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Published chapter
12. Conclusions

Bob Deacon, Noémí Lendvai and Paul Stubbs

INTRODUCTION

This book has brought together three fields of study: that concerned with the role of international actors and their influence on national polices; changes taking place to social policies in the context of globalization, transnationalism and Europeanization; and the political transformations taking place in South Eastern Europe. It has reported the results of empirical investigations into recent changes in social policy in the region and the ways in which transnational actors are influencing these changes.

We divide this concluding chapter into three sections. The first summarizes the actual developments in social policy in the countries of the region and the several and diverse ways in which international actors have, to varying degrees, been influential. We then draw some analytical conclusions arguing how the case studies lead to changes in the ways social scientists should make sense of: the role of international actors engaged in transnational policy-making including that of the EU; the role and nature of states in this ‘multi-level and multi-actor’ process; and the prospects for social policy and the diversity of welfare regimes. Finally, we make suggestions about the kind of research that is needed to advance understanding in these interrelated areas.

INTERNATIONAL ACTORS AND SOCIAL POLICY IN SEE

Answering the questions posed in Chapter 1 in the light of the case studies in Chapters 3 to 11 and taking account of the reflections upon Europeanization in Chapter 2 allows us to begin to piece together the key themes and the complex variations in the presence, nature and influence of international actors on the making of social policy. Based on these answers, we can draw more fundamental conclusions about the nature of the making of social policy in SEE, conceived as a complex product of transnational and domestic legacies, trends and processes. The review of the case studies
also reveals some of the limitations of the comparative case study method for understanding transnational policy-making, a point to which we return at the end of this chapter.

The Variability of Social Policy ‘Choices’ and ‘Accidents’

In terms of the variability of the social policy ‘choices’ being made by different countries in SEE in the spheres of social protection, social services, pensions, health and labour market policies, a number of things are apparent. In some fields there is almost uniformity in the direction of social policy reforms. In others there is diversity. Labour market policy has shifted in the direction of flexibilization and activation accompanying the informalization of the market everywhere. Compensatory unemployment benefits have been reduced or made more conditional. In terms of pension policy, however, while the dominant trend, pushed hard by the World Bank, has been towards the establishment of a multi-pillar system involving the erosion or reduction in importance of the PAYG state system in favour of the increased importance of an individualized, privately invested and managed defined contribution pension, this trend is not universal and has been resisted in Slovenia, Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Albania and, it would seem, in Turkey too. In Kosovo an unusual mixture has emerged of private savings being held by the state and used on retirement to buy an annuity if there are sufficient funds available, with a fall-back state guarantee. Reforms in health care have been less dramatic and more variable but almost always involve a push to partial privatization or marketization, but at the same time there are moves to try to ensure universal access in a resource-constrained environment. Some form of safety net social assistance scheme has emerged everywhere, often with local variation in the adequacy of the amounts provided and variable eligibility conditions. The major, although far from complete, trend in social services has been away from institutional care to other forms of support, including foster care and community-based support. Long-established Centres for Social Work in the post-Yugoslav countries are now being strengthened, having been sidelined in the emergency post-war humanitarian phase of relief in some countries. They now operate within an enlarged welfare mix alongside INGO and NGO players. In this sense welfare parallelism has emerged especially in those countries affected by the wars. The concept of and concern, at least formally, with social exclusion and inclusion echoes imported Euro-speak. Indeed, one feature of the shift in social policies in the region is the reframing of social policy issues away from traditional sector policies and clear policy choices within them to a more discursive concern with social problems associated with women, older people, young
people and children. In turn this has led to a projectization of social policy concerned with minorities, human rights, empowerment, participatory poverty assessments, social exclusion and discrimination. At the same time there has been a shift from a traditional state socialist obsession with defectology involving special education and institutional care towards inclusive care.

One aspect of social policy change noted in the Serbian chapter, but applicable elsewhere, is the sometimes accidental or arbitrary nature of the ‘choices’ made. Some policy shifts, especially in the early days of transition, depended on a particular constellation of consultants and ministers working in the absence of any public political discourse or concern about social policy choices. We return to this theme of the relationship between external and internal actors and the politics of social policy reform later.

A Range of International Actors Scrambling for Influence; the World Bank Remains Dominant but the Neo-liberal Project is Contested, Partial and Unfinished

In answer to our question concerning how complete the neo-liberal project in social policy has been in the region, we can conclude that it is not complete as resistance to the privatization of pensions has been shown in a number of countries and there has been only partial marketization of some health services (see Table 12.3). In some cases such as Turkey, external intervention has been concerned to universalize services and benefits formerly available to a privileged few. In the health sector most interventions have been concerned to set up an independent public health insurance fund to protect it from state plunder. However liberalization is extensively under way in terms of the activation of the labour market. The EU has not been a bulwark against the liberalizing trend as we note below.

