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Στάσις-theory in Homeric commentary

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ABSTRACT: (i) Analysis of the small number of references to the rhetorical theory of stasis (issue-theory) in the Homeric scholia shows that they assume a modified version of the theory of Athenaeus, a contemporary and rival of Hermagoras of Temnos. (ii) In his discussion of Agamemnon's speech in Iliad 3.456-60 Eustathius follows the discussion in Plutarch Quaestiones convivales 9.13, rather than that in the scholia. It is shown that this is justified on technical grounds. The interpretation in the scholia does not fit Agamemnon's speech, and must have originated in a discussion of the attested Homeric 'problem' concerning claims that the Trojans had broken their oath.

I

The sporadic references to στάσις-theory in the scholia to the Iliad employ an unusual terminology. The following terms are found:

(A1) παρορμητική (9.228; 23.594);
(A2) καταστοχαστική (18.497-8);
(A3) ἀλλοιωτική (1.118; 8.424; 9.228, 312-3), of which τὸ ὑπαλλακτικόν is a part (9.228);
(A4) δικαιολογική (23.594); ^
(A5) ρήτων καὶ διάνοια (3.457).

Of these, A2 is a recognisable variant on the standard term ‘conjecture’ (στοχασμός); A4 is common; A5 is standard. But A1 and both items of A3 are less familiar. Is it possible to identify their provenance?

There is no exact parallel to this range of terms, but there are some apparently unique points of contact with the system of Athenaeus, a rhetorician of the second century BC (cf. Quintilian 3.1.16, Hermagoras, cui maxime par et aemulus videtur Athenaeus fuisse). According to Quintilian (3.6.47), Athenaeus recognised four στάσεις:

(B1) προτερπτική or παρορμητική
(B2) συντελική


2 Cf. δικαιολογία and δικαιολογεῖσθαι at 1.158, 9.309, 13.631-9, and Od. 5.130.

3 See Adamietz ad loc.; J. Brzoska, RE s.v. Athenaios (21).
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(B3) ὑπαλλακτική

All four elements in this scheme can be mapped onto elements of the scheme used in the scholia:

(B1) Quintilian describes this στάσις as exhortativum; it corresponds directly to A1. There seems to be no other instance of παρορμητική as the name of a στάσις. Athenaeus’ scheme is unique among those in Quintilian’s survey in giving a place to deliberative oratory among the primary στάσεις.4

(B2) Quintilian identifies the συντελική στάσις as conjecture, but notes that the name is less than transparent. In Stoic grammar συντελικὸς designates perfective aspect;5 this seems to be the most likely derivation of Athenaeus’ term for conjecture, the quaestio facti. In A2 it receives a less exotic, although still non-standard, name.

(B3) Quintilian identifies the ὑπαλλακτικὴ στάσις with what in standard terminology is called definition: mutatione enim nominis constat. Cognate forms are occasionally used (without reference to στάσις-theory) in the Homer scholia for the replacement of one word with a semantically related word of different evaluative import; e.g. at II. 9.109-10: δεξιῶς ὑπήλλαξε τά ὀνόματα, την αυθάδειαν μεγαλοφροσύνην καλών (cf. 4.321, 15.52, 22.56-7); and Cicero reports a rhetorical use of ὑπαλλαγή as equivalent to the grammarians’ metawnymia (Orator 93). Athenaeus presumably saw an analogy to this trope in the strategy of argument in which the speaker takes something which his audience has hitherto considered under one description and asks them to consider it under a different description. This interpretation fits all the occurrences of the ἀλλοιωτικὴ στάσις in the Homer scholia:

(i) At II. 1.118 Agamemnon demands a γέρος: ἀλλοιωτικὴ στάσει κέχρηται, μετατιθεῖσα τά ὀνόματα [n.b.] πρὸς κόσμον ἑαυτοῦ. This cryptic observation is illuminated by the note on Achilles’ φιλοκτενώτατε at 1.122: οὐ γὰρ γέρος ἀγαμέμνονος, ἀλλὰ κέρδος ἀντιποιεῖται. In other words, Agamemnon is seen as defending himself against an (implied or anticipated) criticism of his greed by offering an alternative characterisation of his motives.

