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How the tea is made; or, the scoping and scaling of ‘everyday life’ in changing services for ‘people with learning disabilities’

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Accessible Summary:
- Learning disability day services have gone through a number of changes since they were set up in the 1960s.
- The changes have been guided by certain ‘values’ such as ‘inclusion’, ‘choice’ and ‘control’.
- The everyday lives of people using learning disability services have often been changed to help achieve things like ‘inclusion’, ‘choice’ and ‘control’.
- But it is also important to remember that what we mean by words like ‘inclusion’, ‘choice’ and ‘control’ might also have to change to reflect what people with learning disabilities actually do in their lives, or what they want to do.

Summary:
In the late 20th century the day services which had been set up for adults defined as having learning disabilities became understood as problematic because of the effects of segregation. The new solution became the adjustment of services in order to support a governmental form of personhood; a model of personhood defined by independence, the ability to make choices and be in control, to exercise rights and to take a place within the community and within society. This article tracks the technical changes to everyday life that underpinned this shift - specifically changes in tea making in Croydon’s day services since the late 1960s and techniques of person-centred planning via widely used policy and guidance documents. Through deploying the analytical lenses of ‘scope’ and ‘scale’, two questions are pursued: What is understood as legitimising a person with learning disabilities’ choice? On what scale does choice have to take place in order to be understood as realising ‘choice’ or ‘control’ as they are imagined in policy documents such as Valuing People?

Key words:
Learning Disability, inclusion, choice, citizenship, day services,

In the corner of the Resource Base kitchen is an on-the-wall water heater. It is a device which keeps water heated at all times. As a cup full is taken, more cold water is drawn in from the
pipes and is then heated up so hot water is always available, literally on tap. The water heater is a simple fixture of everyday Resource Base life. A way of making hot drinks. A device around which people move, reaching for the sugar or leaning over to the fridge to get the milk. It is, in other words, an addition to the kitchen which it is easy to overlook.

The significance of the water heater was drawn to my attention by one of the service managers who was remembering the first time people who had attended Croydon’s large day centres visited the new community-based Resource Bases in the mid-2000s:

[It] was important that when people realised – and parents and carers – when they walked through the door, and people were like ‘oh, this seems quite nice’, ‘I can see a bit of effort…I like the chairs’. […] It was about people seeing it was a nice place, people seeing that they would be respected because we’d thought about the tea. Because ‘we want you to make your own tea and coffee’. ‘But what if I …’ ‘We’ll do it with you until you learn’. ‘Ok right, so I don’t have to wait for a tea urn’. ‘No, no, no’. […] Let’s get them in a base [and] they’ll think, ‘I know there’s tea and coffee there, so we’re ok’. ‘We’re ok, there’s tea and coffee and it’s warm and it’s nice’.¹

In this account, tea is far from being simply tea. Rather tea is represented as playing a specific role in managing the experience of day service change.

While day service change had been planned in Croydon long before, a key context for the development of the Resource Bases is the 2001 white paper Valuing People: A New Strategy for Learning Disability for the 21st Century.² The Valuing People vision was for ‘new opportunities for children and adults with learning difficulties and their families to live full and independent lives as part of their local communities’ (DH 2001, p. 2). This vision was underpinned by four key principles: ‘Rights’, ‘Independence’, ‘Choice’ and ‘Inclusion’ (DH 2001, p. 3). Day Services are not a central focus of the white paper. However, reflecting the vision of ‘person-centred planning’ and starting with a person’s needs rather than what is available in an existing service, it is noted that the closure of big day centres is a necessary part of the ‘modernisation agenda’ (DH 2001, p. 3):

Day Services frequently fail to provide sufficiently flexible and individual support. Some day centres do little more than warehousing and do not help people with learning disabilities undertake a wider range of individually-tailored activities. (DH 2001, p. 19)
Valuing People expected a reduction in the number of people using large day centres by 2004 and people still using day centres were seen as a priority for person-centred planning in preparation for the development of new services, of which the Resource Bases in Croydon are one such model (DH 2001, pp. 50, 78). In 2009 Valuing People Now: A new 3-year strategy for people with learning disabilities was published which updated the Valuing People ‘values’ to more explicitly reflect a human rights agenda, as advocated by Joint Committee of Human Rights (2007-8), and evokes ‘rights’, ‘independent living’, ‘control’ and ‘inclusion’ (DH 2009, p. 29).

As this context suggests, how people who fall under the purview of learning disability policy might come by a cup of tea during the day takes on a certain significance. Tea, in the service manager’s account, plays a complex role of coordination. Tea is a point of continuity in a time of change: a ritual which coordinates between daily life at the day centres and the new experiences offered by the more ‘individually-tailored activities’ on offer at the new Resource Bases. Yet while tea itself is a point of coordination the water heater is an innovation designed to support specific values. Tea is no longer made in an Urn – something you have to ‘wait for’ – but rather is set up to be made by you, whenever you want. As there was no longer any need to pick up a heavy kettle and as your cup could simply be placed under an easier-to-push lever, the water heater worked to limit perceived risk and to increase the number of people who might use it to their advantage. Here tea is imagined as both offering the security and routine of the habitual self while – and precisely because it is such an ‘everyday’ occurrence – enabling a changing self, a person who might be understood as enacting and embodying the Valuing People values (DH 2001).

