Cameron, R.P. (2009) What's metaphysical about metaphysical necessity? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 79 (1). pp. 1-16. ISSN 1933-1592Full text available as:
Available under licence : See the attached licence file.
I begin by contrasting three approaches one can take to the distinction between the essential and accidental properties: an ontological, a deflationary, and a mind-dependent approach. I then go on to apply that distinction to the necessary a posteriori, and defend the deflationist view. Finally I apply the distinction to modal truth in general and argue that the deflationist position lets us avoid an otherwise pressing problem for the actualist: the problem of accounting for the source of modal truth.
|Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information:||© 2007 The Author. This is an author produced version of a paper accepted for publication in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 12 month embargo in accordance with the publisher's requirements.|
|Institution:||The University of Leeds|
|Academic Units:||The University of Leeds > Faculty of Arts (Leeds) > School of Humanities (Leeds) > School of Philosophy (Leeds)|
|Depositing User:||Leeds Philosophy Department|
|Date Deposited:||31 Oct 2007 16:20|
|Last Modified:||08 Feb 2013 17:04|