White Rose University Consortium logo
University of Leeds logo University of Sheffield logo York University logo

Particularism and the structure of reasons

Piller, C. (2006) Particularism and the structure of reasons. Acta Analytica, 21 (2). pp. 87-102. ISSN 0353-5150

Full text not available from this repository.


I argue that particularism (or holism) about reasons, i.e., the view that a feature that is a reason in one case need not be a reason in another case, is true, but uninterestingly so. Its truth is best explained by principles that govern a weaker notion than that of being a reason: one thing can be ‘normatively connected’ to something else without its being a reason for what it is normatively connected to. Thus, even though true, particularism about reasons does not support the particularist’s general idea that the normative domain is not governed by principles.

Item Type: Article
Institution: The University of York
Academic Units: The University of York > Philosophy (York)
Depositing User: York RAE Import
Date Deposited: 14 Aug 2009 08:39
Last Modified: 14 Aug 2009 08:39
Published Version: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12136-006-1006-x
Status: Published
Publisher: Springer Verlag
Identification Number: 10.1007/s12136-006-1006-x
URI: http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/id/eprint/5492

Actions (repository staff only: login required)