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Speaker Meaning, What is Said, and What is Implicated [1]

Unlike so many other distinctions in philosophy, H P Grice's distinction between what is said and what is implicated has an immediate appeal: undergraduate students readily grasp that one who says 'someone shot my parents' has merely implicated rather than said that he was not the shooter [2]. It seems to capture things that we all really pay attention to in everyday conversation: this is why there are so many people whose entire sense of humor consists of deliberately ignoring implicatures. ('Can you pass the salt?' 'Yes.') Unsurprisingly, it was quickly picked up and put to a wide variety of uses in not only in philosophy but also in linguistics and psychology. What is surprising, however, is that upon close inspection Grice's conception of implicature turns out to be very different from those at work in the literature which has grown out of his original discussion. This would not be much of a criticism of this literature were it not for the fact that discussions of implicature explicitly claim to be using Grice's notion, not some other one inspired by him (generally going so far as to quote one of Grice's characterisations of implicature). This still would not be terribly interesting if the notion Grice was actually carving out had little theoretical or practical utility. But I will argue here that Grice's own notion of implicature, one quite different from the ones most of us have come to work with, is in fact far more interesting and subtle than that which has been attributed to him.

On the version of Grice's theory which I was taught, conversational implicature is a species of speaker meaning, and speaker meaning divides exhaustively into what is said and what is implicated. This is a common understanding of Grice, and a natural one, given Grice's obvious interest in speaker meaning. [3] But is also, as I shall argue, an unsustainable one, given Grice's understandings of saying and implicating. The problem for this understanding of Grice lies in the fact that Grice's characterisations of speaker meaning and conversational implicature are cast in very different terms: the former completely in terms of speaker intentions and the latter incorporating a good deal about the audience. As a result, the notions do not fit neatly into the simple picture that I was taught: there are many things which speakers mean that they neither say nor impair.

I will argue that the picture which emerges when we pay close attention to Grice's notions of saying and implicating is one which gives substantial weight to the normative side of language use. For Grice, what speakers say and what speakers implicate is not simply a matter of what they intend. In each case, there are constraints which prevent speakers from saying or implicating just anything. This fact has long been acknowledged with regard to Grice's notion of saying: for a speaker to say that P by means of a sentence S, it is not enough for her to mean that PS must also be a sentence which (roughly) is standardly used to mean that P. [4] What I will argue is that there are similar constraints on conversational implicature: on this understanding, if a speaker implicates something, she has thereby made it available to her audience. Speakers don't always succeed in doing this, whatever their intentions.

This paper will be devoted in part to a careful examination of Grice's actual theory, and to ways in which it deviates from common understandings of it. In the course of
this examination, an alternative picture of implicature will emerge, the one sketched all too briefly above. This picture, I will argue, brings out many important features of communication which are lost if we understand Grice's theory in a more traditional manner. Once we appreciate the distinctive character of the Gricean approach, however, we will see that more work has to be done. There are interesting phenomena that escape Grice's system of classifications. Accordingly, I suggest (what I hope are) natural ways of expanding Grice's taxonomy to make room for a wider range of cases.

Speaker meaning which is neither said nor implicated

I'll start by showing just one way in which speakers may mean things which they neither say nor implicate. I'll explore this in a fair bit of detail, and take a look at some consequences it has for uses to which Grice's theory of implicature has been put, then move on to some other ways in which what speakers mean may include more than what they say and implicate.

On Grice's picture, what is said is tightly constrained by linguistic meaning. Conventional implicatures are determined by linguistic meaning. This leaves non-conventional implicature as the only vehicle for speaker meaning which goes well beyond conventional meaning. [5] Frice only gestures at the possibility of non-conversational, non-conventional implicatures, which, he suggests, are like conversational implicatures but arise from maxims other than the conversational ones. (Grice 1989: 28) For the purposes of this paper, I will ignore this category of implicatures, as the exact nature of the maxims generating non-conventional implicatures is irrelevant to my arguments. My focus here will be on conversational implicatures as the mechanism for speaker meaning beyond conventional meaning.

1.1 Near-Implicature

One way for a speaker to mean something which she neither says nor implicates is that she may try but fail to implicate it. In order to begin to see this as a possibility, I'll start with one of Grice's briefer characterisations of conversational implicature:

'what is implicated is what it is required that one assume a speaker to think in order to preserve the assumption that he is following the Cooperative Principle (and perhaps some conversational maxims as well), if not at the level of what is said, at least at the level of what is implicated.' (Grice 1989: 86)

Far from seeming like a part of what the speaker means, conversational implicatures, according to this, are entirely removed from the control (or possibly even awareness) of speakers. [6] What is conversationally implicated is not what the speaker is trying to communicate via the assumption that she is following the Cooperative Principle, but what the audience must assume the speaker to think in order to maintain this assumption. The speaker, then, may easily mean something which fails to be
conversationally implicated because the audience does not in fact need to assume it in order to preserve the assumption that the speaker is being cooperative. [7]

An example of this sort of mismatch will aid the discussion. Suppose that I have spent far too much time reading Grice and my reference-letter writing has been affected. I have been asked to write a letter for a student, Fred, who is a poor philosopher and a chronic petty thief. I don't want to put such things in writing, but I want to write truths and to communicate that Fred should not be hired. Since Fred does happen to be a good typist, I write only this, trusting that Fred's prospective employers (who I take to be a philosophy search committee) will discern my message. [8] Unbeknownst to me, Fred is applying for a job as a typist. What I wrote was precisely the information that Fred's prospective employers require. They don't need to assume that I think anything other than what my words mean in order to preserve the assumption that I am being cooperative. [9] What I mean to communicate, then, fails to be implicated. It clearly is not said since what is said is, for Grice, tightly constrained by conventional meaning. If this is right, then what a speaker means cannot be divided exhaustively into what she says and what she implicates. [10]