The water heater might, therefore, be understood as what Michel Foucault terms a ‘technology of self’, a term associated with his theories of ‘governmentality’, which are now receiving greater attention in Disability Studies (e.g. Tremain 2005) and in approaches to theorising New Labour’s social policy (e.g. Clarke et al. 2007). The concerns which unite theorists mobilising ‘governmentality’ are often expressed, in Foucault’s terms, as lying in the liberal deployment of power to ‘conduct’ the ‘conduct’ of ‘subjects’ who are ‘free’ by structuring ‘the possible field of action’ ([1983] 2003c, p. 139). Or as Mitchell Dean has elucidated:

Government is any more or less calculated and rational activity, undertaken by a multiplicity of authorities and agencies, employing a variety of techniques and forms of knowledge, that seeks to shape conduct by working through our desires, our aspirations,
interests and beliefs, for definite but shifting ends and with a diverse set of relatively unpredictable consequences, effects and outcomes. (1999, p. 11)

As Dean’s take on governmentality suggests, it is the development of a certain kind of person – in the case of *Valuing People*, a person defined through their independence, their ability to make choices and be in control, to exercise their rights and to take their place within their community and within society – which underpins the potential for government to ‘work through’ our desires, aspirations, interests and beliefs. Most specifically, techniques of governmentality presuppose the freedom ‘of the governed’: ‘to dominate is to ignore or to attempt to crush the capacity for the action of the dominated. But to govern is to recognise that capacity for action and to adjust oneself to it’. Rose argues that governmentality is a form of thought – or a set of ideas – put into practice. It is thought ‘made technical’ (1999, pp. 4, 175). In developing my argument I explore two such technical sites; firstly, changes in tea making in Croydon’s day services since the late 1960s and secondly, techniques of person-centred planning via widely used policy and guidance documents. I explore the attempts to generate change in the everyday lives of people with learning disabilities by pursuing two questions: What is understood as legitimising a person with learning disabilities’ choice? On what scale does choice have to take place in order to be understood as realising ‘choice’ or ‘control’ as they are imagined in policy documents such as *Valuing People*?

**Problematisations of ‘Learning Disability’: Normal, Ordinary, Everyday**

A central analytic technique developed by Foucault in his extensive work on what he terms the ‘history of the present’, is to ‘rediscover at the root of . . . diverse solutions the general form of problematizations which made them possible’ (2003d, p. 24). For example accounts of the late-19th century – including Foucault’s 1974-75 lectures on ‘abnormality’ (2003a, pp. 292-294) – suggest the ways in which ‘idiocy’ shifted variably from optimism that idiots could be trained and a more general sense that idiots should not be sent to asylums because they were harmless, towards becoming a certain kind of ‘problem’ (Gladstone 1996, p. 137). Matthew Thomson argues that idiocy became problematized after the introduction of universal primary education in 1870 and, when connected to new forms scientific knowledge based on the notion of ‘normal distribution’, became a threat to maximising the potential of the population (McClimens 2004; Jackson 1996; Thomson 1998, p. 13). It was in response to these new problematisations that solutions including ascertainment and segregation emerged (Jackson 1996, p. 162; Thomson 1998).
In contrast, over the last sixty years the key ‘problem’ has become the very services which were once devised as solutions. From the 1950s onwards – with the publication of the National Council for Civil Liberties’ 50,000 Outside the Law which exposed the restrictions of the liberty of patients in ‘mental deficiency’ institutions (Welshman 2006, p. 22) – the services have been seen as constraining capacity for learning and development (Tizard 1964) and reducing the possibility for self-determination (Goffman 1961; Morris 1969; Robb 1967). As numerous accounts have noted, these problematisations of the services – variously in the name of maximising individuals’ potential (Morris 1969; Alaszewski and Nio Ong 1990), cost saving (Walmsley 2006), human rights (Joint Committee on Human Rights 2007-8) and citizenship (DH 2001; DH 2009) – effectively required a solution which would grant autonomous personhood to those to whom it had been denied. To put this in Foucauldian terms, it was perceived to be the effects of a more dominating model of power which attempted ‘to crush the capacity of action of the dominated’ which became the problem. This new problem required a solution which was governmental in the specific sense that a mode of power was adopted which recognised people with learning disabilities’ ‘capacity for action’ and the need to ‘adjust’ the practices of human services to take this into account (Rose 1999, p. 4).