(ii) At II. 8.424 Iris asks Hera whether she will dare to raise her spear Δίως ἄντα: καὶ ἦ μὲν (Hera) καθ’ Ἐκτόρος ὀρμᾶ, ἦ δὲ (Iris) ἀλλοιωτικῇ στάσει χρωμένη κατὰ Δίως φησιν πολέμειν. The point is that Iris tries to deter (ἐκδειματούσα) Hera by encouraging her to think of her sortie against Hector as instead an attack on Zeus.

4 Hermagoras, according to Cic. Inv. 1.10-12 and Quint. 3.6.56, made deliberative questions a species of the στάσις of quality; this is the place they have also in the later Hermogenean system. Cf. Barwick (n.1), 89-101.

(iii) Odysseus’ speech to Achilles at II. 9.225-306 is divided between two στάσεις, the παρομοιτική and the ἀλλοιωτική (9.228); the latter is introduced when Odysseus urges Achilles to act out of pity for the rest of the Greeks even if he remains angry with Agamemnon (ἐπὶ τὴν δευτέραν δὲ μεταβέβηκε στάσιν 9.300, cf. 9.316). Thus Odysseus seeks to shift the basis of the discussion by asking Achilles to see the situation in terms of his relations with the other Greeks rather than of his relations with Agamemnon. In 9.312-3 it is suggested that this use of the ἀλλοιωτικὴ στάσις is the target of Achilles’ reference to those who think one thing and say another; the insinuation is, presumably, that for Odysseus the appeal to Achilles’ pity for the other Greeks is simply an oblique or disguised way of advancing his real aim, which is still the reconciliation of Achilles with Agamemnon.6

We may conclude, then, that the ἀλλοιωτικὴ στάσις of the scholia (A3) corresponds to Athenaeus’ υπαλλακτικὴ στάσις (B3). Two further suggestions may be advanced more tentatively:

(a) Cicero’s equation of υπαλλαγή with μετωνυμία is exceptional; this usage is therefore likely to have become extinct in or shortly after Cicero’s time. 7 In later rhetoric the term is applied to the (related, but not identical) figure of ἐπιτίμημα, in which a word is used and then corrected (as in Demosthenes 18.130 ὀψε γάρ ποτε ὅψε λέγω; χθες μὲν οὖν καὶ πρόην: see, e.g., Alexander De Figuris 3.40.21f. Spengel). The term ἀλλοιώσεις is associated with Caecilius of Calacte (fr. 75 Ofenloch = Tiberius De Figuris 3.80.18ff. Spengel).8 His application of the term to a range of primarily grammatical figures is not, at first sight, very relevant; but it intersects with Cicero’s υπαλλαγή in one instance, the metonymic use of the name of a country for its inhabitants.9 It is possible, therefore, that the renaming of Athenaeus’ υπαλλακτικὴ στάσις as ἀλλοιωτικὴ reflects Caecilius’ influence. However, there is no sign that Caecilius’ scheme of στάσεις, which was quite differently structured from that of Athenaeus (fr. 6 = Quintilian 3.6.48), has been at work here; so the terminological change provides no more than additional testimony to the already well-attested influence of Caecilius’ work on figures.

(b) One scholion (9.228) identifies τὸ υπαλλακτικὸν as an unspecified part of the ἀλλοιωτικὴ στάσις. This suggests a possible explanation for Quintilian’s

