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The Party Politics of Englishness

Andrew Mycock and Richard Hayton

Introduction

In January 2012 the Labour MP John Denham observed that ‘the political response to the new Englishness is a debate that has hardly begun’ (Denham 2012). While he has not been alone in calling for an active engagement with the so-called ‘politics of Englishness’ over the past decade, Denham has certainly been in a distinct minority of Westminster-based politicians in the main British political parties. Yet there are signs of a growing recognition amongst the Westminster elite that the changing nature of UK politics in the context of devolution has implications for how policies and issues are framed, and how politicians identify themselves and their parties in relation to England.

This paper explores the extent to which there has been a recalibration of party politics amongst Westminster-based unionist parties in the light of both the strengthening of cultural and political identification with Englishness, and the constitutional reform programme instituted by New Labour. The paper assesses to what extent we are witnessing the emergence of a new party politics of Englishness by asking whether parties are becoming more consciously ‘Anglicised’ – that is explicitly orientated towards England - in their framing of national culture, identity and policies. It also considers the conceptual challenges faced by political parties within multi-layered political systems such as the UK, and explores the implications of multi-nationality for parties operating within asymmetrically-devolved polities.

The context for this paper is fourfold. Firstly, a key debate in much of the recent literature on Englishness has been whether we are witnessing the emergence of an English nationalism, or merely a (re)assertion of a cultural national identity. Richard English (2011)
asserts that it is the latter, arguing that Englishness as it is presently constituted and articulated lacks all the elements of a fully formed nationalism which could seek political recognition. However, Wellings (2012) identifies the origins of a nascent English nationalism in opposition to European integration, though this often seeks to legitimise British rather than English sovereignty. Furthermore, there is a body of evidence suggesting the emergence of a more politically orientated English national identity which is distinct from (but clearly taps into) the pre-devolution resurgence of cultural identification with England evident since at least the early 1990s (Aughey 2007; Hayton et al. 2009). This political Englishness has been underpinned increasingly by a sense of grievance regarding England’s place within the asymmetric post-devolution Union, and the feeling that English taxpayers are unfairly subsidising higher levels of public expenditure in Scotland than they themselves enjoy. Between 2000 and 2011 for example, the British Social Attitudes survey suggests a doubling (to 42 percent) of the proportion of people in England who believed that Scotland received more than its fair share of government spending (Ormston 2012, 7). But while Ormston states this evidence of English resentment over finance is not a national identity issue, others argue that it is one indication of the emergence of a discrete ‘English political community’ which will seek political recognition (Wyn-Jones et al. 2012, 2).

Secondly, devolution not only created new legislatures in Scotland and Wales, but it also changed the function of Westminster. Mitchell (2009, 218) suggests that the harmonious ‘state of unions’ which underpinned multi-national asymmetry across the UK saw England governed as a unitary state. This harmony was compromised by devolution, ensuring Westminster has become the de facto parliament for England as well as maintaining many of the important responsibilities affecting the United Kingdom as a whole (Johnson 2001, 341). This has, according to Aughey (2009, 215), meant Westminster has diverged from being ‘the fifth nation’ of the UK which sought to protect its own sovereignty towards becoming ‘a fifth nation’ whose diffusionist tendencies have encouraged a shift from centripetal to centrifugal party politics. The unionist political parties are now therefore faced with the challenges of adapting to an increasingly Anglicised Westminster which requires them to speak – often simultaneously - for England and the UK as a whole whilst
also connecting with national polities and electorates in Scotland, Wales and (to a much lesser extent) Northern Ireland.

Thirdly, changing dynamics within the main unionist parties are creating pressures which increasingly demand a response from Westminster. These reflect both the new multi-level governance structures within which parties now operate, and political calculations and strategies for success in different electoral arenas. In January 2011, for example, prominent Welsh Conservative Harri Lloyd Davies called for the breakaway of the Welsh party from its English counterparts, arguing they were ‘still seen as “boys from London”’ who did not look ‘Welsh enough’ (BBC 2011a). Later that year, as part of his unsuccessful bid for party leadership, Scottish Conservative MSP Murdo Fraser (2011) promised to create a breakaway ‘progressive centre-right party’ with ‘a distinctive Scottish identity’. Fraser claimed to seek a ‘new form of unionism’ whereby affiliated but separate parties who would coalesce under the Conservative party whip in Westminster. Whether separate rebranded Scottish and Welsh centre-right parties could be ‘detoxified’ to revive their electoral fortunes is uncertain but the proposals highlighted emergent tensions within the overarching British party in the wake of devolution. It was noteworthy though that the proposals did not encourage their English counterparts to re-evaluate the Westminster-based party identity or consider whether organisational structures or policy-making should be revised to reflect new post-devolution party political realities. Such Anglo-myopia has not proven unique to the Conservatives: Lee (2010) has argued that the negation of England as a national political or cultural community was a persistent feature of Labour’s period in government between 1997 and 2010.

Fourthly, the forceful re-emergence onto the political agenda of the issue of Scottish independence and the prospect of an impending referendum has inevitably prompted greater debate amongst English politicians, commentators and voters about the possibility of the Union fragmenting. Indeed, some polls have indicated greater support for an independent Scotland amongst English voters than the Scots (Daily Telegraph 14.01.2012). While David Cameron hopes that by agreeing a referendum he will secure the future of the
Devolution and British Multi-national Party Politics

The relationship between a territorially-bounded nation-state and its political system is typically understood to be underpinned by an assumed congruence, though special arrangements may be made for overseas citizens and some extra-national constituencies which are represented within national political institutions. However many modern polities form supra-national constitutional links within entities such as the European Union (EU) which both dilute and diffuse national sovereignty whilst also extending the remit of nationally-located political parties beyond the nation-state. National political parties in the EU can form trans- or supra-national coalitions founded on shared ideological beliefs or political aspirations, such as the Party of European Socialists, the European People’s Party or the European Free Alliance. But whilst such coalitions have developed closer relationships, building common policy platforms for elections and within the European Parliament, national priorities of member parties remain paramount, thus placing limits on the depth of political links and collaboration.

