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Pseudo-Dionysius *Art of Rhetoric* 8-11: figured speech, declamation and criticism

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ABSTRACT: This paper considers the date and authorship of chapters 8-11 of the ‘Art of Rhetoric’ falsely attributed to Dionysius of Halicarnassus. Analysis of the two chapters on ‘figured speech’ suggests that chapter 9 is an unfinished attempt by the author of chapter 8 to rework the material into a more radical (but in fact conceptually flawed) refutation of those who rejected the concept. Distinctive common features indicate that chapters 10-11, on declamation and criticism, are by the same author. The texts probably date to the early second century AD; the author was perhaps the Aelius Sarapion attested in the *Suda*.

The *Art of Rhetoric* attributed to Dionysius of Halicarnassus is not by Dionysius and is not an art of rhetoric. It is a disparate assemblage of essays on a variety of rhetorical themes rather than a systematic treatise, and it contains the work of more than one rhetorician. These essays once circulated without any indication of their authorship. A scholion on chapter 10 infers from a cross-reference to a work *On Imitation* (364.24, cf. 373.22) that the author was Dionysius of Halicarnassus, and this conjecture was subsequently extended to cover the whole collection, but it cannot be correct.¹

The collection falls naturally into two parts. Chapters 1-7 are part of a treatise on epideictic oratory, comparable to, though less sophisticated than, the two treatises attributed to Menander Rhetor.² This paper is concerned exclusively with the remaining four chapters, which are more diverse in content. Chapters 8-9 are both concerned with figured speeches—that is, speeches that have a covert purpose in addition to (or even contradicting) their overt intent.³ These two chapters have a good deal of material in common, but there are also significant differences, and the relationship between them is disputed. In addition they have points of contact with chapters 10-11, concerned respectively with mistakes in declamation and the assessment of texts;⁴ but this relationship, too, has yet to be fully clarified. In this paper I shall argue that the two treatments of figured speech are best understood as the work of a single rhetor, who was also the author of chapters 10-11, and that he was active in the early part of the second century AD. At the end of the paper I shall cautiously propose an identification of this individual with a sophist attested in the *Suda*, and point (even more cautiously) to a possible trace of this sophist in the epigraphic record. But these suggestions are supplementary to my main concerns, which are to elucidate the coherence of this small corpus of texts and to identify its probable context in the history of rhetoric.

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¹ Usener and Radermacher 1904, xxii.
² Translation and brief notes in Russell and Wilson 1981, 362-81; see also Russell 1979.
³ Russell 2001 provides an illuminating introduction to chapters 8-9; see also Chiron 2000. On the concept of figured speech in general see Penndorf 1902; Schenkeveld 1964, 116-34; Patillon 2001, lxxix-xci.
⁴ See Russell 1978.
1. Chapter 8

Chapter 8 begins (295.2-295.14) by noting that some deny the possibility of complete figured speeches (as distinct from figured expressions within a speech)\(^5\) on two grounds: (1) they would be unintelligible and (2) classical authors do not use them. The author undertakes to identify the different forms of figured speech and the way in which each is to be approached, with illustrations drawn from the classical authors. These illustrations will, of course, refute the sceptics’ claim that classical authors do not use figured speech, and will also provide empirical evidence against the claim that they could not be understood if they existed. So the project of classifying and giving technical advice on the treatment of figured speech will also provide a refutation of the sceptics. This means that the chapter as a whole is itself an example of the second of the three main types of figured speech which the author goes on to list (295.15-296.5):

(A) The speaker says what he means, but discreetly out of respect for the dignity of the opponent or out of caution with a view to the audience.

This type is declared uncontroversial (295.18f.), and plays no further role in the chapter; the focus is on those types, B and C, in which all or part of the speaker’s intent remains unspoken:

(B) The speaker says one thing with the aim of achieving something else.

(C) The speaker says one thing with the aim of achieving the opposite.

Archidamus’ speech in Thucydides 1.80-85 is an example of type B. He argues overtly against going to war now, but his ultimate, though unspoken, aim is to dissuade the Spartans from going to war at all. A speech that argued overtly against going to war while actually trying to discredit the case for peace would fall under type C. Note that in type C the speaker’s avowed aim is a pretence; in type B the avowed aim may be a pretence, but it may also be a real aim, the unspoken aim being sought in addition to it. (Archidamus could have counted his speech as a partial success if he succeeded in dissuading the Spartans from going to war at once, even if he failed at this point to dissuade them from going to war at all.) It follows that multiple aims can be combined in a single speech; the author accordingly uses the concept of an ‘interweaving of subjects’ (συμπλοκή ὑποθέσεων) in connection with many of his type B examples.

The author next makes outline comments on the handling of each type (296.6-297.17) before briefly mentioning three more types (297.18-23). These are described as dependent on the main categories (ηρτηνται δὲ τῶν τῶν τρόπων), presumably because they can be understood as special cases of types B and C:

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\(^5\) The use of figures as a stylistic device is elementary doctrine, and it could be taken for granted that students would be familiar with it (see, to go no further afield, chapter 10, 367.11-15); the author is therefore careful to distinguish at the outset the more advanced notion of a wholly figured speech, and repeatedly underlines it in the body of the chapter (299.13, 303.11, 304.21, 308.23) and—most emphatically—in the conclusion (322.20-323.3).
(D) The speaker simulates agreement with a previous speaker while pursuing a different aim.

(E) The speaker simulates opposition to a speech while in fact supporting it.

(F) The speaker makes his point covertly, under the guise of deferring discussion.

The author concludes his introductory material by promising (1) to illustrate these types from a wide range of classical prose and verse authors, covering all three kinds of rhetoric—forensic, deliberative and panegyric (298.1-5);⁶ and (2) to show how to ensure that the covert purpose in the self-subverting type C remains concealed (298.6-15).⁷

The illustrations begin with a quotation of Demosthenes 18.178, designed to establish that he was familiar with σχήμα in its technical sense (298.16-299.10). The point is a minor one, but contributes to the refutation of the sceptics’ claim that classical authors did not use figured speech: not only did they use it, but they used it self-consciously and applied the same terminology.