In addition to the presence of the World Bank, the EU and the UN agencies including the UNDP, ILO and UNICEF, the region is marked by a proliferation of actors, some of which are completely new and largely incomparable with any other bodies elsewhere, and all of which contribute, explicitly or implicitly, to a crowded arena of policy advice, project implementation, and strategic alliance-building in social policy. Table 12.1 captures the presence of these actors in different countries.

In terms of the unusual actors at the regional level, the most important of these has been the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, established in 1999. After sustained lobbying by a range of actors, an Initiative for Social Cohesion (ISC) was established in 2000 within Working Table II on Economic Reconstruction, Development and Co-operation. Its overall objective was 'to address social issues the affect the daily lives of citizens of
Table 12.1 International actor presence and significance in the region

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Relationship to EU</th>
<th>Lending category/ status</th>
<th>World bank pension loan</th>
<th>World bank PRSP prepared</th>
<th>ILO presence mentioned</th>
<th>Bilateral donors</th>
<th>Other forms of intervention</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>Member</td>
<td>None – high income</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td></td>
<td>C of E stability pact (donor)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>Candidate</td>
<td>IBRD</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>Japanese DFID, USAID, GTZ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>SAA negotiations called off</td>
<td>Blend</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>Yes but abandoned</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>DFID Norway etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>Member</td>
<td>IBRD</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>C of E Children’s INGOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>Member</td>
<td>IBRD</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>OHR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BiH</td>
<td>Negotiations for SAA</td>
<td>Blend</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>Yes (MTDS)</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>C of E stability pact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>Candidate</td>
<td>IBRD</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>Yes but abandoned</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>UNMIK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>Not a country</td>
<td>Grants only (not a country)</td>
<td>Grants</td>
<td>No (KDP)</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>DFID</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>SAA signed</td>
<td>Blend</td>
<td>YES but</td>
<td>YES (GPRS)</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>USAID, Italy, SIDA, NORAD</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Candidate</td>
<td>IBRD</td>
<td>YES but</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>NO?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
the countries of SEE through regional approaches in the field of health, social protection, employment policy and vocational training, social dialogue and housing’ (ISC, 2002: 2). In a series of meetings in 2001, when the co-chairs were taken by the governments of France and Serbia and Montenegro (then FRY – France and the Republic of Yugoslavia), the main priorities for the coming years were to: improve health policy; strengthen social protection systems; develop social dialogue; enhance employability; stimulate new housing policies; and monitor and co-ordinate social policy development related projects (ISC, 2002). Leading roles were taken by the ILO, the Council of Europe, the European Trade Union Confederation, and the World Health Organization, with funding from a range of donors, including most prominently Switzerland and the Council of Europe.

The lofty aims of the initiative have gone largely unnoticed and have had little impact outside a small circle of cognoscenti. As the Stability Pact prepares to transform itself into a regional co-operation initiative, the overview of the ISC states that its activities ‘will continue in the form of networks that have been established among the relevant actors’ (Stability Pact, 2006: 6). The three areas mentioned are health, employment and social dialogue, with no reference to social protection. In fact, as a spin-off from the ISC, the Council of Europe has established the Social Institutions Support Programme, with a main office in Skopje in the Western Balkan/CARDS region, to support the modernization of social policies and institutions, and to promote regional social security coordination. This programme is mainly funded by the European Commission, and co-funded and managed by the Council of Europe’s Directorate General of Social Cohesion (DG III). The programme has contributed to the creation of a network of social security professionals and set the basis for regional co-operation in the field of social security. However, the Zagreb declaration following a Ministerial Conference on Social Security Co-ordination in the Western Balkans (Social Institutions Support Programme, 2006) has had little impact. As noted in the Macedonia chapter, the activities of the Centre are ‘by and large of academic or/and networking character, thus having no, (or at least very negligible) general impact’.

However, more significantly in Bosnia-Herzegovina, through the Office of the High Representative (OHR) and in Kosovo, through the UN-administration (UNMIK), as well as through NATO-led peace-keeping missions (SFOR and KFOR); a new kind of ad hoc protectorate governance exists. Interestingly, while in BiH, initially post-war, relatively little emphasis was placed on social policy issues, this was not the case later in Kosovo. Both chapters warn of the dangers in terms of the absence of any public sphere for debating social policy choices, of these protectorate and semi-protectorate arrangements.
Overall, the book shows that there is a bewildering array of international actors and their representatives, some of whom ‘wear more than one hat’, all competing to shape the social policy of the region. Indeed, in this context new intermediaries and brokers emerge with major implications for transparency and ownership. At the very least, as some of the case studies show, some country’s social affairs ministries have been left confused and disempowered in these processes. Indeed, it is not unknown for different donors to be working with different ministries on similar themes, from divergent perspectives, at the same time. What all of this often means is that the real centre of social policy development is determined within the fiscal envelopes of the Ministry of Finance, much constrained by the conditionalties of the IMF and World Bank.