Grice's fuller, more famous characterisation of 'conversational implicature' is somewhat different. On this characterisation, which gives three necessary conditions for conversational implicature, what the speaker actually thinks does have a role to play. But this still yields the result that speakers may mean things which they neither say nor implicate. [11] According to it, a person conversationally implicates that q by saying that p only if:

1. he is presumed to be following the conversational maxims, or at least the Cooperative Principle;

2. the supposition that he is aware that, or thinks that, q is required to make his saying or making as if to say p (or doing so in those terms) consistent with this presumption; and

3. the speaker thinks (and would expect the hearer to think that the speaker thinks) that it is within the competence of the hearer to work out, or grasp intuitively, that the supposition mentioned in (2) is required. (Grice 1989: 30-31)

The requirement which blocked the intended implicature according to the brief summary is the second condition given above: if q is to be implicated by S's saying (or making as if to say) that p, then the assumption that S thinks that q must be required to preserve the presumption that S is being cooperative. This is enough to open the gap between speaker meaning and implicature detailed above. The long characterisation differs from the shorter summary in the addition of some extra necessary conditions for conversational implicature. Clause (1) tells us that it must also be the case that the speaker is presumed to be following the Cooperative Principle. Clause (3) tells us that the speaker must think (and expect the hearer to think that the speaker thinks) that the supposition that she thinks that q is required. Clause (3), then, does introduce an element of speaker control: the speaker must believe that the assumption is in fact required. This is not, however, enough to bring about the attempted implicature. The implicature was blocked because a speaker cannot conversationally implicate something which the audience is not required to
assume that she thinks. This necessary condition has not been removed. Further, we will see shortly that clause (1) opens up new ways in which a speaker may mean something which she neither says nor implicates.

1.1.1 Gricean Speaker Meaning

Thus far, I have worked with an intuitive understanding of the notion of speaker meaning, and argued that it cannot be understood as made up exclusively of what is said and implicatures. Grice, however, devotes considerable time to formulating a definition of speaker meaning, and if his version of speaker meaning is exhausted by these notions, then perhaps what I have argued is wrong. Grice, and all his followers, may have been discussing a notion of speaker meaning which can be divided up this way. We'll see that this is not the case.

Grice's characterisation of speaker meaning is something like the following: [12]

By uttering $x$, $U$ meant that $p$ iff for some audience $A$

(1) $U$ uttered $x$ intending $A$ actively to believe the thought that $p$ (or the thought that $U$ believes that $p$)

(2) $U$ uttered $x$ intending $A$ to recognise that $U$ intends $A$ actively to believe the thought that $p$

(3) $U$ does not intend $A$ to be deceived about $U$'s intentions (1) and (2).

The important thing to note, for our purposes, is that the above definition does not permit the actual state of mind of the audience to impose any conditions at all on what the speaker may mean. Further, although the correct way to formulate Grice's definition is a matter of much debate, all versions share this feature. Since we have seen that the audience's state of mind can impose constraints on what is conversationally implicated, speaker meaning cannot be divided neatly into what is implicated and what is said. There is still room for a speaker to mean something which is not conventionally meant by her utterance, and which does not come to be conversationally implicated.

1.1.2 A Consequence: Referential/Attributive

An influential and popular use for the notion of conversational implicature has been in explaining the referential/attributive distinction as a distinction at the level of what is meant rather than at the level of what is said. Unfortunately, for reasons like those discussed above, conversational implicature is inadequate for this purpose. This does not mean, however, that no pragmatic explanation can succeed. Later in this paper I suggest some new pragmatic notions, related to conversational implicature, which can accommodate all the necessary cases.

Our main example will be from Stephen Neale's *Descriptions* (1990). Neale provides the most explicit statement I have found as to how the conversational implicature explanation of the referential/attributive distinction is meant to go. [13] He begins by couching his explanation in terms of the Gricean distinction between what a speaker
says and what a speaker means. He then lays out the basics of Grice's theory of conversational implicature as a way of drawing this distinction. Finally, he discusses a particular example of referential usage in detail. In this example, both the speaker, Neville, and his audience believe (and know each other to believe) that Harry is the present Chairman of the Flat Earth Society. Harry informs Neville that he will be in San Francisco on Saturday. Neville intends to communicate the object dependent proposition that Harry is coming to San Francisco. (Neale doesn't say why Neville should have this intention, but to make the example more vivid, we can imagine that Neville and his audience are deeply interested in Harry's travel plans. The conversation is, let's say, about their plan to implant electronic listening devices in the hotel rooms of Tom, Dick, and Harry, who they know to be visiting San Francisco in the next few weeks.) Neville utters (1):

(1) The Chairman of the Flat Earth Society is coming to San Francisco on Saturday.

Neville intends to communicate the proposition represented by (1N):

(1N) <Harry, coming to San Francisco on Saturday>

He succeeds in communicating this, and succeeds in doing so via conversational implicature. If Neville has uttered (1), and is obeying the maxims of Quality (which includes: do not say that which you believe to be false), and Relevance, then he must believe (1N). The audience must, then, assume that Neville believes (1N) in order to preserve the assumption that Neville is being cooperative, and Neville knows this. The implicature story, then, explains how (1N) may come to be communicated by (1).