A long series of examples of type B follows. Demosthenes On the False Embassy is discussed at length as an example from forensic oratory (299.10-303.9) and On the Symmories as an example from deliberative oratory (303.10-305.4), using a technique also found in Archidamus’ speech in Thucydides (304.7-16). Plato’s Apology is overtly a defence of Socrates, which serves to conceal (305.12 κέρυσσεις, 305.16 ἐπεσκιάστατο) other interwoven subjects—a condemnation of Athens, an encomium of Socrates,⁸ and (most importantly) a quasi-symbouleutic discourse on how one should be a philosopher (305.5-25). Demosthenes imitated this combination of defence, attack, encomium and protreptic in On the Crown (305.25-306.10). Likewise Pericles’ funeral speech in Thucydides is both an encomium of the dead and an exhortation to the living to continue supporting the war (306.11-308.22). In Euripides’ Melanippe the heroine’s philosophical exposition addresses a personal agenda as well, since it is designed to save her child’s life; in addition, the whole play is a figured expression on Euripides’ part of his respect for his teacher Anaxagoras (308.23-309.18). Old Comedy’s pursuit of a philosophical (i.e. moral) end through humour is a further example (309.19-22). In Xenophon there are examples both in the Cyropaedia (309.23-310.7) and in Clearchus’ speech in Anabasis 1.3 (310.8-12), which imitates⁹ Phoenix in Iliad 9, where the overt explanation of why he could not stay in Troy without Achilles covertly prepares for the plea that Achilles himself should stay (310.12-311.12).

⁶ In view of the wide range of examples that follow it may be relevant that ‘panegyric’ could be used in an extended sense to include non-oratorical forms of prose, and also verse, as in Hermogenes Id. 2.10.

⁷ There is no reason to doubt that this paragraph is where the author put it (contra, e.g., Usener and Radermacher ad loc.). Note the κατα at 298.13f.: the author undertakes to give examples (298.2) and also to explain this point of technique.

⁸ For the theoretical distinction between apologia and encomium see (e.g.) Theon Prog. 112.8-13 Spengel.

⁹ Xenophon’s position in the series (contrast the more apparently logical position between Thucydides and Plato when the series is announced in the introduction, 298.3) is thus explained by the link which he provides to the series of examples from Homer.
Homer, once introduced, dominates the rest of the chapter. A Homeric illustration of type C is announced, but postponed until after the three dependent types have been illustrated (311.13-312.1). Simulated agreement (type D) is exemplified by the speech in *Iliad* 2.337-68, in which Nestor ostensibly speaks in support of what Odysseus has already said: in fact it goes beyond Odysseus, in that he urges the army which Odysseus has restrained from going home to deploy for battle; it is this that explains why Agamemnon singled out Nestor’s speech for praise in his response (312.1-314.18). Simulated opposition (type E) is exemplified by Diomedes’ apparent attack on Agamemnon in *Iliad* 9.32-49 (so different in tone from the respect shown at 4.412f.): it is really designed to help Agamemnon persuade the Greeks to continue fighting (314.19-316.14). Simulated deferral (type F) is exemplified by Nestor’s reply to Diomedes in *Iliad* 9.53-78 (316.15-319.21). Finally, Agamemnon’s speech testing the Greeks in *Iliad* 2.110-41 exemplifies type C, in which a speech covertly seeks to achieve the opposite of its overt aim. Agamemnon deliberately uses arguments that are easy to overturn, and his blunt references to disgrace and flight are meant to provoke a reaction opposite to the one that the speech ostensibly pursues (319.22-322.5). Agamemnon conceals his covert aim by giving the speech an emotional colouring: the audience will attribute the weakness of its arguments to emotional stress rather than covert design (322.6-13).

The final paragraph recapitulates types B and C (322.14-20: there are signs of corruption), and restates the point that what is in question is not isolated figurative expressions but whole figured speeches (322.20-323.3).

2. Chapter 9

Chapter 9 begins, like chapter 8, with the sceptics who deny the possibility of figured speeches, but offers a more radical response: it is impossible in principle for any speech *not* to be figured (323.6-25). However, the next paragraph undertakes to prove that there are whole figured speeches in all three kinds of rhetoric and to establish the classes of figured speech (324.1-3); this programme fails to pick up the claim that all speech is figured and introduces an emphasis (familiar from chapter 8) on whole speeches of which the opening paragraph gives no hint. As in chapter 8, only the three main types are mentioned initially, but here, unlike chapter 8, it is proposed to illustrate them all from Homer (324.3-8), leaving it unclear how this procedure relates to the promise to provide illustrations from all kinds of rhetoric.

Chapter 8 set aside type A (in which the speaker’s meaning is conveyed discreetly), as being uncontroversial; here it is illustrated from Iris’ tactful way of

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10 See Russell 2001, 160-63 for a discussion of this example. The comment (162) that ‘the whole discussion... seems to rest heavily on individual words... Like so much ancient literary comment, it seems to latch on to minute and apparently insignificant points’ seems to me ungenerous. Addressed to a heroic army, words such as ‘disgrace’ and ‘flight’ should not (perhaps) appear insignificant, and our author’s analysis assesses Agamemnon’s arguments, as well as isolated words. Above all, his interpretation is rooted in the context: since Agamemmon does not want the army to do what he seems to propose, his speech must be self-subverting, and an understanding of how this effect is achieved surely cannot be achieved without a close analysis of his words.
conveying Zeus’ threat to Poseidon in *Iliad* 15.201-4 (324.9-22). Type B (with a covert additional aim) is illustrated from Thetis’ words to Achilles in *Iliad* 24.130f. (324.23-325.13), and ‘more clearly’ from Diomedes’ attack on Agamemnon in *Iliad* 9.32-49 (325.13-327.18), which in chapter 8 was the example of type E (simulated opposition). Type C (with a covert inverse aim) is illustrated by Agamemnon’s testing of the army in *Iliad* 2.110-41 (327.19-330.25), as in chapter 8. A fourth type is then added, equivalent to chapter 8’s type D (simulated agreement). Nestor’s follow-up to Odysseus in *Iliad* 2.337-68 is cited as an example, as in chapter 8, and is discussed at considerable length (331.1-333.14). Here, however, the discussion is extended to include a more developed analysis of Agamemnon’s response (*Iliad* 2.370-93): a speech that appears simply to support what Nestor has said includes, as if incidentally, Agamemnon’s acknowledgement that he was at fault in the quarrel with Achilles, and thus obliquely seeks to remove a potential obstacle to the success of Nestor’s exhortation by assuaging the army’s resentment (333.14-335.4). Alcibiades’ encomium of Socrates in Plato’s *Symposium* is cited as a further example of the same technique (335.5-336.2).

