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## WAR-MAKING, PEACEKEEPING, AND PEACEBUILDING

### Two Views of a Post-Cold War World

Charles Krauthammer, "Peacekeeping is for Chumps," *Saturday Night*, vol. 110, no. 9 (November 1995)

Kenneth D. Bush and Kevin J. Bush, "A Street-Proofing Guide for Reading the Writing on the Post-Cold War World: A Response to Charles Krauthammer"

in Mark Charlton, ed., *Cross Currents: International Relations 2<sup>nd</sup> edn* (Scarborough: ITP Nelson, 1999).

**A Street-Proofing Guide for Reading the Writing on the Post-Cold War World:**  
A Response to Charles Krauthammer

*Cross Currents: International Relations*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edn, (Scarborough: ITP Nelson, 1999).

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"When *I* use a word," Humpty Dumpty said, in a rather scornful tone, "it means what I choose it to mean. Neither more nor less."

"The question is," said Alice, "whether you *can* make words mean so many different things."

"The questions is," said Humpty Dumpty, "who is to be master. That is all."

-- Lewis Carol, *Through the Looking Glass*

## INTRODUCTION

Just as parents street-proof their children before allowing them to wander into the streets to play, so should we prepare ourselves before wandering into the writing and rambling of commentators on the post-Cold War world. If children should be wary about accepting candy from strangers, we should be no less cautious about accepting the simplistic assertions and unsubstantiated generalizations offered by neoconservatives and political "realists" who argue that, in essence, the world is no different now than during the Peloponnesian War. Not only are they offering up dubious candies, they've got the car door open and are leaning out to offer us a ride. Don't get in. Their descriptions of the world are inaccurate. Their prescriptions impoverish our political imagination and fail to respond to both the challenges and opportunities presented to us in a post-Cold War World. And most dangerously, they are promoting a recipe for ensuring that the world will be a meaner, more precarious, place.

This short chapter has three objectives. First, it responds to an article by Charles Krauthammer entitled, "Peace-keeping is for Chumps,"<sup>1</sup> in an effort to defuse and dispel many of the misconceptions of the post Cold-War world promoted by the old boys' club of academics and policy makers -- particularly, though not exclusively, in the United States. Second and more importantly, this chapter introduces a simple set of questions that may be used as analytical filters to guide a critical reading of explanations of the post- Cold War condition. Ultimately, this chapter seeks to street-proof readers by introducing some basic analytical tools with which to assess the merit, general integrity, and trust-worthiness of arguments. And finally, the article outlines what it sees to be a more constructive and effective agenda for building peace in a post-Cold War world. There is not the space in this short chapter to address all of the issues provoked by Krauthammer's article. This chapter will have served its purpose if it provides the tools for the reader to revisit, and re-assess, the original article with new and more critical eyes.

Let us be clear about what is not being argued here. We are not arguing that military force does not have an important place in international politics. The most cursory glance at contemporary international relations underscores both the prevalence and perhaps even inevitability of military force in situations where all other options have failed, or in situations where the measured and discriminate application of military muscle is needed to reinforce non-military measures. However, this chapter does take issue with those who view, and respond to, the world exclusively through the narrow lens of military force. To respond to the post-Cold War world with a policy tool kit limited to the hammer of military might is like tackling a plumbing job with carpenter tools. One might be able to fashion a workable system, but it would be less than optimal, to be sure.

The greatest danger in accepting the militarized programme advocated by Charles Krauthammer and his club is this: the use of military force as the first resort, rather than the last resort, and the application of military

"solutions" to non-military problems, risks further militarizing the international environment thereby increasing rather than decreasing individual and collective security.<sup>2</sup> As Simon Dalby points out: "formulating social problems in terms of security all too easily leads to militarization or violence as a solution to what is defined as a problem.... The question then is whether, in the process of extending the ambit of threats requiring a military response, one isn't further militarizing society rather than dealing more directly with social problems."<sup>3</sup>

Neither is this chapter arguing that peacekeeping is a silver bullet that will "resolve" the militarized conflicts confronting us today. In some ways, Krauthammer's failure to provide a definition of "peacekeeping" or to use the term consistently throughout his article, is an accurate reflection of the confusion surrounding peacekeeping today. Although the concept and practice of peacekeeping have attracted significant attention in the post-Cold War World, nowhere are these debates acknowledged, let alone engaged, in "Peacekeeping is for Chumps."<sup>4</sup> Krauthammer savages "peacekeeping" as "perhaps the most widely accepted illusion at work in today's "Utopianism," but fails to define or explain what he means by the term -- traditionally understood to be a strategy "to halt and reduce the manifest violence of a conflict through the intervention of military forces in an interpository role."<sup>5</sup> Instead, he finger-points to a wide variety of different instances where the international community has sanctioned the deployment of military force. Some of these are cases of traditional peacekeeping; some are examples of what are variously called "second generation peacekeeping," or the "new peacekeeping partnership" which involve a large civilian component; and some examples, as he notes, are not peacekeeping operations at all. Yet, all are tarred indiscriminately with the same black brush.

