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The Narrative Imagination across Media

I want to argue against the strong presumption that narrative, capable as it is of expression in several different media, is constituted by a medium-independent content: I propose to interrogate the role of the medium in narrative, as vehicle of transmission or means of articulation, and unpack the relation between narrative media and the foundational narrative concept of the event, which figures (misleadingly) in most definitions of minimal narrative, in order to arrive at a view of narrative as a cognitive faculty. This approach to narrative facilitates a rhetorical model of its medium-contingency, in which a narrative medium is any semiotic means that enables the articulation (as distinct from expression) of cognitive image schemata in narrative form. Integral to this position is an emphasis upon the self-reflexiveness of the narrative imagination in process, of which I take dreaming to be a paradigm case.

In elaborating this view, I shall focus upon the comics page reproduced in figure one, which comes from Sandman volume two, *The Doll’s House*. My choice of example is influenced by the thematic importance of the narrative imagination throughout the Sandman series, notably in relation to the figures of Orpheus and Shakespeare, and in particular the emphasis upon dreaming as an instance of the narrative imagination (the Sandman himself, Morpheus, is Lord of the Dreaming; and much of the narrative advances through or in reaction to the dreams and nightmares of the characters). Represented in figure one are the dreams of a lesbian couple named Chantal and Zelda, residents of the boarding house to which the title of the volume partly refers: the page contains two parallel narrative strands, Chantal’s dream running across the top and Zelda’s along the bottom, both anchored by the central image of the sleeping couple.
Figure one
Before I address the detail of these dream narratives, however, I want to raise a preliminary question about the nature of narrative articulation in sequential art. Consider the relation between two adjacent comics frames, where these delineate a simple event: for example, the lifting of the veil, at the bottom right of the page. Here we have two consecutive images of the same figure, the first with the veil lowered, the second with it raised to reveal a spider’s head. The spider, and indeed the veil, are elements of the couple’s gothic preoccupations: they are known in the boarding house as the spider women, and claim to have “the largest collection of stuffed spiders in private hands on the Eastern Seaboard” (66). These associations help to explain why Zelda’s response at this point in her dream is not the reaction of horror we might have expected. My immediate concern, however, is how such a sequence of images works in narrative terms.

If you were to explain how we comprehend this sequence you might say, with Umberto Eco, “obviously the reader welds these parts together in his imagination and then perceives them as a continuous flow” (24). But is this obvious? It may to an extent be possible to do so, in the same sense that it is possible to use a fiction as the basis for imagining a fictional world, though there is considerable scope for doing so in different ways (in this case, is the movement slow and ceremonial, or abrupt and dramatic?). However, I want to argue that such a process is in no way inherent in reading such a sequence, and furthermore that in terms of narrative comprehension it would in fact be a retrograde move. This claim has large implications for our understanding of the role of media in narrative representation.

Consider the way Eco’s comment represents what happens in the interpretation of a comics sequence such as our veil example. It is conceived as a two-stage process, an
imaginative welding followed by perceiving, by means of which the reader works back through the transformations of the creative process and arrives at a virtual experience of the originary stream of sense data that it is supposed to mediate. The assumed end point of the process, that perception of “a continuous flow,” is the focus of my objection. An undifferentiated flux of sense impressions may indeed constitute the raw material of experience, but as undifferentiated flux it is meaningless: only the cognitive exercise of representation makes sense of it, by articulating it—among other things, demarcating it into events. The lifting of the veil is articulated as an event, an act of revelation, by these two images, the two frames of the sequence. If we were really to respond to this sequence by subsuming it within a continuous flow, we would strip it of its status and meaning as an event. Event status, and narrative tellability, is not intrinsic in the temporal world, but evaluative, and always relative to some interpretative or communicative context. I have argued elsewhere that events cannot be considered as the elemental units of narrative, since they are always only constituted as such in the process of narration. Definitions of minimal narrative are routinely formulated in terms of the representation of one or more events: narrative is either located within the (durational) event, in the transformation from before to after; or it is located between (punctual) events, in the passage from one to the next.¹ But the mutual presupposition of these two senses of event leaves the nature of narrative, which either continues to lurk within, or slips between, entirely unexplained. The notion of event is a narrative product, and its unity as event is contingent upon the signifying units of the medium of narration.² There is a hint in Eco’s formulation of an analogy with film viewing, in which there is indeed a pre-cognitive perceptual flow from frame to frame: but this is a conceptual transposition to another medium with rather
different means of representation and narrative articulation. It should not obscure the
point, precisely because it is a shift to another medium, not a reading through the
medium. In the realm of narrative comprehension, there is always another medium,
because without media there is no representation: this is as true inside the head as it is on
the page or screen.