In some cases, political parties operate within two distinct sovereign states. For example, Sinn Fein contest elections in the UK and the Republic of Ireland, with party policies and election strategies in both states overseen by a singular National Executive (Ard Chomhairle) based in Dublin. However, such examples are rare and most political parties operate predominantly within one state. This does not mean all political parties are active across the entirety of their respective state jurisdictions. Most political systems are multi-layered, with central government typically diffusing power via federal, quasi-federal or devolved multi-national frameworks which sometimes reflect strong local, regional or national cleavages. In such systems, political parties who represent particularistic ethnic, religious or sub-state
territorial interests may choose not to seek universal election. Such parties sometimes pursue self-determinationist or secessionist agendas that seek to challenge the legitimacy and authority of the overarching state in pursuit of greater regional or national autonomy or even independence.

The complexities of multi-layered political systems, particularly an asymmetrically-devolved multi-national framework such as the UK, pose serious conceptual and normative challenges for those seeking to understand the interactions of political parties (Deschouwer 2003). Inter-party relations are underpinned by horizontal and vertical interactions which reflect the multi-levelled nature of governance. Parties therefore seek to develop organisational structures and policy frameworks that are responsive to the commonalities and differences of party systems and their electorates within each level of government. Within the UK’s political system, there are no ‘state-wide’ parties contesting elections in all possible governing arenas (European, UK, the three devolved national legislatures, the London Assembly and local elections). Three mainstream parties are represented at all levels within Great Britain; the Conservatives, Labour and the Liberal Democrats. Each multi-national party has or has had links with political parties in Northern Ireland but these affiliations are not formally extended beyond loose collaborative agreements.\(^2\) UKIP and the BNP do contest elections in all four national remits of the UK but not at all governmental levels or in all constituencies. The Greens contest elections across the UK but since 1990 they have been split into separate parties.\(^3\) A number of parties compete in elections in Northern Ireland alone whilst nationalist parties in Scotland, Wales and England also confine their political activity within their respective national remits.

British political parties are often viewed as singular entities, thus making assumptions about their internal cohesion and multi-layered integration. But although intra-party relations – the vertical and horizontal organisational characteristics and relationships inside political parties – are separate from their respective party systems, they frequently blur and overlap (Deschouwer 2003). This is particularly true of multi-national parties in the UK who contest elections in more than one devolved national political system as well as the overarching UK
parliament. Political priorities of these parties are defined by inter-party competition for representation at a multi-national state level but also reflect distinctive supra- and sub-state national and local electoral priorities and discourses (Moon and Bratberg 2010). This divergence not only influences the selection of candidates, content of political manifestos, and election campaigning but also party leadership, staffing and discipline. Increasingly the trajectories of political careers are linked to the achievement of political goals at state and/or sub-state national or local levels.

The main multi-national unionist parties have distinctive organisational arrangements which each reflect their unique Anglo-British historical development and contemporary intra-party relations. The core of each party has traditionally reflected the dominance of England within the Union and British politics, highlighting the primacy of English concerns in both electoral and governance terms. An instinctive Anglo-Britishness in Westminster politics and media reportage has encouraged the merging of specifically English and broader UK policy issues. This noted, the transnationality of the British party system has meant that politicians and party elites from Scotland and Wales have left a disproportionately sizable and indelible mark on UK politics.

In the cases of the Conservatives and Labour, the creation of sub-Westminster national party organisations in Wales and Scotland emerged after the formation of the UK party, and there has been no attempt to create a distinctive English national party framework. The Scottish and Welsh Conservatives parties have traditionally been dominated by the Westminster party, providing only limited representation in the party executive and formal role in the selection of party leaders. Scottish Conservatives have however retained the right to select candidates for UK general elections. Labour has no secured representation for its Scottish and Welsh national parties on its National Executive Committee and they do not have influence over candidates for the party leadership or Westminster elections (Laffin and Shaw 2007). The formation of separate national Liberal parties in Scotland and Wales has left a legacy whereby Scottish and Welsh Liberal Democrats continue to enjoy a large degree of political and organisational autonomy within the overarching UK federal party. But whilst
the Liberal Democrats federal constitution states that each national element has full
involvement in all areas of the party, the organisational weakness of the English Liberal
Democrats has encouraged its conflation with the overarching federal party (Lynch 1998).

If political parties are primarily organisations that seek candidates to win elections to
aggregate and maximise political power and influence (Katz 2006), the election strategies
and political platforms of mainstream British multi-national parties have traditionally sought
to realise success in Westminster and local government elections, with much less emphasis
placed on European elections. The creation of devolved political legislatures in Scotland and
Wales established new sub-state national electoral frameworks which have increasingly
reflected the distinctiveness of each nation. Emergent inter- and intra-party cleavages,
stimulated by electoral competition at sub-state national level, have challenged the primacy
of the UK parliamentary elections in Scotland and Wales.

The influence of nationalist parties seeking greater autonomy or even secession has
provided new political challenges which have compromised the internal cohesion of the
three main multi-national unionist parties in the UK, which have accepted that intra-party
autonomy and asymmetry is essential to increase the likelihood of electoral success in
Scotland and Wales (Hopkin and Bradbury 2006). Each has empowered their Scottish and
Welsh organisations to strive to convince voters of their respective national – if not
nationalist – credentials. This raises interesting questions as to the identities and political
cores of multi-national parties in the UK. In most cases, Westminster is the location of the
headquarters of the highest level of the party though nationalist parties such as the Scottish
National Party (SNP) and Plaid Cymru are based in Edinburgh and Cardiff respectively. In the
wake of devolution though, sub-state national elites of multi-national parties have
strengthened organisational structures and party identities that offer voters in Wales and
Scotland alternative party cores to those established around the UK parliament.