If we are to develop an appreciation of the positive and negative impacts of "peacekeeping" operations, then surely the starting point must be an appreciation of the variation in the types of operations and the circumstances within which they are launched. Further, if an article is to make a constructive contribution to the debate concerning the role and efficacy of peacekeeping, it has a responsibility to clarify rather than perpetuate such confusion in the field.<sup>6</sup> We need to distinguish between: (1) those instances in which peacekeeping was tried and failed; (2) those instances in which peacekeeping was applied in inappropriate conditions; and (3) those instances which are more accurately categorized as "peace enforcement" or straight forward military intervention. Only then can we begin to develop a clearer sense of the potential utility and limitations of peacekeeping and other forms of military intervention.

As the quote which opens this chapter is meant to suggest, Krauthammer's article illustrates the way in which the concept and practice of peacekeeping have been manipulated to serve the particularistic interests of international political actors to justify unilateral military action. This is a reflection of a common tendency to focus myopically on the military dimensions of international conflict management -- to the neglect of the non-military actors and activities that contribute significantly to the peace process. With this tendency comes the danger that peacekeeping may be confused with, or substituted for, the political and diplomatic activities associated with peacemaking, and the social, economic and institutional reconstruction activities associated with peacebuilding. While Krauthammer is quite correct to point to those instances where military force has been confused for peacekeeping, he ignores these non-military components of the peace process which are essential for the deconstruction of the structures of war, and the construction of the structures of peace.

However, even "genuine" peacekeeping in the absence of peacemaking and peacebuilding may only succeed in imposing an "armed peace," and the removal of peacekeeping troops invites a return to a nasty *status quo ante bellum*. In other words, while peacekeeping may contribute to the management of the conflict (by inhibiting direct military violence), it does not on its own facilitate resolution. Indeed, in the absence of supporting initiatives, peacekeeping may inhibit parties from moving towards peaceful accommodation -- by isolating communities, freezing an unsettled status quo, and building barriers between groups. At best, peacekeeping can create a temporary space within which antagonists have the opportunity to engage in dialogue and hopefully in "peacemaking." At worst, it might only provide a short respite before the re-engagement of militarized violence by well rested and re-armed troops.<sup>7</sup>

Just as it is naive to expect peacekeeping to be a silver bullet, so is it a mistake to expect the war-making blue print of Krauthammer to be a constructive response to our global ills. Indeed, the acceptance and application of such an approach may go a long way to ensuring that the mistakes of the past are continued into the future. However, in the comparison of the efficacy of peacekeeping versus war-making, we should bear in mind the fact that in 1992 the world's total military budget was \$815 billion, compared with a UN peacekeeping budget of \$1.9 billion.<sup>8</sup> It is truly baffling to try to understand Krauthammer's unqualified statement that "war-making works" (p. 76) whether in Bosnia or elsewhere if we acknowledge the deaths of 250,000 people, and the displacement of 2.7 million people in Bosnia and Herzegovina.<sup>9</sup> Of course, he is making a fine distinction between *their* war-making and *our* war-making, as if it makes a difference to a victim whether a bomb is dropped by NATO forces, Bosnian forces, or by generic "men in uniform." But even if it was possible to discriminate between civilians and non-civilians in militarized conflicts, the fundamental problem remains: it is not possible to *resolve* social, political, or economic problems with military solutions.<sup>10</sup>

History is not "just one damn thing after another"; that is, we are not simply propelled by external forces, willy nilly. Occasionally, there are conjunctures in human history when our potential to affect wide spread and lasting constructive change increases. Unfortunately, we often only see these conjunctures in retrospect. It behooves us to ask whether we are in such a position today.

## CRITICAL TOOLS

There are a number "filters" that may help us to critically assess the strength of arguments and the quality of reasoning applied to the explanation or understanding of a specific issue, event, or decision. In most cases, some of these filters are employed intuitively in our reading and thinking. But by identifying them explicitly, they may be more effectively applied to the systematic assessment of arguments. For an argument to withstand independent, critical, assessment, it must be able to respond to the following questions to the readers' satisfaction: 1) So what?; 2) Can you prove it?; and 3) Now what? Each question suggests a host of further sub-questions which help us both to defuse and dismantle shaky arguments, and to construct well-reasoned ones.

### *So What?*

Arguments, like theories, are "always for someone and for some purpose."<sup>11</sup> The question, "so what?" invites us to put an argument into the broader context of the political world and competing ideas:

What is being figured out, settled, or solved? What is the author attempting to understand? What does it matter? Who cares? Whose interests are served, protected, advanced, or compromised by the argument? What is the article doing? Why is it doing it? What are the implications and consequences of the argument? What are the implications of the author's argument? Does the argument make sense? Are the assumption, preconceptions, or presuppositions underpinning the argument transparent and reasonable?

