Efird, D. and Stoneham, T. (2006) Combinatorialism and the possibility of nothing. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 84 (2). pp. 269-80. ISSN 1471-6828Full text not available from this repository.
We argue that Armstrong's Combinatorialism allows for the possibility of nothing by giving a Combinatorial account of the empty world and show that such an account is consistent with the ontological and conceptual aims of the theory. We then suggest that the Combinatorialist should allow for this possibility given some methodological considerations. Consequently, rather than being 'spoils for the victor', as Armstrong maintains, deciding whether there might have been nothing helps to determine which metaphysics of modality is to be preferred.
|Institution:||The University of York|
|Academic Units:||The University of York > Philosophy (York)|
|Depositing User:||York RAE Import|
|Date Deposited:||23 Jul 2009 14:21|
|Last Modified:||23 Jul 2009 14:21|