But consider the same example, with a small alteration. Imagine that the audience does not realise that Neville believes Harry to be the Chairman of the Flat Earth Society. In addition, the audience falsely takes Neville to be interested in bugging the hotel rooms of all the executives of the Flat Earth Society. All other facts are the same (in particular the facts about Neville's beliefs and intentions), and Neville makes the same utterance, fully intending to communicate (1N). Now the assumption that Neville believes (1N) is no longer needed in order to uphold the presumption that he is being cooperative. From the audience's perspective, he has made a perfectly relevant contribution to their discussion, and there is no need to suppose that he has any beliefs about Harry. Neville, then, will fail to implicate (1N). Nonetheless, if (1N) was a part of what Neville meant in the earlier version, it still is. No facts about Neville have changed from the first example to this one-- he still intends to communicate (1N), and to do so via his utterance of (1). So we have another case for which speaker meaning and implicature come apart. This particular case is one which seems to show us that not all instances of apparently referential usage can be explained by invoking conversational implicature.

One might argue, however, that we are no longer discussing referential usages. Perhaps a description cannot be used referentially to communicate that p unless the conditions for conversational implicature are met: the audience's state of mind must be such that the assumption that the speaker believes that p is required if the speaker is to be understood as cooperative. (We saw that this is not the case in the example above.) If this were right, then, the way in which speaker meaning and implicature come apart would not pose problems for explaining the referential/attributive
distinction via conversational implicature. All the cases of referential usage would be ones for which a conversational implicature explanation could be given.

But the suggested requirement would be at odds with what is said by key authors on the referential/attributive distinction. Donnellan (1979: 30) says the following: "the referential/attributive distinction and the presence or absence of speaker reference should be based on such speaker intentions toward his audience or the lack of them" Referential usage depends on speaker reference, which depends on speaker intentions. The actual state of mind of the audience is not meant to place any restrictions on whether or not a usage is referential. [17]

This is not just sloppy formulation, either. The very next example Donnellan discusses after the above quotation is one in which the proposed requirement is not met. Donnellan notes (1979: 31) that '[t]he speaker's audience will not infrequently fail to recognise what he has in mind to talk about just from the uttered description and the context.' He considers a case in which the speaker utters (2), intending to communicate the proposition represented by (2N).

(2) The fat old humbug we saw yesterday has just been made a full professor!

(2N) <Norman, having been made a full professor>

The audience, however, fails to grasp (2N), and asks 'Which fat old humbug?' Donnellan claims that (2N) is what is said by this utterance of (2). The implicature explanation of this case would be that (2N) is implicated by this utterance of (2). [18]

But for (2N) to be conversationally implicated by the utterance of (2), it would have to be the case that, in order to preserve the presumption that the speaker is being cooperative, the audience must assume the speaker to believe (2N). In order to make that assumption, however, the audience would need to grasp (2N), which she clearly hasn't done. Nonetheless, the speaker's utterance appears perfectly cooperative. The audience needn't have any sense that the speaker is not trying to follow the maxims of conversation. If that's the case, however, (2N) cannot be implicated by this utterance of (2). Again, we have a referential usage which the conversational implicature explanation cannot be extended to cover.

1.1.3 Presumption of Cooperativeness (Clause (1))

Grice's three-clause characterisation of conversational implicature not only continues to block attempted implicatures in cases like that of the Fred letter, but it actually blocks yet another sort of attempted implicature. "These implicatures are those which are blocked by clause (1), which specifies that, in order to conversationally implicate that q, the speaker must be presumed to be following the conversational maxims, or at least the Cooperative Principle." Whether or not a speaker is so-presumed is not something that the speaker can control. "This yields yet another way in which a speaker may mean something, and attempt to conversationally implicate it, yet fail to do so." So it gives us yet another instance in which speaker meaning cannot be divided into what is said and what is implicated. [19]
An example: Cedric is applying for a philosophy job, and I think he's incompetent as a philosopher. I write that he is punctual and a good typist, expecting the audience to work out from this that I think Cedric is incompetent as a philosopher. In order to view my utterance as consistent with a presumption that I am cooperative, the audience needs to suppose that I think this. However, this presumption is not present: the audience has been told (falsely, and unbeknownst to me) that I disapprove of the practise of writing letters of reference. Accordingly, the rumour goes, I always write uncooperative, irrelevant letters. So (1) is not satisfied, and I fail to implicate that Cedric is an incompetent philosopher.

1.1.4 Fixing the taxonomy

Our taxonomy, we've seen, is incomplete. "There are elements of what the speaker means which are neither said nor implicated. " Speakers sometimes attempt conversational implicatures which fail. "I propose that we add a new category to our taxonomy, that of utterer-implicature. [20]

Utterer-implicatures are just like conversational implicatures except for modifications to clauses (1) and (2). First, it needn't be the case that the audience actually needs to suppose that the speaker believes the utterer-implicated proposition. It is enough that the speaker think the audience needs to suppose this. So, clause (2) is replaced by (2*):

(2*) The speaker thinks that the supposition that he is aware that, or thinks that, q is required to make his saying or making as if to say p (or doing so in those terms) consistent with this presumption.

Second, it needn't be the case that the speaker is actually presumed to be being cooperative. It is enough that he believe that he is so-presumed. So, clause(1) is replaced by (1*):

(1*) The speaker thinks that he is presumed to be following the conversational maxims, or at least the Cooperative Principle.

The Gricean taxonomy that we've arrived at now is one on which speaker meaning divides into what is said, what is conventionally or conversationally implicated, and what is utterer-implicated but not conversationally implicated. Soon we'll see a need to add yet another category of speaker meaning.

1.2 Near-Saying

In the previous section, we discussed elements of speaker meaning which are meant to be implicated but fail to be. In this section, we will see that there are elements of speaker meaning which are meant to be said, but fail to be.