### *Can you Prove It?*

This question invites us to consider the degree to which an argument substantiates its analysis or recommendations empirically or logically. When we begin to seek evidence supporting an argument, we are better able to distinguish the empirical from the ideological:

What empirical evidence or detail is offered to substantiate the argument? How accurate is the data, information, or evidence? What are its sources? How can we check validity? Are specific examples given? Are they appropriate? Are details missing? Are the complexities of the issues understood? How does the the argument present causes and effects? Does this make

sense? Is the argument reasonable? Do inferences and interpretations lead directly to the stated "conclusions," given the evidence? What (whose) point of view is taken? Could things be otherwise? Are alternative and competing understandings or arguments recognized, addressed, and presented fairly? What is missing from the argument?

*Now What?*

Of each of the three sets of questions posed here, this one tends to be the most neglected, particularly in the academic setting:

Does the argument give us an idea of where we might go from here, for example, in terms of ideas, theories, policies or concrete actions? Does it make the leap from critique to the development of a practical plan of action? Does it provide alternative courses of action to change negative structures or processes, or to nurture or construct new ones?

There is not the space to apply each of these questions systematically to "Peacekeeping is for Chumps." However, with these questions in mind, we may focus our attention on the article and make a number of observations and assessments.

#### READING BETWEEN THE LINES

*Marx said that all great events in world history reappear in one fashion or another, the first time as tragedy, the second time as farce. And I would add: the third time as hallucination (p. 73)*

Charles Krauthammer finds himself in curious political company with his reference to Karl Marx's *18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*. In his rush to get to his cute punch line ("the third time as hallucination"), Krauthammer misses Marx's central point: "The tradition of all the dead generations weighs like a nightmare of the brain of the living. And just when they seem engaged in revolutionizing themselves and things, in creating something that has never yet existed, precisely in such periods of revolutionary crisis they anxiously conjure up the spirits of the past to their service and borrow from them names, battle cries and costumes in order to present the new scene of world history in this time honoured disguise and this borrowed language." Ironically, Krauthammer's "Peacekeeping is for Chumps" is a fine example of the point made by Marx. As we shall see in the section below, Krauthammer appears unable to move from the intellectual straight jacket of the Cold War to view the present as a new and different world. I once heard an aboriginal American bend Marx's aphorism in a way which is both true to the original text and especially appropriate in the current context: "those who repeat their history are bound to remember it."

*It is important for us to recognize that the post-Cold War world is not new. It is as old as the international system. The reality of that system is that peace depends, as it has since the Peloponnesian Wars, on balance of power. And the structure of the world being what it is today, with the United States overwhelmingly dominant, that means American power, and the will to use it. (p. 76)*

A well-reasoned argument is a *process* by which an author leads the reader progressively through a series of points to a final, common, conclusion. It is a process of persuasion which attempts to convince the reader that the world is, in fact, as it is portrayed in the text. As we are invited into this process, we should be sensitive to subtle and not-so-subtle coercive rhetorical techniques that might be employed. For example, in the passage above, we should pay attention to the use of the phrase, "*the reality of that system*" for it represents an attempt to manoeuvre

the reader into believing that he/ she is seeing the world "as it is," rather than as it has been packaged and presented by Krauthammer. This is a form of rhetoric which conjures up impressions of objectivity and detachment, and thus may obscure the ideological and subjective dimensions of the representations.<sup>12</sup> Cruder versions of rhetorical coercion are evident in the form of the simple statement and restatement of the principal assumption of the article, in place of argumentation or empirical substantiation -- namely that "the natural state of the world is not perpetual peace but perpetual conflict." However, this argument loses much of its vigour, if we challenge this assumption with the more plausible (and empirically verifiable) position that the "natural state of the world" is neither perpetual peace or perpetual conflict exclusively, but some shifting combination of both. If we accept this position, then our analytic lens broadens to enable us to recognize patterns of both international cooperation and conflict over time, and in different places and issue areas.

One of the reasons that Krauthammer and his ilk are incapable of even considering a cooperative realm of international relations is their very narrow, and increasingly disconnected, conception of power. Like all die-hard Cold Warriors, they are unable to see that the *nature of power is changing fundamentally in the post-Cold War World*. Such a recognition would challenge one of the central assertions of his argument: that the only currency of value in the international arena is military "power."

