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**Published paper**
Metaphor, Indeterminacy and Intention

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Abstract

David Cooper has argued that it is a constraint on any acceptable theory of metaphor that it account for the 'indeterminacy' of metaphorical content, that is, the sense that many metaphors admit of more than one acceptable interpretation, none of which can be uniquely demonstrated to be correct. He further argues that the 'speaker's meaning' model of metaphorical content proposed by Searle and others cannot meet this constraint, and thus must be disregarded as a prospective account of such content.

In this paper I argue firstly that Cooper's characterisation of the proposed constraint is misguided, and that we should be careful to distinguish the role that intention plays in determining metaphorical content from the question of whether we can have satisfying interpretations of metaphors that do not take speaker intention into account. I then give my own characterisation of the problem, relating it to a more general tension between the intuition that first person ascriptions of intentions carry a certain authority, and the fact that it seems to misrepresent the phenomenology of metaphor production to ascribe to the speaker a pre-existing and precise cognitive content which his metaphorical utterance is intended to convey. I go on to argue that we can resolve this tension by following Crispin Wright in viewing self ascriptions of intention as essentially response dependent; with our best judgements constituting rather than tracking the facts about what we intend. I conclude that while such an account must be refined in order to distinguish intentions related to specifically metaphorical content from the literal case, the general shape of the account is sufficient to remove the intuitions that Cooper's objection trades on.
Introduction

Intention plainly has something to do with metaphor. We can choose to make a metaphor, and intend our utterance to be taken as such. We have a certain authority with respect to our utterances; we are entitled in many circumstances, to treat lack of respect for a prior intention as a cognitive failing. You've misunderstood me, we might say, I wasn't speaking literally, or I didn't intend that aspect of the metaphor to be emphasised. Admittedly, this need not be, and in all probability isn't always the case. When speaking to a psychoanalyst, or writing a novel, for example, one might implicitly or explicitly renounce a certain degree of authority over the interpretation of one's metaphors, along with some of one's literal utterances. Moreover, there might be many other types of cases where speakers happily allow their metaphorical utterance to be extended in a way that is new or surprising to them. We should not let consideration of these cases blur an important distinction, however. To take a somewhat analogous case, there is a big difference between being happy with a way a witty remark is picked up and elaborated upon, and claiming the embellishments as one's own. We need an account of the role of intention that allows us to make just this kind of distinction in the case of metaphorical utterance.

On the other hand, there might seem to be a problem in reconciling this consideration with the peculiarly open-ended quality of metaphor. Many commentators, for example, have felt dissatisfied with a straightforward "speaker's meaning" account of metaphor, which in its crudest form holds that:

I: S's metaphorical utterance m means that p iff S intends m to convey that p.\(^1\)
Such an account is clearly so over-simplistic as to allow straightforward disqualification as a serious theory of metaphorical meaning; the spiralling complexities of speech act theory have taught us that. Yet we might be sceptical of the prospects for any such account, however hedged and qualified, and not only for this crude precursor. Surely, we might want to say, this whole approach to metaphor is in danger of just misrepresenting the phenomenology of metaphorical utterance. We don't typically have a distinct content ‘in mind’, as it were, that we then express via the use of metaphor. Indeed, if we did, it would seem to render the motivation behind metaphorical utterance a little mysterious. If you intend to say that p, then why not just say it? We seem to be close to a view of metaphor that characterises it merely as amusing embellishment, or useful shorthand. And such a view has often been felt to be philosophically and phenomenologically unsatisfying. Of course, one response to this worry would be to deny that we have any privileged access to the content of our own intentions, to hold that we can have at best inductive evidence, resulting from a process of self-interpretation, for what we intend and mean, even in the most everyday cases. But this move, in turn, makes a mystery of the very authority we grant to speakers, which originally supported the speaker-intention model. We need an theory of metaphor that allows us to be faithful to the phenomenology of metaphor making, while also delivering a satisfying account of how we interact with metaphor makers. It may seem, however, that no speaker-meaning theory can deliver both desiderata.