On Grice's view, as on most views, if one intends to say that P but accidentally utters a sentence which conventionally means that Q, one has not said that P. [21] This kind of case is quite common. Two prime sorts of examples come from malapropisms and poor translations. [22] The utterer of (3), below, intended to say that which (3*) conventionally means.
(3) We're having a small conservative built onto the back of our house.

(3*) We're having a small conservatory built onto the back of our house.

An easy mistake to make in Spanish is that of uttering sentence (4) when one wants to say one is embarrassed. The right way to say this is with sentence (4*).

(4) Estoy embarazado.

(4*) Estoy azorado.

Victims of this mistake utter a sentence which has the conventional meaning of (5), rather than (5*). [23]

(5) I am pregnant.

(5*) I am embarrassed. [24]

(3*) is surely what the utterer of (3) meant, both in the ordinary sense and in Grice's sense. Yet it is not said-- (3)'s conventional meaning guarantees that. Moreover, it is not implicated by the utterance of (3)-- the speaker did not think that the audience would be able to work out that understanding her as having a belief about a conservatory was required in order to make sense of her making a claim about a conservative. She did not even realise that had uttered the wrong sentence. [25] The same problem arises for the Spanish mistake. (4)'s conventional meaning is that of (5), not (5*). So utterers of (4) do not say what is said by (5*). Nor do they implicate it. Utterers of (4) certainly don't think that audiences are able to work out that taking them to be embarrassed is required to make sense of them seeming to say that they are pregnant'they don't even know that they've chosen the wrong word. [26] What they mean is neither said nor implicated.

Can our new notion of utterer-implicature help? No. An utterer-implicature is like a conversational implicature except that a speaker may implicate that Q by saying (or making as if to say) that P even if the supposition that the speaker thinks that Q is not in fact required to maintain the assumption that she is cooperative. It is enough that the speaker takes this assumption to be required in order to make sense of her saying (or making as if to say) that P. But our speakers in the examples we've just been discussing do not take that assumption to be required.

We need, then, to acknowledge a category of propositions that a speaker attempts but fails to say. Speaker meaning, then, includes what is said, what the speaker tries but fails to say, conversational implicatures, conventional implicatures, and utterer-implicatures which fail to be conversational implicatures. [27]

Here I will begin to explore the possibility that some conversational implicatures may not be meant. "Grice is far less clear on this issue than one might have expected. "In this section, I note the possibility that there is room for unmeant conversational implicatures. [28] In the next section, I'll discuss some alternative interpretations which rule this out (as well as one which doesn't).
We have already seen that Grice's short summary of conversational implicature (1989:86) places no requirements whatsoever on the speaker's state of mind. Grice's three-clause characterisation of conversational implicature, however, does involve the speaker. Surprisingly, this characterisation also falls short of requiring that conversational implicatures be meant by speakers. For quick and easy reference, here are those necessary conditions again.

1. [the speaker] is presumed to be following the conversational maxims, or at least the Cooperative Principle;

2. the supposition that he is aware that, or thinks that, q is required to make his saying or making as if to say p (or doing so in those terms) consistent with this presumption; and

3. the speaker thinks (and would expect the hearer to think that the speaker thinks) that it is within the competence of the hearer to work out, or grasp intuitively, that the supposition mentioned in (2) is required. (Grice 1989: 30-31)

To see that this falls short of requiring conversational implicatures to be meant, suppose that now I am writing a letter of reference for Roland, who is applying for a philosophy job. I like Roland personally and want him to do well, but I feel that I cannot in good conscience write him a positive letter, as he is a terrible philosopher. So I write a long letter, describing the classes Roland has attended and taught, and the topics on which he has written. I make no value judgments whatsoever. I know that the search committee is perfectly capable of realising that the only way to understand this letter as cooperative is to realise that I think Roland is not a good philosopher. However, I suspect that they will read hastily, be impressed by the sheer detail in the letter, and offer Roland a job. In fact, this is my plan. The claim that Roland is not a good philosopher meets the three necessary conditions for conversational implicature. However, I do not intend my audience to form this belief— in fact I want them to form the belief that Roland is a good philosopher. [29] So, if the three necessary conditions suffice for conversational implicature, what I have conversationally implicated is not something that I mean.

As described, this is a case in which I think that the audience will not pick up on my implicature. One might argue, then, that I really don't believe that they are capable of working out the implicature. I think they could work it out if they had more time and fewer applicants, but I don't really think they could given their circumstances. But this point turns out to be inessential to the example. I could write the very same letter with the belief that they will realise that I don't think well of Roland, accompanied by the desperate hope that they will somehow miss this. Despite my belief, I think it would be very hard to maintain that I intend my audience to form the belief that I do not think well of Roland. This is in fact the very last thing I'd like them to do. So there are claims which meet the three necessary conditions for conversational implicature, but which are not meant. This, of course, raises the possibility that perhaps more is required for conversational implicature than meeting the necessary conditions cited above. We will explore this possibility in the next section.

Alternative Interpretations
In "The Causal Theory of Perception" (Grice 1961), in which Grice suggests an aside that conversational implicatures must be meant. If Neale is right, then it's clear that there are no unmeant conversational implicatures. I think, however, that the passage cannot be as decisive as Neale takes it to be, as it has a rather odd status. Grice chose to omit the section in which this passage occurs when he compiled his collected papers for Studies in the Way of Words. There are very few other such omissions. The reason Grice gives for this omission is that the view presented there is 'substantially the same' as that presented in his later papers, which contain fuller discussions. (Grice 1989: 229) This leaves us at quite a loss for what to do with the early aside: if Grice still thought conversational implicatures must be meant, surely he would have left it in, as it represents an important omission from his later presentations of the theory; on the other hand, if Grice had changed his mind, surely he would not say that the early presentation was 'substantially the same' as the later ones. Given its puzzling status, then, I think it would be inappropriate to draw conclusions about Grice's views from the omitted passage.