The argument concerning the changing nature of international power has been made forcefully by Joseph Nye.<sup>13</sup> The traditional indicators of power have changed. They are no longer limited to the size of army, population, territory, natural resources, and so on. More significant are factors such as technology, education, and economic clout. This general diffusion of power leads Nye to adopt a differentiated view of power: "Although both bipolarity and multipolarity are useful terms, today, different spheres of world politics have different power structures. Military power, particularly nuclear, remains largely bipolar in its distribution. But in trade... power is multipolar. Ocean resources, money, space, shipping and airlines each have somewhat different distributions of power."<sup>14</sup>

The power of states varies, as does the significance of nonstate actors in different spheres. Very importantly, as world politics has been fragmented into different spheres, military power resources have become less fungible, *i.e.*, less transferable from sphere to sphere. The fact that the United States is the Mike Tyson of the 21st Century does not, on its own, give it extra clout in its trade negotiations with states that are more vigorous and robust economically. Indeed, because the use of military force has become increasingly costly (economically and politically), less threatening forms of power have grown increasingly attractive. As Nye notes, "diminished fungibility means that specifying the context is increasingly important in estimating the actual power that can be derived from power resources -- Power for What?"<sup>15</sup> As the instruments of power change, so should strategies. Nye realizes this. Krauthammer does not.

Both the diffusion and the changing nature of international power point to a world which is becoming increasingly complex. A one-dimensional understanding of the world, based on a narrow focus on military conflict misrepresents the post-Cold War condition. This is certainly not to suggest that we should abandon military institutions or the traditional concerns of the military balance of power. Rather, it is a call to reject simplistic views of the post-Cold War condition, and to recognize the complexity of an international system which contains both elements of militarized competition and conflict, *as well as elements of cooperation*. Traditionalists such as Krauthammer seek in vain for "security" through the intimidation which characterizes the military balance of power, either oblivious of, or dismissive of, the fact that international actors themselves increasingly recognize that emerging threats to "global security" are beyond the control of any single actor, *e.g.*, environmental threats, epidemiological threats such as HIV/AIDS, economic volatility/ crisis, arms trafficking, illicit drugs, terrorism, and the international migration.<sup>16</sup> This recognition has led to significant levels of international cooperation.<sup>17</sup> With the expansion of NATO, we are also seeing considerable efforts to develop cooperative arrangements within traditional security arenas as well -- between East and West, no less. A one-dimensional, militaristic, view of the world ignores, and may even threaten, established and evolving cooperative

relationships in these arenas. Conversely, cooperative initiatives in these other realms may have beneficial pacifying effects in military security arenas.<sup>18</sup>

Such cooperation is premised on equal portions of self-interest and common interest. This is a far cry from the so-called "Utopianism" that Krauthammer seems to bite on like a piece of tin foil. He uses the term to refer to: "an era marked by the belief that peace is the norm, that peace is something to be kept, that all it requires is for the unrulies of the world to be civilized by compromise and reason, Western style, and that we do this with talk -- Vance-Owen plans, UN resolutions -- and blue helmets" (p. 76). The counter-position presented in "Peacekeeping is for Chumps," may be labelled ostrich-ism (not to be confused with ostracism) -- a position characterized by the refusal to recognize changes in behaviour which might challenge one's intellectual/ideological position. A wide range of techniques may be used to plant one's head firmly in the sand, including the two evident here: the caricaturization and ignoring of alternative positions.

It is estimated that from 1945 to 1989, 23 million children, women, and men have died as a result of 138 wars.<sup>19</sup> There is no doubt that the post-Cold War world continues to be a violent, militarized, place. Indeed, in many instances, contemporary militarized violence is a direct consequence of the superpower rivalry that defined the Cold War.<sup>20</sup> One need only review the pattern of arms trafficking to see that the past is very much evident in the present. We see that the five permanent members of the UN Security Council provide 86 per cent of the arms exported to developing countries, and that in 1992, as the world searched for the mythical "peace dividend," the United States alone accounted for 46 per cent of the delivery of weapons to these states.<sup>21</sup> In Krauthammer-style arguments, the supply and demand for such weapons are necessary because the international system is inherently conflictual. The insidiousness of the logic underpinning this argument lies in its potential to become self-fulfilling. An alternative assessment which is equally (if not more) plausible, views the supply and demand of such weapons to be the cause rather than a consequence of a conflictual world. The counter-argument that "guns don't kill, people do," is as feable at the international level as it is at the domestic American level.

Clearly there are threads of continuity linking the past and the present (for better and for worse). Importantly, decisions and actions undertaken today may either reinforce or sever these threads. However, there is also discontinuity between the past and present. While being careful not to ignore the legacy of the Cold War, we must also recognize that there we are seeing fundamental changes that offer the possibility of moving out of the dark shadow of the past.

## NOW WHAT?<sup>22</sup>

There are certainly times when conditions are not right for international military intervention, whether in the form of peacekeeping, peace "enforcement," or war-making. However, once it has been decided by international, national and domestic actors that a large scale "mission for peace"<sup>23</sup> (including a military component) is required and possible, the following considerations should be borne in mind.