This has had implications for the cohesive nature of policy frameworks and party identity as
the diffusion of centralised party authority has compromised their ability to maintain
common multi-national policy platforms. In areas such as health, education and welfare, each party has had to accommodate particular sub-state national demands, thus meaning a common British social and economic citizenship has become increasingly fragmented (Bradbury and Andrews 2010; Leith 2010). Moreover, newly-empowered sub-state national party leaders have emerged as important figureheads within the newly-devolved legislatures, thus compromising the ability of UK party leaders or Westminster-based elites to speak for their parties as a whole. This has proven problematic, with some Westminster-based politicians struggling to come to terms with the cauterisation of their democratic mandate, but also unwilling to embrace the notion that they speak (on some issues) for and to English voters only. Furthermore, frequent failures to acknowledge emergent Welsh and Scottish political nuances and sensitivities have allowed sub-state national opponents, particularly those from secessionist nationalist parties, ammunition to challenge the creditability or legitimacy of unionist opponents to speak for the individual nations of the UK.

In sum, devolution has radically altered the context within which political parties in the UK operate, creating opportunities for differentiation in the devolved polities but also significant tensions for Westminster-based parties. England remains the only nation with a unitary, centralized government which is administered directly by departments of the UK government which mix UK-wide and England-specific policy. The challenge for the main parties in England, which also seek to represent and govern the UK as a whole, is to find not only the internal institutional mechanisms and structures to respond to this situation, but also appropriate discourses which balance Anglicised national conversations with their aim to speak for the UK as a whole. As the following sections illustrate, for a variety of reasons this has proven difficult for them to achieve and is continuing to develop.

**Towards a party politics of Englishness?**

*The Conservative Party*
Labour’s landslide victory at the 1997 general election left the Conservatives as a *de facto* English party at Westminster, without representation in Scotland or Wales. In Scotland particularly this marked the culmination of a long-term trend of declining support for the Conservatives, where they had performed notably worse than in England at every general election since 1970. Even before devolution, the Conservatives might therefore have been seen as having a strategic interest in articulating and engaging with a politics of Englishness, and perhaps campaigning for looser governing arrangements between the UK’s constituent nations. The growth of self-conscious cultural Englishness, increasing identification with England and concerns about the Anglicisation of the Conservative party all pre-date Labour’s radical constitutional reform programme. But in spite of this cultural shift and changing electoral profile, the Conservative leadership proved reluctant to play the ‘English card’ after devolution, remaining committed to the Union (Kenny and Lodge 2009, 233-4).

John Major and his successor William Hague strongly opposed Labour’s plan for devolution, warning that it would plant the seeds of destruction in the Union. But the implementation of such constitutional changes has not prompted a fundamental reappraisal or reshaping by the Conservative party leadership at Westminster of their electoral focus, multi-national orientation and cultural framing of their policies and identity - or indeed a desire to bring about such a shift. Successive Conservative leaders have preferred instead to reaffirm their commitment to the Union, containing debate about devolution within constitutional boundaries, whilst (thanks to the proportional electoral systems selected) accepting the opportunity to re-establish footholds in the new Scottish and Welsh legislatures (Hayton 2012, 81-89).

Hague did though raise concerns about England’s dominance of the Union, noting ‘English nationalism is the most dangerous of all forms of nationalism that can arise within the United Kingdom’ (BBC 2000). In July 1999, he announced the Conservatives adoption of English votes for English laws (EvfE) at Westminster to address the West Lothian Question without resorting to the creation of an English Parliament. This was presented as necessary to protect the Union by preventing the emergence of a strongly felt sense of grievance that
England could become ‘the residue of constitutional change’ (Baker 1998, cited in Hazell 2006, 52). Although critics highlighted the potential difficulties with the practical operation of such a mechanism, a commitment to introduce some form of EvfEl mechanism featured in all subsequent Conservative manifestos. Under Cameron’s leadership, intraparty debate has focused on the specifics of how EvfEl might be practically implemented. Moderated versions seeking to achieve the desired outcome via the committee system were proposed by Scottish Tory Sir Malcolm Rifkind and also the Democracy Taskforce established by Cameron and chaired by Ken Clarke (Conservative Party 2008). Some prominent figures, such as David Davis (2001) were prepared to break ranks and voice support for a referendum on the creation of an English parliament. Davis argued the English had been willing to subordinate their Englishness in the ‘greater interests of the Union’ but deserved the same choice as the peoples of Wales and Scotland. John Redwood (2007) proposed English MPs should sit in an English Parliament located within the Palace of Westminster where they could also meet with colleagues from the rest of the UK.5

There is a certain irony to the Conservative response to devolution, as on the one hand they were vocal in warning of the potentially far-reaching (and generally negative) consequences of constitutional reform whilst on the other they have sought to downplay the wider transformational significance once it had occurred. By focusing their response to devolution on the relatively narrow confines of seeking to address the constitutional anomaly of the West Lothian Question, the Conservatives were able to maintain their traditional Unionist standpoint and sidestep the broader question of growing cultural and political identification with Englishness. However their pragmatic approach also reflected the extent to which the debate on constitutional reform in England had yet to capture the public imagination or even animate much of the English political elite. This means it has made little sense for the Conservatives to radically revise how they sought to present themselves or frame their policies. Paradoxically, Conservative electoral weakness outside of England may also have reduced any incentive to seek to overhaul their approach to eliminate the lazy amalgamation of England, Britain and the United Kingdom, which has much less of an irritant effect on English audiences than those in other parts of the UK. Alongside the limited
electoral traction of political Englishness, Conservatives were wary of engaging within English nationalist position which could attract accusations of populism that ran counter to moves to modernise the party’s image and compete for the political ‘centre ground’. For Cameron particularly, a looser and ill-defined unionism proved a useful foil for his efforts to cultivate a more inclusive Conservative image whilst also providing some resonance with the tradition of ‘One Nation’ conservatism (Hayton 2012, 97-100).