**Implicatures as Meant but not Said?**

Another way to argue that implicatures must be meant is to focus on the words with which Grice introduces the three necessary conditions from 'Logic and Conversation' [30]:

A man who, by (in, when) saying (or making as if to say) that \( p \) has implicated that \( q \), may be said to have conversationally implicated that \( q \), provided that[...] (Grice 1989: 30-31, emphasis mine)

The three clauses then follow. Our current suggestion begins from the very reasonable claim that Grice's necessary conditions are meant to tell us when it's the case that some claim, which we already know to be implicated, is conversationally implicated. Reasonable as this is, it is very difficult to know exactly what it comes to. In order to even begin to understand conversational implicature, on this reading, we must already understand implicature. The only passages which might have given us this prior understanding occur on pages 24-25. There Grice says that he is introducing 'implicate' as a technical term for a family of verbs which includes 'implied', 'suggested', and 'meant', which he thinks we have an intuitive ability to recognise. [31] The problem with this is that what's implicated is meant to be distinct from what's said, yet anything which is said must be, for Grice, meant. This does not sit well with the thought that 'implicate' can stand in for 'meant'. One charitable interpretation of all this would have it that implicatures are any claims which are meant but not said. On this reading, then, the three clauses of Grice's definition tell us what is needed for something which is meant but not said to be a conversational implicature.

This reading, of course, commits Grice to the claim that all conversational implicatures are meant. There are, then, no unmeant conversational implicatures. This consequence may well seem a happy one. But the reading is also problematic. If anything which is meant but not said is implicated, then what speakers mean as they accidentally utter the wrong words is implicated. Those who commit the Spanish mistake mentioned earlier implicated that they are embarrassed by uttering words which meant that they are pregnant. This seems quite odd to me. Certainly, we could
decide to use the terms 'implicature' and 'implicate' in this way, but it would, I think, be a change. [32]

This reading commits Grice very strongly to the claim that speaker meaning divides exhaustively into what is said and what is implicated. Accordingly, my claim that there are elements of speaker meaning which are neither said nor implicated fails. However, a related claim can be made instead. Grice divides implicatures into three main categories: conversational (our main focus here), conventional, and non-conventional non-conversational (because due to other maxims). There are, I have argued, claims which are meant but which do not fit into any of these categories. To avoid this result, the exhaustiveness claim may be taken as fundamental: anything which is meant but not said simply is implicated. On this reading, my arguments can be taken to show that Grice's taxonomy of implicatures must be wrong—implicatures cannot be divided exhaustively into the three categories Grice suggests. [33] This alternative, then, merely shifts the location of my concern. Recognition of utterer-implicature and near-saying offer a way of filling this relocated gap. [34] Importantly, we are still left with a more restricted understanding of conversational implicature than that which is commonly assumed. For the purpose of the rest of this paper, I'll mostly set aside this interpretation, as it won't matter to the points that I am making. My concern from here on will be mostly with the nature of and motivation for Grice's quite restrictive understanding of conversational implicature.

What speakers implicate, according to Davis, is a very broad category: speakers implicate whatever they mean by saying something else. On the basis of this, he argues that Grice's inclusion of audience-oriented criteria in his necessary conditions for conversational implicature (which must include all that speakers implicate) was a mistake. Davis writes, 'S's [the speaker's] intentions do not depend on what anyone else presumes[m]y having certain intentions cannot be constituted or generated by any fact about you.' Since 'to mean or imply something is to have certain intentions', Davis continues, Grice is wrong to include audience-oriented criteria in his characterisation of conversational implicature. (Davis 1998: 122.)

Davis' views on the inclusion of audience-oriented criteria have some (to my mind) rather startling consequences. He discusses a case in which Carl says 'I feel sick' and Diane replies with 'A flying saucer is nearby'. Carl thinks what Diane said is false, and fails to see its relevance to his comment. Nonetheless, Diane 'might well have been [conversationally] implicating that Carl could get help from the doctors on the flying saucer'. (Davis 1998: 74.) Because of Davis' understanding of conversational implicature, anything that the speaker means to convey by what she says is conversationally implicated. So speakers like Diane, with extremely eccentric beliefs, can successfully conversationally implicate all sorts of surprising things. [35]

I find this counter-intuitive. Davis' understanding of conversational implicature does have the consequence that anything which speakers mean is either said or implicated. But although he attributes this understanding to Grice, I think it's far from clear Grice that would agree with it. Grice's inclusion of audience-oriented criteria in his discussion of conversational implicature does not have the appearance of a careless aberration. Rather, he includes such criteria over and over, and is much clearer about the need for audience-oriented criteria than he is about implicatures being meant. All
this might be beside the point if there didn't seem to be any good reason to include such audience-oriented criteria, but I will suggest that there is good reason.

It is problematic to rely upon intuitions to guide us in our understanding of conversational implicature. After all, 'conversational implicature' is a theoretical term, not a bit of ordinary English. Nonetheless, I, at least, have come to have intuitions about its use, and the use to which Davis puts it in his flying saucer example feels wrong. It feels wrong because it seems to me that speakers lack total authority over what is implicated, just as they do over what is said. Some other element has to enter in, and the audience seems a likely candidate.

