Cameron, R.P. (2005) Truthmaker necessitarianism and maximalism. Logique et Analyse, 48. pp. 43-56. ISSN 0024-5836
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Abstract
In this paper I examine two principles of orthodox truthmaker theory: truthmaker maximalism - the doctrine that every (contingent) truth has a truthmaker, and truthmaker necessitarianism - the doctrine that the existence of a truthmaker necessitates the truth of any proposition which it in fact makes true. I argue that maximalism should be rejected and that once it is we only have reason to hold a restricted form of necessitarianism.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | This is an author produced version of a paper subsequently published in Logique-et-Analyse. Uploaded with permission from the publisher. |
| Academic Units: | The University of Leeds > Faculty of Arts (Leeds) > School of Humanities (Leeds) > School of Philosophy (Leeds) |
| Depositing User: | Leeds Philosophy Department |
| Date Deposited: | 10 Oct 2007 12:01 |
| Last Modified: | 08 Feb 2013 17:04 |
| Status: | Published |
| Publisher: | National Centre for Logical Investigation |
| Refereed: | Yes |
| Related URLs: | |
| URI: | http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/id/eprint/3217 |
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