Lang, GR (2010) How Far Can You Go With Quietism? Problema, 4. 3 - 37 (35).
Available under licence : See the attached licence file.
Ronald Dworkin’s Justice for Hedgehogs renews and amplifies his earlier attacks on metaethics. This article reviews the main lineaments of Dworkin’s anti-metaethical arguments and discusses, in detail, a number of issues which arise from them. First, it is suggested that Dworkin’s appraisal of what is doing most of the explanatory work in his account is largely askew. Second, it is claimed that Dworkin’s allegation that expressivism is self-defeating is wide of the mark, but that another charge in the same vicinity might be more effective. Third, it is argued that Dworkin’s incuriosity about moral metaphysics is misplaced. What his arguments actually support is an opposition to leaving metaphysical hostages to fortune, rather than an opposition to pursuing greater clarification about moral metaphysics. In this connection, it is tentatively suggested that Dworkin might be tempted by a certain version of naturalism.
|Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information:||© 2010 National Autonomous University of Mexico. Reproduced with permission from the copyright holder.|
|Institution:||The University of Leeds|
|Academic Units:||The University of Leeds > Faculty of Arts (Leeds) > School of Humanities (Leeds) > School of Philosophy (Leeds)
The University of Leeds > Faculty of Arts (Leeds) > School of Philosophy, Religion and History of Science (Leeds) > School of Philosophy (Leeds)
|Depositing User:||Symplectic Publications|
|Date Deposited:||05 Jan 2012 14:04|
|Last Modified:||04 Jun 2014 11:53|
|Publisher:||National Autonomous University of Mexico|