However, while an increasing focus on personhood came to be a solution to the ‘problem’ of Learning Disability services, the development of this form of personhood does itself generate a range of problems. As Rose argues the multiple ways in which ‘conduct’ might be ‘conducted’ are variable and far from adding up to a coherent and stable ‘personhood’:

At any one time human beings are subject to a variety of distinct practices of subjectification in different places and spaces. For example, if one considers the bourgeoisie of late nineteenth-century Europe, the regimes of subjectification – the relations to the self presupposed and enjoined – on the sensual subjects of the bedroom are not the same as those for the self-absorbed subjects of the library, the civilized citizens of the evening promenade, the disciplined subjects of the school room or the consuming subjects of department stores. (1999, p. 43)

This variation can be equally traced between the values which have guided changes in learning disability services over the past forty years. It would be possible to trace the philosophical origins of each of the Valuing People values and to demonstrate the different modes of subjectivity they attempt to call into being. However, for the purposes of this article I want to
focus on the difference in subjectification evoked by ‘inclusion’ and by ‘choice’ or ‘control’. This
debate was articulated at the very birth of normalisation – through the varying emphasis on
Indeed, Burt Perrin and Bengt Nirje in their 1985 correction to Wolfensburger’s uses of
‘normalization’ argue that ‘normalization’ was not that ‘mentally handicapped people must be
expected to, indeed forced to, act “normal”, to conform in all respects to society’s statistical
norms for all dimensions of behaviour’ but rather argued that ‘normalization’ as ‘originally
defined’ was ‘based upon a humanistic, egalitarian value base, emphasising freedom of choice
and the right to self-determination’ (1985, p. 71). Where Nirje argues that his meaning of
normalization was related to the extension of a model of personhood to learning disabled
people, Wolfensberger’s early writing – in contrast – defines normalisation as ‘utilization of
means which are as culturally normative as possible, in order to establish and/or maintain
behaviours and characteristics which are as culturally normative as possible’ (1972, p. 28).
While the debate is not quite as clear cut as Perrin and Nirje suggest – and the debate shifted
with Wolfensberger’s later adaptations of normalization into social role valorisation (see Race,
Boxall and Carson 2005) – I refer to this early debate because it makes visible the extent to
which normal was defined either through a rights-based model of personhood which could tend
towards a range of outcomes (Nirje 1985, p. 65) or through outcome-specific norms of
appearance and deportment as already defined by ‘society’.4

The tension between ‘integration’ and ‘choice’ has not gone away but it has become less visible.
In today’s policy and practice guidelines there are various examples where ‘choice’ is simply
imagined as automatically leading to ‘inclusion’. For example the contemporary ‘Good Life’ is
defined by UK Social Care Institute for Excellence in the following way: ‘doing things which have
a purpose and are meaningful for the individual’ and ‘doing things uniquely right for the
individual’ (Cole 2007, p. 10). However, these person-centred aspirations are imagined as
automatically tending towards ‘doing things in ordinary places, that most members of the
community would be doing’ and ‘meeting local people and developing a sense of belonging
(SCIE 2007, p. 10). Similarly, Valuing People guidelines describe person-centred practice in the
following terms: ‘When we use the term “person centred” we mean activities which are based
upon what is important to a person from their own perspective and which contribute to their full
inclusion in society’ (DH n.d. p. 2 emphasis original). Both accounts point to the optimism at the
heart of governmental approaches. There is a strong hope that freedom will underpin an agency
which in turn will lead to certain specific and desired outcomes. In the case of Valuing People
these outcomes are, for example, imagined as employment or living in a supported living context. Yet the emphasis on agency itself generates – in Judith Butler’s terms – the possibility of exceeding the intentions of, in this case, policy makers or professionals (Butler 1997, p. 17); the excess of agency exercised by the people, for example, who don’t want a job, who want to cut out pictures from magazines all day or those who want to sleep in until lunchtime (Drinkwater 2005, p. 240).

Yet, while there is a philosophical tension when viewed in this way which mirrors the old poles of individual/agency and society/structure in sociological debate, the question in practice concerns the relative emphasis placed on ‘choice’ or ‘inclusion’ and precisely how the two are connected. In an article titled ‘revisiting choice’ Michael W. Smull has suggested that choice is helpfully broken down into three aspects, ‘preferences’, ‘opportunities’ and ‘control’: ‘preferences reflect what people want while opportunities reflect what is available. Control is the authority to make use of an opportunity to satisfy a preference’ (1995, p. 1). Smull’s vision of choice connects to inclusion through the idea that ‘many people need to have a life of their own before they can have a dream of their own. […] Unless they have already experienced it they will not know whether or not they like it or not [sic]’ (1995, pp. 2, 6). Smull, therefore, relates choice to integration – or at least to a moving into the world – as a means of legitimising ‘control’. To put this in Foucauldian terms, what seems to legitimise an individual’s control over their preferences is the extent of their freedom, the range of opportunities from which they are choosing and the breadth of their sense of what is possible. However – and as we return to the technical site of how the tea is made in Croydon day services – tensions in expanding the scope of the everyday emerge precisely through how choice becomes legitimised by the scale on which it is played out. From control over tea to control over housing.

