Lang, GR (2012) Invigilating Republican Liberty. The Philosophical Quarterly. ISSN 1467-9213
Republican liberty, as recently defended by Philip Pettit and Quentin Skinner, characterises liberty in terms of the absence of domination, instead of, or in addition to, the absence of interference, as favoured by Berlin-style negative liberty. This article considers several claims made on behalf of republican liberty, particularly in Pettit's and Skinner's recent writings, and finds them wanting. No relevant moral or political concern expressed by republicans, it will be contended here, fails to be accommodated by negative liberty.
|Institution:||The University of Leeds|
|Academic Units:||The University of Leeds > Faculty of Arts (Leeds) > School of Philosophy, Religion and History of Science (Leeds) > School of Philosophy (Leeds)|
|Depositing User:||Symplectic Publications|
|Date Deposited:||05 Jan 2012 12:44|
|Last Modified:||04 Nov 2016 02:40|
|Publisher:||John Wiley & Sons|