During the 2010 general election, the Conservatives continued to frame issues of policy in areas such as health, education, welfare, transport and policing without acknowledging in their manifesto or campaign that they related mainly to England alone and not the wider UK. This pattern has continued in government, with ministers and others reluctant to delineate between England and the more general deployment of the term ‘national’. Therefore calls to offer a National Citizen Service, teach British history to young Britons, build the ‘Big Society’ or reform public services such as health and education often overlook the fact that such initiatives are located almost exclusively in England. Conversely Cameron and other leading figures have failed to acknowledge that what appear to be banal populist pronouncements on high-profile issues such as sport are underpinned by an instinctive Anglocentrism. In celebrating England’s Ashes victory or energetically supporting England’s failed 2018 World Cup bid, Cameron has lauded the ‘country’ without recognising that England is not the UK or that some people in the other nations might not share his enthusiasm for English sporting interests (Mycock 2011). Moreover, Cameron’s framing of British patriotism draws heavily on Anglicised traditions and values of parliamentary sovereignty together with ‘forgotten’ institutions such as the Church of England.

However, Aughey’s (2008) observation that ‘English nationalism is still a mood, not a movement, if only because the Conservative Party refuses to mobilise it as such’ could become obsolete. Non-governmental initiatives such as Harriet Baldwin’s Private Member’s Bill on Legislation (Territorial Extent), introduced to the House in April 2011, would appear motivated by growing English disquiet within the party. The bill sought to require all draft legislation to clearly identify its effect separately for England, Wales, Scotland and Northern
Ireland. Unofficially re-titled ‘the English Question’ bill, it was rejected after a third reading in September 2011. Discontent about the spending differentials produced by the Barnett formula is also apparent. In opposition Cameron indicated the Conservatives might seek to replace the Barnett formula (McLean et al. 2008, 28), but has since avoided stirring up resentment over the issue. It was not included as a pledge in the 2010 election manifesto or the subsequent Coalition Agreement. But some Conservative MPs, such as Andrew Selous, have publicly in declared that the Barnett formula is ‘busted’ and ‘unfair’ to the ‘poor people in England’ who ‘should be treated fairly’ (BBC 2011b). George Henderson, has gone further, noting ‘it is simply wrong that English taxpayers are being asked to help subsidise for people living in Scotland a range of services not available in England, including free prescriptions, free hospital parking, free accommodation in care homes and free university tuition fees’ (Groves 2011).

Others have sought to raise grievances regarding cultural representations of Englishness, often linking narratives of identity victimhood or denial to the perceived decline of the nation. A popular cause amongst Conservative MPs has been the need for a public holiday to celebrate St George’s Day as part of a reassertion of Englishness. Philip Hollobone has suggested multiculturalism is at fault as ‘we spend far too much time in this country celebrating cultures other than our own’ (Hansard 2009). But some have sought to link this to concerns about the influence of immigration, and supranationalism. Karl McCartney (2011) has argued Labour willingly allowed ‘a loss of Englishness’ in government by ‘allowing uncontrolled immigration’. For Douglas Carswell (2009), England is now a ‘middling European nation’ because the ‘English political establishment’ has allowed European Union membership to undermine English democracy.

The Conservatives face a conundrum whereby they are exposed to demands for recognition of cultural as well as constitutional Englishness which could damage the Union but where defence of the current asymmetrical arrangements could see them placed in opposition to rising English populism. Those Conservatives seeking to celebrate their Englishness or highlighting post-devolutionary anomalies or grievances stand out though precisely because
they appear at odds with the traditional prioritisation of British unionism. But many newer Conservative MPs are more relaxed about the breakup of the Union, and there is evidence of a broader expression of English interests amongst the party membership. A ConservativeHome survey in December 2008 revealed that only 32% of respondents agreed England should have its own parliament. By December 2010 this figure had increased to 51%. A YouGov poll for Prospect magazine in October 2011 suggested that three-quarters of those polled who voted Conservative in the 2010 general election saw themselves as English rather than British. It is unclear, at present, whether the party has the requisite awareness of the subtleties of constitutional and identity politics required in government to ensure they can meet the challenges of maintaining the union whilst also satisfying the demands of growing numbers of their English MPs in parliament and the English majority within the party as a whole.

The Labour party
Tomaney (1999) notes that since the late 1970s Labour’s plans for constitutional reforms in England offered little more than vague commitments to regional government. The belief that there was little demand in England for another layer of government meant Labour’s 1997 general election manifesto plans for regional devolution lacked detail when compared to proposed devolution to Scotland and Wales. But Labour’s subsequent (unfinished) programme of asymmetrical devolution not only failed in its principle aim of nullifying secessionist Scottish or Welsh nationalism. It also stimulated increasingly voluble protests about the lack of comparable political voice in England outside London which intensified in the wake of defeat in the 2004 North-east devolution referendum. Although some Labour ministers were prepared to acknowledge that emergent ‘English questions’ required urgent answers (Kelly and Bryne 2007), a policy vacuum emerged concerning the governance of England. Faced with a strong electoral disincentive to answer the West Lothian Question, Labour were locked ‘into a defensive position on England’ (Kenny and Lodge 2009, 232) whereby calls for an English parliament (for example Field 2008) and Conservative plans for EvFEl were both dismissed as recipes for constitutional chaos that would undermine the Union.
Labour’s 2010 general election manifesto had little to say about English devolution beyond pledging to ‘extend the powers available to our major city regions’ and increase the number of directly elected mayors (Labour Party 2010, 65). Like the Conservatives, Labour preferred not to draw attention to the fact that many ‘national’ policies in practice applied to England alone: indeed, the only explicit reference to England in the manifesto was a pledge to support the bid by the English Football Association to host the 2018 World Cup. Given that the party had a Scottish leader seeking to secure a mandate across the whole of the UK it was perhaps unsurprising that Gordon Brown sought not to draw attention to the fact that his powers as Prime Minister to affect the lives of his own Kirkcaldy and Cowdenbeath constituents were significantly less than for people in England. In office, Brown sought to downplay the importance of this through an emphasis on a shared British identity, but his sometimes ham-fisted attempts to articulate his vision of Britishness (often by drawing on historical and cultural themes more commonly associated with Englishness) led to the charge that his ‘British Way’ was an attempt to stifle English identity (Lee, 2006).