The author then promises to exhibit from the orators and from dialogues the same εἶδος (336.3-6). Since εἶδος has consistently been used in this chapter to refer to the various types of figured speech, it might seem that the reference should be to the type that has just been under discussion; in fact, something wider must be meant. However, we then break off abruptly to be introduced to another type, embracing two subtypes. In the first (G¹), a speaker who intends to say something outspoken and provocative tries to pre-empt offence by giving in advance a guarded indication of what is to be said (336.7-11); this is illustrated from the exchange between Achilles and Calchas in *Iliad* 1.58-100 (336.16-339.24). In the second subtype (G²), what is meant for the ears of one person is seemingly addressed to another, thus avoiding the offence that might arise from confrontational directness (336.11-15); this is illustrated from Odysseus’ rebuke to the fleeing kings and troops in *Iliad* 2.185-207 (340.1-342.3).¹¹

We now turn to the promised illustrations from the orators and from dialogues—introduced as ‘prose examples’ (342.4), although they will turn out to draw on tragedy as well. The series of examples broadly corresponds to that used to illustrate type B in chapter 8, but there are some differences. The quotation which shows that Demosthenes knew the term σχῆμα now also serves as an illustration of type A (342.4-20). This is followed (without any mention of the *False Embassy* by On the Symmories and its Thucydidean model in the speech of Archidamus (343.1-345.8). The analysis is more extended and more complex here than in chapter 8 and suggests a subtly different categorisation of Archidamus’ speech. When Demosthenes argues against war with Persia by saying that Athens should not go to war with Persia γενότα, he is using figured speech of type A: he is saying what he means, but saying it discreetly (ἐνπρεπέως 343.11f.). It is the fact that Demosthenes’ overt encouragement of preparation for eventual war against

¹¹ Much is made (341.23-342.3) of the use of the word κοιροκεῖον to describe Odysseus’ behaviour at 2.207: is it relevant that the lexicographers associate κοιροκεῖον with καιρός (an important concept in rhetoric)?
Persia (which he does not want) is also covert encouragement of preparation for war against Philip (which he does want, though he does not mention it in this speech) that makes the speech a fully fledged example of type B: the speech has a covert additional aim. Demosthenes’ imitation therefore goes beyond its Thucydidean model. A reference to Euripides’ Aeolus is added before Melanippe (345.9-346.22). We then have brief mentions of Isocrates' Panegyric, Philip and Antidosis (347.1-11); Plato’s Apology, along with Xenophon’s Memorabilia and Apology (347.14-21); Demosthenes On the Crown, linked here to Isocrates as well as to Plato (347.11-14, 21-4); Xenophon’s Agesilaus, Cyropaedia and Anabasis (347.24-348.15); and finally Thucydides’ Funeral Speech (348.15-21). These examples are given without any significant analysis (and are sometimes compressed to the point of unintelligibility, if the transmitted text is sound); but the notion of the ‘interweaving of subjects’ (συμπλοκῆ ὑποθέσεων) is introduced (347.19, 348.17), as in chapter 8.

A concluding paragraph begins by claiming that the initial proposition that there is no speech that is not figured has been proved (348.22-349.3). That has not, in fact, been proved; nor, indeed, could such a universal proposition be proved merely by accumulating examples of speeches that are figured. An argument in principle is needed, and a glimpse of one follows: the rhetor is engaged in a double agon, one concerning the fact, the other (and more important) concerning character, and the need to establish a characterisation entails that all speech is in some way figured (349.3-7). But this interesting line of thought simply adds to our problems: the principle of the double agon was not, as the author claims, established at the outset and has not, in fact, been mentioned anywhere in chapter 9. To add to the impression of confusion, another nine pages of examples from Homer follow. I shall argue below that much of the material in this appendix can be understood as exploring further the problem that surfaced in the chapter’s concluding paragraph, but it also contains miscellaneous afterthoughts that are only loosely associated with each other, or with the rest of the chapter.

3. The relation of chapters 8 and 9

It will be clear from these summaries that there are significant differences between chapters 8 and 9. But there are also distinctive connections, and it is generally acknowledged that we have to reckon, at the very least, with the work of closely connected authors. So, for example, Usener suggested that chapters 8 and 9 were the work of pupils of a single rhetor, based on lectures given at different times in his career. But it would be more economical if we could eliminate the pupils. Why should the teacher not have been directly responsible for both chapters? At first sight it may seem impossible to believe that the poorly organised and poorly thought-out chapter 9 stems from the same hand as the comparatively orderly chapter 8. But chapter 9 as it stands cannot plausibly be seen as a fully realised composition, and we should not draw far-reaching conclusions from

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12 Cf. Usener and Radermacher on 347.19-21: ‘balbutit scriptor’. But what if the author is saying: in the Apologies the defence of Socrates also conveys a defence of Plato and Xenophon?
13 Usener 1895, vi; followed by Radermacher in Usener and Radermacher 1904, xxiii.
imperfections of structure and presentation that may be due to its being unfinished. On the contrary, we should try to understand why chapter 9 was left in such a state. I wish, therefore, to suggest as a working hypothesis that the author of chapter 8 subsequently began to rework his material with a view to producing a new treatise, of which chapter 9 is an unfinished draft or sketch. This poses three questions. Can we identify a plausible motive for the reworking? Does the hypothesis help us to make sense of the relation between the two chapters, and (ideally) of the difficulties of chapter 9? And can we provide a plausible explanation of why the new treatise remained unfinished?

The suggestion that the two texts might have a single author runs counter to analytical positions that deny a single author to either of the texts. Let us begin with a modest analytical hypothesis. In chapter 8 Penndorf (1902, 178-84) identified a primary core, to which the introduction and illustration of types D-F are a secondary addition. However, it is clear that this addition has been carefully integrated into its context (as is shown by the sign-posting at 311.13-17, 319.22-24). So someone thought that the discussion of the dependent types fitted where we now read it, and there is no obvious reason why it should not have been the author himself who thought this. Penndorf’s suggestion is, indeed, that it represents an authorial afterthought. But one may then question what reason we have for supposing that the hypothetical original version was ever actually written: if the author thought that the ‘secondary’ material fitted where we now read it, why should he not have reached this conclusion before he began writing? Penndorf’s argument for authorial revision therefore seems to go either too far (in postulating a prior state of the text without sufficient warrant) or not far enough. Accordingly Schöpsdau (1975), in the most detailed study of the texts to date, adopts a more radical position. He believes that we can go behind Penndorf’s primary text, which he resolves into two distinct sources, one documenting the three types of figured speech, the other countering the opponents who deny the very existence of whole figured speeches; in the latter it is possible in turn to distinguish an original kernel from secondary elaborations. Schöpsdau’s argument turns on the observation that the long series of examples of type B is unnecessary for the purposes of documentation; one or two examples would have sufficed, as with the other types. From this it follows that the original function of the series was not to document type B, but to accumulate evidence against the denial that classical authors composed whole figured speeches. This is doubtless correct, but does not support Schöpsdau’s analytical hypothesis. In a treatise extensively concerned with the interweaving of subjects (σωμπλοκή ὑποθέσεων) such a combination of functions should surely not give rise to suspicion about the integrity of the text, especially when it has been announced in the introduction (295.10-14). Analysis has certainly over-reached itself when an author’s argumentative sophistication becomes grounds for disintegrating his composition.