In terms of our second question – where, why, how and when have certain international actors been influential? – a number of answers are evident. In general where the economy and the state has been weaker (even taken over as a protectorate) and where ‘civil society’ or the ‘public sphere’ appears less active, then the role of international actors has been that much stronger. The variation in the region is from Slovenia at one extreme where ‘international actors were obliged to respect Slovenian conditions’ to Kosovo at the other extreme in which ‘the development of post-conflict social welfare programmes . . . is perhaps the most extreme example of external intervention in policy formation’. Here ‘Kosovar popular actors, from organized labour and capital, to political parties and social movement organisations were not an influential part of the initial policy formation process’. Albania after the pyramid selling debacle comes a close second. In the countries involved in the wars of Yugoslav succession, the subsequent post-war stabilization process created opportunities for IO involvement and INGO involvement on a large scale, often in ways that distorted subsequent developments in national social policy.

In terms of the major external players, the World Bank is cited everywhere as having, or attempting to have, the greatest influence on social policy using loan conditionality or cross-conditionality with the IMF to secure change. A country’s status with regard to eligibility to borrow cheaply from the IDA arm of the World Bank is a factor here, with Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia eligible for IDA as a result of low incomes, but deemed financially creditworthy. Kosovo, since it is not a state, is eligible only for grants, not loans. Croatia, Macedonia and Turkey qualify for non-concessional loans through the IBRD as do Slovenia, Bulgaria and Romania. The ILO, while it is mentioned in a number of chapters, appears to have played something of a minor role, although it is now involved in producing regional and country overviews of key social policy issues, including social services (Fultz and Tracy, 2004) and social security spending (ILO,
The two UN agencies with an extensive country presence are UNDP and UNICEF. The United Nation Development Programme is a significant actor, often in conjunction with bilateral donors, although its efforts to inject MDG concerns into the PRSP appear to have met with mixed results. Its Human Development Reports remain influential. The United Nations Children's Fund has an operational presence linked to state obligations under the Convention on the Rights of the Child and has a high profile on child protection reform. The TransMONEE programme has been an important source of data and analysis on regional trends affecting children.

Nevertheless, it barely features as a key reform actor in the case studies in this book. Among the bilaterals, the UK's DFID has been active everywhere, often in conjunction with the World Bank. In addition, the Scandinavians, particularly Finland, Sweden and Norway, are involved in supporting social policy initiatives. USAID has had significant inputs into some reforms, notably in pensions and the labour market but is now slowly withdrawing. In Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, in particular, a group of, primarily US-based INGOs, including CARE, Catholic Relief Services and Mercy Corps International, more renowned for their emergency relief programmes, ventured into the sphere of social policy, particularly CARE. The British-based consultancy company Birks Sinclair and Associates Limited, have been involved, mainly on DFID-funded programmes, in a number of countries.

Variable Relation to an ‘Indifferent’ EU Minimizes and Delays the Europeanization of Social Policy

Often coming late in the day after the World Bank has set the social policy reform agenda is the European Union which, in the case of Turkey for example, has ‘Little interest in counterbalancing the IMF/World Bank’. In the case of Macedonia it was reported that there was ‘minimal intervention by the European Union, in the period until 2004, towards steering the country’s social policy direction closer to the “European social model”’. Furthermore ‘the absence of any concrete EU social policy prescription, created an additional gap, which altogether enabled the current neo-liberal social policy orientation in Macedonia to take hold’. The chapters on Bulgaria and Romania, Slovenia and, in particular, Croatia note the significance of the process of drawing up Joint Inclusion Memoranda as injecting a new dynamic into social policy thinking and, to an extent, programming. At this point, we can conclude that the European Union’s main contribution to the social policy of the countries of the region sometimes appears have been the generation of a discourse if not (yet) a practice of social inclusion. More generally, the EU has contributed to the process...
noted earlier whereby traditional domains of social policy have been deconstructed and new domains have emerged.

In terms of social policy, the variable relationship to the EU matters, as it presents a variety of very different modalities and frameworks, all with their own particular problems. While EU membership involves signing up to and realizing in practice a somewhat limited set of legal social policy requirements: health and safety regulations, equal treatment of men and women, transferability of social security rights, and a system of social protection, this leaves a lot of room for policy choice. At the level of rhetoric, the EU exhorts the countries of the region to establish a social dimension to their market economies. In practice many authors (de la Porte and Pochet, 2002; Deacon et al., 1997; Ferge, 2002; Vaughan-Whitehead, 2003) have observed previously that there has been very limited influence from the EU on social policy in Eastern Europe. There have been exceptions to this, as in the negative opinions regarding Bulgaria and Romania with regard to children in institutions and street children, and more widely in terms of the question of the treatment of minorities where the EU has ‘shown some teeth’ in the accession negotiations (Ferge, 2002). This may yet prove to be an important issue, of course, in relation to other SEE applicant countries in the context of concerns about human rights and, in particular, the rights of minorities.

