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Self-Deception, Interpretation and Consciousness

NOORDHOF, P. (2007) Self-Deception, Interpretation and Consciousness. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 67 (1). pp. 75-100. ISSN 0031-8205

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I argue that the extant theories of self-deception face a counterexample which shows the essential role of instability in the face of attentive consciousness in characterising self-deception. I argue further that this poses a challenge to the interpretist approach to the mental. I consider two revisions of the interpretist approach which might be thought to deal with this challenge and outline why they are unsuccessful. The discussion reveals a more general difficulty for Interpretism. Principles of reasoning—in particular, the requirement of total evidence—are given a weight in attentive consciousness which does not correspond to our reflective judgement of their weight. Successful interpretation does not involve ascribing beliefs and desires by reference to what a subject ought to believe and desire, contrary to what Interpretists suggest.

Item Type: Article
Institution: The University of York
Academic Units: The University of York > Philosophy (York)
Depositing User: York RAE Import
Date Deposited: 27 Feb 2009 11:35
Last Modified: 27 Feb 2009 11:35
Published Version: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2003.tb00026...
Status: Published
Publisher: Wiley-Blackwell
Identification Number: 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2003.tb00026.x
URI: http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/id/eprint/7198

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