Cameron, R.P. (2007) Turtles all the way down: Regress, priority and fundamentality in metaphysics. Philosophical Quarterly, (Onlin. ISSN 1467-9213
This paper is a discussion of an intuition commonly held by metaphysicians: that there must be a fundamental layer of reality; that chains of ontological dependence must terminate; that there cannot be turtles all the way down. I discuss application of this intuition with reference to Bradley’s regress, composition, realism about the mental and the cosmological argument. I discuss some arguments for the intuition, but argue that they are unconvincing. I conclude by making some suggestions for how the intuition should be argued for, and discussing the ramifications of giving the justification I think best.
|Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information:||© 2007 The Author. Embargoed by the publisher until May 2008.|
|Institution:||The University of Leeds|
|Academic Units:||The University of Leeds > Faculty of Arts (Leeds) > School of Philosophy, Religion and History of Science (Leeds) > School of Philosophy (Leeds)|
|Depositing User:||Leeds Philosophy Department|
|Date Deposited:||02 Nov 2007 18:12|
|Last Modified:||08 Feb 2013 16:55|