The relation between frames is also discussed by Scott McCloud, who is quite clear
about the differences between its operation in comics and in film. Here too, though, the
point that concerns me is, at best, obscured. McCloud explains how we bridge the gutter
between frames in terms of closure, a concept that would work very well if he meant it in
the narrative sense, which is congruent with the demarcation of events. His usage,
however, draws upon the idea of visual closure, “observing the parts but perceiving the
whole” (63), which makes it very prone to a conflation between representations and their
objects. So while he says that “in the limbo of the gutter, human imagination takes two
separate images and transforms them into a single idea” (66), a formulation I would
happily accept, he also says that “closure allows us to connect these moments and
mentally construct a continuous unified reality” (67), and “closure is comics’ primary
means of simulating time and motion” (69). These are statements I want to resist, because
they embody the basic assumption that I’m contesting: that is, the assumption that
narrative representation works simply as a reproduction, or simulation, of reality,
temporality, and flux. Flux is what we encounter in the world, and there’s already plenty
of it to keep us busy. Representation is one of the ways in which we busy ourselves, an
encoding process of cognitive mapping which, as such, is semiotic: its power is that of
assimilation, primarily by reducing the chaos of sense data to comprehensible terms.
Representation always functions within some system of signs, the interpretants of which are not the real, but other signs. This pursuit of signs is a function of cognitive processing, and it could not lead beyond that frame of reference without ceasing to signify, at which point it would also cease to have any pragmatic value as a means of understanding. The efficacy of representation depends upon the fact that it begins and ends in the mind: its baseline is not the real but the percept, which is itself a representation, and only functional as significant within the articulated system of perception. Narrative representation has its roots here, in the articulation of change: it delimits the mutability of matter in time, producing event, cause and effect, agent and purpose.

I shall return to the specifics of the comics medium, and of my Sandman example, in a moment; but in order to draw out the implication of my argument for our understanding of narrative media in general, it helps to step back from the various notions of a medium in general usage. These tend to compound several overlapping senses, which have been helpfully teased apart by Marie-Laure Ryan: she draws a basic distinction between transmissive and semiotic concepts of a medium, as a “channel of communication” or a “material means of expression” (16). Ryan argues that neither category alone can yield an adequate definition of medium: transmissive senses represent media as the technological conduits of essentially autonomous meanings; while semiotic senses do not provide for the conceptual separation of medium and message that is necessary if we are to understand narrative as a structure independent of any medium, and transposable between media (17). However, the view I am advancing contradicts this second argument: there is no conceptual level of narrative between the formlessness of mind-external data and the
semantic framework of representation, in which some medium is inherent, whether mental or technological. Narrative ideation is itself medium bound, in the perceptual and conceptual apparatus of mental representation. In other words, My argument implies that the semiotic sense of medium does indeed supply a necessary and sufficient definition of medium, while the transmissive sense involves a range of more or less contingent, more or less technological extensions of the concept. Narrative, on this view, cannot be medium-independent: it is always dependent upon representation in some medium, even while it is capable of harnessing several.