It seems to me not unreasonable to suppose that Grice had similar inclinations. Despite his focus on speaker intentions, he wanted what is said not to be entirely subject of the whims of individual speakers. Instead, he defined 'saying' in terms of both speaker meaning and sentence meaning, and defined sentence meaning by generalising across speakers. (Very roughly, the meaning of a sentence S, for Grice, is largely a matter of what speakers in general mean by their utterances of S.) This definition was not without its difficulties (see for example Neale 1992), but it did succeed in removing what is said from the total control of individual speakers. Grice's inclusion of the audience in his definition of 'conversational implicature' serves a similar purpose. With conversational implicature, generalising across speakers would be inappropriate given the importance of context. Instead, he looked to the other participant in the conversation: the audience. According to Grice, a speaker's intending to convey that P by saying that Q is not enough for the speaker to implicate that P. The audience must also need to believe that the speaker believes that P in order to preserve the assumption of the speaker's cooperativeness. This is an attempt to give some degree of intersubjectivity to the notion of conversational implicature. Speakers have authority over what they utter-implicate, but they can't fully control what they conversationally implicate. [36] (As we will see in the next two sections, Grice is careful not to hand too much control over to the audience, either. What matters is what the audience is required to believe, not what she does believe.)

The audience involvement that Grice builds into the notion of conversational implicature is what blocks the sorts of claims that Davis makes about his flying saucer example. Blocking those claims seems a reasonable thing to want to do. Since Grice did offer an account which ruled them out, rejecting that account as misguided in this regard requires more argument than Davis gives.

Utterer-implicatures are claims that the speaker attempts to conversationally implicate. We can define a parallel notion for the claims that the audience takes to be conversationally implicated, audience-implicature. Audience-implicatures are just like conversational implicatures except that audiences have authority over what is audience-implicated. For this notion, we change conditions (2) and (3) of the three necessary conditions for conversational implicature.

Clause (2) is replaced with (2A): The audience believes that the supposition that he is aware that, or thinks that, q is required to make his saying or making as if to say p (or doing so in those terms) consistent with this presumption.
Clause (3) is replaced by (3A): The audience takes the speaker to think that it is within the audience's competence to work out that the supposition mentioned in (2) is required.

This notion will prove useful to us in exploring the nature of conversational implicature, but it is also useful for dealing with certain sorts of everyday cases. Imagine, for example, that I am writing a letter of reference for my student Felix, who I consider to be an excellent philosopher. I falsely believe, however, that he is applying for a job as a typist, so I discuss nothing but his fine typing and punctuality. The audience, which is actually a philosophy appointments committee, takes me to have conversationally implicated that Felix is a poor philosopher. They are, of course, wrong: clause (3) of Grice's characterisation was not satisfied, as I had no idea that they would, or even could, work out from my utterance that I think Felix is a poor philosopher, and I would not have made my utterance if I'd realised the situation. This claim, then, fails to be conversationally implicated. But it is useful to have a term to describe its status, and it meets the criteria for audience-implicature.

It is perhaps worth noting that certain passages in Grice fit better with audience-implicature than with conversational implicature, but still fit only imperfectly. Consider, for example, Grice's short summary of conversational implicature, and another similar passage:

[...]what is implicated is what it is required that one assume a speaker to think in order to preserve the assumption that he is following the Cooperative Principle (and perhaps some conversational maxims as well), if not at the level of what is said, at least at the level of what is implicated. (1989:86)

Implicatures are thought of as arising in the following way; an implicatum [...] is the content of that psychological state or attitude which needs to be attributed to a speaker... (1989:370)

In these passages, Grice makes no mention whatsoever of the speaker's actual state of mind. This suggests that they might be better understood as relating to audience-implicature. However, audience-implicature requires more than is mentioned in these passages. Specifically, it must also be the case that (a) the speaker is being presumed to be cooperative and (b) the audience takes the speaker to think that the audience is capable of working out the implicature. The notion Grice alludes to in the passages above is one which focuses only on the fulfillment of the second necessary condition from the three-clause characterisation of conversational implicature.

It is not. The reason for this is that some claims which are conversationally implicated fail to be audience-implicated. This is so whether or not being meant is taken to be a necessary condition for being conversationally implicated. Imagine that I write a letter for another poor student, Trigby, designed to communicate my low opinion of her as a philosopher. I say nothing about her that is relevant to the philosophy job for which she is applying, but confine my discussion to extolling her virtues as a rock-climber. The audience does realise the assumption that I think poorly of Trigby is needed. However, they also think that I didn't expect them to pick up on my poor opinion of Trigby. In fact, they are offended that I thought I could mislead them so easily. In such a case, I have conversationally implicated that I think poorly of Trigby as a
I have not audience-implicated that Trigby is a poor philosopher, as the audience doesn't realise that I thought they could work this out. This kind of imperfect communication counts as conversational implicature but not as utterer&audience-implicature.

We now have a good grip on the difference between claims that are conversationally implicated and those that are both utterer and audience implicated. But we have not yet seen why one might be interested in conversational implicature, rather than the intersection of utterer and audience implicatures, as I have defined them. This question at first seems difficult to answer. Anything which is utterer-implicated and audience-implicated, after all, has been successfully communicated. We can easily see why one would be interested in this notion. But conversational implicature, allowing as it does for certain sorts of imperfect communication, is more puzzling.

On closer reflection, however, conversational implicature turns out to be an extremely interesting and important notion. We saw that some conversational implicatures failed to be audience-implicatures: audience error can lead to some claim failing to be audience-implicated, while it is still conversationally implicated. There are, then, cases in which we can reasonably say that the audience should have worked out the conversational implicature, even if they failed to do so. This means that conversational implicature is a more normative notion than utterer&audience implicature.

