Allen, K. (2007) The Mind-Independence of Colour. European Journal of Philosophy, 15 (2). pp. 137-158. ISSN 0966-8373
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Published Version: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0378.2007.00258.x
Abstract
The view that the mind-dependence of colour is implicit in our ordinary thinking has a distinguished history. With its origins in Berkeley, the view has proved especially popular amongst so-called ‘Oxford’ philosophers, proponents including Cook Wilson (1904: 773-4), Pritchard (1909: 86-7), Ryle (1949: 209), Kneale (1950: 123) and McDowell (1985: 112). Gareth Evans’s discussion of secondary qualities in “Things Without the Mind” is representative of this tradition. It is his version of the view that I consider in this paper.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Academic Units: | The University of York > Philosophy (York) |
| Depositing User: | York RAE Import |
| Date Deposited: | 28 Aug 2009 15:41 |
| Last Modified: | 28 Aug 2009 15:41 |
| Published Version: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0378.2007.00258.x |
| Status: | Published |
| Publisher: | Blackwell Publishing |
| Identification Number: | 10.1111/j.1468-0378.2007.00258.x |
| URI: | http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/id/eprint/6157 |
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