The sense in which the category of narrative transcends any particular medium, then, is not to be conceived in deep structural terms, by invoking medium-independent notions such as fabula, or story grammar: it is a discursive matter—a communicative rhetoric that exploits certain representational capabilities that are common to a range of media. The only alternatives to this view are that narrative structure can be conceived in the absence of representation, or that representation can be conceived in the absence of any medium. For narrative structure to be independent of representation, story logic would have to be innate in mind-external reality: the world itself already storied. On the other hand, if story grammars are mental representations, but independent of “medial realization,” which would be reserved for the process of “externalization” (Jahn 201), this commits us to an unjustifiably restricted definition of “medium.” A medium, minimally, is a vehicle of semiosis, and that is present at the ground level of cognitive processing, in the articulation of sense data in the perceptual system. The necessary condition for semiosis, here, is articulation, rather than communication in any restrictive sense: semiosis is always, even within the mind, a contextually situated and dialogic process.\(^3\)
Perhaps the difficulty here is a legacy of the structuralist analogy between narrative and language, which is itself indirectly buttressed in narrative theory by the privileged status often accorded to narratives in linguistic media. Ideas of narrative syntax, story grammars, and the general baggage of the linguistic analogy tend to contaminate more broadly cognitive terms such as “script” and “schema” (Schank and Abelson). For my purposes, at least, the value of these concepts lies precisely in the extent to which they are irreducible to a linguistic paradigm, so it’s worth noting why that is so. Scripts are not particularized narratives, somewhat as grammars are not sentences; but unlike grammars they are not generative, in the sense that they do not define what shall and shall not be a well formed, or “grammatical” narrative. Instead, scripts are heuristic: their value lies in the extent to which they facilitate the ongoing encounter between mind and temporal existence. Any heuristic will do until you encounter something that resists its explanatory or predictive power, at which point you have to revise the script. Grammars are medium-independent abstractions that can be used to characterize the structure of digital semiotic systems, such as language, which use discrete signifying units; but narrative is capable of articulation in both digital systems and analogical systems such as visual imagery, which are graded or scalar. Narrative, then, is not amenable to grammar: scripts and schemata are not abstractions but templates, general-purpose representations, which serve as tools of the cognitive project of the narrative faculty. The narrative faculty, on this view, is not a species of the linguistic faculty, but something quite distinct and in some sense more primitive.

By characterizing narrative as a cognitive faculty, I am seeking to ground my earlier account of the articulation of narrative events more solidly upon the foundation of
general cognitive processing. The event is a product of narrative processing, an instance of cognitive chunking in which the mind negotiates with temporal phenomena. Narrative processing, then, is a mode of articulation of the data of experience: “articulation” must be understood to mean the production of meaning, the creation of structure, rather than the expression of some mind-independent content. What matters is this codification, the respect in which mental representations differ from their objects rather than merely reproduce them, because this is the respect in which they assimilate data. A map you can read, however crude or partial, serves human purposes in ways that the illegible terrain itself cannot. It goes without saying that the meaning-producing act of articulation is also potentially a communicative, or meaning-transmitting act: meaning is inherently part of a discursive economy, whether it circulates within the individual mind or between minds.

In the discussion so far I have silently run together two perspectives upon narrative representation that I now want to juxtapose more explicitly. In one perspective, a narrative is the object of interpretation; in the other, it is a means of interpretation. These alternatives are well captured in David Herman’s introduction to Narrative Theory and the Cognitive Sciences, where he distinguishes between “making sense of stories” and “stories as sense-making” (12-14). We differ slightly in our interpretation of the second category, which he takes to mean stories “as tools for thinking” (14), whereas I take it, more fundamentally, to mean “stories as sense-making processes.” That is to say, I want to place the emphasis upon the narrative process as a basic, essential human sense-making activity, rather than upon the narrative product as a tool of sense-making. This process is inherently anthropocentric, and indeed anthropomorphic, not because stories are about people (though they usually are), but because they are by people: their frame of
reference is human experientiality. We are capable of recognising the partiality and
distortion entailed by this horizon, and we have developed other ways of modelling the
universe which have greater analytic and predictive powers in many contexts; but there is
something irreducible about the limitations of narrative sense-making, because those
same limitations are integral to narrative’s role in the production of human value. This
elemental reciprocity between narrative process and narrative meaning is what I mean to
capture in the word “articulation,” which means both the creation of significant relations
between parts, and the expression of such relations: in narrative, fundamentally, these
two are the same. This reciprocity can also be seen as the root of a recursiveness that I
think is innate in narrative understanding generally, and crucial to the fictive use of
narrative. The same recursiveness is latent in Herman’s distinction between making sense
of stories and stories as sense-making: the correlation of these two perspectives expresses
very well the point that, within the parameters of narrative, making sense of stories is
making sense of sense-making. That is to say that, both across and within media,
narrative representations are intelligible in terms of other narrative representations.

Narrative sense-making always rides piggy back upon prior acts of narrative sense-
making, and at the bottom of this pile is not the solid ground of truth, but only the
pragmatic efficacy of particular stories for particular purposes in particular contexts.