To see the interest of a notion like this one, imagine that I write a letter of reference for Wesley, another of my (fictional) unpromising students. I know that Wesley is applying for a philosophy job, and I write a letter designed to communicate my low opinion of Wesley. I write (truthfully), 'Wesley's main virtues as a philosopher are punctuality, an attractive choice of fonts, and an encyclopaedic knowledge of illegal pharmaceuticals.' The audience, though certainly capable of working out from this that I think Wesley is a poor philosopher, reads too quickly, and takes away from the letter only the information that Wesley has encyclopaedic knowledge. They hire him, become disappointed, and complain to me. Saying that I utterer-implicated that Wesley is a poor philosopher is not much of a defense: I could have utterer-implicated that Wesley was Elvis if I was crazy enough to suppose that attributing this belief to me was required to make sense of my utterance, and that the audience could work this out. That something has been utterer-implicated does not show that the speaker has done enough to make the information available. But I did not succeed in audience-implicating that Wesley is a poor philosopher, because my audience failed to realise that they needed to assume that I thought this. So I cannot defend myself by saying that I utterer&audience-implicated this claim. What I can do, however, is maintain that I conversationally implicated it: It was required in order to understand me as cooperative, and my audience was capable of working this out.

Saying something does not guarantee audience uptake but does mean that the speaker has fulfilled her communicative responsibilities with regard to explicit content (as she wouldn't have done if she chose words which didn't have the conventional meaning that she intended). Similarly, conversationally implicating something also fails to guarantee audience uptake but does mean that the speaker has fulfilled her communicative responsibilities with regard to what she wants to communicate beyond
what she says. She may not have communicated her intended message, but she has made it available. The normativity of saying and conversationally implicating are quite parallel, although Grice uses different mechanisms to achieve this normativity for the two notions.

**Conclusion**

We have seen that the standard understanding of Grice, on which speaker meaning divides exhaustively into what is said and what is implicated, does not fit with Grice's understandings of these notions. I have suggested new notions which can fill the gaps revealed in Grice's taxonomy. But I have also suggested that these gaps should not be viewed as mere careless errors: Grice can be seen as attempting, with conversational implicature, to do far more than merely fill out the rest of speaker meaning. When we closely examine the role and function of conversational implicature as characterised by Grice, we see that there is very good reason for a notion which doesn't fit neatly into the standard picture. The notion of information which the speaker makes available to the audience is an important and useful one, and one which all too easily goes unnoticed in discussions of implicature.


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According to the movie, 'Menendez: A Shooting in Beverly Hills', this is what Erik Menendez said when he phoned 911 (the US emergency services line). He later confessed that he and his brother were the ones who shot his parents.

A few examples will provide some indication of the popularity of this reading. Stephen Neale attributes this view to Grice on pages 73-83 of Neale 1990 and in Neale 1992. In the latter, there are two diagrams which show "what U meant" dividing exhaustively into what is said and what is implicated. (The diagrams make the first level of division between what's conventionally meant and what's non-conventionally meant, but the division between what's said and what's implicated is still exhaustive. Laurence Horn (1992: 165) also provides a diagram showing what's meant dividing exhaustively into what's said and what's implicated, as does Stephen Levinson on page 131 of his 1983 textbook, Pragmatics. (For both Horn and Levinson, the first level of division is between what is said and what is implicated.) Kent Bach also apparently takes this to be the received view of Grice as he argues for an additional category, conversational implicature in his 1994.

Actually making this work, particularly when we consider indexicals, is a bit of a nightmare. But the general idea is clear enough.

I say 'well beyond', because reference assignment for indexical terms is arguably a mechanism for speaker meaning beyond conventional meaning, as conventional meaning fails to determine such referents.

I am assuming that speaker meaning must be under the control or at least awareness of speakers. This seems a very common assumption in discussions of speaker meaning.
[7] Wayne Davis (Davis 1998) also discusses the irrelevance of Grice's necessary conditions to speaker meaning. Davis, however, draws very different conclusions from this. I discuss his views more fully in part 3.

[8] Assume also that I mean that Fred is a good typist, so that this is said by my utterance. (Grice takes meaning that P to be a necessary condition for saying that P. One who utters a sentence which would normally say that P but does not mean that P, according to Grice, has only made as if to say that P.) The example can succeed even if I only make as if to say that Fred is a typist, but this introduces unnecessary complications.

[9] Mitch Green has suggested to me in correspondence that what is required in order to preserve the assumption that the speaker is being cooperative should be evaluated with reference to the shared common ground of speaker and hearer. In the example above, there is no common ground with respect to the key question of what the letter is for-- I think that I'm to evaluate the candidate's philosophical abilities, and my audience thinks that I'm to evaluate his typing abilities. Without common ground to draw on, my utterance will presumably fail to generate an implicature. But I am unaware that this common ground is missing, so I attempt to implicate that Fred is not a good philosopher. (If I were aware that the context was not shared, I would not attempt this implicature, but since I am unaware that the context is not shared, it is difficult to see how this fact could affect my intentions.) This approach yields no great improvement on that suggested in the text. Although the reason is different, we still have a case in which the speaker means something which is neither said nor implicated.

[10] If one takes anything which is meant but not said to be an implicature, this example can seen as demonstrating the need for new sorts of implicature. See part 3 for more on this.

[11] The exact status of this characterisation is somewhat controversial. Some authors treat it as a definition, while others do not. I will explore its status in some detail in part 3. For now, however, all that matters to my argument is that the three clauses of this characterisation represent necessary conditions for conversational implicature, and this much should be uncontroversial.

[12] This characterisation has, notoriously, been reworked over and over again. I have chosen the characterisation above, taken in part from the discussion in Neale (1993).

[13] Other authors who invoke implicature without being so explicit about how it figures in the explanation include Kripke (1977) and Blackburn (1984).

[14] In addition, his 1992 makes it utterly clear that he takes speaker meaning to be composed exhaustively of what is said and what is implicated (conventionally and non-conventionally). See in particular the diagrams on pp 524, 543.

