Manzano-Santaella, A (2009) Payment by results and delayed discharges. British Journal of Healthcare Management, 15 (9). 440 - 443. ISSN 1358-0574
Abstract
Delayed discharges caused by social services could potentially pose a financial risk for hospitals. In 2003, the English Government introduced a controversial policy based on fines for social services departments unable to discharge patients from hospital within set timescales. This article analyses the implicit relationship between Payment by Results (PbR) and the Delayed Discharges Act (DDA), and highlights some of its most relevant features.
Metadata
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| Institution: | The University of Leeds |
| Academic Units: | The University of Leeds > Faculty of Education, Social Sciences and Law (Leeds) > School of Sociology and Social Policy (Leeds) |
| Depositing User: | Symplectic Publications |
| Date Deposited: | 22 Jan 2014 18:21 |
| Last Modified: | 20 Feb 2024 16:56 |
| Status: | Published |
| Publisher: | Mark Allen Healthcare |
| Identification Number: | https://doi.org/10.12968/bjhc.2009.15.9.44008 |
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