I propose, therefore, to take the two texts as we have them and to consider whether the relationship between them can be understood in terms of the working hypothesis formulated above—that the author of chapter 8 reworked the material with a view to producing a new treatise, of which chapter 9 is an unfinished draft or sketch. The first question posed, that of motive, is easily answered. Chapter 8
responds to the sceptical opponents of figured speeches by undertaking to show that figured speeches do exist; chapter 9 envisages a more radical response, that only figured speeches exist: ‘we assert that the person who says that figured speeches do not exist is so far from speaking the truth that—on the contrary—no speech is unfigured and no speech is simple (ἀπλοῦς)’ (323.11-14). An author whose continued reflection on a controversial issue led him to glimpse the possibility of a more radical and comprehensive refutation of his opponents would have had good reason to revise his earlier essay.

There are other features in chapter 9 that may be evidence of the author’s continuing reflection on the topic of figured speech in the development or modification of some of his original positions. For example, in chapter 8 the examination of the speeches of Odysseus and Nestor in Iliad 2 makes passing reference to Agamemnon’s reply to Nestor, as evidence that there was more to Nestor’s speech than met the eye; chapter 9 goes on to show that there is more than meets the eye in Agamemnon’s speech as well.14 We have already noted how the more elaborate analysis of On the Symmories leads to an implicit recategorisation of Archidamus’ speech. Another recategorisation turns Diomedes’ attack on Agamemnon in Iliad 9.32-49 (325.13-327.18), an example of type E (simulated opposition) in chapter 8, into an example of type B (covert additional aim) in chapter 9, although there is no substantive difference of interpretation. The author has decided (correctly) that types E and F can be collapsed into the three main categories, and eliminated them from his system. The core of his classification is the same in both chapters. Since types A-C are paralleled elsewhere,15 this is not surprising: the author was able to fall back on a standard classification when the weakness of the elaboration attempted in chapter 8 became apparent. In both chapters his ambition to make an original contribution to the subject leads him to explore the possibility of extensions to the classification, but these exploratory extensions are naturally less stable than the more traditional core. The exploratory urge is still in evidence at the end of the appendix, where a new category is announced, the speech figured ‘through an image’ (δι’ εἰκόνος, 355.10-358.10); since its function is to safeguard against offence when offering criticism (355.11-18, 356.15f., 358.8-10) this can be seen as a third subtype of chapter 9’s type G.16

14 Schöpsdau 1975, 108 treats the greater clarity in chapter 9’s handling of this example as evidence against its dependence on chapter 8. The assumption that a reviser (whether the author or, on Schöpsdau’s hypothesis, a redactor) can only change things for the worse is surprising.

15 See [Hermogenes] Inv. 4.13. Fuhr 1907 argues that pseudo-Dionysius must postdate pseudo-Hermogenes, mainly because the latter does not have the additional types; but it is perfectly intelligible that a later text should omit an unstable and unsatisfactory elaboration. For conjectures about the authorship and date of pseudo-Hermogenes see variously Heath 1998a (Apsines) and Patillon 1997a (Aspasius of Ravenna).

16 As Schöpsdau 1975, 121 points out. He adds, again rightly, that everything in the appendix takes an idea from chapter 9 and develops it further, although it cannot be fitted into the structure of the chapter as it stands. But the conclusion he draws from this seems to me quite wrong: ‘Das schließt natürlich eine Identität der Verfasser des Anhangs mit dem Autor des Traktats B [= chapter 9] aus.’ The observation is consistent with, or indeed supports, identity of authorship, on the hypothesis that the author of chapter 9 is here exploring the potential for further development of ideas that were expressed in provisional form in the preceding incomplete draft.
On the other hand, there is also shared material that fits its context in chapter 9 less well than the context in chapter 8. This suggests that chapter 9 is dependent on chapter 8, and that the reworking of its material has not been carried through fully. The obvious example is the announcement of the chapter’s programme at 324.1-8, which fails to take up the new and more radical claim that there is no unfigured speech, and which retains an emphasis on whole speeches that reflects the account of the sceptical case given in chapter 8 (295.3-6) but does not connect with the sceptical case as summarised in this chapter.

There are numerous other signs of incompleteness in chapter 9. The perfunctory and often obscure treatment of examples towards the end (347.1-348.21) has already been noted; the cursoriness would be explicable if this section is seen as a preparatory draft. But the clearest evidence of incompleteness comes from the conclusion, with its false claim that the principle of the double agon had been established at the outset. As we have seen, the strategy of accumulated examples did not (and could not) prove the chapter’s radical thesis that all speeches are figured. If the author, having reached that point in the draft, realised that his argument was defective, then the concluding remarks about the double agon might represent his perception of how the case could be argued in principle. If so, then the false claim that the principle had already been mentioned need not be due to the author’s faulty memory: it might instead anticipate the introduction of the argument at an earlier point in a projected revision of the draft.

First, however, the implications of this new argument would need to be thought through. The otherwise perplexing appendix might be construed as (in large part) an attempt to do this. If (as the appeal to the double agon suggests) characterisation entails figure, then straightforwardness or ‘simplicity’ (ἀπλότητς) provides a test case; if even this can be shown to be a rhetorical pose, then there would be strong grounds for claiming that there is no non-figured speech. Initially the author had said there was no ‘simple speech’ (323.13f.); here he modifies this formulation, saying (350.23f.) that figured speech is more common than ‘simplicity’ and adding that even ‘simplicity’ is an artistically contrived figure designed to make the speaker more persuasive (351.1-3). Ajax serves as the limiting instance, since he is as simple as anyone could be (ἀπλόστατος 352.12). In Iliad 9 Phoenix uses a figured speech (the interpretation agrees with that offered in chapter 8, 310.12-311.2), which fails because Achilles sees through it (351.2-325.11). But Ajax, when he seems to be angrily breaking off the discussion and launching a bluntly spoken attack on Achilles (352.13-17), is in fact pleading with him and putting pressure on him (352.17-21)—to great effect, as Achilles’ response shows (352.22-353.4). Thus what seems to be straightforward and freely spoken actually exploits technical artistry (ἐντός προσχρόμενος 352.23) for persuasive effect, showing that the pose of simplicity is in fact a figure (353.5f.).

It may seem that the author has embarked on a promising line of argument here, but in the next part of the appendix a fundamental weakness begins to emerge. The chapter’s introductory paragraph did include one argument in principle for the universality of figuration: every speech-act (address, invitation, request etc) has to be performed in some way, and will therefore be figured (323.20-23). There is an echo of this in the appendix when it is noted that requests
for the reciprocation of a past favour are typically figured, in the sense that they are discreetly expressed to avoid any appearance of rebuke (353.6-10). Homer is used to illustrate the difference between requests that are formulated in this way and those that are not (353.10-354.11): when Achilles asks Thetis to supplicate Zeus on his behalf he envisages an explicit rehearsal of Zeus’ debt to her, but Thetis discreetly leaves the grounds of her appeal unspoken (*Iliad* 1.393-412, 503-10). This is described as a distinction between artistic (ἐντεχνος) and non-artistic (ἄτεχνος) requests. But since it was artistry (τέχνη) that proved figuration in the limiting case of Ajax, the concept of non-artistic speech is surprising: it threatens to undermine the claim that all speech is figured. It is certainly true that Thetis’ oblique approach is figured in a way that Achilles’ explicitness is not, but this is a different sense of ‘figure’ from the one needed to establish the universality of figuration: for if figuration is universal, a request formulated as Achilles proposed would also be figured. The fact that everything is said somehow does not mean that everything is said with a measure of concealment, obliquity or technical contrivance. Our author’s radical strategy thus depends on an equivocation.

