Turtles all the way down: Regress, priority and fundamentality in metaphysics

Cameron, R.P. (2007) Turtles all the way down: Regress, priority and fundamentality in metaphysics. Philosophical Quarterly, (OnlineEarly Articles). ISSN 1467-9213

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Abstract

This paper is a discussion of an intuition commonly held by metaphysicians: that there must be a fundamental layer of reality; that chains of ontological dependence must terminate; that there cannot be turtles all the way down. I discuss application of this intuition with reference to Bradley’s regress, composition, realism about the mental and the cosmological argument. I discuss some arguments for the intuition, but argue that they are unconvincing. I conclude by making some suggestions for how the intuition should be argued for, and discussing the ramifications of giving the justification I think best.

Item Type:	Article
Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information:	© 2007 The Author. Embargoed by the publisher until May 2008.
Academic Units:	The University of Leeds > Faculty of Arts (Leeds) > School of Humanities (Leeds) > School of Philosophy (Leeds)
Depositing User:	Leeds Philosophy Department
Date Deposited:	02 Nov 2007 18:12
Last Modified:	08 Feb 2013 16:55
Published Version:	http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9213.2007.509.x
Status:	Published
Publisher:	Blackwell Publishing
Refereed:	Yes
Identification Number:	10.1111/j.1467-9213.2007.509.x
Related URLs:	http://www.leeds.ac.uk/philosophy
URI:	http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/id/eprint/3344

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• Turtles all the way down: Regress, priority and fundamentality in metaphysics. (deposited 02 Nov 2007 18:12) [Currently Displayed]
  • Turtles all the way down: regress, priority and fundamentality in metaphysics. (deposited 08 Apr 2008 16:56)

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