Saatsi, J. (2005) Pessimistic induction and two fallacies. Philosophy of Science, 72 (5). pp. 1088-1098.
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The Pessimistic Induction from falsity of past theories forms a perennial argument against scientific realism. This paper considers and rebuts two recent arguments—due to Lewis (2001) and Lange (2002)—to the conclusion that the Pessimistic Induction (in its best known form) is fallacious. It re-establishes the dignity of the Pessimistic Induction by calling to mind the basic objective of the argument, and hence restores the propriety of the realist program of responding to PMI by undermining one or another of its premises.
|Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information:||© 2005 University of Chicago Press. Reproduced in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy.|
|Institution:||The University of Leeds|
|Academic Units:||The University of Leeds > Faculty of Arts (Leeds) > School of Humanities (Leeds) > School of Philosophy (Leeds)
The University of Leeds > Faculty of Arts (Leeds) > School of Philosophy, Religion and History of Science (Leeds) > School of Philosophy (Leeds)
|Depositing User:||Leeds Philosophy Department|
|Date Deposited:||05 Oct 2007 09:52|
|Last Modified:||08 Feb 2013 17:07|
|Publisher:||University of Chicago Press|