**How the tea is made: changing the scope of the everyday**

In 1967 Croydon’s Waylands Craftwork, Social and Training Centre was opened by Enoch Powell, who had in 1961 made a speech criticising the large institutional hospitals as ‘isolated, majestic, imperious, brooded over by the gigantic watertower and chimney combined’ (quoted Welshman 2006b, p. 66). Waylands Centre was described as a ‘multi-purpose centre for training both mentally and physically handicapped people’ and, in the words of the *Croydon Advertiser* newspaper ‘is considered to be the most advanced project of its kind in the country’ (1967, p.1). It was set up through a collaboration between the Health Services Committee and the Welfare Services Committee and followed the 1963 Health and Welfare White Paper which
saw a large role for training centres and advocated an almost doubling of places (Welshman 2006b, p. 71). The name ‘Waylands’ was, as the *Croydon Advertiser* put it, ‘chosen with care and has special significance’: ‘In ancient mythology there are references to Wayland who was crippled but shod horses and was skilled in all metal work’ (1967, p. 1). So it was a name which emphasised the training and work element of the centre and through the centre’s title directly linked the function of training with craftwork, socialising and leisure.

The day centre’s multiple purpose meant that tea was initially made in two distinct ways. The first was connected with work. Until the 1990s at Waylands – and at Croydon’s other day centres Cherry Orchard (which opened in 1970) and Heavers Farm (which opened in 1974) – most people’s time (outside of what was called ‘Special Needs’, a demarcated area for people with higher support needs) was spent in workshops doing a range of industrial work and ‘assembly and packing’ work including packing up bags for Virgin airlines and packing plastics knives and forks. Time was highly organised in the first part of this period. As one woman who worked in Waylands industrial laundry remembers ‘we done it right up to twenty to four’, which was when the coaches and minibuses came to pick people up. In the earlier years, time was regulated by bells or buzzers which signalled tea time and lunch time, as a man who attended Cherry Orchard put it, ‘every time you go outside and you clock in and it said what time you left’.

In this work-centred context, drinks were only had at break times, as one woman who did her ‘workshop time’ in the Waylands kitchen recounts ‘I used to … got the tea on trolley … all the cups ready on the trolley. Took them around cup of tea to the workshops and the laundry’.

The second way tea was made was in the context of home economics or, later, ‘independent living’ sessions. Each of the day centres had a flat where, as a woman employed as a Home Economics Instructor remembers, ‘… we used to teach them to be like – how to make beds, how to clean the bathroom, all the things that you would need to actually be able to go out and live on your own’. Part of this process was an assessment of levels of skill:

To start off with we had to assess how much they actually knew. So you’d get them to make a cup of tea or a cup of coffee and then see how far they could actually go. From the first stage of [. . .] filling the kettle to plugging the kettle in, putting the coffee in the mug, put sugar in, putting the milk in.

A key ‘training’ technique used at that time was ‘forward’ and ‘backwards chaining’ of tasks, as a woman who worked at Heavers Farm put it ‘you would look at a task and you would break it
down into steps’, often on the advice of ‘psychologists who used to attend the centre every week, within the special needs, or Special Care Unit’. This process was one also used for tea-making, as the woman who worked as a home economics instructor recounts:

So if you ever asked for a cup of coffee – you always got this lukewarm thing – which was a bit yucky, so we had to like retrain them sometimes. It was, you literally had to go through it in stages with them. So once they got to a certain stage, you then took them on to the next stage, and then you finished it off. Then the next time you take them through to the next stage – it just got repeated and repeated and repeated until they eventually got it. Everything was very repetitive. Basically because that’s the way they learn, and that’s the way you and I would learn [. . . ] Once it’s repeated and repeated it seems to log and then they can go ahead and make teas and coffees.

As the accounts of forwards and backwards chaining suggest, the initial procedures of the day centre operated through what Foucault referred to as ‘training’, that is disciplinary measures which focus on the ‘detail’ – including the repetition, as we have seen – of specific activities (1984, p. 188). As this account of tea making suggests, in a disciplinary model there is an effective alignment of power, the person is trained through repetition with the hope that ultimately this kind of aligned supervision would no longer be necessary.