### *Division of Labour*<sup>24</sup>

The number and complexity of tasks involved in peacebuilding and reconstruction will require the energies and resources of a multiplicity of actors. The working relationship between these actors must be premised on a clear division of labour which recognizes and harnesses the comparative advantages and particular skill sets of the respective actors. Particular types of actors are better suited to play particular roles. Thus, peacekeeping is best undertaken by military actors; peacemaking and preventive diplomacy are best tackled by formal political actors and organizations -- including political leaders, statesmen, and recognized and accepted leaders of the groups involved in a conflict; and peacebuilding falls most clearly within the purview of governmental development



agencies, some multilateral actors such as the UNDP, as well as NGOs and community organizations. Thus, within this division of labour the military should not be expected to play a development role effectively, just as development NGOs should not be expected to play a peacekeeping role. This is not to suggest that the activities associated with these roles are not at times interdependent. However, they are not inter-changeable.

In order to understand the success or failure of specific efforts at peacebuilding and political, economic, and social reconstruction, we need to examine how these different actors and activities interact to support or undercut each other. While there are clear military security tasks that are best undertaken by military actors in the immediate post-conflict setting, it is a mistake to cast military activities as the cardinal referent from which all other activities take their bearing. As demonstrated by the case of international intervention in Somalia, to do so may jeopardize peace and reconstruction efforts. Jan Eliasson, the UN Under Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs, observed in July 1993 that in Somalia the international community "was spending ten dollars on military protection for every dollar of humanitarian assistance," and that "unless sufficient funds [were] provided for rehabilitation activities, there [was] a risk that the military operation can be perceived as an end in itself,"<sup>25</sup> Fundamentally, the rebuilding of war-torn societies is a developmental initiative with a crucial security component, rather than the other way around. While the military security dimension should not be neglected, the prospects for longer-term development are compromised to the extent that it is dominated by a military security logic. A very important step towards institutionalizing this developmental position is evident in the recent release of the final report of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) DAC Task Force on Conflict, Peace, and Development Cooperation entitled, "Policy Guidelines for Development Cooperation in Conflict Prevention and Post-Conflict Cooperation."<sup>26</sup>

In many ways, the *modus operandi* of peacekeeping and other military interventions run contrary to most approaches to sustainable development. Peacekeeping and military intervention minimizes local inputs and places a priority on the self-sufficiency of soldiers; development approaches tend to maximize local inputs and build on local resources. The military brings with it the material and human resources for its anticipated job; development actors attempt to develop state and community capacities to identify problems and formulate solutions. A peacekeeping/ military approach is task-oriented, short-term and dependent on high institutional support; a development approach is process-oriented, long-term, and minimally dependent on institutional support.

The point to be emphasized here is that while soldiers have an important role to play in the military dimension of the peace and reconstruction process, their institutional structure and *modus operandi* are designed for specific functions. In an already militarized situation, a trained and disciplined military force is essential for some tasks in the first stages of de-militarization -- for example the decommissioning of arms; demobilization of soldiers; and de-mining.<sup>27</sup> Also, the contributions of military engineers in the areas of logistics and infrastructural construction in the immediate post-conflict setting are sometimes invaluable. This is where the military's talents are best used. However, the military does not possess the necessary skill set to play effective non-military roles. Further, as argued above, the use of military actors in non-military roles, risks "militarizing" international efforts.

*Avoid the temptations of "Bungee Cord Humanitarianism"*<sup>28</sup>

Bungee jumping is an adventure sport which involves tying a long bungee cord -- a thick elastic band -- to the ankles of a person who then dives head first off a very high platform. As the bungee cord expands and contracts, the participant's body is yanked up and down in a series of progressively less extreme drops. In the end, the participant ends up hanging upside down rather ignobly before being lowered earthwards. While the participant experiences the thrill of having jumped in and out of the jaws of death, in the end, he or she has not made a noticeable difference in the world.

An emphasis on "rapid reaction," and "minimal time commitment" increases the danger that bungee jumping might become an appropriate metaphor for so-called peacebuilding initiatives. This appears to have been the central logistical concern in the discussion surrounding the modalities of the multinational force for Zaire, and it

is certainly a feature of the Canadian Peacebuilding Initiative of the Minister of Foreign Affairs.<sup>29</sup> The problem with quick in-and-out operations is that their emphasis on rapidity and short term commitment is antithetical to the cumulative approach and long-term commitment required for peacebuilding -- if we are to use the term "peacebuilding" in any reasonable sense of the term. Academics, multilateral agencies, NGOs and governments all have a responsibility to avoid, and actively discourage, what might be called bungee cord humanitarianism.

### *Identification, Support and Harnessing of Indigenous Peacebuilding Resources*

There is a need to invert the dominant understanding of, and approach to, peacebuilding during and after violent conflicts. Instead of being top-down, externally driven exercises, they need to be internally driven and indigenously controlled approaches that draw on and cultivate those indigenous resources necessary for war-torn societies to build their own peace, with their own hands. This type of bottom-up approach is likely to be more sustainable and cost-effective in the long-term. However, it also tends to go against the political grain of the standard *modus operandi* of governments and multilateral organizations. The adoption of a bottom-up approach would require external actors to forfeit considerable control over the process, and to assume a supporting rather than starring role in a production which may have significant salience in the domestic political arena. While, some work has been undertaken in this field, much more work needs to be done in the systematic identification and assessment of indigenous peacebuilding and reconstruction efforts.