The distinctive rhetoric of narrative fictionality can be understood in relation to this
principle of narrative recursiveness, by way of the rather more accessible phenomenon of
self-reflexivity. The comics page in figure one is representative of the Sandman series as
a whole in exhibiting several kinds of self-reflexivity, but I want to make a broad
distinction between two kinds: the first kind, overt self-consciousness, is a circumstantial
(but not unusual) feature of this example, and one of the ways fictionality often advertises itself; but the second kind, implicit self-reference, is the more fundamental feature of narrative self-reflexivity, and it is the exploitation of implicit self-reference that most strongly correlates with the rhetorical stance associated with fictionality. Sandman is extremely self-conscious in its relation to the narrative stockpile of several cultures, drawing for example upon classical, Norse, African, and eastern mythologies, as well as ranging widely over the literary canon; and equally self-conscious in its more specific invocation of the history of the comics medium, including stylistic allusions to such varied instances as Winsor McCay’s Little Nemo in Slumberland, EC horror comics of the ’fifties, and contemporary Japanese manga. It is also extremely self-aware and sophisticated in its use of the semiotic potential of the twin media channels of comics—image and text—both separately and in counterpoint to each other, and almost every page offers evidence of its rhetorical inventiveness in this regard. These features of Sandman make it very suggestive as an occasion and means for reflection upon the recursive nature of the narrative imagination.

One aspect of the overt self-consciousness in figure one is an instance of the way Sandman constantly indexes the literary and visual heritage of various cultural traditions: here we have the allusions to the gothic novel, Melmoth the Wanderer and The Castle of Otranto in particular; and the evocation of John Tenniel’s famous illustrations for Alice in Wonderland. Those are both features of Zelda’s dream, at the bottom of the page. Chantal’s dream, at the top, exhibits the other, formal aspect of overt self-consciousness, in which Gaiman exploits the relation between the verbal and visual channels of the comics medium. Chantal dreams she is having a relationship with a sentence, and the
sentence that tells us so, standing in for her lover-sentence (which we never get to read),
is an embodiment of that odd elevation of language: the lettering emphasises the
materiality of the text (as in fact does the cursive script in the rest of Chantal’s dream,
though to different ends); and the words form a monumental block filling half the frame,
balancing the image of Chantal herself in the other half.

The verbal text of Chantal’s dream plays with the conceit of the lover-sentence, but
the images are complicating the story, in a way that illustrates my other category of self-
reflexivity, the implicit self-reference exploited by the rhetoric of fictionality (here, I’m
referring to the fictionality of Sandman, not of Chantal’s dream narrative). This visual
counter-narrative begins at the juncture of text and image, with the letter zed, or zee,
which appears to be the title of the book in Chantal’s dream; it is also, as Zelda’s dream
reveals, the pet name Zelda’s mother used for her (and a central theme of Zelda’s dream
is the structural interchangeability of her mother and Chantal). So it is significant that in
the second frame Chantal kisses the book, as opposed to the sentence, and that in this
frame, her head position and her anomalously dishevelled hair closely echo the image
below, of their actual sleeping position, in which Zelda occupies the position of the
book. These metonymic and metaphoric displacements (sentence to book, book to
Zelda) imply that understanding the sentence is understanding Zelda. But Chantal’s
explicit dream narrative is pulling away from any such insight, and in the next frame
begins to re-establish the idealised self-image represented by the full-face pose. The
tension involved in sustaining the surface narrative finds expression in the negative turn
of events from this point on, while the direct gaze of Chantal’s ideal self-representation
prepares us for its fracture into shards in the last frame of the dream: this confirms it as a
mirror image—or perhaps, since the “Z” is not reversed, as the inaccessible self of whom the dreaming Chantal is herself only a broken reflection.

This sort of interpretation cannot be supported solely by reference to the notional object of representation, the dream itself, because it depends upon transgressions of the boundaries between media channels, narrative threads, and non-sequential frames on the page. Instead, it is sanctioned by our awareness of self-awareness, which is the substrate of fictive rhetoric. The foregrounding of implicit self-reference is characteristic of fictionality because it is intrinsic to the priority of discourse over reference in the narrative imagination: the fictive process generates narrative in response to anthropocentric imperatives (on several levels: instinctual/libidinal, emotional, ideological), which are available as values only within a discursive economy; whereas non-fictional narrative is generated under the presiding referential imperative of accountability to extra-textual sources. This privileging of value over documentary fact is not a substantial distinction, but a rhetorical one: all narrative semiosis unfolds in an evolving recursive process or feedback loop within the domain of discourse. Non-fictional narrative, however, is characterised by a rhetorical “direction of fit” in which semiosis is always approaching its represented object, only to arrive at another sign; whereas fictional narrative semiosis is always approaching achieved significance, only to arrive at further representation. This reversal of the direction of fit that prevails in the non-fictional paradigm is the rhetorical reorientation that an awareness of fictionality provides for, and that makes it possible to comprehend this distinctive use of narrative media. Fictive rhetoric exploits representation’s power of assimilation more than its modelling of an object: what matters is the respect in which representations are not their
objects but uses of a medium, because this is the respect in which they serve human needs. The fiction/non-fiction distinction is not fundamentally ontological, but pragmatic: not a distinction between referential worlds, but between communicative purposes.