The fact that ‘figure’ had more than one sense was well understood (Quintilian 9.1.10f.), and failure to maintain the distinction plays directly into the hands of the opposition. Alexander son of Numenius argued against opponents whose ground for rejecting the concept of figure was precisely that all thought and speech is figured in the broader sense—and hence that the concept fails to mark any useful distinction. Alexander’s reply distinguishes between natural or habitual figures and their artistic (non-natural, contrived, imitative) counterparts.17 In other words, to retain a useful concept of figure Alexander has to make a distinction similar to our author’s distinction between artistic and non-artistic speech, but in doing so he is denying that all speech is figured in the relevant sense. It is conceivable, therefore, that in trying to find a way to put right the argumentative lacuna in the draft of chapter 9 the author encountered the underlying conceptual incoherence of his radical strategy, and abandoned the project for that reason. This would provide a possible explanation of the treatise’s unfinished state.

4. Chapters 10-11

In this section I shall argue that chapters 8-9 are the work of the same rhetorician who wrote chapters 10-11. I begin by offering a summary account of these two chapters, and of the relationship between them.

Chapter 11, on the assessment of texts (περὶ λόγων ἐξέτασσε), takes as its starting-point the need for a fixed criterion to guide one’s judgement; without it, judgement will vary erratically—as someone unskilled in arithmetic never reaches the same answer to the same sum twice (374.7-375.1). Four points are identified on which judgement is to be based: character, thought, technique and diction (375.4f.). The rest of the chapter develops these points in detail, and the same four points provide a framework for the first part of chapter 10, on mistakes in declamations (περὶ τῶν ἐν ταῖς μελέταις πλημμελομένων).

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Character (ὑθος) is divided into two categories. General or philosophical character (375.9-377.4) is the moral tendency of the text when one abstracts from the individuals involved—when, for example, one passes from the individual story of Paris in Homer to the general implications of the contempt which someone of such bad character evokes and the terrible consequences of his misbehaviour. Individual or rhetorical character (377.4-382.14) is the appropriateness of what is said to the speaker, audience, subject-matter and opponent embodied in a given theme. This is analysed under seven headings: nationality, general (Greek or barbarian) and specific (the various subdivisions of these); status (e.g. father); age; moral disposition (προσώπεσις); fortune; and profession. An Athenian father will differ from a Spartan father; an Athenian son who is a doctor from one who is a general, and so on. Rhetorical characterisation should therefore consider every different aspect of any individual, and aim at a synthesis of the characteristics appropriate to them all. Chapter 10 (359.2-361.17) contrasts this integrated treatment of character with the practice of those declaimers whose characterisation consists in isolated expressions (τοιχοφόρησις) suggesting this or that characteristic, and also argues that philosophical character (that is, the overall moral import of the text) should underlie and control the whole.

Thought (γνώμη) is discussed under three headings (382.15-384.21, cf. 361.18-362.11). A case can be undermined by excess, as Thersites compromises a fundamentally sound position by the extravagant self-aggrandisement that makes him seem ridiculous. Homer has deliberately given Achilles an advocate who spoils his case in this way in order to make the change in the army’s attitude plausible: their new enthusiasm for the war may be understood in part as a reaction against Thersites’ self-defeating intervention (382.17-384.3). Conversely, one must not weaken one’s case by saying less than the subject requires. Third, one should also beware of ἐναντία—contradictions, or perhaps rather points that are vulnerable to contradiction, since the key idea here is that one should proceed securely, arguing from agreed premises (384.7-17).

Technique (τέχνη) is an audience-related counterpart to the two previous topics, concerned with presenting character and thought in a way that will be acceptable and persuasive to the audience; analogously, a doctor has not only to identify the right medicine, but also to administer it in a way the patient will accept (384.22-385.13). In chapter 11 a lacuna deprives us of the development of these points, but in chapter 10 (362.17-365.2) the discussion touches on the way heads of argument are introduced: not ‘naked’, but with reference to what the opposition will or might say. Since there is a risk that predicting an opponent’s argument will be taken as recognising its strength a definite ‘I know he will say...’ should be reserved for points that one is confident of refuting; the opponent’s strong points should be introduced by ‘I hear he will say...’; a conjectural ‘perhaps he will say...’ can be used for points of intermediate strength. There is also a warning against inflexible adherence to a set order of heads of argument: one must be willing to vary the order, to omit heads, to conceal weak arguments by juxtaposing them with stronger ones, and to use anticipation so that different parts of the argument give an impression of mutual reinforcement.
The lacuna in chapter 11 also deprives us of the first two of the four headings under which diction (κēξις) is analysed, but a summary permits a partial reconstruction (385.15-386.20). Diction should be clear, pure and varied—in the sense both of using synonyms to avoid repeating the same word (πολλοστῶξ), and of using words from different stylistic registers (ποικιλωξ). The discussion in chapter 10 (365.3-367.17) identifies as errors the use of everyday speech (which lacks both precision and vividness), the quest for recondite archaisms, and the use of terms from a specific register in the wrong context (poetic vocabulary, for example, should not be used indiscriminately).

As has been noted, the four points of chapter 11 provide the framework for the first part of chapter 10. The second part of chapter 10 uses as its framework the four standard parts of a speech (proem, narrative, heads of argument and epilogue), identifying various errors in each. One recurrent theme is the failure to consider the function of each part within the speech as a whole (e.g. 368.20-369.7, 373.3-11). Another is the failure to keep in view the persuasive function of the whole speech: declaimers do not contribute to proving their case by including narratives of events that are well known and not in dispute (369.20-370.12), generalised arguments that are either irrelevant to the particular case or else give a bad impression of the speaker (370.13-372.3), or pointless descriptive excursions (372.3-373.2). Declamation should be governed by the same constraints as genuine oratory (370.15-17, 371.22-372.2).