However in the 1990s services became a ‘problem’ once more and questions emerged relating to how individuals might exercise greater control – in Smull’s sense – over how they spend their daily lives. Central to this was a gradual disalignment of power. In order for the scope of people’s everyday experiences to be broadened out – and to move from a disciplinary to a governmental model of power – a number of the structures which had organised time and space at the day centres were changed. In Waylands, the relaxing of time led to the symbolic changing over of one of the workshops into a social space which included a café. The aim being to create a space which was not activity focused, to give some people the experience of working in a café and others the experience of buying and paying for a drink. At the same time, people went out more to cafes and pubs to buy tea and other drinks, as one manager commented ‘no matter how many activities you do – and you can do role plays about buying a sandwich till you’re blue in the face – isn’t it just better to do it?’ Underpinning these shifts in where and when tea might be consumed were changes to work in the day centres, including the continuing existence of the Waylands Laundry. One of the women who worked in Waylands laundry remembers, ‘we tried to save [the laundry], we had lots of meetings trying to save it, but it went against us, didn’t it?'
However a senior manager at the time argued that closing the laundry was essential precursor to future choice:

Built into Waylands was the laundry [...] they were working flat out in there and the conditions were [...] – but they loved it, they loved it. I was the person who actually phased it out in the end because [...] if it had been a sheltered workshop and people were being paid for the work that would have been fine. Many people moved on, pressure was being put on more and more for smaller numbers of people to turn this work around and it really wasn’t what they needed in terms of their own personal development. It was creating a dependency. [...] We discussed it. I think if we’d taken a vote whether people wanted it or not then we would have lost it. [...] I believe in consultation, I believe in choice and getting to a position where people can make informed choices but in that respect I think I felt we had to make a choice for them. We put alternatives in place. So there was a certain amount, a lot of soul searching really but I just felt we had to move on, we had to make – show that we were moving on really.

There are both spatial and temporal dimensions to this decision. Spatially, being in the laundry rather than elsewhere is seen to limit people’s sense of what was possible – hence the importance of extending scope of everyday life. Temporally, the choice in the present – predicated as it is perceived to be on a narrow life experience – is denied in favour of future choices which are imagined as being of greater significance. If put in Smull’s terms, control to satisfy a preference is only seen as being validated once opportunities have been explored.

One of the effects of understanding the extension of the scope of everyday life – and opportunities – as legitimising self-determination is that it implicitly draws ‘legitimate choice’ towards aspects of everyday life which are scaled as more significant. Smull, for example, criticises services which ‘ask people what they want to wear but not who they want to live with’ or list likes and dislikes in terms of food but not people (1995, pp. 1, 3). The assumption is that the broader the scope, the greater the independence, choice and control. Clearly, there is some truth in this as if you choose who you live with you can probably also avoid buying and cooking broccoli. However, one of the problems which arises in managing change through the expansion of the scope of opportunities is the extent to which different aspects of a person’s life (what they do in the day, social support, where they live) are evolved concurrently. With the loss of work in the day centres also went the ‘wages’ or incentive pay. While the loss of the wages
was not an issue for some people, it had a real effect on others as one woman who attended Cherry Orchard commented:

I got £4.50 a week. And I was quite happy with that money, I used to save that up, I used to get my bulbs for my garden at home. I was told the Government didn't like us working for so little money.

It is certainly the case that the vision of day service modernisation was that someone would not simply go from getting 'incentive pay' to getting no money. Rather the vision included increasing employment prospects but also changes in housing (from residential and adult placements with families to supported living). Either moving into paid employment or into supported living should mean that people have more money which is visibly their own to spend (Fyson et al. 2007). However, the end of industrial work has represented for some people a present where 'control' has been lost not gained.

Returning once more to the Resource Base water heater, it is therefore possible to view this arrangement for tea making as a kind of bulwark. The water heater with its free supplies co-ordinate for the present between the past of free tea and coffee and a hoped for future of increasing autonomy over your money by recognising that being in the community now does not mean you will be always able to choose – afford – to buy a cup of tea. The presence of the water heater seems to suggest a valuing not only of the choices which might become possible as day opportunities are expanded through the Resource Bases but also of these everyday choices, the choices that are close and that can be made right now.

Scaling the extended scope: when choice becomes 'control'
When Smull expresses his frustration with the focus on what people using services might want to wear rather than who they might want to live with, or what food they might like or dislike rather than which people they'd like to spend time with, he is mobilising two forms of scaling. On one hand, his is a plea for the extension of choice via opportunity towards control. Or to put it another way that being a private tenant gives you greater control over your daily life than a list of foods and activities liked and disliked. There are obvious reasons for this. Control over when to have a cup of tea, is read as a first step towards taking control over other aspects of your life. Controlling where you live and who you live with is scaled as bigger precisely because control over housing and housing-related support immediately (in theory) allows a range of other daily preferences to be facilitated (private space, favourite television programmes, own clothing,
breakfast at a certain time). Additionally, these more substantive areas of control are stressed no doubt because the changes in housing have been and remain harder for institutionally-oriented services to achieve. Secondly, though intimately linked to this more practical reading of scale, is the form of conceptual scaling evoked in considering the extent to which what goes on in everyday life measures up to guiding ‘values’. Exercising control over when to have a cup of tea being potentially less expressive of self-determination than, for example, control over where you live and with whom.