In part Brown’s Britishness agenda reflected recognition by the Labour government that it needed to engage more seriously with the identity question, but it also indicated a continuing fearfulness in the party of English nationalism. The rising salience of issues such as immigration led some in the party to voice concerns that New Labour’s preoccupation with ‘middle England’ had led to the abandonment of traditional Labour voters, who in increasing numbers identified with the BNP (Cruddas 2009). Following the 2010 general election defeat (when Labour’s support in Scotland actually rose marginally, but collapsed in England to 28.1 percent) Englishness started to receive a more prominent hearing amongst the party elite. The heir apparent, David Miliband (2010) claimed that Brown’s emphasis on (multicultural) Britishness was central to the failure to ‘resolve Labour’s English question’ particularly when many citizens were ‘expressing an identity bound up in the history and iconography of England’. In his leadership campaign, Miliband urged Labour to ‘reconnect with England’ through articulation of ‘a revived politics of Englishness rooted in a radical and democratic account of nationhood’. John Denham claimed Labour’s election defeat was due
to its failure to address social inequality in England (particularly in the southeast) and lambasted Labour’s reluctance ‘to talk about England, or to recognise the real and growing interest in English identity’ in the election campaign. He complained that while it was possible to download Scottish and Welsh Labour manifestos ‘if you were English you could only download Labour, or British Labour material’ (Denham 2010). This was echoed by Jon Cruddas (2010) who questioned why ‘there is Scottish Labour, there is Welsh Labour and there is Labour. But there is no English Labour’. It was time, Cruddas suggested ‘for a truly English Labour Party’.

In spite of this upswing of debate about Labour’s relationship with the English electorate issues of English governance were largely avoided by all of the leadership candidates, who were in agreement about their opposition to an English parliament and support for ill-defined plans for greater localism in England. Following his election Ed Miliband initially appeared reluctant to respond to calls to be more explicitly English in his leadership and policy focus (Hodges 2010). However, in June 2012 Miliband made a speech in arguing that Labour had ‘been too reluctant to talk about England in recent years’ and that ‘if we are committed to enabling a vibrant Scottish identity to work within the United Kingdom as we are, so too surely we must do the same for England’ (Miliband 2012). Miliband acknowledged the influence of Cruddas – who he had chosen to lead Labour’s policy review - and Denham in shaping what he described as a gentle, progressive, patriotic Englishness which drew on Labour’s traditions but also acknowledged English qualities such as ‘stoicism’ and ‘humour’. He immediately drew criticism though from some on the left who regarded his speech as a distraction from Labour’s core mission of representing ‘working people, regardless of their national affiliations’ (Jones 2012). Others also accused his speech of failing to address issues of English self-governance (Facey 2012), with one commentator summing up Miliband’s core argument as ‘Englishness must be celebrated... but it does not merit any political or constitutional recognition’ (Martin 2012).

Miliband’s speech also reflected the impact of the ‘blue Labour’ debate led by Maurice Glasman and others who have encouraged the party to realise its potential to be the
patriotic voice of England (Sylvester 2011). Supporters have argued England must be re-empowered, re-democratised and re-nationalised through the reform of Westminster and development of an alternative economic model founded on ethical collective ownership, public investment, and regulation of labour markets. This is linked to an active pursuit of the ‘good society’, shaped by key communitarian values such as reciprocity, mutuality and solidarity, to establish an optimistic Englishness which seeks a more egalitarian citizenship (Glasman et al. 2011; see also Painter 2011). The importance of local communities and social, religious and cultural institutions for encouraging a shared sense of English civic patriotism is also stressed, leading Sandbrook (2011) to typify the blue Labour movement as promoting ‘family, faith and flag’.

But whilst proponents of ‘English Labour’ have stressed the cosmopolitan and civic potential of contemporary Englishness and its potential to counter far-right extremism, they have appeared less sure of boundaries between inclusive civic and exclusive ethnic nationalism and its political repercussions. For example, Glasman’s call for ‘British jobs for British workers’, together with controversial calls for a temporary cessation of immigration and engagement with the English Defence League (Riddell 2011), connected more explicitly with established far-right English nationalist themes (Rooksby 2011). Others, such as Field (2011), have also tapped into narratives of English grievances, noting that ‘if English taxpayers continue to pay for free services in Scotland... a certain sourness will enter into the relationship between our two countries’. However, he overlooks the potential that such tensions could be replicated between Scottish and English wings of the party itself. Indeed, calls for need to articulate ‘a modern, radical Englishness’ which the eulogising the ‘specifically English struggles of working people’ (Cruddas 2011a) potentially marginalises Scottish and Welsh contributions to a shared British Labour party. The Anglicisation of key parts of the British Labour party’s history, ideals, and values, as well as important figures such as G.D.H. Cole, R.H. Tawney and Clement Attlee (Cruddas 2011b), also raises questions about multi-national origins and past achievements.
Such shifts would also appear to reflect the belief that devolution, as Vernon Bogdanor (2009) has argued, has undermined the notion of the UK state being an effective vehicle for social democracy. But scant consideration has been given to the implications of the Anglicisation of the Westminster Labour party outside of England. Devolution has seen the Scottish and Welsh wings of the party and non-English MPs establish ‘clear red water’ through political necessity. Plaid Cymru and the SNP have proven sensitive to accusations of Anglophobia, carefully couching their criticisms of ‘London’ or ‘Westminster’ rather than ‘English’ Labour. Cruddas (2010) has suggested that an English Labour party with its own leader could ‘build an identity to respond to white English ethnic nationalism’ and be accommodated within a ‘federated party structure’. However, others such as Yvette Cooper have argued that an English Labour party would have implications for strong regional and local party identities across England, particularly in the north (Mycock 2010). The promotion of an explicitly English identity for the Westminster party could provide secessionist nationalists with political ammunition which encourages non-English politicians and party wings to seek greater autonomy or confederation.

