothing about the intense sensitivities around “peace” at the time of the workshops – which were held as very delicate peace talks were taking place inside and outside the country. The facilitators were unable to respond to questions about the specific relevance of PCIA to the on-going peace process (questions that should have been expected, since PCIA had been a part of a three-year consultation between government, donors, and civil society).

The response from organisers concerning the apparent political insensitivity of their workshop was that PCIA was treated only from a “technical point of view” which “was never looked at from a political perspective.” This response only reinforces the sense of their basic misunderstanding of PCIA, a misunderstanding which quickly slides down the slippery slope of commodification. You cannot separate the political from the technical. PCIA is fundamentally, and inexorably, political. PCIA is not a “tool” or a set of tools, it is a political process. How could the organisers have expected participants not to focus on the current peace process – especially in the rebel-controlled areas? When participants did try to steer discussion towards their immediate political-conflict context, it was dismissed: the specific national context was explicitly not structured into the workshop. It appears that the workshops saw the meeting of two disconnected universes: the one of the facilitators who knew next to nothing of the political realities of the country, and the other of participants who were inextricably mired in these realities. How is it possible to have a workshop in rebel-controlled areas – or any part of a war-affected country – where that context is not the overwhelming point of reference for everyone in the room? Not only should this have been expected, it should have been the basis for holding the workshops. To not anticipate this, to not respond to this, is to set the workshops up for failure, and to invite the disgruntlement of participants – who would be correct in dismissing PCIA as an irrelevant academic concept. The workshops therefore missed an opportunity, while possibly foreclosing more relevant and informed discussion on PCIA in the future.

In addition to the confused content and process of the workshops, documents were written in academic English and not translated into local languages. On-site interpretation was inadequate. All of these factors combined to ensure the frustration of participants and the failure of the exercise. Ironically, the net impact of workshops may have been to decrease the opportunity to strengthen PCIA capacity. Despite this, a second round of workshops was held.

The second workshop followed a similar path – its Northern-defined agenda was based entirely on academic, English-language, material. Local participants were required to sign forms committing themselves to “rolling out” the tools in the workshops before they were accepted to participate. That is, they were required to commit (in writing) to support a process/product which they had not yet seen. On the second day of a week-long workshop, the deputy director of the Sri Lankan organisation which was serving as the “sales agent” for the Northern project had to drive to the site to try to address the clash of expectations between the academic – PCIA products being sold off the rack by Northern consultants – and the field workers – looking for useful relevant approaches and tools. (Details for this harsh assessment were derived from interviews with a number of participants in the workshops.)

One of the lessons that might be drawn is that even PCIA workshops should be vetted with a pre-project PCIA.

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In late May 2004, OXFAM UK (Sri Lanka) and the Asia Foundation (Sri Lanka & Philippines Offices) supported a five-day workshop in Habarana, Sri Lanka that sought explicitly to create the space to examine and strengthen the capacities of Sri Lankan participants to manage the often competing personal and professional demands of working in violence-prone settings – whether they worked in the North, the East, the deep South, or any other area at risk of inter- or intra-group violence.

The Habarana Workshop was based directly and explicitly on the lessons learned from two similar workshops held in Mindanao (Philippines) in 2003 organised by the Local Governance Support Project.

The Sri Lankan workshop contained two distinct, but inter-related, components.

The first part focused on the challenges of building a Culture of Peace in Sri Lanka. For the first two days, participants were introduced to concepts of the Culture of Peace and presented with various types of activities designed to deepen their understanding of a COP, which enabled them to delve into the cultural dimensions (broadly defined) of violence and peace in Sri Lanka. The original framework was developed by Toh Swee-Hin, UNESCO Laureate for Peace Education in 2000 (LGSP 2003).

The second part of the workshop consisted of a capacity-building exercise that introduced the concept of PCIA (drawing specifically on Bush 1998, 2001a, 2001b, 2003, 2004a, 2004b, 2004c, 2004d), and allowed participants to apply tools developed and presented in HANDS-ON PCIA: A Handbook for Conducting Peace and Conflict Impact Assessments. Participants applied this material to actual projects or programmes, which they themselves brought to the workshop.