The fourfold framework is only one of the points that these two chapters have in common. The Platonist background is clear in both. The Platonic inspiration of the discussion of rhetorical character as a matter of division (διαφασεως) into the different categories and combination (συναγωγη) into a single integrated characterisation is explicit (382.9-13, cf. 377.6), and Plato is referred to constantly (376.16-18, 379.11-17, 381.4-10, 384.15-17; 360.17-23, 361.3-8, 364.12-23, 373.19). Demosthenes appears primarily as an imitator of Plato (360.23-361.3, 364.9-23). The two chapters also share specific and distinctive doctrines, such as the twofold view of character, and the important idea that the rhetor is involved in a double agon: underlying the contest about the matter in question is the more crucial contest of character, on which persuasiveness at root depends (359.3-6, 377.7-11).

A striking feature of both chapters is the clarity of their structure, visible even where the text has been preserved in mutilated form. In chapter 11, after an introduction that clearly sets out the purpose of the discussion (374.7-375.1), the four points are stated (375.4f.) and immediately reinforced by repetition (375.5-8). Each point is sign-posted (e.g. 375.9-13) and summed up (e.g. 377.2-4), often with a memorable catch-phrase (‘So much for common character: avoidance of vice and acquisition of virtue’, 377.2-4; ‘That is the art of division: one is many, many one’, 382.12f.). Transitions explicitly refer to the overall framework (e.g. 384.22f.), and the whole is recapitulated at the end (387.1-14). This is a good lecturing style. Similarly in chapter 10 there are summaries of individual points (e.g. 361.12-17); there is also a summary at the end of the first part (367.15-17).

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18 For this view of Demosthenes see Russell 1978, 127f.
immediately followed by an outline of the second part (367.18-21), and both parts are recapitulated at the end (373.23-374.3). However, chapter 10 has no introduction beyond a one-sentence statement of the theme, and it is particularly striking that, although the framework of the parts of a speech to be used in the second part is set out in advance (367.20f.), the fourfold framework used in the first part is not. This would make good sense on the assumption that chapter 10 was composed as a sequel to chapter 11; familiarity with the framework could then be presupposed.

In chapter 11, on the assessment of texts, the discussion of rhetorical character is summed up and illustrated using a declamation theme (381.11-382.9). The target audience is therefore one of rhetorical students whose engagement with texts is meant to furnish them with models for their own declamatory practice. Chapter 10, offering specific advice on errors to avoid in declamation, is a natural complement. But this outline guidance would need to be supplemented in detail, and students would also need to be shown how to apply the principles in practice. The end of chapter 10 notes that only the most obvious points have been covered; much remains to be said in subsequent classes (ταύτα περὶ τὸ φαινόμενον πλέον δὲ τὰ ὑπολειπόμενα, <ὁ> δείξοντο τις συνειδήσει, 374.3f.). In these two chapters, therefore, we appear to have a pair of introductory lectures prefaced to a rhetor’s course of practical classes in declamation.

Just before the end of chapter 10 there is a brief statement on the true nature of imitation (373.14-21). Simply reproducing something found in a classical author is not enough (this, by implication, would be another mistake in declamation); what is to be imitated is not what (for example) Demosthenes said, but rather the underlying artistry that he displayed in saying it. But this, we are told, is a lengthy topic that will be considered later in the treatment of imitation that has already been promised (373.21f., cf. 364.23f.). This appears to foreshadow a further lecture in the introductory course, or perhaps another, more advanced course of instruction.

We are now in a position to consider whether chapters 8 and 9 have significant features in common with chapters 10-11. First, chapter 8 displays a similar concern to maintain clarity of structure. Consider, for example, the way in which the analysis of Demosthenes On the False Embassy is dotted with reinforcements of the point being illustrated (299.12f., 299.16-19, 301.2f., 303.4f., 303.7-9), and the careful interim summaries and transitions, with explicit reference to a previously announced plan (e.g. 305.1-8). Admittedly, the overall structure does not have the same lucidity as chapters 10-11; but the material is inherently complex and difficult to organise. The decision to take type C out of order creates an awkwardness; but the author’s instinct to reserve the most complete kind of figured speech (311.15f.) for the end of the chapter is understandable, and his care to signal and explain the departure from the most straightforward order of exposition is striking (311.13-17, 319.22-24). Likewise, a desire to avoid overloading the brief introductory comments on technique would

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19 This is clear from (among other things) the very limited way in which some of the points introduced in chapter 11 are developed in chapter 10.
explain why the advice on how to conceal what one is doing in type C is deferred until after the illustration; it is also arguable that the advice is clearer after the example. The inclusion of an explicit foreshadowing of this advice when the overall outline of the discussion is announced (298.6-15) is evidence of his concern to work with a clearly stated plan.

As to content, the author’s admiration for Plato is obvious, and Demosthenes is seen as an imitator of Plato in chapter 8 (305.25-306.10), as in chapter 10. Homer plays a larger role in his exposition, but illustrations from Homer are also found in the discussions of character and thought in chapter 11 (376.1-13, 382.17-384.15). Most strikingly, the principle of the double agon that is one of the distinctive doctrines shared by chapters 10 and 11 also appears at the end of chapter 9. As was noted earlier, the claim that this principle was introduced at the beginning of chapter 9 is false: the abrupt appearance of this concept (whether it results from forgetfulness or, as I suggested above, from a projected revision that was never completed) is surely easier to understand when we realise that it was a characteristic doctrine, which the author was used to expounding in more elementary lectures.

5. Pseudo-Dionysius and pseudo-Hermogenes

It has long been recognised that there are parallels between chapters 8-11 and the treatise On Method preserved among the works of Hermogenes. The fact that these parallels are spread through all four chapters lends some support to the hypothesis of their common authorship (although it would also be consistent with multiple authorship within a common school).

The main parallels are as follows:

(i) Both authors use ἱδέα for the three classes of oratory, normally called γένος or (in later rhetoricians) εἴδος. I discuss this point, and in particular its implication for dating, in the next section.

(ii) Method 4 uses the same illustrations of varied diction as does chapter 11 (385.15-388.8): Iliad 11.269-72 and Thucydides’ proem. The four quotations from Thucydides are given in a different order, but in both cases the order is wrong (in chapter 11: 1.1.3, 1.8.2, 1.2.6, 1.6.2; in Method: 1.1.3, 1.8.2, 1.6.2, 1.2.6); an additional error in On Method is the conflation of 1.6.2 with 1.5.3; but each gives one of the quotations in a correct and fuller form than the other.

(iii) Method 22, on establishing one thing by saying the opposite, is concerned with figured speech of type C in chapters 8-9. The same illustration, Agamemmon’s testing of the army in Iliad 2, is used, but Method does not offer any extensive analysis; its one point of detail, that the rotting of the ships mentioned in Iliad 2.135 precludes sailing away (cf. sch. BT II. 2.135c), is not in pseudo-Dionysius. There are some verbal correspondences: what is normally κακ…α in a speech becomes ἀρετή (437.10-13 ~ (9) 329.3-12); the sequence

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20 There is a minor terminological divergence: On Method refers to ποικιλία (416.22), without drawing the pseudo-Dionysian distinction between speaking πολλοστός and speaking ποικίλος.