6 The analysis of Odysseus’ speech in pseudo-Plutarch De Homero 169.2-4 does not offer any verbal or conceptual parallel to the ἀλλοιωτικὴ στάσις of the scholia. Odysseus’ speech is not discussed in the pseudo-Dionysian treatises περὶ ἐσχηματισµένων λόγων, but Polemo ap. Philostratus FS 542 does connect Achilles’ remark at 9.312-3 with ἐσχηματισµένοι λόγοι.
7 Cf. Barwick (n.5), 96. For parallels see the Iliad-scholia cited above; and Prof. Schenkeveld draws my attention to parallels at D.H. Comp. 3 (11.16-18 Usener-Radermacher), with Pomp. 2 (228.9-12). Quintilian 8.6.23 explicitly cites Cicero as his source for this usage.
8 On Caecilius see J. Brzoska, RE s.v. Caecilius (2), and the introduction to Ofenloch’s edition (1907, repr. Stuttgart 1967).
9 Cf. Carmen de figuris 70.173 Halm, where υπαλλαγὴ and ἀλλοίωσις are alternative names for this figure. In the extensive discussion of Homeric ἀλλοίωσις in pseudo-Plutarch De Homero 41-64 ὑπαλλάσσεν occurs only at 62, although the common variants ξε- and ἐνυπαλλάσσειν are frequent (cf. Herodian 3.168.3 Spengel). The sense given to ἀλλοίωσις by Rutilius Lupus (13.11ff. Halm, cf. Quint. 9.3.92) is quite different.
report that ‘some’ identified Athenaeus’ ὑπαλλάκτικη στάσις as μετάληψις (3.6.48): if Athenaeus’ ὑπαλλάκτικη στάσις included any attempt to shift the basis of an argument (either by redefining the act in question, or by challenging the validity of the proceedings), the follower who substituted ἀλλοωτική for ὑπαλλάκτικη in the generic sense may have retained the latter term for the procedural species. There seems to be no other instance of ὑπαλλάκτικη as a term in στάσις-theory.

(B4) That Athenaeus used the term δικαιολογική is inferred from Quintilian (iuridicalem, eadem appelatione Graeca qua ceteri usus, 3.6.47 with 3.6.33); it corresponds directly to A4.

This leaves A5. Although no separate mention of the νομικαί στάσεις is made in Quintilian’s report on Athenaeus, he can hardly have ignored them. One possibility is that he counted them as branches of B4, which will in that case subsume A5 as well. However, because ἰδιωτική διάνοια is so standard a term in στάσις-theory there is no guarantee that the note in question (3.457) has the same source as the other, more distinctive scholia on στάσεις. I discuss this note further in (II) below.

It seems, therefore, that the scheme of στάσεις applied in the Homer scholia is substantially that of Athenaeus. Two structural features point to this conclusion: the recognition of a deliberative στάσις (A1 = B1); and the conception of a στάσις, taking the place of the standard στάσις of definition, analogous to metonymy and/or related tropes (A3 = B3). The coincidence of two terms (παρορμητική, ὑπαλλάκτικη) apparently unparalleled in στάσις-theory tends to confirm an Athenaeus provenance for the relevant scholia. However, in view of the changes in terminology, Athenaeus himself is unlikely to be the source. One of these changes may reflect the influence of Caecilius’ treatment of figures; but he, too, cannot be the source since his own theory of στάσεις had an incompatible structure. There appears to be no way of determining more closely who was responsible for the modification of Athenaeus’ scheme, or who applied it to Homer.10

II

The references to στάσεις-theory in the scholia are, with one exception, suppressed by Eustathius, despite his extensive use of other branches of rhetoric in