Culture of Peace is...

- Dismantling the culture of war, including militarized/armed conflicts or physical violence – within a country or between countries (macro); within a family, community, school (micro), as well as symbolic manifestations (e.g. media and war toys);
- Living with compassion and justice – how we live in a manner where all resources are distributed in a way that meets the basic needs of all peoples within and across societies and nations;
- Building intercultural respect, reconciliation and solidarity – how we can build relationships among different cultures and civilizations so that we can live in harmony, peace and respect with each other; no racism and discrimination of any forms;
- Promoting human rights and responsibilities – based on the principle that each human being has rights (civil, political, economic, social, and cultural) as well as responsibilities; we can promote human rights rather than violate them;
- Living in harmony with the earth – how to prevent environmental destruction due to unsustainable development policies and lifestyles, and promote peaceful people-planet relationships;
- Cultivating inner peace – how do we nurture and cultivate a deep sense of spirituality that enhances inner peace, which in turn has an impact on building social peace.

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Workshop Objectives

1. Deepen the understanding of basic concepts and principles of the Culture of Peace, cultural diversity and intercultural solidarity in the midst of the multiple conflicts and immediate challenges confronting those working in violence-prone areas (recognizing that in Sri Lanka there is a multiplicity of conflicts throughout the island which sometimes intersect/interact and sometimes do not).

2. Articulate the relevance and challenges of conflict and identify the factors which help in assessing the state of a particular conflict.

3. Demonstrate skills in the use of conflict mapping and analysis.

4. Cultivate and apply the understandings and practical, hands-on, skills necessary to anticipate, monitor, and evaluate how a developmental, humanitarian, peacebuilding, or private sector intervention may affect the dynamics of peace or conflict in violence-prone regions.

5. Initiate an assessment of the peace or conflict impact of a project or programme which the participant is familiar with/working on to deepen knowledge and skills in Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment.

6. Plan follow-through mechanisms for continuing exchange and sharing learning applications among participants.

7. Develop South-South (Filipino-Sri Lankan) linkages to facilitate capacity-building relationships in the area of Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment.

The Habarana workshop was an unprecedented and unique contribution to the development of peacebuilding capacities in Sri Lanka because of its attempt to link the work being done globally to nurture a Culture of Peace with ongoing work on Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment. It should be highlighted that it was the first time in Sri Lanka that Culture of Peace and PCIA have been bundled together in a workshop. (The approach was piloted in the Philippines in collaborative initiatives between the Local Government Support Programme and myself.)

It is essential to understand why the workshop sought to integrate Culture of Peace with Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment in a single workshop, because it sheds light on the structure, content and the implications of this workshop and future efforts to nurture PCIA capacities.

In the past, Culture of Peace training has tended to be undertaken without the explicit consideration of the institutional realities and professional demands of those working on, or in, conflict-prone areas. It was left up to the individual to decide how (or whether) to incorporate COP ideas into their work. Conversely, training in PCIA (or derivative methodologies) has been treated almost entirely as a mechanistic, analytical, exercise in complete isolation from the personal and cultural (not to mention philosophical and ethical) foundations that will shape the ways in which PCIA is understood and applied – and that will ultimately determine its success or failure, by whatever criteria one chooses to use. So, even when done properly, “single-track” (technical) training artificially compartmentalizes the cultural and the technical, and makes it difficult for participants to apply – let alone integrate – workshop learning and tools into the professional and personal realities of their daily lives.

As one workshop participant observed, “It is not possible to be a 9-to-5 project officer in a 24-hour war zone”. In other words, there is no hard and fast border between the personal and the professional demands thrust on individuals working in conflict-prone areas. The struggle to manage these two sets of demands often leads to burn out or break down at a personal level, and poor decision-making leading to project failure (or worse) at a professional level.

