Lawlor, R. (2006) Luck, evidence and war. Journal of Applied Philosophy, 23 (3). pp. 247-257. ISSN 1468-5930Full text not available from this repository.
We seem to have conflicting intuitions regarding luck and war, and we seem to be faced with a dilemma. Either, we deny that a war can be made just or unjust as a result of luck, and we accept that we should not appeal to the outcome when claiming that the war was or was not justified. Or, alternatively, we allow that it is legitimate to base our judgements on the outcome, but as a result we must accept that luck can make a war just or unjust. Traditionally, these have been taken to be the two forks of the dilemma, but, in this paper, I argue that they are not the only options. Rather, we can appeal to the outcome of our actions without claiming that this is, in anyway, an appeal to moral luck. Rather, the outcome provides us with evidence.
|Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information:||© 2004 Blackwell Publishing. This is an author produced version of a paper published in Social Theory and Practice. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy|
|Institution:||The University of Leeds|
|Academic Units:||The University of Leeds > Faculty of Arts (Leeds) > School of Humanities (Leeds) > School of Philosophy (Leeds)|
|Depositing User:||Leeds Philosophy Department|
|Date Deposited:||10 Oct 2007 15:13|
|Last Modified:||10 Oct 2007 15:13|