Cooper's objections

David Cooper has objected to the speaker's meaning view of metaphor along related, if not strictly analogous, lines. His objection contends that such a view cannot account for the indeterminacy of metaphorical content. A metaphor is indeterminate in Cooper's sense if it admits of more than one interpretation, none of which can be demonstrated as uniquely
correct. Cooper holds that any successful account of metaphor must give us a story about metaphorical indeterminacy.

It is clear that Cooper's characterisation is unsatisfactory as it stands - it lets in cases where all interpretations are clearly incorrect, for example. Rather than try to offer an improved version, however, I intend to take it merely as gesturing at some important aspects of our normal thought about metaphor: namely, that metaphor is apt for competing, independently satisfying interpretations of which there is seemingly no a priori guarantee, in the general case, that we will have reason to adopt one rather than another.

Cooper considers three possible ways in which the speaker-intention model could try to account for such indeterminacy. Firstly, the indeterminacy might be caused by our ignorance of what exactly it is that the speaker intended. Secondly, the speaker’s intention might be somehow ‘open-ended’ or indeterminate. Cooper characterises this option, following Searle, as implying that when S utters some metaphor of the form ‘A is B’, he intends to mean or implicate a range of meanings; A is C1 and/or A is C2, C3 etc. Finally, we might take the indeterminacy to be a feature related to the fact that different possible speakers could use the same sentence to convey different contents. Cooper rejects all three of these proposed accounts.

Cooper's arguments

In this part of this paper, I want to look more closely at what exactly Cooper thinks is wrong with the various accounts. I will argue that his discussion is unsatisfactory in a number of respects, and then go on to claim that the idea that in metaphorical utterance the speaker’s intention is ‘open-ended’ can be better characterised and defended.
Cooper has a number of objections to the first proposal:

**(M1)** A metaphorical content \( M \) is indeterminate iff we are ignorant of what an actual speaker \( S \) intended to convey by his corresponding metaphorical utterance \( P \).

He first considers the case were we have no knowledge of \( S \) at all, and concludes that this case collapses into a special case of the third proposal (M3, see below); with the indeterminacy being caused by the speculation about what different possible speakers might have meant. He then argues that even if we do know quite a lot about the identity and context of \( S \), a limited amount of ignorance about his environment can still leave us completely in the dark about \( S \)'s intention. He cites solely literary cases

> In learning about writers such as Rimbaud, Mallarmé, Marinetti and Ezra Pound, one soon learns that speculation as to what they intended to communicate by individual metaphors is pointless - in the dual sense of being a waste of time and beside the point. But this does not mean that it is pointless to try and interpret the metaphors, nor that any old interpretation will do.\(^4\)

Having argued that the interpretation of metaphor can be relatively determinate even when we know little about the speaker's intentions, Cooper goes on to argue the converse; that we can be sure of what the speaker's intentions were without determining the metaphorical content.

> The speaker, poet or painter does not have exclusive rights to interpretation - and even if he did his interpretation would not have to mimic his intention at the time of composition.\(^5\)

So, he concludes, ignorance of an actual speaker's intention is neither necessary nor sufficient for a metaphor to have an indeterminate content.
If the point here is solely that we can come up with satisfying interpretations of apparently metaphorical utterances that mention little about the actual speaker, then the point is well taken. But that is surely not what should be at issue here. We should be careful not to confuse the idea that we can interpret what a person knowingly said in making an utterance with the idea that we can interpret the sentence he uttered in a way that satisfies us in some respect. The whole idea of something being an unintentional double entendre, for example, relies on there being a gap between what a speaker actually said and the possibility of construing it in a satisfying way. We should similarly admit the existence of non-intentional metaphors – in the sense of sentences or utterances that we can intelligibly or usefully treat as if they were metaphors – which we can generate and interpret for particular purposes. Perhaps Burroughs' technique of cutting up newspapers and randomly assorting often suggestive sentences would be a clear example of how we can intentionally bring about such non-intentional metaphors. Nobody should claim that only intentional utterances can be interpreted as if they were metaphors, just as nobody should suggest that only intentional jokes – or joke shaped utterances - are funny. But this should not lead us to play down the role of intention in the practice of joke telling, nor in metaphor.

In addition, we must be careful not to assume that we can give a unified account of how we should best interpret metaphors, no matter in what context they may arise. The cases Cooper cites, involving Modernist writers, may well demand a different treatment than the everyday case, but this is not to say that we haven't identified an important feature of the everyday case when we link metaphor to an intended use of a sentence.