21 ‘Apsines’ Fig. 26 has the same doctrine, but different words (ἐμφάρτημα, κατόρθωμα).
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evδιώλυτα, ἐναντία, στρεφόμενα (437.11f. ~ (8) 322.4f., cf. (9) 329.20, 330.7, 13f.); giving ἄντιλαβαί to an opponent (437.17f. ~ (8) 321.1, cf. 320.9f., (9) 330.6).

(iv) Method 23 discusses how to put forward one’s opponent’s arguments and recommends the same correlation between claims to know, guess or have heard what the opponent will say with the strength of the argument as does chapter 10 (362.17-363.8). There is one verbal correspondence: 439.10f. ἵνα δοκήσῃ... μὴ συνειδέναι ~ (10) 363.7f. ἵνα μὴ δοκῶμεν συνειδέναι.

(v) Method 25 discusses how to render praise of oneself inoffensive; one technique corresponds to that recommended in type G² figured speech in chapter 9, described in both as ὑπαλλαγή προσώπου (441.18, 442.12 ~ (9) 336.11, 340.7).

(vi) Method 26 discusses the pose of simplicity in terms similar to chapters 8 and 9 (443.8f. πανουργόν and ἄπλοτητα ὑποκρίνεται, 443.16f. κλέπτων and ἄπλοτητα προσποιεῖται, 444.3 πανουργόν; (8) 302.23f. ἄπλοτητος προσχήματι κλέπτων τὴν πανουργίαν; (9) 351.2f., 353.5 ἄπλοτητος προσφοισίσις).

(vii) Method 32 advises admitting an obvious fault as the only palliative; the collocation of ὄμολογία and παραμυθία (448.21f., 449.4-8) is parallel to chapters 8 (314.5-7) and 9 (334.4f., 25). Moreover, Method 6 suggests that ὄμολογία τοῦ τολμήματος is one παραμυθία for a bold expression (419.12f.); compare the same collocation of ὄμολογία and παραμυθία in chapter 10 (367.9), with reference to making an unfamiliar word acceptable.

Some of these parallels might be explained by independent access to widely disseminated rhetorical doctrine, but cumulatively they suggest a more specific connection. The dependency clearly does not involve direct transcription; rather, one or other is familiar with the teaching and terminology of the other, or both draw on a common source. Details are supplied independently by the dependent text (or texts); in particular, the fact that both have errors and correct expansions in the quotations from Thucydides in (ii) suggests that the example was remembered in an abstract form, and that the details have been influenced by the author’s memory of Thucydides’ text. Hence there is no clear way to decide whether one work depends on the other (and if so, which), or whether they both draw on a common source.

6. Date

The parallels examined in the previous section have been used to argue for a date not earlier than the third century.²² However, this argument rests not only on the uncertain assumption that the parallels reveal pseudo-Dionysian dependence

²² Fuhr 1907; and see n.15 on the relationship to the pseudo-Hermogenean Invention. This argument is followed by Radermacher in Usener and Radermacher 1904, xxii-xxiii; contrast Usener 1895, vi, opting for a first-century date. Radermacher also argues (xxiii) for a date not before the second century in the light of Schrader 1902, but the speculations that led Schrader to identify Telephus of Pergamum as the source of the Homeric material in pseudo-Dionysius and many other authors have been comprehensively discredited: see now Schmidt 1976, 48-50; Hillgruber 1994, 61f.
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on *On Method*, but also on the attribution of *On Method* to Hermogenes, which is certainly incorrect.23

Since there is no secure external evidence on which to base a dating of the pseudo-Hermogenean treatise, this might seem to be a dead-end. However, one of the parallels may be significant. Pseudo-Dionysius and pseudo-Hermogenes both use ιδέα (rather than γένος or εἴδος) for the different classes of oratory. This usage contrasts with two other technical senses of the term. First, and most familiar, is ιδέα as a key term in stylistic theory. Hermogenes *On Types of Style*, the surviving masterpiece of idea-theory, has traditionally been dated to the early 180s, but that dating depends on an untenable biographical legend,24 and we cannot rule out the possibility that it is a mature composition dating to the early decades of the third century (in view of the work’s sophistication one might even regard this as probable). The *Suda* attributes a work on idea-theory to Hadrian of Tyre, active as a teacher from the 160s to the 180s; this seems to be the earliest datable occurrence.25 Second, in later rhetoricians expressions like δικαιονική ιδέα are used not of a particular class of oratory, but of the character, style or manner typically appropriate to that class; this is a flexible concept, allowing for the possibility of untypical cases, so that (for example) a speech in one εἴδος might demand to be treated in accordance with a different ιδέα.26 Minucianus may have used ιδέα in a similar sense in the latter part of the second century.27 We learn from Sulpicius Victor (316.3-22) that Zeno, a rhetorician active in the middle of the second century, differentiated the distinction between the forensic and deliberative classes from that between *species* defined by the kind of treatment required.28 It seems unlikely that the distinctive usage of ιδέα common to pseudo-Dionysius and pseudo-Hermogenes persisted once these two technical senses had established themselves; one might therefore look for a date not later than the middle part of the second century.

On the other hand, there is reason to resist a date much before the early second century. One of the faults which chapter 10 warns against is mechanical adherence to a fixed order of heads of argument (363.11-20): arguments should be organised to suit the needs of the case in hand, rather than according to a fixed

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24 Heath 1998b.
25 Aelius Aristides used the word ιδέα in a stylistic context in about AD 147 (28.119-20), but without giving any clear indication of a developed theory of stylistic ‘ideas’. The date of the texts falsely attributed to Aristides is uncertain. The *Suda* attests a number of later writers on ideas: Aelius Harpocratus (late second/early third century), Metrophanes of Eucaria (a third-century commentator on Hermogenes *On Issues*) and Tiberius (third century). Syrianus (1.12.24-13.4) allows us to add Basilicus (late second/early third century) to the list.
26 E.g. Syrianus *RG* 4.187.30-188.2: ‘in *On the Crown* the εἴδος is judicial, but the ιδέα is panegyric.’ Cf. 191.19-192.28 (Sopater), and 192.29-194.7 (Marcellinus); Nic. *Prog.* 8.19-9.2.
27 See Marcellinus *RG* 4.185.11-187.18. But the evidence for Minucianus’ terminology and doctrine here is conflicting: contrast *RG* 4.182.9-183.14, and Syrianus 2.42.16-43.12. On Minucianus’ date see Heath 1996.
28 On Zeno see Heath 1994. He too is sometimes credited with a work on idea-theory in the Hermogenean sense, but this rests on a misunderstanding of Syrianus’ reference (1.13.5-10 Rabe) to his independently attested commentary on Demosthenes.
template (like reciting the alphabet from A to Z). Someone who wanted a fixed order of heads of argument that could be followed mechanically would search the works of earlier rhetoricians, including (for the most part) Quintilian, in vain. But an incautious user of a textbook such as Hermogenes On Issues might easily fall into such an error. Hermogenes sets out sophisticated model argumentative strategies, formulated as the ‘division’ of each issue into an ordered sequence of heads of argument; his commentators discuss the relative merits of alternative sequences. It was not the intention of such teaching to establish templates to be followed mechanically: that would miss the fundamental distinction between natural and technical order—the order that is optimum in general and the order that is appropriate to a given case (see, e.g., RG 4.307.6-11, 5.119.1-8). But the mistake is one against which someone trained in this way would need to be warned. The division of issues into standard sequences of heads is found in Zeno in the middle of the second century, and Lucian’s declamations, which seem to apply sequences of heads similar to those recommended by later theorists, provide evidence that it was already being taught in the 130s. That we find only hints of this approach in Quintilian suggests that it was a late first or early second-century development.