One participant described the attempt to integrate the cultural and the technical in
Habarana workshop as an effort “to connect the heart with the mind.” It would be naïve to expect that the workshop could succeed in catalysing this connection in all of the participants – since the very process of working in conflict zones actively works against such integration. However, the slow process of such integration begins with the realization that (1) this compartmentalization exists (for various reasons) and (2) it carries a price that diminishes us both personally and professionally. The workshop itself offered an opportunity to examine these connections and disconnections. Through increased awareness and the application of basic tools, capacities were stimulated to begin a self-critical process to connect the cultural and the technical in the work and lives of participants.

Why Resist Disconnecting PCIA from COP?

One participant suggested that it might be more efficient to separate the Culture of Peace component of the workshop from the PCIA component. Because it is difficult to get people to commit to a five-day workshop, and because people want the immediate hands-on tools of PCIA, why not just have a 2-day PCIA workshop? Or alternatively, why not divide the workshop into two separate shorter workshops?

There are a number of reasons for resisting efforts to disconnect PCIA from Culture of Peace workshop components.

- As discussed above, an integrated workshop allows participants to recognize the disconnections between the personal and the professional, and thereby creates the space for self-conscious efforts to connect them.
- An integrated workshop allows participants to articulate a principled foundation from which to make personal and professional decisions in conflict-prone areas. Cognizant of the fact that we can never be bias-free in how we assess the impact of any initiative, the Culture of Peace module provides an opportunity for the participants to surface and become aware of their own way of looking at peace and conflict issues and may be strategically applied in PCIA based on how they have personally worked out these issues themselves.
- An integrated workshop allows for trust to begin developing among participants. This is essential not only for the success of the workshop but for the evolution of the supportive personal and professional relationships which will support their individual and their organisation’s efforts to work with PCIA.

South-South Linkages

One particularly exciting dimension of the Habarana workshop was that it was co-facilitated by three Filipino colleagues (Myn Garcia, Madett Virola-Gardiola and Abdul Jim Hassan, see footnote 4) who are the pioneers in developing COP-PCIA training in the Philippines – which now includes working directly with communities and local governments that are applying PCIA in seven Peace Zones in Mindanao. There is no other group in the world that currently possesses experience in training and application of PCIA that surpasses the informal PCIA network in the Philippines. In addition to this unrivalled expertise which they brought to the workshop (and which, in practice, is an openness to share from their PCIA experiences and to learn from others), there were many times when contrasts and comparisons were made between the Philippines’ efforts in PCIA and Sri Lankan efforts. This added a very important dimension of two-way learning to the workshop. In addition to the three Filipino co-facilitators, there were two participants from Nepal whose presence and engagement similarly contributed to learning using comparative methods. The potential for further South-South linkages beyond the personal friendships which were initiated is high.

Peace and Conflict Stakeholder Mapping
Working in groups, participants undertook an exercise to map the peacebuilding and conflict stakeholders in the immediate area of a project site. Through this exercise participants see that mapping involves more than finding and fitting pieces into a single peace/conflict puzzle. Participants realize that there are, in fact, different pieces to different puzzles (different conflicts; different conditions at different points in the same conflict; intersecting conflicts; and so on). Sometimes the same group is identified (correctly) as both a conflict and a peace stakeholder. And they see that the interests, objectives and means associated with different stakeholders may also change over time. The fluidity and complexity of the map underscores the need for an iterative approach to mapping throughout the life of a project.

Test-Driving PCIA Tools

Participants apply PCIA tools to projects that they bring to the workshop. This exercise allowed them to develop a hands-on understanding of the tools. (See the discussion below, “Responsive Changes in Workshop Format”.) This gives participants a reasonable basis to decide for themselves whether (or to what degree) PCIA may be immediately useful for them. Because participants’ projects are usually drawn from different phases of the project cycle (pre-, in, and post-project), the sharing of findings/experiences allows the possibility of appreciating the differences in application in different projects, stages, sectors, contexts, and locations. A number of participants found it particularly useful to have to identify and distinguish between peace indicators, conflict indicators, and development indicators in their particular projects. This was the exercise that, for them, summed up the way in which PCIA challenges us to rethink the ways we do our conventional development and humanitarian work.