In terms of EU assistance, what appears to occur is that the social *acquis* are emphasized least for those countries which, perhaps, need them most—the poorest countries, for whom EU membership is more distant. For many of these countries the EU’s external assistance agenda, and its various aid and reconstruction programmes, bear at best only a passing connection to the social *acquis*. In short, the EU’s relationship with much of the region of South Eastern Europe is dominated, still, by a reconstruction and development agenda, heavily bureaucratized and delayed in its implementation, in which social policy concerns are rarely or haphazardly stressed. This is the case with the CARDS programme in the Western Balkans (cf. Stubbs, 2004) and appears to be the case within the specific context of the European Agency for Reconstruction which is responsible for the main EC assistance programmes in Serbia and Montenegro, Kosovo and Macedonia. There is little room to be optimistic that the newer Instrument of Pre-Accession Assistance for the countries of the Western Balkans will offer more coherence or greater emphasis on social policy issues in this regard. Hence, we would assert that the EU and models of a social Europe are absent from centre stage in most of the key debates and technical assistance programmes of the EU regarding policy reform in South Eastern Europe.

Most crucially, the ‘Europeanization’, or to be more precise the ‘EUization’, of South Eastern Europe takes place in a much more complex and
hybrid way than the institutionalist literature on Europeanization often seems to suggest. On the one hand, EU-ization represents a very uneven and incoherent process, in which the EU has a variety of external assistance agendas which do not correspond to its own agenda (most notably the social *acquis* and the revised Lisbon agenda). On the other hand, EU-ization of South Eastern Europe has to be understood in the context of ‘multilateral donor tandem’ and in the context of an ambivalent competition/co-operation between the World Bank and the EU. While South Eastern Europe is the newest region of ‘Europe in waiting’ (Clarke, 2005a), its contemporary policy debates are dominated, shaped and projected by the World Bank rather than the EU.

The competition/co-operation between the EU and the World Bank takes many shapes and forms. Often the two agencies offer very different ‘technologies of involvement’ and ‘technologies of enumeration’. From the point of view of social policy, the World Bank has a strong and often pervasive ‘structural adjustment’ framework, which addresses key social policy areas, such as pensions, social assistance and health. On similar ‘core’ issues, the EU largely remains silent (as in Croatia, Romania, Bulgaria or Macedonia) or plays a co-ordinating, but not a decisive role (as in Slovenia). A second important difference in their approach is that while the EU seems to be using ‘soft’ technologies such as supporting and monitoring the adoption of the regulatory framework of the *acquis*, the World Bank is relying on ‘hard conditionalities’ reinforced by structural loans (Table 12.2). As noted in Chapter 1, notwithstanding the existence of a joint EU/World Bank office for the region, the World Bank often appears to pay lip service to, or indeed to misunderstand, EU social policy processes, in programmes and adjustment loans. Also, of course, the World

| Table 12.2  European Union and World Bank modes of influence compared |
|-----------------|------------------------|
| **Regulatory frameworks/ legal standards/ framework legislations** | *Acquis communautaire* | – |
| **Policy-making/ agenda-setting** | Ambivalent ‘reform’ agenda – political and economic criteria | Structural adjustment agenda |
| **Projects/programmes/ funds** | Soft, but bureaucratized funds (CARDS, PHARE, IPA, etc.) with little social policy agenda | Loans, ‘hard’ funds attached to core social policy agenda |
Bank’s insistence on the importance of absolute poverty lines stands in contrast to the emphasis on relative poverty by the EU. However, a number of cases reveal important similarities between the two agencies. First, as we learned from the Croatian chapter, often key international actors such as the World Bank and the EU are forced to pool from the same social policy ‘experts’ and rely on the same consultants. Second, we see similar practices of enframing used through a series of ‘data’, ‘report’ and ‘knowledge’ production throughout South Eastern Europe, whereby important studies, reports and databases are developed to be acted upon. In this regard, a careful analysis of key documents produced by the World Bank and the EU show surprising textual (cut and paste) similarities. The Romanian case shows how the EU’s Open Method of Coordination for social inclusion (OMC/inclusion) as soft governance stands hand in hand with a World Bank loan of US$57 million for promoting the aims set by the OMC process. In that sense the World Bank in SEE follows its policy developed in Central Eastern European countries in the late 1990s, where the World Bank discourse from transitional structural adjustment moved towards helping further adjustment in order to support these countries in their integration to the European Union.