If, as external actors, we are to facilitate and support indigenous peacebuilding initiatives, we must first know what partnership opportunities exist. Thus, it would be useful to develop the means of identifying and mapping those peacebuilding potentials, opportunities and resources within a society that might be supported externally. This suggestion rests on the understanding that building peace requires both the deconstruction of the structures and processes of violence, as well as the construction of the structures and processes of peace. The ability to systematically map peacebuilding capacities in conflict prone areas is an essential requirement for moving beyond *ad hoc*, reactive, measures. "Early warning" mechanisms may be helpful for monitoring the disintegration of political, legal, social and economic structures that increase the likelihood of violent conflict. Equally important however, is the ability to recognize and support those indigenous resources that may contribute to conflict prevention, peacebuilding and reconstruction.<sup>30</sup>

### *Seek to Create Opportunities, Not to Impose "Solutions"*

This caveat might be the most obvious, and the most overlooked: rebuilding wartorn societies is *not* about the imposition of "solutions" -- military or otherwise; it is about the creation of opportunities. That is, from an international vantage point, the challenge of rebuilding wartorn societies is to nurture and create the political, economic, and social space, within which indigenous actors can identify, develop, and employ the resources necessary to build a peaceful, just, and prosperous society. The desired outcome is rarely a return to the *status quo ante bellum*. Indeed, in most cases, the status quo ante is not a desirable state of affairs to the extent that it entails conditions, structures and processes which are implicated in creating the existing condition of violence. In most cases, years of violent conflict and profound changes in the local and international conditions have destroyed any chance of returning to a status quo which may (or may not) have existed. Thus, the ultimate objective is the creation of a new basis for peaceful coexistence. The end point is not a conflict-free utopia, but a society in which conflict may be dealt with non-violently as it arises through sustainable, indigenous, structures and processes.

The critical tools presented and applied (albeit briefly) above are as appropriate for assessing the current chapter as they are for assessing Krauthammer's article. The point of this discussion is not limited to critique -- as necessary and satisfying as this may be. This chapter seeks to take one step beyond critique, into the realm of possibility, whereby we might begin to fashion a different future based on a critical understanding of the constraints and opportunities of the past and present. It is perhaps appropriate to conclude with another, lesser-known quote from Marx's *18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* which speaks to the present as much as it did to the

time in which it was written: "The social revolution of the 19th Century cannot draw its poetry from the past, but only from the future. It cannot begin with itself before it has stripped off all superstition in regard to the past."

#### ENDNOTES

1.... *Saturday Night*, November 1995, pp. 73-76. All page numbers in this chapter refer to the original article.

2.... Examples of the application of military "solutions" to non-military problems would include the so-called "war on drugs," and the militarized response to illegal migrants and refugee claimants.

3.... Simon Dalby, *Contesting an Essential Concept: Dilemmas in Contemporary Security Discourse*, Occasional Papers Series #6, Paterson School of International Affairs, Ottawa, 1994, p. 6).

4.... See for example: Gordonker, Leon and Thomas G. Weiss (eds), *Soldiers, Peacekeepers and Disasters*, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1991; Weiss, Thomas G., 'New Challenges for U.N. Operations: Implementing an Agenda for Peace', *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 16. No. 1, Winter 1993; William J. Durch, (ed.) (1993). *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analysis* (New York: St. Martin's Press); Paul F. Diehl (1994). *International Peacekeeping* (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press); David Charters (1994). editor, *Peacekeeping and the Challenge of Civil Conflict Resolution*, Centre for Conflict Studies, University of New Brunswick; Mats R. Berdal (1993). "Whither UN Peacekeeping?" *Adelphi paper #281* (London: IISS); David Rieff (1994). "The Illusions of Peacekeeping," *World Policy Journal*, 11:3 (Fall); Adam Roberts (1994). "The Crisis in Peacekeeping," *Survival* 36: 3 (Autumn), pp. 93-120.

5.... Michael Harbottle, "The Strategy of Third Party Intervention in Conflict Resolution", *International Journal*, 25:1, 1979. Conventionally, peacekeeping was characterized by four main activities: internal pacification; buffer forces; border patrol; and unarmed observation. The evolution of the institution of peacekeeping established a number of principles which guided thinking about whether or not to launch a peacekeeping operation, in particular: (1) consent to international intervention by all parties to the conflict, and their willingness to cooperate with the UN; (2) the full backing of the international community, as expressed through the support of the Security Council and the broad willingness of member states to contribute troops and financial resources to the operation; and (3) Peacekeepers would not use force except in self-defence and were armed with defensive weapons only. Notably however, while non- use of force was a distinguishing principle of traditional peacekeeping, many of the tasks involved in past operations were predominantly military in character. In the post-Cold War era, each of these principles is being challenged by a changing international political system, shifting national priorities, and the increasing salience of domestic political and economic pressure in foreign policy decision making. *International Peace Academy, Peacekeeper's Handbook* (New York: Pergamon Press, 1984), p. 31.