[15] In Neale's book, he himself is the speaker, but this makes discussion of the example in connection with Neale's view of it a little confusing in the present context. In addition, I make some additions and alterations to the example, and I wouldn't want these to be read as relating to Neale himself, so I have substituted the fictional Neville.
Neale actually leaves the exact nature of this proposition open, stating that it may be object-dependent without containing the individual Harry. I represent it as above for simplicity, because the details do not matter to the point I am making here.

The speaker's beliefs about the audience's states of mind may of course place restrictions on what intentions the speaker can form, but this is quite a different matter.

Actually, Donnellan himself is quite unclear about whether his distinction is at the level of what is said, as noted by Kripke (1979). But, as Kripke argues, the only way to understand Donnellan's distinction as a problem for Russell's Theory of Descriptions-- its intended purpose-- is to take it to be at the level of what is said. Certainly this is (or so it seems to me) the standard interpretation of Donnellan.

On the alternative reading alluded to earlier, this claim needs to be reformulated. I discuss this in part 3.

Utterer implicature should not be confused with Davis' (1998) notion, speaker implicature, which I discuss in Part 3.

Unlike many others, Grice also denies that, in such cases, one has said that Q. But this controversial bit of his view is not relevant to my concerns.

Donald Davidson (1986), of course, also discusses malapropisms in connection with Grice's views. The use to which he puts malapropisms, however, is very different from the use I make of them.

I thank my brother, Joe Saul, for his memorable demonstration of this mistake.

A wonderful, though imperfect, example of mistranslation is John F Kennedy's Berlin utterance of 'Ich bin ein Berliner' when he should have uttered 'Ich bin Berliner'. The latter means I am a Berliner while the former -- so the story goes-- means I am a jellydonut. The example is imperfect, however, because the sentence Kennedy uttered was ambiguous. The jelly donut reading was indeed strongly favored, due to the presence of 'ein', but the Berliner reading was still possible. So it's not straightforwardly the case that Kennedy didn't say that he was a Berliner. I thank Christian Piller for saving me from false claims about this example.

Some utterers, of course, might realise that they had uttered the wrong sentence. But our focus here is on someone who doesn't realise this.

In both these cases, I focus on the fact that clause (3) is unfulfilled. It seems less clear to me that clauses (1) and (2) are unfulfilled, as it does seem reasonable to suppose that the audiences could use conversational maxims in order to make sense of the speaker's utterance.

It shouldn't surprise us that we need a category of what the speaker attempts to say. In fact, it fits well with the fact that Grice allows for a category of what the speaker 'makes as if to say'. A speaker makes as if to say that P if P would normally be said by the sentence the speaker utters, but is not meant by the speaker. Saying, for Grice, involves both speaker meaning and conventional meaning. Surrounding it, then,
we have notions which involve only speaker meaning and only conventional meaning. I should note also that there may well be other kinds of speaker meaning, which fit into none of the categories given above.

I do not want to commit myself to the idea that there can be unmeant conversational implicatures, as I think these issues are incredibly tricky. But I do want to argue that the idea is not so obviously crazy as one might have supposed. I am very grateful to Chris Hookway for discussion of this idea.

Whether or not I mean that Roland is a good philosopher may be a contentious issue. Fortunately, we don't need to settle it here.

I thank Kent Bach and Chris Hookway for pointing out this line of interpretation.

In 'Utterer's Meaning and Intentions,' Grice writes, 'Implicature' is a blanket word in order to avoid having to make choices between words like 'imply,' 'suggest,' 'indicate,' and 'mean.' He seems a bit less comfortable here with our grip on these notions, as he continues: 'These words are worth analysing.' (1989:86.)

Another passage which can be read as suggesting the interpretation suggested in this section occurs in "Further Notes on Logic and Conversation" on page 41 of Grice 1989. There Grice describes his view in "Logic and Conversation" by writing, "I was operating, provisionally, with the idea that, for a large class of utterances, the total signification of an utterance may be regarded as divisible in two different ways. First, one may distinguish, within the total signification, between what is said (in a favored sense) and what is implicated; and second, one may distinguish between what is part of the conventional force (or meaning) of the utterance and what is not. This yields three possible elements: what is said, what is conventionally implicated, and what is nonconventionally implicates though in a given case one or more of these elements may be lacking. For example, nothing may be said, though there is something which a speaker makes as if to say." This passage can certainly be read as supporting the idea that speaker meaning divides exhaustively into what is said and what is implicated. But doing this requires assuming 'total signification' to be a synonym for 'meaning'. (As Chris Hookway has pointed out to me, it would be odd for Grice to introduce a new term if he was discussing his by now familiar notion of meaning.) It also requires us to put aside Grice's qualifying phrases, in particular the fact that he takes himself only to be describing a taxonomy for "a large class of utterances", rather than one that is applicable to all utterances. I am not sure whether these moves are appropriate, but if they are made this passage can lend support to the idea that the view described above should be attributed to Grice.

At least as he characterises them: the category of non-conversational, non-conventional implicatures could of course include near-saying and utterer-implicature. But Grice would have to give up the claim that the implicatures in this category are just like conversational ones except that they are generated by different maxims.

The notion of utterer-implicature can easily be revised to be more in accord with this interpretation, according to which implicatures must be meant. The simplest way to do this would be to add a clause demanding that, in order to conversationally
implicate that q, the speaker mean that q. This modification makes no real difference to my paper, so I'll merely note its possibility.

[35] It is worth noting that on the view considered in 3.2, the alien doctor claim also counts as implicated. However, on that view it does not count as conversationally implicated.