To sum up, the Europeanization of South Eastern Europe has three important and unique characteristics. First, it represents a very incoherent set of influence and practices, which bear little resonance with the agenda of the EU integration itself. Second, while for many, Europeanization implies the adoption and promotion of ‘Social Europe’ and represents a counterbalance to Americanization, or neo-liberalization, the chapters show a far more complex picture. Finally, as much as very diverse socio-economic and cultural contexts would require a differentiated approach by the EU, the EU itself remains largely indifferent and shows little learning capacity. Paradoxically, while one of the core agendas of the EU is to enhance the learning capacity of institutions in the candidate and aspirant states, there is little evidence of the development of these capacities in the way EU conducts the accession processes. This not only significantly weakens the influence of the EU in this crowded economic and social transnational space, but may prove to hinder the EU integration of the region in the future.

Diverse Institutional and Cultural Legacies Mediate External Influences

In terms of our question about diverse institutional and cultural legacies mediating the impact of external actors, a number of points can be made. First, the common legacy among all of the countries was that of the quite similar state socialist (Bulgaria, Romania, Albania), Bismarkian (former
Yugoslavia) or ‘Inegalitarian corporatist’ (Turkey) (formal) work-related welfare state with social security benefits reflecting certain privileged work categories. This was combined with a state commitment to universal health and education in all countries except Turkey. In terms of social care, institutionalization and defectology reigned supreme. The Bismarkian legacy was overridden in Kosovo and the state-socialist legacy, except in the pension field, collapsed along with the economy in Albania. In Kosovo totally and in Albania partly the external actors began, in effect from scratch, to invent social policies. On the other hand, the Bismarkian legacy in Slovenia and Serbia and even in post-war Bosnia-Herzegovina was entrenched enough to provide an institutional obstacle to change. This is less the case in Croatia and Macedonia, at least with regard to pension reform. In Romania and Bulgaria the legacy delayed the impact of the neo-liberal agenda. In Turkey the World Bank has rather been concerned not to overthrow the corporatist legacy but to universalize its provisions and remove some of the worst elements of inequity in its operation. In general a commitment to universal health and education has not been challenged by external actors, although marketized ways of ensuring it are being introduced. There were uneven legacies in terms of the presence or absence of a long-term and long-established professional class of social workers. This class which was well established in the former Yugoslavia and, in part, in Bulgaria and Romania, was associated with institutional care which became challenged in the post-communist transition and is being replaced by care in the community and social inclusion, at least in theory.

Our questions concerning culture and confessional practice in the SEE region present us with not only the Catholic and hence Bismarkian inclined, but liberal influenced, Croatia and Slovenia, but also Orthodox and initially Bismarkian Serbia, Macedonia and Bulgaria, and an Islamic-influenced Turkey, Albania and parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina. None of the case studies suggest that these cultural contexts were significant in terms of promoting or resisting neo-liberal social policy ideas. In most of the texts, international actors combine with secular elites to reproduce secularized, supposedly ‘modern’ social policy. The role of religious-based international organizations, including various Islamic charities, often based in Saudi Arabia, Caritas and International Orthodox Christian Charities has not been mentioned in the case studies. Our view is that this is a complex product of realities on the ground and the way in which social policy issues have become framed so as to discount cultural factors. More work is clearly needed, then, to explore this complex issue, within a more open frame.

The related set of questions we posed concerned the ethnicization of social life in much of the region, through wars, forced migrations and the interest of one state in contiguous diasporas elsewhere, does receive some
attention in the case studies. There is, clearly, a clustering of ethnicized questions and ethnicized claims-making in social policy in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia, Albania, Kosovo, Macedonia and Turkey. The significance of disjunctions between formal citizenship, place of residence and belonging, leading to the invoking of cross-border solidarities and ethnicized welfare claims-making is relevant in Croatia, Serbia, Kosovo, Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, they have not been addressed as central issues by most of the chapters’ authors. In part, this may be because a national- or country-based comparative methodology is not best suited to capture cross-border processes. The intellectual and data frames used are not conducive to revealing answers: in this sense, national frames are both too small and too large. In addition, of course, technical questions of the transfer of entitlements when states break up are complicated by the slow and contested unfinished processes of state-building, migration, return and resettlement. Nevertheless the parallel Serbian-directed provisions for Serbs in parts of Kosovo is noted and the reported decision to build a new pension system in Kosovo which makes no claims upon the former Yugoslavian pension ‘fund’ was clearly driven by political pragmatism. In Bosnia-Herzegovina both entities have retained the former Yugoslav PAYG schemes, but because of differential economic growth in the two entities they now pay out at different rates leading to residence claims which do not match where people actually live and to legal class actions by those in Republika Srpska to claim benefits at the level of those in the other entity. One consequence of the wars has been the significance of veterans’ ‘claims-making’ distorting social protection and benefit allocation priorities, especially in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia, which the World Bank appears powerless to tackle. Examples of ‘enclave welfare’ entailing a notion of ‘community citizenship’ or ‘ethnic membership entitlements’ were noted in Macedonia in terms of the Albanian community.