6.... An examination of "peacekeeping" must be put in the context of the inter-related processes of "peacemaking," and "peacebuilding." Together, they constitute the "peace process." While there is considerable agreement on the general meaning of the terms, there is no similar agreement on how these are (or should be) interrelated in practice. Some of the areas of common understanding are presented below.

**Peacekeeping:** A strategy "to halt and reduce the manifest violence of a conflict through the intervention of military forces in an interpository role," (Michael Harbottle, "The Strategy of Third Party Intervention in Conflict Resolution," *International Journal*, 25:1, 1979). In the UN context, peacekeeping refers to: "the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with

the consent of all the parties concerned, normally involving the United Nations military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well" (Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace: Peacemaking and Peacekeeping*, Report of the Secretary General Pursuant to the Statement Adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council, January 31, 1992, United Nations, New York, p. 6).

**Peacemaking:** Political and diplomatic activity "directed at reconciling political and strategical attitudes, through mediation, negotiation, arbitration or conciliation" (Harbottle, Ibid.) According to Boutros Ghali (Ibid.) peacemaking refers to: "action to bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially through peaceful means" (p. 6). Including: *mediation and negotiation* (p. 11); *the World Court* (p. 11); "international action to ameliorate circumstances that have contributed to the dispute or conflict" (p. 12); *sanctions and special economic problems* (p. 12); *use of military force* -- only when all peaceful means have failed -- including peace-enforcement units which would "respond to outright aggression, imminent or actual" (pp. 12-13). Also included by the UN Secretary General in both peacemaking and peacekeeping are: the disarmament of warring factions and the restoration of order; custody and perhaps destruction of weapons; repatriation of refugees; advisory and training support for security personnel; monitoring elections; advancing efforts to protect human rights; reforming or strengthening governmental institutions and promoting formal and informal processes of political participation.

**Peacebuilding:** "The practical implementation of peaceful social change through socioeconomic reconstruction and development" (Harbottle, Ibid.). Boutros Ghali (Ibid.) specifically refers to a "post-conflict" peacebuilding process as "action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict" (p. 6); and "the construction of a new environment" to prevent a recurrence of violent conflict (p. 16). The suggested prescriptions apply to protracted social conflicts: (i) *cooperative projects* "which link two or more countries in a mutually beneficial undertaking that can not only contribute to economic and social development but also enhance the confidence that is so fundamental to peace"; (ii) *reducing hostile perceptions* through educational exchanges and curriculum reform may be essential to forestall a re-emergence of cultural and national tensions which could spark renewed hostilities" (p.16). This might include programmes which encourage freer travel, cultural exchanges and mutually beneficial youth and educational projects (p.16). (iii) *democratic institutions*: support for the transformation of deficient national structures and capabilities, and for the strengthening of new democratic institutions (p.17).

Stephen Ryan elaborates: "Peacebuilding is the strategy which most directly tries to reverse the destructive processes that accompany violence. This involves a shift of focus away from the warriors, with whom peacekeepers are mainly concerned, to the attitudes and socio-economic circumstances of ordinary people. Therefore it tends to concentrate on the context of the conflict rather than on the issues which divide the parties" (Stephen Ryan, *Ethnic Conflict and International Relations* (Aldershot, England: Dartmouth, 1990), p. 61.

7.... See Kenneth D. Bush, "Towards a Balanced Approach to Rebuilding War-Torn Societies," *Canadian Foreign Policy*, III:3 (Winter 1995), pp. 49-69.

8.... The Commission on Global Governance, *Our Global Neighborhood: the Report of the Commission on Global Governance* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 125.

9.... See Anthony Borden and Richard Caplan, "The Former Yugoslavia: the war and the peace process," in *SIPRI Yearbook 1996: Armament, Disarmament, and International Security* (New

York: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 203-250.

10.... It should be noted that in contemporary conflicts civilians make up more than 90% of the casualties.

11.... Robert Cox, "Gramsci, Hegemony, and International Relations: An Essay in Methods," *Millennium*, 12 (1983), p. 162.

12.... A similar argument has been made by Alfred J. Fortin, "Notes on a Terrorist Text: A Critical Use of Roland Barthes' Textual Analysis in the Interpretation of Political Meaning," in James Der Derian and Michael J. Shapiro, eds., *International/ Intertextual Relations: Postmodern Readings of World Politics* (Lexington and Toronto: Lexington Books), 1989, pp. 189-206.

13.... Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "Soft Power," *Foreign Policy*, No. 80 (Fall 1990), p. 153-171; or his *Bound to Lead: the Changing Nature of American Power* (New York: Basic Books, 1990).