As such, the issue of scale – both practical and conceptual – takes us back to the tension between choice and inclusion. In this reading, choice (or self-determination) and inclusion work in a mutually reinforcing cycle: it is assumed that this very self-determination will both tend towards and be best supported by quite specific work and living arrangements. Of course this is not accidental; these arrangements have been generated by and for the ‘self-determination’ of the general population. Yet, this reading works to pulls the variability of ‘choice’ – where the agency generated by the self-determining model of personhood can tend towards varied and unpredictable outcomes – towards a vision of ‘inclusion’ in a way which is relatively fixed. The question I pursue now is whether this relationship between choice and inclusion might be more dynamically conceived. Not simply adjusting people with learning disabilities’ everyday lives for specific values, but in turn opening up the possibility that the very fact of inclusion might adapt what is meant by ‘inclusion’.

The notion of ‘scale’ has come in for substantial theoretical revision in recent years. The substantive criticism being that academics have deployed scale too often as, what Bruno Latour calls, ‘instant sociology’ and as a means of magically explaining a specific interaction or experience with a general term (e.g. capitalism, patriarchy) (Latour 2005, p. 50). Latour’s key insight here being that there is a substantial academic arrogance in assuming that society can be understood through the terms already existing for its analysis. Instead he argues that society is constantly being traced by the descriptive work done by us all and, rather than contribute to that in formulaic ways, academics should ‘follow the actors’: ‘every time some A is said to be connected to some B, it’s the social itself that is being generated’ (2005, p. 103). Such a focus on the micro-ness of how ‘society’ is generated finds strong synergies with trends in learning disability research, whether that is the longer standing interest in oral history and people’s lives on their own terms (e.g. Atkinson, Jackson and Walmsley 1997) or the deployment of conversational analysis in understanding staff-service user interactions (Antaki, Finlay and
Walton 2007). In terms of scale in daily life Latour suggests, people ‘might mobilize the whole of humanity’ into their argument but then ‘settle for a local compromise’ (Latour 2005, p. 185). While people themselves scale through a process of conceptual enrolment (how we pull in ideas and people to make sense of the world), Latour also emphasises the importance of material connection and that it is literally through being better connected to more people and places that organisations or ideas grow. To sum up, how ‘big’ an event or everyday occurrence is in flux through what we say and do.

The idea of self-determination evoked by Perrin and Nirje has been a strong theme for Simon Duffy, who has been a key player in the development of the UK iteration of the personalisation agenda. His 2002 Keys to Citizenship identifies the basis of self-determination as already resident within the individual: ‘we each have our own unique identity, one that maybe lost or hidden, but an identity which is truly our own’ and it is only by asking the right kind of questions that you can find out ‘who someone is’ (Duffy 2002, p. 39). Yet, the overarching message of his book is that the values which already exist in society require you to enter the world in certain ways, specifically by six keys of citizenship: ‘self-determination’, ‘direction’, ‘money’, ‘home’, ‘support’ and ‘community life’. Duffy argues that taking hold of the keys of citizenship is important because ‘people with learning difficulties are still not thought of as individuals’ (2002, p. 1) and ‘the first thing you need to do if you want to be treated as a citizen is to be recognised by those around you as someone who can be treated as a fellow citizen’ (2002, p. 5). So – and very much like the poles of choice and inclusion or agency and structure – there are two conceptual poles to Duffy’s work; the already-existing self who must come to articulate themselves and the core and fixed keys of society which you must hold to qualify as a citizen.

Yet – and between these poles – Duffy’s account of agency is not simplified. Duffy argues against understanding such values as ‘all or nothing’ and implicitly points to the importance of interdependence and the varying points when sharing control might be helpful (Duffy 2002, pp. 7, 103). This complexity is given a specific political articulation through Duffy’s approach to social change:

It can be argued that only a change by other people, by the community itself, will really help. […] But this is not the view that drives this book. Much has been done already by individuals and each time an individual with learning difficulties makes progress in achieving recognition by the community, they do not just do it for themselves but they do it for others; and in this way they begin to change the whole of society. To my way of
thinking it is by each of us doing our own bit, by trying to play a full role as a citizen, that we will each transform the community into a more welcoming place. In the end, if we carry on behaving like we belong, we will find that we really do belong. (2002, p. 3)

In Duffy’s vision – and reflecting Latour’s notion of the daily generation of society – just getting out there is a form of reconnecting and therefore adjusting what we think of as society. In Duffy’s work this model of individual change links with a governmental model of personhood which is secured via a tactical politics of optimism and of non-foreclosure. A deliberate non-assumption of what is or what is not possible. Under this guise, people are advised to meet potential employers face to face because ‘it is much easier for people to say “no” to a letter than it is for them to say “no” to your face’ (2002, p. 62). However, in Duffy’s imaginary the openness and contingency of micro-negations are all understood as working for the specific goals of grasping the keys. Whilst how you get a job might be negotiable with your employer, that you have ‘direction’ is not. You might ‘contribute to the community’ in various ways but ‘we cannot live the life of a full and active citizen without spending time contributing to the community’ (2002, p. 147). In Duffy’s vision it is necessary that these contributions are recognizable to others as ‘contributions’. It is only then that ‘you will be someone who not only has the right to be treated with respect, you will also be someone who genuinely deserves to be treated with respect’ (2002, p. 148). While Duffy imagines these contributions as playing out in various ways from ‘bringing people together over a cup of tea’ or ‘organising a street party’, both of Latour’s dynamics of scale are in play. For Duffy, citizenship, as a form of inclusion, is not an abstract right. It is rather materialised both through everyday acts which connect you to others in the ‘community’ and are generated through the deliberate enrolment of the more abstract values of citizenship to guide your daily life. In this sense, the keys of citizenship act as a scaling device because they pull the specificity of the daily life of your ‘real self’ into line. Citizenship calls you into being as a person and therefore also calls you to account.

