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Chances, counterfactuals and similarity

Williams, J.R.G. (2008) Chances, counterfactuals and similarity. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 77 (2). pp. 385-420. ISSN 1933-1592

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John Hawthorne in a recent paper takes issue with Lewisian accounts of counterfactuals, when relevant laws of nature are chancy. I respond to his arguments on behalf of the Lewisian, and conclude that while some can be rebutted, the case against the original Lewisian account is strong. I develop a neo-Lewisian account of what makes for closeness of worlds. I argue that my revised version avoids Hawthorne’s challenges. I argue that this is closer to the spirit of Lewis’s first (non-chancy) proposal than is Lewis’s own suggested modification.

Item Type: Article
Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: © 2008 International Phenomenological Society. This is an author produced version of a paper accepted for publication in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
Institution: The University of Leeds
Academic Units: The University of Leeds > Faculty of Arts (Leeds) > School of Humanities (Leeds) > School of Philosophy (Leeds)
The University of Leeds > Faculty of Arts (Leeds) > School of Philosophy, Religion and History of Science (Leeds) > School of Philosophy (Leeds)
Depositing User: Leeds Philosophy Department
Date Deposited: 02 Nov 2007 18:38
Last Modified: 08 Feb 2013 17:05
Published Version: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2008.00196.x
Status: Published
Publisher: International Phenomenological Society
Identification Number: 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2008.00196.x
Related URLs:
URI: http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/id/eprint/3357

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