10 G. Lehnert, De scholiis ad Homerum rhetoricis (Leipzig 1896), 104-6 and H. Schrader, Hermes 37 (1902), 530-81 (see esp. 564-5), propose Telephus of Pergamum, on whom see C. Wendel, RE s.v. Telephos (2); Wendel is rightly sceptical. Note that the testimonium for Telephus’ book περὶ τῆς καθ’ ὀμηρίαν ῥητορικῆς (RG 7.5.23ff. Walz = Prolegomenon Sylloge 189.3-7 Rabe) says that he discussed the thirteen στάσεις, which, if true, must imply something like the scheme of Menucianus (Μηνουκιανός: πρῶτος τῶν καθ’ ἑκατὸν τεχνογράφων ἵνα εἶναι φησὶ τὰς στάσεις, Syrianius 2.55.2-3 Rabe; cf. Gloeckner, (n.1) 45) and Hermogenes; but then Telephus as source is inconsistent with the idiosyncratic terminology of the scholia. On ancient discussions of rhetoric in Homer see also G.A. Kennedy, AJP 78 (1957), 23-35.
elucidating Homer.\(^\text{11}\) One reason for this may have been the unfamiliarity of the terms used to one trained (as Eustathius would have been) in the Hermogenean tradition. But there was also an element of literary judgement. When he introduces the figure μετάληψις (79.11-12 Stallbaum = 125.10-12 van der Valk), Eustathius distinguishes it from the στάσις of that name (the sense the term has in ‘political rhetors’), which would be disagreeable (δυσχερής) in poetry.\(^\text{12}\) On the one occasion where Eustathius does apply στάσις-theory (415.23-41 = 653.3-25; 434.32-40 = 683.21-31) he is discussing the dispute which could, but in the event does not, arise after the duel between Paris and Menelaus; and he observes that Homer uses Pandarus’ breach of the truce to avoid legal arguments which would slacken tension (ιὰ μὴ δικαικα παρενείρη καὶ ἀνειμένην τὴν ποιήσιν ἀπεργάσηται καὶ χαλάσῃ τὸ σύντονον). The discussion below might be thought to confirm Eustathius’ literary judgement on this point. It is striking, however, that on this one occasion when Eustathius does apply στάσις-theory to Homer he disagrees with the scholia.

First, the context. At Il. 3.67-75 Paris issues a challenge to Menelaus on the basis that the victor will take Helen and the property; Hector conveys the challenge to the Greeks in the same terms (86-94; cf. Idaeus at 255). When Menelaus accepts the challenge he assumes that one of them will be killed (101-2); and when Agamemnon formulates the oath used to confirm the truce he says that whichever party kills the other will take Helen and the property (281-7). But in the event Paris, though beaten, is rescued from death by Aphrodite; and Agamemnon claims Helen and the property for Menelaus on the basis of his victory (456-60). As Eustathius observes, Pandarus’ breach of the truce forestalls any explicit Trojan response to this claim.\(^\text{13}\)

According to the scholia, the issue of the dispute is one of letter and intent (3.457 καὶ γίνεται ἡ στάσις ῥήτων καὶ διάνοια; by contrast Eustathius identifies it as ἀντινομία (415.33 = 653.15; 434.37 = 683.27). The problem is discussed as an instance of ἀντινομία in Plutarch’s Quaestiones Convivales (9.13), a work with which Eustathius was closely familiar;\(^\text{14}\) but why has he chosen to abandon the scholia in favour of Plutarch at this point?

Two features of the discussion in the scholia offer prima facie support for Eustathius’ decision. The note to 3.457 speaks of the Trojans invoking the support of Agamemnon’s words, the Greeks of Hector’s; this satisfies Hermogenes’ definition of ἀντινομία precisely: ἀν μὲν οὖν περὶ ἐν ῥήτων ἡ ζήτησις... ῥήτων καὶ διάνοια γίνεται... (40.6-8), εἰ μέντοι περὶ δόῳ ῥήτῳ... ἡ ζήτησις εὑ... ἀντινομία γίνεται (40.20-41.1). Moreover, the comment in the scholion to 3.281-7 that the Trojans have the better of the argument ὅτι μᾶλλον τὰ ἐπὶ τοῦ ὀρκοῦ ὤριζόμενα is lame if the issue is whether to follow the letter or the

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\(^{11}\) See M. van der Valk, Eustathii Commentaria ad Homerii Iliadem pertinentes (Leiden 1971-87), I.xcii-e, II.li-lxx.

\(^{12}\) For the association of στάσις-theory with ‘political’ rhetoric see Hermogenes 28.10-14 Rabe.

\(^{13}\) For a more recent commentary on this sequence see G.S. Kirk’s notes on 3.281-7, 306-7, 457.