Intriguingly in Duffy's sociological imagination there is a fluidity in the micro negotiations of the everyday through which he imagines change as happening which does not exist at the more conceptual level of these keys to citizenship. For example, he argues:

Of course it could be argued that the community ought to treat everybody as a full citizen anyway; that no one should have to possess self-determination, direction, money, a home, support and a community life before they are recognised as citizens. And that is true. It should not be necessary to achieve the keys to citizenship; a truly successful
community would be one that recognises the citizen in the individual who lacks all those things. But that is not the community in which we live today. (2003, p. 3)

The question remains whether the fluidity he describes at the level of daily life might be more dynamically connected to how we understand citizenship. Or to put it another way, whether the acts which make up individuals becoming ‘citizens’, might itself adjust ‘citizenship’. To tease out further this possibility, I explore the slightly different form of scaling in evidence in Smull’s writings and in the *Essential Lifestyle Planning Handbook* written by Smull with Helen Sanderson and Bill Anderson. The *Essential Lifestyle Planning Handbook* – one of four key person-centred planning tools – is specifically interested in hopes and dreams. Smull, Sanderson and Anderson suggest dealing with all the hopes and dreams in terms of ‘blue skying’ by writing everything down. After this process is complete the facilitator is expected to ‘revisit each idea with the person and the group and prioritise some that could work’ and then work through the rest to turn them into actions of some kind (2004, p. 100). Unlike Duffy’s politics of non-foreclosure, Smull et al.’s process clearly include some kind of evaluation of what is more or less possible. In Smull’s writings elsewhere, this process of evaluation is worked through as a kind of translation. Smull describes working with a man ‘who wanted to have a job just like his father’. However, his father was ‘a well known research scientist with the federal government who determined what projects got funded’. Smull suggests that through ‘many conversations’ it was possible to ‘find out that the characteristics that mattered to him were that he be treated with the same respect that his father received and that he wear a tie to work’. So, Smull and his team found him a job where he could wear a tie and did photocopying for a facility that did scientific research. In the example given by Smull, the ‘dream’ is slowly broken into its constitutive parts until it is made into something which is possible. In this imaginary there are limitations which are acknowledged but are not determining. It is a case of working via dreams as a means of adjusting the everyday but through the understanding of world as defined by the individual concerned (what ‘mattered to him’).

One reading of what it might mean to have a job ‘like his dad’ necessitates a bigger scale and the enrolment of universities, degrees, large grant budgets and networks of colleagues. If read in this way then it would be possible to suggest that a big dream (being a Research Scientist) is translated into a paltry substitute (photocopying). However, in a sense Smull’s approach enables a shifting of scale so that the man himself could determine the meaning of a having a job ‘like his father’s. The flip side of this reading of a person-centred approach is in effect not
only that the man was able to define what 'like his Dad' meant but, through that, he was also able to define what ‘inclusion’ might mean for him. While concerned with precisely the same forms of coming into being (jobs, housing, social networks) as Smull, for Duffy the keys to citizenship have to be relatively fixed because society will only accept people if they access personhood through a range of specific acts and materialisations of citizenship. Smull’s approach in essence mobilises the fluid micro-politics evoked by Duffy but in way which suggests the potentiality for working within and redefining the ‘values’ in ways which are close, immediate and tangible to the people involved.

**Conclusion: ripping up and re-scaling**

The *Valuing People* model of personhood has been the subject of some concern in recent research, whether that be concern over the emphasis on independence rather than interdependence (e.g. Fisher 2007, p. 286), the romanticism of the *Valuing People* values which ignore inequalities (Burton and Kagan 2006), the nature of possible access to employment in the context of global shifts in work patterns (Dowse 2009, pp. 582; 580) or the ways in which values such as ‘choice’ become indexed with the reduction or marketisation of services (Williams and Holman 2006; Redley 2009, p. 497). Equally, Rose reflects in more general terms on the model of the free, autonomous self by noting that while it ‘endows all sorts of rights and privileges’, ‘it also divides, imposes burdens, and thrives upon the anxieties and disappointments generated by its own promises’. However, at the same time he recognises that this notion of personhood seems to ‘trace out something quite fundamental in the ways in which modern men and women have come to understand, experience, and evaluate themselves, their actions, and their lives’ (1998, p. 3). Because of this – and inspite of associated divisions, burdens and anxieties – denying the ‘rights and privileges’ of autonomous personhood to people defined as having learning disabilities is, of course, not an option. However, it might be that it is precisely in revising the logics of the ‘values’ associated with autonomous personhood that a politics might lie.