Let us assume, in the interests of charity, that Cooper's target is only the 'naïve' intention theorist, who thinks that M1 says all that needs to be said about metaphoric indeterminacy. His arguments against naïve intentionalism then seem cogent; metaphoric determinacy and actual speaker intention can come apart. What about the second idea then, namely;
A metaphorical content M is indeterminate iff the speaker's intention is open ended.

Cooper admits that a speaker can, on occasion, intend for a metaphor to be taken in 'several ways at the same time'. Perhaps when I say "John is a real giant among men", I can intend that his mother will think that I am praising him, while knowing that you will really know that I am drawing attention to his weight problem. But, Cooper argues, this is not happily characterised as intending to mean C1 or C2 by P, but rather C1 and C2. Moreover, it cannot suffice for a metaphor to be indeterminate that the relevant intended meaning be vague, since that would suggest not incommensurate interpretations but a single one that 'matches the speaker's intention in vagueness'. Nor can S intend merely to try out a striking sounding sentence, for that would render the relevant speaker's meaning non-existent, not open-ended.

Cooper claims that there is only one kind of case that might happily be described as one of 'speaker's open ended meaning'. This is where the proposition meant by the speaker is of the open-ended form 'P or Q or …'. [But] To say that a speaker might have meant P, or might have meant Q, is not equivalent to saying that he meant a disjunctive proposition P or Q or…

Cooper rightly points out that whereas we might be happy to say of a notoriously ironic friend that we often don't know whether he is saying P or saying not-P, we never take him to be uttering the tautology P or not-P.

All these arguments, I would suggest, are fine as far as they go. But Cooper is wrong, I think, to take the best construal of M2 as involving vagueness or disjunction. In the latter half of
this essay, I want to outline what I take to be a better picture of how intention and indeterminacy are related.

We can deal briefly with

(M3) A metaphorical content M is indeterminate iff different possible speakers could mean different things by the corresponding utterance P.

This is untenable, and Cooper rightly demolishes it. Firstly, there are just too many possible speakers. We have to narrow them down to the 'most reasonable ones', and Cooper argues, we can do so precisely because we have a prior idea of what counts as a reasonable interpretation of the metaphor. Our grasp of the metaphoric content determines the relevant possible speakers, and not vice versa. I am slightly sceptical about the general effectiveness of this response to more plausible modifications of (M3), but do not intend to take issue with it here.

A more general problem?

Let's go back to the problem that we started out with. There is a tension between two ways we might want to think about metaphor. On the one hand, we are pulled in the direction of saying that the speaker’s intention must in some sense constrain acceptable interpretation of metaphor. After all, how else are we to explain the common sense idea that the speaker has often selected a particular metaphor, that she has reasons for using the expression that she does, etc? On the other hand, there is definite substance to the intuition that lies behind Cooper's objection. The idea that in metaphorical utterance we have a definite and pre-existing content to convey, that the problem of selecting a metaphor is one of how best to dress up such a content in borrowed clothes, seems to completely misrepresent the
phenomenology of what we do. Typically metaphors spring to mind with a rather vague feeling of aptness. We can often struggle to express or even elucidate in literal language what we meant by a metaphor. Yet typically we can recognise interpretations of a metaphor as being in or out of accord with the way we meant them to be understood. We ought not to envisage ourselves as throwing metaphors out into the world, semi-randomly as it were, to fare as they happen to be taken up and elaborated on, whether by ourselves or others. But similarly it seems difficult to see how, after the metaphor has been correctly and fully interpreted, taken in the way we meant it, we could have had a prior intention to mean or implicate all of that.

I think we should see this tension as an instance of a more general issue about intentional states, discussed by Crispin Wright in a number of papers and usefully summarised by Jim Edwards:

The problem is to reconcile the first person epistemology of such intentional states, the fact that we normally take a person’s sincere avowals of his own intentional states to be authoritative, with the fact that an intentional state may also ‘have to answer to’ future behaviour, behaviour which the subject need not ‘have had in mind’ when he made the avowal.

