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Turtles all the way down: regress, priority and fundamentality in metaphysics

Cameron, R.P. (2008) Turtles all the way down: regress, priority and fundamentality in metaphysics. Philosophical Quarterly, 58 (230). pp. 1-14. ISSN 1467-9213

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Abstract

This paper is a discussion of an intuition commonly held by metaphysicians: that there must be a fundamental layer of reality; that chains of ontological dependence must terminate; that there cannot be turtles all the way down. I discuss application of this intuition with reference to Bradley’s regress, composition, realism about the mental and the cosmological argument. I discuss some arguments for the intuition, but argue that they are unconvincing. I conclude by making some suggestions for how the intuition should be argued for, and discussing the ramifications of giving the justification I think best.

Item Type: Article
Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: © 2007 The Author. This is an author produced version of a paper published in Philosophical Quarterly. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher's self archiving policy. Embargoed by the publisher until May 2008.
Academic Units: The University of Leeds > Faculty of Arts (Leeds) > School of Humanities (Leeds) > School of Philosophy (Leeds)
Depositing User: Repository Officer
Date Deposited: 08 Apr 2008 16:56
Last Modified: 08 Feb 2013 17:05
Published Version: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9213.2007.509.x
Status: Published
Publisher: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of the Scots Philosophical Club and the University of St Andrews
Refereed: Yes
Identification Number: 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2007.509.x
Related URLs:
URI: http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/id/eprint/3737

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