Divisions over Labour policy concerning English governance have also continued in opposition. Labour’s extensive non-English representation in Westminster means EvfEl remains an unpopular option. Glasman (2010) has argued for an English parliament, noting ‘England, as a political nation, has no body and it cannot speak’. Lord George Foulkes (2011) supports its creation within a unicameral UK federal framework to allow the English ‘to better express their Englishness’. Cruddas (2010) has been more circumspect, suggesting Labour debate whether an English parliament, possibly in York, or elected mayors and parliaments in major English cities is more appropriate. David Blunkett (2010) has raised concerns held by many within the party about the implications of an English parliament for the Union, also suggesting ‘England and Englishness has an overriding suspicion of big government’. Denham (2012) has suggested that House of Lords reform offers the opportunity for English interests to be represented on English-only matters in a democratically elected upper house. But ‘radical’ regional and local devolution remains the most popular response to the question of English governance (see, for example, Benn 2012),
although plans remain ill-defined with regards to the extent such powers should be devolved or how emergent institutions would mesh within the existing UK parliamentary frameworks. Moreover such plans would not resolve the West Lothian Question, particularly as Scotland looks likely to move towards substantial further devolution of powers over the coming decade. As such, they are unlikely to sate those demanding recognition of political Englishness.

Liberal Democrats and Other parties
Commitment to a federal system of government has been one of the Liberal Democrats central political aims since the formation of the party. Since devolution, they have acted as a nationalised rather than centralised party, actively seeking to form coalition government in Scotland and Wales (Laffin 2007). British policy objectives have therefore been realised through informal and reciprocative national intra-party coordination of state and sub-state elites. However Holmes (2009) argues the UK party’s federal credentials are open to question, with intra-party organisation, policy-making and campaigning prioritising an increasingly Anglicised Westminster parliament and elections. The Federal party have proven reluctant to engage debates about English governance and identity beyond the promotion of regional devolution in England.

In observing that devolution to Scotland and Wales had provoked uncertainty about national identity and constitutional arrangements in England, former party leader Charles Kennedy (1999) did not rule out an English parliament but raised concerns about its potential to satisfy ‘the English Question’ and its implications for the cohesion of the union. He identified the need for a written constitution to provide ‘much clearer rules for regulating relations between the constituent parts of the Union’. Surety in the potential of regional devolution wavered however after the North-east referendum defeat in 2004, this being reflected in subsequent calls for the establishment of a Constitutional Convention to examine the ‘relationships between the nations of the United Kingdom’ (Liberal Democrats 2007). The current leader Nick Clegg (2008) has acknowledged growing English grievances, noting England has been ‘hamstrung by Whitehall’ and that the inequalities of the Barnett
formula mean, unless there were reforms, English people ‘will start to demand separation’.
Deputy party leader, Simon Hughes, has called for ‘urgent initiatives’ to address the ‘democratic deficit for England’ and the replacement of the Barnett Formula with a ‘needs-based formula’ (Liberal Democrats 2009).

Since agreeing to form a UK coalition government, the Liberal Democrats have come under increasing pressure to explain how their Anglocentric quasi-federal policy-making addresses asymmetries between Westminster and the devolved nations in social, economic and political rights. The furore over the raising of student tuition fees in England, whilst maintaining their commitment to free university tuition in Scotland, highlighted growing challenges to the Liberal Democrats ability to maintain a consistent UK-wide policy framework. Moreover, whilst the 2010 general election manifesto promised a Constitutional Convention would ‘address the status of England within a federal Britain’ (Liberal Democrats 2010), the remit of the subsequent Coalition government’s ‘West Lothian’ commission has proven considerably narrower, focusing on how England-only laws are handled by both the House of Commons and the Lords rather than imbalances in fiscal arrangements or parliamentary representation across the UK (Hansard 2011). Whilst the Federal party insist ‘England remains the most centralised state in the democratic world’, they remained undecided whether the answer to the ‘English question’ is an ‘English tier of government’ or regional or sub-regional bodies based on ‘cities or historic counties’ (Liberal Democrats 2011, 19).

The reluctance to engage in the ‘party politics of Englishness’ is, in part, reflective of a suspicion of English nationalists who, together with white supremacists and Islamic fundamentalists, are seen as a ‘threat to harmonious social relations in Britain’ (Cable 2005, 47). Liberal Democrats have typically sought to articulate a common Britishness founded on recognition of multiple identities, British democracy and equal rights for individuals and communities (Kennedy 2005; Clegg 2009). However Clegg’s assertion that values that underpin his vision of Britishness such as tolerance and respect are those of ‘liberal England’ possibly reveals an emergent Anglocentrism within the Federal party (quoted in Brown
2010). Other English Liberal Democrats have expressed support for public recognition of cultural Englishness. Chris Huhne (2009) has argued St George’s Day provides an opportunity to commemorate English achievements and show national unity by flying ‘the flag of Shakespeare, Milton and Chaucer’ and nearly a third of those who supported a 2009 Early Day Motion for it to become a public holiday were Liberal Democrat MPs.

For UKIP, the party politics of Englishness offers both opportunities and threats. On the one hand, the right wing populist nature of much of the political discourse surrounding English nationalism has the clear capacity to resonate with much of the party’s core support who, along with supporters of the BNP, are the most greatly exercised by the issue of immigration, and highly sceptical of the probity of the British political establishment (Hayton, 2010: 31). However, sub-state nationalisms raise the question of the integrity of the UK, particularly the prospect of smaller nations being subsumed within a broader European ‘superstate’ and the prioritisation of English regionalism. UKIP has thus been keen to present itself as a UK-wide party committed defending the whole Union from the perceived threat of European integration. In reality however, the large bulk of its support in all UK-wide elections is in England, concentrated in the south and midlands. In their most significant electoral achievement to date UKIP came second in the 2009 European Parliament election securing 13 MEPs, 12 in England and one in Wales.