It can be argued that a supposed ‘normal’ focus on the development of collective social rights and duties (the stuff of social policy) could be seen as lending support to collective but ethnicized claims. Now it might be suggested that this ethnic exclusivity is, itself, ‘normal’ and was the story of the development of social rights in even the most advanced social democratic states of Europe, and is a stage of historical development which is only now giving way to the realities of complex multicultural and multi-identity societies. Dimitrijević (1997) however, for example, has argued that the focus of social policy in SEE should be on individual rather than collective rights. Certainly a rights-based approach to social policy has been a key feature of the discourse about social entitlements in the context of developing countries, and prescription for social policy in SEE has sometimes used this approach in furthering claims to social protection. The reframing of social
policy as social rights was evident in the Bulgarian and Romanian chapter and elsewhere.

In addition, the role of and variety of state and sub-state agencies in reproducing exclusionary practices which cut across traditional citizenship-based claims to social rights is an important phenomenon throughout the region. The fate of the Roma in South Eastern Europe, clearly over-represented in parts of the social control elements of welfare such as children's homes and juvenile justice institutions, also gives cause for concern. In addition, wider diasporization is clearly a factor which serves to de-territorialize social policy in parts of South Eastern Europe, although sending remittances home, noted in Chapter 1, is also a phenomenon which has been little remarked upon in the case studies reported here except for Albania where the emigration of skilled workers and the level of remittances is significant. Again the comparative method might not enable a focus on these issues.

The Complex Coexistence of ‘Social Policy’, ‘Social Development’ and ‘Post-conflict Reconstruction’ Frames

The ‘normal’ transition from state socialism to welfare capitalism observed previously in Hungary, Ukraine and Bulgaria (Deacon et al., 1997) within which we might expect institutional legacies to matter has, of course, been overlayed in some countries in this book by war and various post-war settlements, internal conflict and financial collapse, all of which have impacted upon the trajectory of social policy reforms. One aspect of this has been that the region has been seen by external agencies through the lenses of development and post-war reconstruction, thus bringing to the area a development discourse and practice combined with emergency interventions which then have distorted ‘normal’ social policies. This means that the intellectual reference points, and therefore the discourse of policy advocates working in the region, is more complex than the clash between the EU and World Bank social policy discourses of universalism as opposed to selectivity, or regarding public versus private social provision. This is particularly important in terms of the development of social funds, explicitly in some parts of the region and implicitly in others, and the formulation of Poverty Reduction Strategy Programmes used to fashion safety nets. Gerry Redmond (2006) makes a series of points about the problematic nature of PRSPs and the tendency for these to result in policies directed at targeting the poor for special relief and facilitating small enterprise loans. Poverty Reduction Strategy Programmes appear less concerned with defending under-funded universal social protection, health and educational systems and with universal child benefits or public pension systems. It is fair to
suggest that, in general terms, there is a disjuncture between the intellectual and policy worlds of development specialists and those of European social policy experts. The existence of the two paradigms in some ways reflects the ambiguity of the EU towards the region, as we discussed earlier. Is it a region on the brink of rejoining Europe within which a social policy paradigm applies, or is it a region still in the throws of post-war crisis and under-development within which a development paradigm is fitting? The book charts this clash and the development of hybrid or mixed discourses which seek to combine social development and social policy frames.

This returns us to the question we asked in Chapter 1 about whether the aid processes that were related to the post-conflict situations of the wars of Yugoslav succession are consistent with social policy-making in ‘normal’ times. In earlier studies of the development of social policy in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Deacon and Stubbs, 1998; Stubbs, 2001), it was shown how relief interventions have tended to operate through international and local NGOs, often subcontracted to provide services, thus forming a parallel system with little integration or functional relationship to the well-established system of public services, including Centres for Social Work, with a 50-year history. These CSWs were, sometimes, used as mere conduits for emergency aid and time-limited cash assistance programmes, serving to undermine further their legitimacy. These conclusions have been replicated in a number of the case studies in this book, namely, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Albania and Kosovo in particular. Of course, throughout the region, there was an urgent need to diversify provision of services and to secure a mixed model of welfare incorporating ‘new’ actors such as associations of citizens, community-based organizations, local NGOs and, indeed, an emerging private sector. The problem is that, within the imported social development discourse, these actors were seen as, in and of themselves, more ‘progressive’, ‘responsive’, ‘rights-based’, and so on, than the public sector, leading to a substantial erosion of the role of public provision, a resistance to planning and national direction, and a move towards a project-culture rather than needs-based provision. Again, interestingly, here, some chapters note that a new frame is emerging in which processes from the PRSP are now fused into a more European-sounding national development planning strategy. The move from projects to strategies may, also, fall victim to the vagaries of external consultancy-led interventions.

