Allen, K. (2007) The Mind-Independence of Colour. European Journal of Philosophy, 15 (2). pp. 137-158. ISSN 0966-8373
The view that the mind-dependence of colour is implicit in our ordinary thinking has a distinguished history. With its origins in Berkeley, the view has proved especially popular amongst so-called ‘Oxford’ philosophers, proponents including Cook Wilson (1904: 773-4), Pritchard (1909: 86-7), Ryle (1949: 209), Kneale (1950: 123) and McDowell (1985: 112). Gareth Evans’s discussion of secondary qualities in “Things Without the Mind” is representative of this tradition. It is his version of the view that I consider in this paper.
|Institution:||The University of York|
|Academic Units:||The University of York > Philosophy (York)|
|Depositing User:||York RAE Import|
|Date Deposited:||28 Aug 2009 15:41|
|Last Modified:||28 Aug 2009 15:41|