The Sandman series as a whole offers a wealth of material about dreams, and there is perhaps more to be said about the general affinity between the comics medium and dream narrative; but I’ve chosen to focus upon this page primarily because it offers a plausible, fairly literal representation of certain aspects of dreaming in process. Cognitive approaches to dreaming are hampered by the inaccessibility of the primary empirical data, of course, and this is no answer to that problem: I’m not proposing to do anything so tendentious as to treat these fictional representations of dreams as if they were instances of actual dreaming. What I want to do, though, is to use some of the issues raised by the attempt at representation itself as an occasion to reflect upon certain features of dreaming, and to speculate a little upon the relation between dreams and fictions.

Dreams are situated ambiguously between experience and narrative, and that is bound to be exposed by any attempt to represent a dream. The two instances of dream representation in figure one respond in different ways, which are manifested in their differing strategies of narration and focalization. Chantal’s dream is narrated in the third person, which might deter us from attending to her as dreaming subject, except for the strong sense of internal focalization—that is, of an alignment between the third person narration and Chantal’s own perspective. This is apparent in the text of the dream, and in the form of that text, the cursive script suggestive of Chantal’s own handwriting; it is also conveyed by the sense that, as I’ve already suggested, the frontal images of Chantal are mirror images, and hence that we are seeing through her eyes. The sense of Chantal’s
dream that emerges is of a third-person self-narration, in which experience is continuously pushed to arm’s length, producing the cyclical, self-eluding self-consciousness that is central to Chantal’s characterization: a little later her dreaming becomes an infinite regress in the form of spiralling repeated images with the text: “It was a dark and stormy night. And the skipper said to the mate, ‘Mate, tell me a story.’ And this is the story he told: It was a dark and stormy night…” (191). Just as the substance of Chantal’s dream is an evasion of self-knowledge, then, the representation of that dream evades the ambiguity between experiencing and narrating even as it foregrounds it: the dream Chantal produces and consumes remains trapped in cycles of creation and reception, writing and reading.

Zelda’s dream is different in a number of ways. Firstly, the text is first-person narration, except in the very last frame. At the same time the visual self-representation is even more dissociated than Chantal’s: it is not even a childhood self, but a cultural archetype of the young girl adrift in a strange world—Alice in Wonderland. There is a stronger sense here of a fluid reciprocal relation between the generation of the dream narrative and the dreamer’s experience of it, a reciprocity conveyed by distributing its elements between the verbal and visual channels of the representation. The verbal narrative is a breathless monologue (the text is compressed so that there are no spaces between the words), which at times becomes a kind of meta-discourse, a running commentary upon the visual articulation of the dream narrative: “That’s us”; “Let it be Chantal, not my Mom”; “Thank you God”. The visual channel, meanwhile, is both anticipating and responding to the verbal discourse. The iconography of mother and daughter in the second frame conflicts with the commentary identifying this as Chantal
and Zelda, and leads into the anxious confusion of Chantal with Zelda’s mother that follows. Conversely, the verbal narrative of Zelda’s Mom saying “Oh God Zee you’re sick listen Robert do you know what I saw in her room your daughter’s disgusting” is then elucidated via the image of an animal skull, the ornate picture frame of which marks it as a flashback, an image of a disturbed family history preserved on Zelda’s psychological mantelpiece. The perspectival fluidity of Zelda’s dream is even more apparent in the last three frames: the veil sequence is the only clear-cut example here of first-person experiential perspective, images in which the dream experience and dream narration coincide; whereas the detached third-person narration of the final frame removes us to a greater distance from the action than at any point previously. This frame can only continue to make sense as Zelda’s own dream perspective at the cost of a radical dissociation from her own self-representation—that is, a close analogue of the shattered mirror effect at the end of Chantal’s dream.