In his delineation of the familiar key ideas mobilised and re-worked by neo-liberal states (e.g. governing, freedom, control, community), Rose deploys the Foucauldian idea of genealogy to evoke the possibility of not standing outside these ideas but rather working within them to ‘invent ways of becoming other than what we are’ and of an ‘ethics of creativity’ which might allows space for the ‘active, material, technical and creative assembling of one’s existence [and] one’s relations to oneself’ (1999, p. 196). As Rose suggests it might be precisely through
mobilising the agency given to us by this ambivalent model of personhood that we also have the agency to re-size what is meant by its constitutive values. Foucault – commenting on the uses of Marxism and psychoanalysis and echoing comments he made elsewhere about the anti-authoritarian struggles of the 60s and 70s (of which the disability movement was part) – argues ‘all-encompassing and global theories’ provide ‘tools at the local level only when . . . the theoretical unity of their discourse is, so to speak, suspended, or at least cut up, ripped up, torn to shreds, turned inside out, displaced, caricatured, dramatized, theatricalised and so on’ ([1976] 2003b, p. 6). In many ways it is this ‘ripping up’ which is being done in practice and should be consciously done with the Valuing People values. However, the possibilities suggested by ripping up and re-sizing the model of personhood imagined in Valuing People must also become connected back into policy development. The everyday lives of people defined as having learning disabilities have long been adjusted for the realisation of governmental values. The time has come for these values to themselves be adjusted so they taken into account the lived experience, interpretations of the world, priorities and everyday lives of the people whose lives policy aims to improve. It is this constant revision of values-in-practice which might ultimately and slowly reshape and expand what personhood needs to look like to be understood as personhood.

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Bibliography


Croydon Advertiser (1967) Centre will cost 1d. rate – but let’s not count the cost. *Croydon Advertiser*, 19th May, p. 1


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1 All interviews quoted here were conducted at part of the Heritage Lottery Funded ‘History of Day Centres’ project (2006-2008). The interviews are in the public domain via a booklet, two exhibitions and an archive held in the Local Studies Library in Croydon. In the vast majority of cases, people choose to be named. In spite of this, I have chosen to anonymise all quotations I use for the purposes of academic publications. While all interviewees did consent to their interviews being used for research purposes as well as for the public history aspects of the project, the position I’ve come to is that there is a difference in purpose which must be recognised. In the booklet and exhibition extracts from interview were not critically analysed. They stood as testimony of the varying and contrasting experiences and positions on day
service change. However, the purpose of the critical analysis offered here is to delineate the discursive formations which affected the translation of policy aspirations into people’s everyday experiences. In our individualised culture there is a fine line between ‘having your say’ or ‘telling your story’ and ignoring the social contexts – even ‘structures’ – which enable and constrain certain articulations. Anonymisation is used here as one technique of ensuring that agency – and with it responsibility and culpability – are analytically distributed beyond the individual.

2 In fact there is a paper trail demonstrating substantial re-thinking of day services in Croydon from 1994. Initially this review was focused on younger adults (‘Younger Adult Day Services: Review of Day Services. Project Brief’, John Spedding/ Sue Hutt 1994; ‘Timetable for Day Services Review’ 1994; ‘Day Services Review: Service User Profile – Additional Information’ 1994; ‘Younger Adults Day Services. Forward Plan: Towards 2000’,1994/5). However, in 1999 the Best Value Day Services Task Group was formed which includes a review of other day services as well as an appraisal of Croydon’s services (Best Value Day Services Review 1999).

3 Other local authorities have taken the ‘building-less’ approach advocated by the King’s Fund Changing Days project. See Changing Days (Wertheimer 1996) and Days of Change (McIntosh and Whittaker 1998).

4 Wolfensberger also noted that society might need to be changed (1972, p. 40).

5 In Judith Butler’s terms: ‘The subject might yet be thought of as deriving its agency from precisely the power it opposes, awkward and embarrassing as such a formulation might be, especially for those who believe that complexity and ambivalence could be rooted out once and for all. If the subject is neither fully determined by power not fully determining of power (but significantly partially both), the subject exceeds the logics of non-contradiction, it is an excrescence of logic, as it were. To claim that the subject exceeds either/or is not to claim that it lives in some free zone of its own making. Exceeding is not escaping, and the subject exceeds precisely that to which it is bound’ (1997, p. 17). In other words, giving people choice might tend towards all sorts of outcomes which do not look like ‘inclusion’.

6 The others are PATHS, MAPS and Personal Futures Planning. For an overview of each see Helen Sanderson Associates, available at: http://www.helensandersonassociates.co.uk/Reading_Room/Reading_Room.htm