14.... Nye, "Soft Power," pp. 158-9.

15.... Ibid..

16.... Two of the best readers on "global" or "world" security are edited by Michael T. Klare and Daniel C. Thomas: *World Security: Trends and Challenges at Century's End* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991); and *World Security: Challenges for a New Century* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994).

17.... The literature in this sub-field is well developed. For now classic discussions see: Kenneth Oye, ed., *Cooperation Under Anarchy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986); David A. Baldwin, ed., *Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993); Robert Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton, PUP, 1984); Joseph Grieco, "Understanding the Problem of International Cooperation," in David Baldwin (ed.), *Neorealism vs. Neoliberalism* (New York: Columbia, 1993), pp.301-338; John J. Mearsheimer, "The false Promise of International Institutions," *International Security*, 19:3 (Winter, 1994/95); Stephen D. Krasner, *International Regimes* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983); Stephen Haggard and Beth Simmons, "Theories of International Regimes," *IO*, (Summer 1987), pp. 491-517; and Volker Rittberger, ed., *Regime Theory in International Relations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993).

18.... The conflict-dampening impact of the evolution of common interests has been a major point of reference in research on both intra- and inter-state violence. See: Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, eds., *Debating the Democratic Peace* (Cambridge and London: MIT Press, 1996); Donald L. Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley and London: University of California Press, 1985); and Milton J. Esman, *Ethnic Politics* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1994).

19.... *Our Global Neighborhood*, p. 14.

20.... For example: Somalia, Zaire, Angola, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Cambodia.

21.... Commission on Global Governance, *Our Global Neighborhood: The Report of the Commission on Global Governance* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 15. For a detailed review see: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), *SIPRI Yearbook 1996: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996).

22.... This section draws directly from Kenneth Bush, "Beyond Bungee Cord Humanitarianism: Towards a Developmental Agenda for Peace," *Canadian Journal of Development Studies*, Special Issues (1996), pp. 75-95.

23.... This concept is developed in Kenneth Bush, "When Two Anarchies Meet: International Intervention in Somalia," *Journal of Conflict Studies*, (Forthcoming, Summer 1997).

24.... This argument is developed further in Kenneth Bush, "Towards and Balanced Approach to Rebuilding War-Torn Societies," *Canadian Foreign Policy*, III (Winter, 1995), pp. 49-70.

25.... Quoted in Samuel Makinda, *Seeking Peace from Chaos: Humanitarian Intervention in*

*Somalia* (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner, 1993), p. 85. Even higher estimates are suggested by Mohamed Sahnoun, the former UN Special Representative in Somalia who has argued that peacekeeping costs in Somalia "dwarfed" humanitarian aid costs. In his estimation, it cost \$2 billion in "peacekeeping" to protect less than \$50 million of "effective emergency relief." (Presentation to the International Development Research Centre (IDRC) Roundtable on Peacebuilding, May 1995). He also points out that between April and December 1993 "an estimated 6,000 Somalis and 83 UN Peacekeepers may have died in clashes between UN forces and Somali armed groups since the UN took over the American-led "Operation Restore Hope". (Mohamed Sahnoun, "An Environment for Peace," *IDRC Reports*, 22:3 (October 1995), pp. 4-6.

26.... This was circulated in draft form on 21 February 1997 (DCD/DAC (96) 31/ REV1).

27.... It should be noted that there are a number of NGO initiatives to develop de-mining capacity at the community level. For example, in Cambodia the Banyan Agriculture Returnee Reintegration project (World Vision Canada) addresses land shortages due to widespread mining, and facilitates community efforts to locate, mark, and map mined areas, as part of an effort to assist reintegration. Similarly, in Laos, the Mennonite Central Committee Canada (MCCC) has been working with the Mines Action Group (UK) to develop the local expertise necessary to clear the millions of mines and bomblets that litter the country and inhibit the development process ("Unexploded Ordnance Project"). This capacity-building approach is similar to that of the Cambodian Mine Action Centre (CMAC) in Cambodia, currently operating under the auspices of the United Nations Development Program.

28.... The term was introduced and developed in Bush, "Beyond Bungee Cord Humanitarianism."

29.... The "Canadian Peacebuilding Initiative" announced by the Minister of Foreign Affairs in October 1996 is intended to "improve the coherence and coordination of our programmes and policies that support conflict prevention and resolution, peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction." Notes for an Address by the Honourable Lloyd Axworthy, Minister of Foreign Affairs, at York University, "Building a Peace to Last: Establishing a Canadian Peace-Building Initiative," North York, October 30 1996.

30.... Instructive in this regard is Mary B. Anderson and Peter J. Woodrow's Capacities and Vulnerabilities Analysis Matrix in *Rising from the Ashes: Development Strategies in Times of Disaster* (Boulder and San Francisco: Westview Press, 1989).