The problem of person and perspective in the representation of dreams is indicative of the dream’s ambiguous status between experience and narrative. The ambiguity is in part a question of the distinction between the dreaming mind and its self-representation within the dream—a distinction manifest, for example, in any awareness that you are somehow not yourself, as Zelda most obviously is not—but it is also, more broadly, a question of consciousness in dreams. The difficulty in locating the self in dreaming is the reason why it turns out that the most partial self-representation here is the most direct one: the first-person experiential perspective of the veil sequence. Conversely, the most rounded perspective emerges from the most dissociated representation: the last frame, incorporating as it does the interpretative idiosyncrasy of Zelda’s affective response to
her own dream. Selfhood is never integral in a semiotic model of cognitive articulation, which is both by and for the self. Dreams tend to foreground this internal division, by adding to the split between sender and receiver a further split between narrator and agent.

The broader context of the ambiguity between experience and narrative, concerning consciousness in dreams, is a multi-layered issue: consciousness of self is one level of it, somewhere mid-way between the irreducible level of consciousness on which you experience the dream on the one hand, and on the other hand the more occasional consciousness that you are dreaming, or even your conscious manipulations of the course of the dream narrative. All these coexist with the unconscious level on which dreams typically form themselves, independently of any conscious choice on the dreamer’s part. Conscious choice, however, is consciousness of a choice: it is not coextensive with choosing. The sequential character of dream development, which comes out especially strongly in Zelda’s dream, is a result of an ongoing process of “self-interpretation” in dreaming, which can be said to straddle the border of consciousness. Bert States has aptly characterised dreaming as a “first draft of thought,” in which an initially random collision of images prompts the sense-making effort of the dream-work (110). He notes a key difference between dream thought and waking processes such as free association or daydreaming, which is that “the dream can’t revise. What comes to mind goes straight to the visual cortex” (112). The sequential development of dreaming can be seen as an effect of this constraint: it is a kind of revision on the fly.

My speculative thought resolves into the question, are dreams fictions? The answer would be trivial if it rested upon their referentiality: of course they are not true. But it rests more fundamentally upon the way we understand the mental apparatus of perception
to be functioning as a medium in dream cognition. Percepts in general are already internal representations, certainly, but they are not innately narrative; the narrativity of dreams depends upon the assumed sources of dream material. Is the selection of dream material itself a cognitive process, drawing purposively upon episodic and semantic memory? Or is the input to dream cognition an effect of other determinants (instinctual drives, sensory stimuli, recency effects, random brain activity), in which case the cognitive phase of the dream-work is the effort to make sense of this material, which is functionally equivalent to sensory data? The ambiguity is between fiction and illusion, or narrative and experience. It is clear, however, that whatever blend of these two aspects of dreaming applies, dreams cannot be purely illusional. At the higher levels of dream cognition, of course, there is an overt self-consciousness informing the creative process of the dream-work; but even at the most elemental unconscious level, the dream-work is a sequential, recursive process, in which every representation is influenced by the cognitive assimilation of the preceding one. Where the dream materials originate independently of cognitive processing, they have the status of data, even if not quite the external data of waking life; but where they arise out of cognition, they are subject to whatever imperative values inform that process (and this need not exclude desiderata of the same unconscious origin as some of the first type of dream material). To that extent, the dream conforms to the direction-of-fit rhetoric by which I have characterized fictionality, its representations generated discursively, out of prior representations, rather than referentially, in response to experiential data; and to that extent, it can be understood as a, or even as the, proto-fiction.

Dreams as fictions, the reflexivity of the narrative imagination, the immanence of
narrative in its media of articulation (not least at a cognitive level), even the affinity between dream narrative and the comics medium: all of these are adumbrated in the thematic and formal preoccupations of Gaiman’s Sandman series itself. What Sandman also triumphantly instanciates, of course, is the richness and resonance of the many intertwined stories that traverse, under the eye of the Sandman, the realm of the narrative imagination—the Dreaming.

Notes

1. Compare Genette (30); Prince 1982 (4); Rimmon-Kenan (19); Bal (5); Toolan (14); and Prince 1989 (58); and see O’Neill (17-18).

2. For further discussion of the status of narrative events, as part of a critique of the notion of fabula, or story, see Walsh.

3. Peirce’s sense of semiosis as process went hand in hand with an idea of internal reflection as social: “Your self of one instant appeals to your deeper self for his assent” (6: 388).

4. There is scope for disagreement about who is who in this image: positive identification is inhibited by the fact that both Chantal and Zelda are almost always represented as veiled, but it is arguable possible to infer from some images that Chantal is slightly taller than Zelda, which would count against my interpretation here.
Works Cited