Responsive Changes in Workshop Format

The major change to the workshop was a decision by the team of facilitators to not use the hypothetical case study (“Tugal”) as the focus for the first application of PCIA tools (i.e., before applying the same tools to existing projects in Sri Lanka). The original reason for developing the hypothetical case study was so that participants would not get hung up on disagreements over the details or minutiae of an actual case. The intention was to allow them to concentrate on the tools, and their systematic application in pre-project, in-project, and post-project phases. The case material was prepared and presented in a way that was designed to facilitate quick assimilation of the salient details of a project, a conflict, and an implementing agency. In practice, however, as experienced in the workshops done in the Philippines, there was considerable difficulty by participants to absorb the details and then apply the new tools. Further, upon reflection, any debate or dispute over “details or minutiae” can prove to be quite beneficial to the learning process, provided it could be harnessed and directed appropriately. The experience of conducting a PCIA workshop in the Zones of Peace in Mindanao, Philippines, wherein the participants used their actual community projects in applying the PCIA tools, clearly showed the relative ease in understanding the concepts and applying the tools of PCIA when using a “real” project that the participants know by heart. The additional advantage of using Sri Lankan cases (drawn from all phases of the project cycle) is that it provides a better opportunity for participants to actually test the utility of PCIA ideas and tools in cases that are pressing and important to them and their organisations.

A focus on existing projects (proposed, underway, or completed) means that facilitators need to have a detailed knowledge of the country (especially conflict-prone regions) in order to be most effective – or that they need to be paired up with co-facilitators with deep knowledge and area expertise. In one working group, for example, it took considerable probing and discussion before it
was made explicit that a border village in which a project was to be located was politically volatile not only because of a history of confrontation between the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and the Sri Lankan armed forces and between Tamil and Sinhalese villagers. Because it straddled the dividing line between the Northern Province and the Eastern Province, and had been the site of a major battle between the LTTE and rebel-LTTE forces in Spring 2004, the location was also exceptionally volatile as a potential site for future confrontations within the LTTE. For a variety of possible reasons, this crucial fact was not placed on the table for discussion. The facilitator needs to be able to follow and understand not only what is being said but, more importantly, what is not being said in order to sharpen participants’ application of PCIA tools.

Workshop Documentation and “Packaging” PCIA for Different Communities

The documentation used in the workshop is being revised in response to suggestions and experiences during the workshop. However, earlier versions of material used in the workshop may be downloaded from the web site for the Philippine-Canada Local Government Support Project.6

One of the exciting possibilities generated by the workshop was the connection made between an organisation interested in translating HANDS-ON PCIA into Tamil and Sinhala, and an organisation interested in funding such an initiative. This, however, is only the technical side of an issue that was raised throughout the workshop: the need not only to translate the language of PCIA, but to ensure that it is presented in forms that are appropriate and intelligible to a given constituency, whether this is community leaders, government decision makers, international NGOs, or donors. Unfortunately, there is not a single recipe that can be used to “cook up” a different PCIA dish to suit the tastes and appetite of each constituency. A lesson from Mindanao suggests that this can best be done through participatory engagements between the facilitating organisation and the constituency. Even more important to understand from the Mindanao experience is: (1) PCIA was only accepted once it was appropriated and “indigenized” by local communities; (2) the adoption of PCIA was a slow, organic, process; (3) PCIA was not the reason for initiating a relationship with a community. That is, a relationship was not built instrumentally with a community so that PCIA could be introduced into it. Rather, long standing relationships of trust and communication had built up over the years through an organic process of working with the communities, organising them, building their capacities and empowering the women, men and other sub-groups. PCIA just happened to be in the right hands, at the right place, at the right time. According to one of the Filipino co-facilitators, when this happened in Mindanao, the communities developed their own language, terms, and approaches. This was seen to be one of the next steps for PCIA in Sri Lanka.