In the case of metaphor, the intentional state in question is what the speaker intended to mean by the metaphor. The future behaviour is the responses and judgements made by the speaker concerning which interpretations and extensions of the metaphor are in accord with his original intention. Wright’s attempted resolution of the problem involves taking the speaker’s considered belief about what he intended to mean to constitute the facts about what he meant, rather than seeing them as tracking an independent fact of the matter. What I intend by a metaphor can be open-ended precisely because for any given interpretation, extension or
development of the metaphor, there is not an independently determined, pre-existing fact about whether it accords with my intention.

Wright’s Provisional Equations

Before we go on to consider the particular case of metaphor, let’s look a little more closely at how Wright’s general account is structured. He is interested in different ways of interpreting what he calls ‘Provisional Equations’, which take the following general form

\[(PE)\] For a set of optimal conditions \(C\), a state of affairs \(P\), and a subject \(S\):

\[\text{If } C \text{ holds, then (it would be the case that } P \text{ iff } S \text{ would judge that } P).\]

There are two different ways, Wright thinks, that we could understand the case where PE holds true for a particular \(C\), \(P\) and \(S\). We could understand the \(C\)-conditions as being such as to allow \(S\) to successfully track an independently obtaining fact that \(P\). That is, we could understand the biconditional as indicating that \(S\) judges that \(P\) because \(P\) is the case. For example, we might understand the PE that told us that under relevant \(C\)-conditions \(S\) judged that \(x\) was square when and only when it was square as holding because \(x\) was in fact square, and, under conditions \(C\), \(S\) is a competent judge of squareness. Call this the extension-reflecting sense.

On the other hand, we could understand the biconditional as indicating that it is \(S\)’s best opinion that \(constitutes\) the fact that \(P\). In this case, we understand it as telling us that \(P\) is the case because \(S\) judges that \(P\). For example, we might take the PE that told us that under relevant \(C\)-conditions \(S\) judged that \(x\) was funny when and only when it was funny as holding
because the facts about funniness depend on our best judgements about what’s funny. Call this the *extension-determining* sense.\(^{11}\)

How are we to tell which way we should read the Provisional Equation? Wright’s idea is that it should be read as extension determining just in case it meets a set of further constraints. First, the C-conditions must be specified substantially, not by means of a ‘whatever it takes’ *ceteris paribus* clause. Second, they must be a priori true. Third, whether the C-conditions are satisfied must be logically independent of facts about P. And finally, our case for reading it as extension determining must be *extremal*; there must be no better explanation of why the first three conditions are satisfied than the claim that S’s best judgements constitute the fact that P.

What is the motivation behind these constraints? Wright wants to test whether or not a particular biconditional is extension determining or extension reflecting by examining whether or not there is a merely accidental link between our best judgements and whether or not the fact that P holds. It is clear that if we specify the C-conditions by means of a ‘whatever it takes’ clause, the biconditional will hold trivially true, and thus prevent us from examining whether the link between judgement and fact holds merely contingently.\(^{12}\) So we must specify the C-conditions in more detail, without appeal to *ceteris paribus* clauses. If we do so, and the biconditional holds a priori true, then that will be a sign that the facts of the matter cannot come apart from our best judgements of the matter, and thus that we should construe the Equation in the extension-determining sense. But such a sign will only be an accurate guide if the further two conditions hold.

The independence condition is required in order that we can allow *echoing*, making use of the very concepts that we are concerned with in specifying the optimality conditions, without running the risk that we might be jeopardising the idea that the a prioricity of the PE can be a test of whether the relevant concepts are extension reflecting or determining. By making
sure that the concepts only occur, if at all, in contexts governed by intensional operators, we ensure that there is no 'hidden reference' to the extension built into the optimality conditions. We avoid the charge that in specifying the conditions under which, for example, we can best judge whether something is red, we have implicitly appealed to an response-independent property of redness, thereby rendering our proposed test valueless.

The extremal condition, that there must be no better explanation of why the first three conditions are satisfied than that S's best opinions constitute the fact that P, is intended to leave room for the idea that the a priori co-extensiveness of judgement and fact might be a result of our infallibility about a particular type of fact, for example, and not an indication that our judgements constitute the relevant facts. In effect, the condition ensures that if we are to be justified in claiming such infallibility we must be able to give a pretty detailed story of why and how we can be infallible about this particular type of fact. In the absence of such a story, we are entitled to assume that our best judgements determine what the facts are.

