Katzav, J. (2004) Horwich on meaning and use. Ratio, XVII (2). pp. 159-175. ISSN 1467-9329Full text available as:
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Paul Horwich claims that theories of meaning ought to accommodate the commonsense intuition that meanings play a part in explaining the use of words. Further, he argues that the view that best does so is that according to which the meaning of a word is constituted by a disposition to accept, in some circumstances, sentences in which it features. I argue that if meanings are construed thus, they will in fact fail to explain the use of words. I also argue that if we insist, as Horwich does, on the commonsense assumption that meanings are a species of entity, all versions of the view that meaning is constituted by our dispositions to use words will have to be rejected. I do not, however, claim that such theories ought to be rejected. My point is that they are incompatible with the requirements of commonsense. Further, I suggest that it is premature to impose such requirements on theories of meaning.
|Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information:||© 2004 Blackwell Publishing. This is an author produced version of a paper published in Ratio. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy.|
|Academic Units:||The University of Leeds > Faculty of Arts (Leeds) > School of Humanities (Leeds) > School of Philosophy (Leeds)|
|Depositing User:||Leeds Philosophy Department|
|Date Deposited:||05 Nov 2007 12:08|
|Last Modified:||08 Feb 2013 17:04|
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