9. Teaching PCIA in the Academic Setting

Obviously, teaching a full course on PCIA at a graduate level in a university is very different from week-long capacity-building workshops in the field. Even if the total number of hours is roughly the same in each format, the fact that a university course stretches out over 12 weeks permits a much more extensive engagement with “the literature.” It also allows the space to glimpse the “larger picture,” not only by comparing and contrasting different versions of PCIA, but by developing a better understanding of the basic “nuts and bolts” of monitoring and evaluation in general, and by examining the ways in which evaluation and assessment are conventionally undertaken in the fields of development, human rights, governance, military intervention, humanitarian assistance, and peacebuilding.

6 http://www.lgsp.org.ph/pdf/COP-PCIA.pdf
As an illustration, the appendix includes the English and French syllabi for a course taught in the MA Programme in Conflict Studies at St. Paul University in Ottawa, Canada.

The centrepiece of the course is the requirement for students to apply the Hands-On PCIA Handbook to a project of their choice located in a conflict-prone setting. Those students with field experience, or those who choose to work on projects drawn from home countries such as Lebanon, Ethiopia, Somalia or Sudan, may be closer to the thick details of a case, but each student faces his or her particular challenges in applying newly acquired tools and approaches to a case with more detail than can possibly be absorbed over the span of a few weeks. Further, none of the students are able to integrate the essential element of broad participation and consultation into their assessments. In one class, a student asked, “How can we possibly do this assignment within these severe constraints of information and time?” She was right. It was indeed impossible to succeed. However, the assignment does not seek (indeed, cannot expect) to generate the “perfect” PCIA. Rather, the best it can hope for is a “successful failure” – one that illustrates that the student: (1) “gets it” or understands the conceptual and methodological underpinnings of PCIA; and (2) is able to apply this understanding and related tools to a case in a way that demonstrates an ability to tease out and interpret impacts (potential or actual) of an intervention on the structures and processes of peace or conflict. Particularly important is that the student get a “feel” for conducting a PCIA; develop a sense of the complexities of a case and the analytical challenges involved in interpreting it; be able to read between the lines of descriptive project documents in order to flag possible peace or conflict impacts; develop an ability to interrogate the project story to identify logical gaps, information holes; and to know what questions need to be asked (and answered) before impacts or proto-impacts (that is, possible impacts) may be determined or divined.

The greatest challenge to teaching PCIA within the university is the great distance between university realities and case realities. PCIA assignments risk being intellectual exercises. However, when university training is viewed as a starting point, rather than an end point, the fruit of the exercise may only become apparent in the future as students learn from experience and grow and develop in the real world.

10. Next Steps

In light of this discussion, where should we be placing our emphasis? In my opinion, the foregoing analysis suggests the following:

(1) The cultivation of patient and collaborative working relationships with Southern partners that would form the foundation for learning from their experiences with formal and informal PCIA (both successes and failures), and for understanding how they (and their work) may be supported, and how knowledge and experiences may be seeded through our relationships with communities in other conflict settings. Here, it cannot be over-emphasized that genuine North-South partnerships are possible only if they are built on respect, true collaboration and long-term relationships. More often than not, Southern participation is forced into agendas that are Northern-defined, and characterized by top-down arrogance/control, short-term transactions, and budgets that benefit Northern “partners” over Southern “partners.”

(2) South-South linkages: Even more useful than the cultivation of respectful North-South relationships is making the connections between those organisations and individuals in the South who possess practical PCIA experience and expertise and other Southern groups in other violence-prone areas – as was done in Habarana where PCIA facilitators from the Local Governance Support...
Programme in the Philippines led a week-long PCIA workshop for Sri Lankan and Nepalese field workers.

(3) The **explicit engagement of Northern organisations in the challenge of integrating or “mainstreaming” peace and conflict impact issues into their work** – at country, programme, and project levels. I know of two organisations – OXFAM and WUSC (World University Services of Canada) – who are developing initiatives which attempt to do just this. While learning from these efforts, we should not avert our eyes from other initiatives by international actors like UNICEF in Sri Lanka and UNDP in Solomon Islands where it is patently clear that although they might have learned how to sprinkle PCIA phrases into proposals to donors, they have so far failed to genuinely integrate PCIA into their projects, let alone programmes. Among the possible reasons for this is the fact that PCIA must be participatory; it must include communities; it must build on and develop existing national capacities, if it is to be useful and relevant. All this is necessary for the simple reason that it is impossible to identify or understand impact without the active participation/analysis/assessment of partners and communities on the ground. However, genuine participation with communities poses “problems” from the perspective of most Northern organisations because it increases “inefficiency” (e.g. by increasing the time needed to conduct an assessment; or by requiring the cultivation of trust with communities instead of the usual short-term-transactional relationships) and risks loss of control (by raising expectations and increasing community demands for accountability by the organisations; by creating the space for community influence over the means and ends of an initiative).