The Shaping of Social Policy in SEE

From the discussion above we are now able to compare and contrast in summary form in Table 12.3 the extent to which the factors that we have
Table 12.3  Significance of four major factors influencing social policy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Continuation of Bismarkian/corporatist/institutional legacy</th>
<th>Impact of war and INGO lead post-war reconstruction</th>
<th>Impact of neo-liberal agenda on pensions</th>
<th>Impact of neo-liberal agenda on labour market</th>
<th>Impact of neo-liberal agenda on health services</th>
<th>EU influence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>Partial. Not pensions</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>PARTIAL</td>
<td>YES late</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES partially</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>Emergent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>Being eroded</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>Being eroded</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>IN PROCESS</td>
<td>PARTIAL</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BiH</td>
<td>YES (pensions)</td>
<td>YES heavily</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>Eroded</td>
<td>PARTIAL</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>PARTIAL</td>
<td>Emergent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>Replaced</td>
<td>YES heavily</td>
<td>YES in unique form</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>Eroded by financial collapse leads to same effect</td>
<td>NO but collapse</td>
<td>PARTIAL</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Unequal corporatism being universalized</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>Emergent</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
identified have been differentially important in shaping social policy in each country or territory. The four factors are:

1. Social policy institutional legacies: primarily those associated with work-based state socialist or Bismarkian/Corporatist benefits structures.
2. Neo-liberal driven interventions primarily associated with the World Bank. In Table 12.3 we distinguish between pensions, labour markets and health.
3. War and post-war reconstruction leading to a broad welfare mix and welfare parallelism.
4. Closeness to, and impact of, the European Union.

Table 12.3 shows the diversity of outcomes in the case study countries. To an extent, the pattern emerges of those countries and territories which were most disrupted by conflict, and/or which are the poorest, as well as the most developmentally advanced, for very different reasons, being relatively resistant to neo-liberal agendas. Obviously, trends towards Europeanization are only now beginning to develop for most of the region. Clearly, it is in the most disrupted societies where the proliferation of international non-governmental activity and influence is greatest.

**International Actors as Agencies of Empowerment and Disempowerment**

Finally in this section we turn to the series of questions posed concerning the impact of international actors on the policy-making process understood as a set of power relations. We asked what the implications were of a policy-making process involving transnational actors for national institutional follow-through and, essentially, whether international actors enrich the national policy debate and empower local actors or in fact disempower, becoming substitutes for normal politics. An absence of follow-through of legislation inspired by external actors was certainly reported strongly in the cases of Bulgaria and Romania, and suggested in Albania and other cases. Empty institutions have been created in a context of excessive legalism with EU-like legal frameworks downloaded, cut and pasted, but with little real institutional follow-through. It is important to note that the EU and other actors have recognized this and have increasingly funded capacity-building projects to compensate. The legal frameworks in Kosovo, and the constitutional framework in Bosnia-Herzegovina were, essentially, protectorate engineered. International organizations and international NGO interventions sometimes have enriched the national policy debate and empowered local actors. In Slovenia the World Bank’s failed interventions raised the
pension issue to a constitutional crisis but by contrast in Croatia the intervention was hardly challenged. In the case of Serbia a regressive tax law was engineered without even a debate among policy experts let alone a politicized public. The buying out of independent experts by external actors noted in Bulgaria, Romania and Macedonia often detracts from the possibility of open debate and policy contestation. In the term used in the case of Bulgaria and Romania, external actors exercise ‘indirect influence by providing expertise and moulding local knowledge’. In this sense the transnationalisation of social policy-making has led in places to its de-politicization and technicization in the emerging policy spaces created by their intervention. These new policy spaces are sometimes open and permit the emergence of a new set of civil society actors, as noted in Croatia around issues of gender and child protection, but are sometimes closed down, as in Kosovo, inviting in a new technocracy who act as the new intermediaries between the international and national in policy articulation. The advice and policy-translation activities of this limited-in-number cohort of local but co-opted social policy scholars are often rendered unaccountable and untransparent.

These new SEE local actors engage with a ‘new’ mobile technocratic policy advising and project designing class which emerged in three broad circuits. One circuit is a socio-economic policy expertise which began in the countries of the former Soviet Union, moving to the new EU member states, including Slovenia, and Romania and Bulgaria, before emerging in other countries of South Eastern Europe. The pension reform circuit emerged in Latin America before moving to the former Soviet Union and, subsequently, to SEE. Finally, a post-conflict social development circuit moved from conflicts in the Third World to the post-Yugoslav countries before moving on to newer conflict zones. Again, a comparative case study methodology is not the best tool to grasp these processes. Another issue worthy of note is the rise of ‘think tanks’ as policy actors including G17+ in Serbia, which became a political party, and a range of liberal groupings, alongside regionally focused international think tanks such as the European Stability Initiative often contracted to implement policy prescriptions which they have recommended in their analytical work.

**REVISITING ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORKS**

Over and above our analysis of the particular ways in which external actors have been influential in the specifics of social policy in the region, we believe it is possible to draw rather more general conclusions refining our understanding about international actors, states and social policy. These insights
derive from the case studies and, build on other work in other parts of the world.