Provisional Equations and Intentions

How might such an account look with respect to first person self-ascriptions of intention? Consider the Provisional Equation for Intention (PEI), and its past tense counterpart (PEI*) for any subject S and content P

(PEI) If conditions C hold then (S believes that S intends P iff S intends P).
(PEI*) If conditions C hold then (S believes that S intended P iff S intended P).

Wright argues that in suitable conditions a subject's judgements about his own intentions constitute the fact that he has such and such intention. It is not at best a contingent matter whether or not we have access to our own intentions, he thinks. Rather, it is precisely the fact

13
that our best opinion determines whether or not we have a particular intention that explains why we are 'effortlessly, non-inferentially and generally reliable about [our own] psychological states.'

Of course, it is possible for us to be self-deceived about our own states of mind. Moreover, there seems to be no straightforward way of ruling out such self-deception in formulating the C-conditions in PEI and PEI*, without running into trouble with the substantiality condition. Nevertheless, Wright holds, the 'grammar' of intention is such that we are a priori entitled to presume that we are not deceived, unless we have actual evidence to the contrary. That is, although we cannot include a 'no self-deception' clause in the optimality conditions and still fulfil the substantiality condition, we can still be a priori justified in holding that any given instances of PEI and PEI* are true. (That is, we are not a priori justified in holding that the universal closures are true, but we are in holding that any given instances are.)

Such justification is a priori but defeasible, since evidence that S was in fact self-deceived would remove it. Wright’s claim, therefore, is that the fact that PEI and PEI* are a priori justified is, in the absence of a better explanation, enough to show that our best opinions about our own intentions are extension-determining rather than extension reflecting.

Since it is our best judgements about what we intend or intended that constitute the facts about our intentions, we can reconcile the idea that we have a definite authority with respect to our own intentions with the fact that intentions have to 'answer to' future demands about behaviour which we may not have considered at the time when we first formulated the intention. Self-deception aside, our judgements are not tracking independent facts about what we intend - so that, even in best conditions, I could fail to be true to my original intention to, say, mean plus by 'plus'. Rather, the facts about what we intend depend on the possibility of our judging that they are thus and so.
We now have the resources to make the case that in making a metaphor, the speaker's intention concerning how it should be understood can be essentially 'open-ended'. The correct reply is that intentions concerning metaphorical content are merely a special case of intending in general. In the correct conditions, my judgements about my own intentions are, as Wright has plausibly argued, constitutively linked to the facts about what those intentions are. So there is no need for the intention theorist to have to make the case that in intending to authoritatively convey a propositional content P by uttering a metaphor M, a speaker S must somehow have had P 'before his mind' when intending to utter M metaphorically. It is a perfectly acceptable picture to conceive our access to the facts about what S intended by a particular metaphor as primarily relating to when, under optimal conditions, he would judge that a particular interpretation is in accord with what he intended.

Cooper originally defined a metaphor as being indeterminate just in case it admitted of more than one interpretation, none of which can be demonstrated as uniquely correct. We have seen that we must distinguish the idea that there can be satisfying and productive interpretations of 'non-intentional metaphors' from the notion that a speaker's utterance has a metaphorical content that admits of more than one interpretation. So Cooper requires a narrower definition of what indeterminacy consists in. What I want to argue is that the intuition that metaphors are in some sense indeterminate because a speaker simply couldn't have had all that content in his mind's eye, as it were, is simply misplaced. The speaker typically does not have a independently determined content in mental view, which he then conveys with a greater or lesser degree of success. Nor is he merely in equal hermeneutic standing with his interlocutor, forced to interpret his own metaphors in just the same fashion as he interprets those of others, and as others interpret him. Rather, the speaker can inhabit an epistemically optimal position from which to arbitrate between different interpretations,
making constitutive judgements as to which was in accord with his earlier intention. But this doesn't entail that indeterminacy in Cooper's sense is completely removed, that one can uniquely demonstrate that one interpretation is correct. Such a demonstration is not possible since the interpretation at hand is always defeasible, conditional not only on the possession of a continuing warrant to hold that the relevant epistemic conditions are ideal, but also on the speaker's future judgements and avowals relating to alternative or modified interpretations.16