But whilst UKIP’s conception of British civic nationalism purports to be ‘inclusive and open to anyone of any ethnic or religious background who wishes to identify with Britain’, the party identifies a number of ‘threats to Britishness’ that compromise this stated position. Although the EU is seen as the primary threat, both undermining national sovereignty and ‘our relationship with traditional Anglosphere and Commonwealth kith and kin’, UKIP has also identified ‘a serious existential crisis’ evidenced by the growth of Scottish, Welsh and Irish ‘pseudo-nationalisms’; ‘the cultural left’ who have supported multiculturalism and supranationalism; and the ‘Islamification’ of Britain (UKIPa 2010, 4). But although ‘restoring Britishness’ is a UKIP policy claim, the party’s ‘unashamedly unicultural’ stance instinctively conflates Englishness and Britishness. An inherent Anglocentrism is evidenced in their
support for a public holiday on St George’s day, whereby they argue ‘we have so much to celebrate in this country’ without acknowledging whether the country is England or the UK (UKIP 2010b).

UKIP have also been prepared to tap into narratives of English grievance concerning asymmetries across the ‘Home Nations’ such as ‘unfair’ distribution of social services, university fees and free NHS prescriptions ‘despite the fact most tax is raised in England’ (UKIP 2010a, 13). But although they stated that ‘the “English Question” is arguably the most serious threat to Britishness’ (UKIP 2010, 6) UKIP have proven unsure as to how to balance demands for English governance with their desire to maintain the union. In 2006, former Party Chair, David Campbell-Bannerman (UKIP 2006) called for the dismantling of English regional structures and the creation of an ‘English parliament’ to ‘treat the English fairly’ and put it ‘on a par with Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland’. Closer inspection though revealed the proposals sought to establish ‘English days’ in Westminster, a variant of EvfEl, rather than the creation of a new English parliament.

In September 2011 party Leader Nigel Farage told his party conference that the UKIP national executive now supported an English Parliament as ‘the only way of saving the Union’ by addressing ‘English resentment’ over the West Lothian Question and Barnett formula (Farage 2011). The party announced a new policy proposal (with acknowledged input from the Campaign for an English Parliament) which sought to turn the House of Commons into an English legislature with an English first minister, with the current House of Lords becoming an elected upper chamber with representatives from all parts of the UK elected from existing constituencies (Nuttall 2011, 2-3). This would allow England to become ‘constitutionally equal to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland and thus rebalance the Union’. However, Trench (2011) notes that UKIP fail to acknowledge the lack of symmetry in the distribution of devolved powers across Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland or the potential for a separate English parliament dwarfing the other constituent parts of a federal UK. Such federal instability could be significant, thus highlighting the lack of compatibility between UKIPs unionism and English statehood. In seeking to gain greater
electoral returns in England, UKIP’s could therefore undermine their primary aim of the UK’s withdrawal from the EU.

Whilst UKIP have sought to typify other Anglo-British and English ‘extremist parties’ as ‘blood and soil’ ethnic nationalists who threaten the cohesion of the Union (UKIP 2010a), they and the BNP and the English Democrats draw on shared narratives emphasising perceived English cultural, political and economic grievance. The BNP and English Democrats explicitly support the creation of an English Parliament and the scrapping of the Barnett formula. Although the BNP often frames identity narratives within British contexts, both parties seek to promote a common English culture, history and language together with the celebration of the English national anthem, flag and St George’s Day (EDP 2010; BNP 2010). Each party also reject what they see as politically-correct, state-sponsored promotion of multicultural Britishness promoted by the main unionist parties, highlighting the perceived threat of the Islamification of British or English society, culture and civic institutions.

There is however, divergence on how multiculturalism and immigration are conceptualised. For the BNP, ethnicised conceptions of Englishness provide a ‘two-fingered response’ to the perceived prioritisation of immigrants and ethnic minorities over the rights of the white working class (Kenny and Lodge 2009, 227). The English Democrats ascribe to a civic Englishness whereby ‘the people of England are all those UK citizens who live in England’. England is conceived as a multicultural society in so much that people of many cultures now live there. But in stating that the ‘public culture of England should be that of the indigenous English’, it is clear that Englishness is implicitly ethnicised and hierarchical and the party have become increasingly strident in their criticisms of Muslim ‘extremists’. But the emergence of English Defence League (EDL) highlights the potential threats for both parties from the so-called ‘new far-right’ (Jackson 2011). The EDL’s supporters hold common views with the BNP on issues such immigration and the threat of Islam but also share the English Democrats concerns regarding preservation of English national and cultural values (Demos 2011). It has existed as a loose pressure group without formal membership structures whose activities have included demonstrations, leafleting and engaging in public debate.
However in November 2011 it announced an electoral alliance with the British Freedom Party to field candidates in local elections.

Conclusions

This article has argued that the main unionist parties are increasingly vexed by the challenges of English questions and implications of proposed solutions. The ‘party politics of Englishness’, though embryonic, is a political reality that the Conservatives, Labour and Liberal Democrats are beginning, however reluctantly, to engage with. In this sense we are witnessing the ‘Anglicisation’ of party politics in the Westminster-based unionist parties, as they reactively adapt to the \textit{de facto} status of post-devolution Westminster as England’s parliament, and the amplifying divergence of public policy debates and choices across the UK. As the ability of Westminster politicians to speak for the ‘multi-nation’ has diminished, influential figures have sought to connect with debates about political and cultural Englishness, sometimes tapping into narratives of English grievance. However, there is not yet anything like a consensus within or between these parties about how to answer such English questions. In that sense this nascent ‘Anglicisation’ remains diverse, and at times opaque, and its final form is yet to be determined.

