Williams, J.R.G. (2008) Chances, counterfactuals and similarity. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 77 (2). pp. 385-420. ISSN 1933-1592Full text available as:
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John Hawthorne in a recent paper takes issue with Lewisian accounts of counterfactuals, when relevant laws of nature are chancy. I respond to his arguments on behalf of the Lewisian, and conclude that while some can be rebutted, the case against the original Lewisian account is strong. I develop a neo-Lewisian account of what makes for closeness of worlds. I argue that my revised version avoids Hawthorne’s challenges. I argue that this is closer to the spirit of Lewis’s first (non-chancy) proposal than is Lewis’s own suggested modification.
|Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information:||© 2008 International Phenomenological Society. This is an author produced version of a paper accepted for publication in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.|
|Academic Units:||The University of Leeds > Faculty of Arts (Leeds) > School of Humanities (Leeds) > School of Philosophy (Leeds)|
|Depositing User:||Leeds Philosophy Department|
|Date Deposited:||02 Nov 2007 18:38|
|Last Modified:||08 Feb 2013 17:05|
|Publisher:||International Phenomenological Society|
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