Cameron, R.P. (2005) Truthmaker necessitarianism and maximalism. Logique et Analyse, 48. pp. 43-56. ISSN 0024-5836Full text available as:
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In this paper I examine two principles of orthodox truthmaker theory: truthmaker maximalism - the doctrine that every (contingent) truth has a truthmaker, and truthmaker necessitarianism - the doctrine that the existence of a truthmaker necessitates the truth of any proposition which it in fact makes true. I argue that maximalism should be rejected and that once it is we only have reason to hold a restricted form of necessitarianism.
|Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information:||This is an author produced version of a paper subsequently published in Logique-et-Analyse. Uploaded with permission from the publisher.|
|Institution:||The University of Leeds|
|Academic Units:||The University of Leeds > Faculty of Arts (Leeds) > School of Humanities (Leeds) > School of Philosophy (Leeds)|
|Depositing User:||Leeds Philosophy Department|
|Date Deposited:||10 Oct 2007 12:01|
|Last Modified:||04 Jun 2014 18:16|
|Publisher:||National Centre for Logical Investigation|
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