Williams, J.R.G. (2008) Permutations and foster problems: two puzzles or one? Ratio, 21 (1). pp. 91-105. ISSN 1467-9329Full text available as:
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How are permutation arguments for the inscrutability of reference to be formulated in the context of a Davidsonian truth-theoretic semantics? Davidson (1979) takes these arguments to establish that there are no grounds for favouring a reference scheme that assigns London to ‘Londres’, rather than one that assigns Sydney to that name. We shall see, however, that it is far from clear whether permutation arguments work when set out in the context of the kind of truth-theoretic semantics which Davidson favours. The principle required to make the argument work allows us to resurrect Foster problems against the Davidsonian position. The Foster problems and the permutation inscrutability problems stand or fall together: they are one puzzle, not two.
|Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information:||© 2007 The Author. This is an author produced version of a paper accepted for publication in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.|
|Institution:||The University of Leeds|
|Academic Units:||The University of Leeds > Faculty of Arts (Leeds) > School of Humanities (Leeds) > School of Philosophy (Leeds)|
|Depositing User:||Leeds Philosophy Department|
|Date Deposited:||02 Nov 2007 18:44|
|Last Modified:||08 Feb 2013 17:05|