Of course, all this still leaves plenty of room for a speaker to be mistaken about what he intended. If optimal conditions do not hold, or there is evidence that he is self-deceived, then PEI is silent about whether or not S's judgements constitute the facts about what he means. We might favour a subjunctive account, appealing to what the speaker would have meant. Alternatively, in many cases where the optimal conditions for PEI do not hold, the optimal conditions for radical interpretation still might, and we might take the facts to be constituted by the judgements of a actual or hypothetical radical interpreter. In other cases, including perhaps the case of the Modernist novelist and the psycho-analytic patient, I might be taken to have renounced my first person authoritative standpoint with respect to my intentions, even when I actually inhabit best conditions.17 But there will be a wide area of cases in which it is precisely my best judgements that are authoritative.18

We have the beginnings of a solution, then, to the problem we started off with. In the everyday case, there is a firm link between speaker intention and metaphor. But we needn't imagine that this entails having the whole metaphorical content antecedently 'in mind' in the philosophically problematic way. This was the very picture that Cooper's suggestion that metaphorical content is indeterminate was reacting against. Instead, it is open to us to replace this picture with another which allows the nature of our knowledge of intention itself to be characteristically 'open'. Wright's theory has just this feature, since the existence of facts about what I intended are conditional on my best judgements, many of which, at any given time, I shall not have considered or made.
Cooper thus needs a finer grained definition of metaphoric indeterminacy, one that avoids the danger of triviality posed by the general open-endedness of first person ascriptions of intentions. Until such a definition is offered, we can take it that his 'indeterminacy' objection simply lapses.

Much more than this has to be said, of course, in order to differentiate this type of metaphorical indeterminacy from the general indeterminacy highlighted by Wright's account of intention. After all, that account applies as much to ‘2+2=4’ as to 'Juliet is the sun'. Perhaps metaphor is a case in which there is a stricter set of optimality conditions. Perhaps in some cases we are happier to admit that, at the time of utterance, we didn't quite know exactly what we meant to convey, while in the literal case we resist this much more strongly. Moreover, there will no doubt be many cases where the particular propositional content intended to be conveyed by the speaker is just not to the point: we like the metaphor because of its non-propositional effects on us, say the way the words sound together. The main point remains a good one, however. Cooper's objection is motivated by the right intuition, but he misconstrues the nature of the solution required.

Notes


3 We can further note here that on this characterisation, if Quine and Davidson are right about the indeterminacy of translation, then all metaphors will count as trivially indeterminate.

4 Cooper, Metaphor, p. 72

5 Cooper, Metaphor, p. 73

6 Cooper, Metaphor, p. 74

7 Cooper, Metaphor, p. 75


11 Since the PE only tells us about what is happening in optimal conditions, Wright normally describes our optimal judgement of whether P as at best partially determining the facts about P. I have often blurred this distinction here.

12 I blur here the important distinction between necessity and a prioricity. In the case of extension determining judgements, Wright seems to see the facts about our judgements as being the truth makers for e.g. the facts about what we meant. The a prioricity of the biconditional is interpreted as a sign that judgement and fact are non-contingently linked.

13 Statistically standard health, statistically standard external conditions, possession of relevant concepts, judging after a period of careful reflection, etc.


16 Cooper may well have intended 'uniquely demonstrate' to mean 'in principle uniquely demonstrate'. I do not address here the interesting question of whether we can get ourselves into a position of having a warrant to ascribe a metaphorical content that in fact survives arbitrarily close scrutiny of its pedigree and arbitrary extensions of the state of information that warrants it. It may well be the case that ascriptions of metaphorical content can be superassertible in this sense. (See Wright’s *Truth and Objectivity*).

17 We might characterise what is happening here in different ways. Is it a refusal to make the judgement about my intentions, even if ideal conditions hold? Or a second order intention that my first order intention not be taken as authoritative? (I might of course still require that my second order intention be taken as such.)

18 Or if not, the case has to be made. I take it that e.g. postmodernist critics aim to show that the optimality conditions are never fulfilled - the lures of patriarchy, ideology or the unconscious mean I am always self-deceived. I leave open the question of whether this is a coherent thought.

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