(4) **Launch of a PCIA “Facility”:** There is a general appreciation of the potential utility of Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment in the work of development actors and donors. Exactly how this might be undertaken and integrated into their work is less clear. The establishment of a PCIA “facility” or “mechanism” would serve as a resource for all stakeholders interested in using, and ultimately integrating, PCIA within their organisations and activities. This facility could take the form of a team of individuals backed up with the necessary resources (financial, administrative, logistical, institutional) to undertake or facilitate the following activities: (1) PCIA training; (2) managing a mentoring programme for individuals within organisations to undertake PCIA and to integrate Peace and Conflict Sensitivity throughout their work; and (3) the collection, analysis and dissemination of PCIA experiences (assessments, toolkits, training material, mainstreaming efforts, etc.) and lessons, leading to the creation of a repository of PCIA-relevant initiatives and the on-going, systematic analysis of this material in order to develop a clearer sense of what is working, where it is working, why it is working, and whether lessons culled from successes and failures can be applied to other settings. The explicit objective is the development and refinement of tools, approaches, and expertise in peace and conflict impact monitoring and programming. Wherever the facility is located, it should be readily accessible to those who will draw upon it, and it should very explicitly demonstrate its commitment to the principles of capacity-building and local ownership discussed above. Among other things, the facility would collect and translate material into hands-on and immediately useable PCIA-relevant tools.

(5) **PCIA Pilot Projects:** Parallel with, or even prior to, the launching of the PCIA Facility noted above, it is recommended that a number of pilot projects be identified and supported. This might, for example, include a commitment from cutting-edge organisations to explicitly integrate PCIA into selected projects – as is being proposed by WUSC and OXFAM. And it should include the participation of partners within the pilot initiatives.
To ensure that any PCIA initiative will have a positive peacebuilding and developmental impact, it ultimately needs to be able to answer “yes” to the following two questions:

1. Is the initiative increasing the capacities of participants – particularly Southerners – to (a) identify the real and potential peace and conflict impacts of an intervention; and (b) formulate and implement their own solutions non-violently and effectively?

2. Is the initiative built on a partnership that leads towards genuine ownership by Southern partners?

What we soon see is that there is no silver bullet; no one blanket solution to address all problems; and that the answer “yes” to the deceptively simple questions above requires an examination of a thick and complex set of issues that are guaranteed to slow initiatives down, increase ambiguity about the process and outcomes of an initiative, and raise awkward political questions of control. If these are indeed the costs of undertaking PCIA, the costs of not undertaking it are even higher.

11. References


(Please Note: revised versions are generated regularly in response to experiences and ongoing learning. The most recent versions are always available directly from the author at: kbush@ustpaul.ca or kbush@iprolink.ch).


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APPENDICES*

Appendix I

A manual conceptualised to be reader-friendly and user-friendly, containing quick check-lists, diagrammes, examples, question-answer boxes, and worksheets. Please note that recent versions are always available directly from the author at: kbush@ustpaul.ca or kbush@iprolink.ch.

Appendix II

St. Paul University, MA in Conflict Studies, Faculty of Human Sciences
ECS 5330: “Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA) of Interventions in Conflict-Prone Settings”, Fall 2004
Course outline and bibliography.

Appendix III

Université Saint-Paul, Maîtrise des Arts, Études de Conflits, Faculté des sciences humaines.
ECS 5730 : Résolution des conflits: résultats et évaluation – « l’évaluation d’impact sur les situations de la paix et de conflit (EIPC) » Winter 2005
Course outline and bibliography.

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