Cameron, R.P. (2008) Turtles all the way down: regress, priority and fundamentality in metaphysics. Philosophical Quarterly, 58 (230). pp. 1-14. ISSN 1467-9213
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This paper is a discussion of an intuition commonly held by metaphysicians: that there must be a fundamental layer of reality; that chains of ontological dependence must terminate; that there cannot be turtles all the way down. I discuss application of this intuition with reference to Bradley’s regress, composition, realism about the mental and the cosmological argument. I discuss some arguments for the intuition, but argue that they are unconvincing. I conclude by making some suggestions for how the intuition should be argued for, and discussing the ramifications of giving the justification I think best.
|Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information:||© 2007 The Author. This is an author produced version of a paper published in Philosophical Quarterly. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher's self archiving policy. Embargoed by the publisher until May 2008.|
|Institution:||The University of Leeds|
|Academic Units:||The University of Leeds > Faculty of Arts (Leeds) > School of Humanities (Leeds) > School of Philosophy (Leeds)
The University of Leeds > Faculty of Arts (Leeds) > School of Philosophy, Religion and History of Science (Leeds) > School of Philosophy (Leeds)
|Depositing User:||Repository Officer|
|Date Deposited:||08 Apr 2008 16:56|
|Last Modified:||08 Feb 2013 17:05|
|Publisher:||Blackwell Publishing on behalf of the Scots Philosophical Club and the University of St Andrews|
Available Versions of this Item
Turtles all the way down: Regress, priority and fundamentality in metaphysics. (deposited 02 Nov 2007 18:12)
- Turtles all the way down: regress, priority and fundamentality in metaphysics. (deposited 08 Apr 2008 16:56) [Currently Displayed]