Established conceptions of the multi-layeredness of British political and party systems have historically been founded on an assumed consensus amongst multi-national unionist parties that the English electorate consciously and uncritically accepted the conflation of English and UK governance as part of the price for dominating the union. But whilst these unionist parties are not products of English ‘internal colonisation’ of British party politics, the era when they can – or are allowed to – simultaneously speak for England and for Britain (if not always the UK) is drawing to a close (though they often continue to speak of Britain when they mean England). Devolution now presses unionist parties to find answers to potentially intractable questions about England’s governance whilst continuing to represent a multi-national state and electorate which is increasing defined by asymmetry rather than commonality. The Anglicisation of the Westminster parliament and its associated party
politics has undermined the instinctive Anglo-Britishness which previously defined inter-party competition. The revision of policy remits and political identities of union-wide parties has also remodelled intra-party cohesion regarding leadership, policy-making, and engagement with the media and the British electorate. This phenomenon will only intensify further as more powers are ceded by the UK government to Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales.

Anglo-British unionist parties have largely sought to avoid directly addressing the ‘party politics of Englishness’. During the 2010 general election and in subsequent debates about the future of the UK, particularly with regards to the forthcoming Scottish independence referendum, multi-national unionist parties have proven reluctant to engage in a discrete ‘party politics of Englishness’ or prioritise questions about the governance, economy or public services of England over those of the UK as a whole. Unwillingness to acknowledge the extent to which devolution has reshaped the British political and party systems, particularly the reduction and Anglicising of the policy remit of the UK government also reflects enduring Anglo-British instincts across the mainstream parties and awareness of the potential repercussions for the union of playing the ‘English card’. As such, it is unlikely that a sustained unionist party-based campaign for an English parliament will emerge in the immediate future. However, shifting attitudes amongst the English electorate concerning perceptions of England’s democratic and material interests suggest that English politicians and unionist parties may no longer be able to assume that it is safe to overlook England in the devolution debate. A similar need to introspectively consider potential organisational implications has also been given little heed by the Westminster-based unionist parties, each of which is faced with a dilemma that reflects their particular historical development and structure. Federalisation for the Conservative and Labour parties raises the potential for the dominance of the English wings over their Scottish and Welsh counterparts, thus extending accusations of enduring Anglo-British synonymity. For the Conservatives, the Westminster party represents its English core in policy and identity. Future developments could therefore see the emergence of a confederal union with separate Scottish and maybe Welsh parties. Such a scenario may well be Labour’s future too, though this raises problems about cogence
of the foundational and largely successful narrative of British social democracy and the potential for its Anglicised appropriation. Although the federal structures of the Liberal Democrats would suggest it is best adapted to the party politics of Englishness, its divergent electoral appeal in different parts of the UK and the conflation of the English and Federal wings mean separation might prove a political necessity.

As English (2011) points out, the political mobilisation of Englishness is at present largely absent, meaning that English nationalism is on its own unlikely to be a large vote winner. Indeed anxieties about the potential of a English nationalist ‘backlash’ are, at present, mainly limited to Westminster elites (Aughey 2010) and the media (Condor 2010) rather than the broader English public (Ormston 2012). This would suggest the real significance of the party politics of Englishness currently lies in the challenges it poses across the political spectrum to the main UK-wide unionist parties, as each seeks to relate with and articulate a sense of English national identity rather nationalism. Nonetheless, Wellings (2012) is correct in his assertion that nationalism politicises culture. Further Anglicisation of public culture in England, when combined with growing public hostility towards the unionist orthodoxies and terms of governance, could see mainstream parties persuaded to abandon their long-held view that the UK is sacrosanct and adopt more explicitly Anglicised political platforms. For the Conservative Party in particular this may be a tempting strategy, particularly for its younger generation of politicians and party members who appear less instinctively Unionist than has been the case in the past. Conservative fear of appropriation of support in England by UKIP and other parties, combined with continued failure to return any significant numbers of seats outside of England, also have the potential to drive such a shift by the party leadership.

Beyond the mainstream UKIP and the BNP may well be prepared to abandon their current veneer of British unionism in the pursuit of English votes. For UKIP particularly, connecting a sense of English grievance with issues such as Europe, tax and immigration may be a tempting strategy to draw right-wing voters away from the Conservatives. This noted, UKIP and the BNP, together with other fringe parties such as the English Democrats, are hindered
by their limited appeal in domestic elections, instability in membership and party cohesion, and associations with far-right groups and even political violence (Ford, Goodwin and Cutts 2011; Goodwin and Evans 2012). It is unlikely however that an English centrist English civic nationalist equivalent of the SNP will permeate further than the fringes of party competition in the near term. Both Labour and the Liberal Democrats appear still wedded to unionist principles, possibly due to the significant number of non-English seats they currently hold in the Westminster parliament. But it is the continued lack of an explicitly English civic institutional framework that means it is likely the emergent ‘party politics of Englishness’ outlined in this article will continue for the foreseeable future to overlap and conflate with its overarching British counterpart.

All of this suggests there is need for more far-reaching studies to investigate further the permeation and precise nature of the Anglicisation of party politics in England. These might take a number of forms. In examining Anglicisation it is important to remain sensitive to the risk of Anglo-centrism, and there is space for a broader comparative analysis exploring the nationalisation of party politics across the UK. As this article has highlighted, devolution has altered multi-level inter- and intra-party politics within the multi-national UK state, and Englishness can and should be analysed as another nationalism within this context. There is also scope to analyse the changing language used by parties and politicians in England and how it relates to the UK more broadly in discussions about citizenship, identity and public policy with regards to English voters is ripe for quantitative study of speeches, manifestos and policy documents. More broadly, whether we are seeing the emergence of a ‘rhetoric of Englishness’ in British politics, drawing on the upsurge in cultural Englishness witnessed over the past couple of decades, and how these issues are being viewed, interpreted and discussed by politicians both in the Westminster village and beyond, could and should be explored at greater depth than has been possible here.

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