The same conclusion is indicated by the controversy about figured speeches addressed in chapters 8 and 9. Quintilian refers to an argument against the possibility of figured speech that takes the form of a dilemma in which the figure is eliminated if the speech is understood and also if it is not understood (5.10.70, 9.2.69). This argument is set out less cryptically at the beginning of chapter 9 when the position of the author’s sceptical opponents is summarised (323.6-10). We have seen, too, that Alexander son of Numenius engages with opponents of the concept of figure, using arguments that have a bearing on the radical strategy of chapter 9. This suggests that the question about the possibility of figured speech was a live one in the late first and early second centuries. Thereafter, there is no evidence that the concept was controversial: figured speech is taken for granted in rhetorical theorists of the late second century and later.

7. A possible identification

In the light of the proposed dating, the following Suda entry (Σ115 = FGrH 1087) is of interest:

Σαραπίων, ὁ Αἰλίος χρηματίσας, ῥήτωρ, Ἀλεξάνδρεύς. ἔγραψε περὶ τῶν ἐν ταῖς μελέταις ἁμαρτανομένων. ἀκροάσεων βιβλία ζ’, πανηγυρικὸν ἐπὶ Ἀδριανῷ τῷ βασιλεῖ, βουλευτικὸν Ἀλεξανδρεύσιν, ἐν δικαίῳς Πλάτων ὁμήρου ἀπέστημε τῆς πολιτείας, καὶ ἄλλα συχνά. καὶ τέχνην ῥητορικήν.

Sarapion, surnamed Aelius, rhetor, of Alexandria. He wrote On Mistakes in Declamations; Lectures (7 books); Panegyric on the Emperor Hadrian; Speech

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29 Quintilian 7.2.27-50 does provide what is in effect a recommended sequence of heads for conjecture, although it is not set out with the clarity of the Greek sources, but in 7.3.19 the certus ordo for definition embraces only two points, not a detailed analysis, and 7.10.4-9 insists that it is only possible to articulate a ‘natural’ order of heads for each individual case.

Sarapion fits chronologically: his panegyric on Hadrian was presumably composed on the occasion of Hadrian’s visit to Alexandria (AD 130-131). The essay on Plato’s expulsion of Homer is consistent with the intense interest in both authors which we have observed in pseudo-Dionysius. Sarapion’s works included lectures, and we have identified chapters 10-11 as lectures. His essay on mistakes in declamation appears to be the only attested parallel to chapter 10. The titles are not identical: ‘mistakes’ are ἀμαρτανόμενα in Sarapion’s title, but πλημμελομένα in pseudo-Dionysius. It is possible that he wrote a formal treatise on a topic also covered in his lectures (the two treatments of figured speech attest a willingness to revisit material already considered), but a simpler explanation would be that the discrepancy results from banalisation in the transmission to the Suda of a title separated from its text. Certainty is unattainable, but we should hesitate to dismiss as a coincidence the fact that the one attested parallel to chapter 10 is attributed to a rhetor of the right date who displays other points of convergence with pseudo-Dionysius.

A further speculation might then, very tentatively, be entertained. When Galen gave a lecture on anatomy in Rome in AD 163 the audience included a pupil of Favorinus named Demetrius, from Alexandria, who was giving daily public displays of extempore speaking on themes proposed by the audience (14.627 Kühn). C.P. Jones has plausibly identified this Demetrius with the rhetor Aelius Demetrius attested in two Alexandrian inscriptions:

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Ἦροκλεῖ Καλλινίκῳ ἡ πόλις διὰ Αἰλίου Δημήτριου νικόθε Αἰαίου [read Αἰλίου] Σεραπίδονος [ῥήτορος.

In the first of these inscriptions ‘father’ is used in an academic sense. Demetrius was therefore a rhetor whose pupils included philosophers (Favorinus himself was a philosopher with a reputation as a sophist). The second inscription reveals that Demetrius’ father was named Aelius Serapion. We do not know that he was also a rhetor or that he shared his son’s philosophical connections, but the phenomenon of professional continuity from one generation to the next is so common that it would not be surprising were this the case. If so, it would be tempting to identify him with the Suda’s Aelius Sarapion—an Alexandrian rhetor, living at the right time, with philosophical interests. The names Serapion and Sarapion are too easily

31 The combination is admittedly by no means distinctive at this time: see Weinstock 1926/7 (149 on Sarapion); Trapp 1997, 149f.

32 The title is confirmed by the essay’s opening words. πλημμελεῖν and cognates appear 11 times in chapter 10 (accepting Usener’s supplement at 367.16), ἀμαρτεῖν 8 times.

33 Jones 1967; the inscriptions are S. de Ricci, Archiv für Papyrusforschung 2 (1902/3), 566, no. 127 (= Dittenberger OGIS 712), and 564, no. 112. Galen’s friend should not be identified with the Alexandrian sophist Demetrius who wrote τέχνας ῥητορικὰ (Diogenes Laertius 5.84): Brzoska RE 4 (1901) 2884 s.v. Demetrius (96) and Dittenberger on OGIS 712 note that the position in Diogenes’ list of homonyms implies an earlier date. On sophistic activity in Alexandria: Schubert 1995.
confused for this variance to be a significant obstacle to the identification. But since the names are extremely common, the identification is anything but certain.

Bibliography


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34 See e.g. the manuscript variants at Plut. Mor. 396d etc.

35 Another Alexandrian rhetorician named Serapion with philosophical interests is attested in the third century: he studied with Plotinus, but was prevented by financial exigencies from giving up rhetoric entirely (Porphyry Life of Plotinus 7). The identification of Aelius Sarapion with the father of Aelius Demetrius has now been proposed independently by Puech 2002, 200-3. I am grateful to the journal’s anonymous referees for exceptionally detailed and helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper. The research on which it is based was completed with the support of a British Academy Research Readership.
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