\(^{14}\) van der Valk (n.11), l.ev.
spirit of the oath (being in that case either trivially true or question-begging), but fits perfectly as a move in the relative evaluation of the challenge and the oath.\textsuperscript{15}

But these are relatively superficial points. More fundamentally, the στάσις cannot be determined without identifying the question in dispute. There are two possibilities. If the question is whether the Trojans break their oath in failing to return Helen, the στάσις is indeed ῥητὸν καὶ διάνοια. The Trojans would insist on the conditions made explicit in the oath, while the Greeks would argue that Menelaus’ victory satisfies its implied conditions; the terms of Paris’ challenge would be invoked only as evidence that the oath’s explicit reference to killing implicitly embraced other kinds of victory. However, if the question is simply who has best claim to Helen and the property, the Greeks could argue that the Trojans are—as it were—legally bound to return Helen by the terms of their challenge and the fact of its acceptance, even though they are not strictly speaking under oath to do so.\textsuperscript{16} In that case, both challenge and oath are of primary relevance, and the στάσις is ἀντινομία. The scholion in question is commenting on a speech in which Agamemnon appeals to the terms of the challenge in order to establish a claim to Helen, making no reference to the oath as such. The second way of construing the question therefore seems more apposite.

Eustathius, then, is justified in departing from the scholia. For the scholia seem to offer a correct analysis of a question (are the Trojans breaking their oath?) which is not posed by the lines on which they are commenting, but an incorrect analysis of the more immediately relevant question (who has best claim to Helen?). This suggests the possibility that the reference to ῥητὸν καὶ διάνοια originated in some context other than a commentary on this passage. An obvious alternative context is a ἀζητήμα on the prima facie inconsistency between the terms of the oath and subsequent claims that the oath has been broken (especially by Antenor at 7.351-2). We know from Porphyry’s \textit{Quaestiones Homericae} (59.35-60.16 Schrader) that this problem had been discussed as least as early as Aristotle.\textsuperscript{17} For a later rhetorician the use of στάσις-theory to resolve the difficulty

\textsuperscript{15}This agrees with Hermogenes’ treatment of the heading πρὸς τι in ἀντινομία at 87.2-9 (contrast 83.15-16 on the same heading in ῥητὸν καὶ διάνοια, where—naturally—there is no comparison of two legal instruments, only of two actions). Plutarch uses the point in this way at QC 742d-e. Another parallel to Hermogenes in Plutarch is the use of the heading περὶέχομενον καὶ περιεχόμενον, which Hermogenes identifies as distinctive to ἀντινομία (84.15-20, 87.9-19); this appears at 742f: ἐμοὶ γε ὅθεν μὴ ἀντινομίαν γεγονέναι τὸ ζήτημα, ταῖς δευτέραις ὁμολογίαις τὸν πρῶτον ἐμπερεχομένον. The speaker’s point here is not of course that the στάσις is something other than ἀντινομία, but that the dispute is decisively settled by this argument (diversionary tactics, for the argument is flawed).

\textsuperscript{16}Cf. the pro-Greek speaker at Plutarch QC 742b, where I presume the point is not that Agamemnon’s oath is invalid \textit{per se}, but that it does not supersede the terms of the challenge since the Greeks, in accepting the Trojan challenge, had no power to vary its terms; this party’s version of περὶέχομενον καὶ περιεχόμενον (see previous note) would therefore be that the terms of the challenge can retain their validity without annulling the oath. The heading πρὸς τι is supplied by the argument that the claim of the victor is intrinsically more just than that of the killer (742b-d).

\textsuperscript{17}Aristotle observes (fr.148 Rose) that the poet nowhere states that the Trojans broke the oath; but he argues that the Trojans are nevertheless subject to the curse invoked at 3.298-301 on those who
would be an obvious step; and, as we have seen, an appeal to ῥητὸν καὶ διάνοια is the correct solution to the problem thus posed.

merely ‘injure’ (πημήνειαν) the oath: ὀὰκ ἐπιώρκησαν μὲν σὺν, ἐκακούργησαν καὶ ἐβλαψαν τοὺς ὄρκους ἔπαρατοι σὺν ἦσαν.