**International Actors**

The book has illustrated the proliferation of international actors and their variability in their policy orientation (cf. Deacon, 2007). Hence, impact is also variable although we would conclude that, always and everywhere, they are relevant and, hence, that no analysis of social policy change is complete without their role being understood. The well-known World Bank neo-liberal versus EU social solidarity ideological struggle in terms of the models and contents of social policy (cf. Deacon et al., 1997) is still there but is most apparent in SEE in the pensions field. In terms of labour markets, the prescriptions of each organization are broadly similar. In health, social care and social assistance the contestations are more complex and highly mediated through outsourced technical expertise.

The study has begun to show how ‘old’ and ‘new’ kinds of international organizational structures collide, elide and coexist. Thus the traditional, predictable, stable IOs with a clear function, mandate and tools are still present, perhaps even in some contexts dominant, but a new breed of flexi, hybrid, less predictable organizations, networks, temporary coalitions and informal networks are sharing the stage. These are increasingly influential in their own right and having slow but perceptible impacts on the older traditional organizations. We are witnessing a move from a dominant international civil servant class to a mobile, flexible, short-term consultant class in need of further study.

The specific ways in which IOs relate to local players matter. They mould local knowledge and expertise, strengthening some think tanks and scholars not others. They co-opt scholars into IOs, dissolving potential criticisms and engendering a revolving-door process of a scholar becoming a deputy minister becoming a World Bank consultant, and such like. Hybrid forms of identities are also privileged as agencies search for ‘internationalized locals’ and ‘localized internationals’. These translators and intermediaries frame the social policy choices as much as, if not more than, traditional publics, emerging civil society and, even, parliaments.

Powerful external agencies shape domains and statistical nomenclature but this of itself does not guarantee institutional, policy or practice change. Notions of ‘strong’ versus ‘weak’ conditionality oversimplify and need to be, at the very least, complemented by notions of technologies of power, disciplinary complexes and knowledge claims. A literature which shifts focus from ‘governance’ to ‘governmentality’ is, hence, relevant here, understanding emerging rationalities, knowledge claims and calculation as forms
of social practice. In addition, while focusing on international actors there is still, of course, a need to note the many, varied and sometimes successful forms of domestic policy resistance, subversion or lip service, not least as local agents have ‘time’ on their side in a way that mobile consultants often do not (Lendvai and Stubbs, forthcoming). Finally, agency needs to be brought back in to discussions in terms of the role of particular individuals and a sense in which social policy-making may be a series of accidents, as the right (or wrong) people in the right or (wrong) or place meet other right (or wrong) people at the right (or wrong) time. Such chance encounters, most clearly addressed in the Serbia chapter, but also noted in the chapter on Bosnia-Herzegovina, can and do shift policy in ways which can and do become entrenched, especially in transition contexts.

States

In terms of states, the study has shown that states still matter but, more important, the variations in state forms, state capacity, the nature of public administration, the nature of political parties and the degree of clientelistic relations, all mediate the extent to which and the ways in which states have policy influence. Again, a structural and institutional notion of the state needs, therefore, to be complemented by discursive and agent-centred definitions. International actors need to be conceived as a part of the ‘extended’ state with transformational effects in some places. The traditional distinction between the internal functions of the state and the external functions of the state also tends to be eroded. Above all, then, states should not be conceived simply or exclusively as unified, cohesive macro-structures defined by their functions, but should be seen as composed of overlapping networks of agents with diverse and competing interests, projects, and agendas. Similarly, sovereignty needs to be conceived in new forms which replace tradition either/or notions. The studies show varying kinds of reformulation of sovereignty so that, in both Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, it is not the case that external actors can rule without reference to internal processes. Forms of protectorates, semi-protectorates and quasi-protectorates exist in the region, however, and their impact on social policy choices is considerable. Over and above this, a dominant rationality of ‘new public management’ which transforms the state into a rational, calculative, actor disciplined in the same way as an external project, seems to be present everywhere.

Social Policies

Social policy understood in terms of sectors (education, social protection, health, labour markets) and policy choices in those sectors (public or
private, universal or selective) still apply and matter but the discourse of social policy is being transformed or deconstructed and reconstructed, in the process of transnational engagement. The process is uneven but involves a complex slippage from social policy to social development to social exclusion to poverty alleviation to human security to livelihoods. Social policy understood as redistribution, regulation and rights still holds good but transnational actors downplay the first in favour of the last and do not address their own role in the second. Social statistics matter, but are not disinterested. The question of whose frame is used and how it is self-validated becomes important (St Clair, 2006). Perhaps most importantly, coherent welfare regimes of the Esping-Andersen type are dissolving to be replaced by assemblages of policies which vary within states across sectors and between them (cf. Clarke, 2004). Legacies still matter but in complex ways. The legacies themselves are complex, diverse and, in some cases, fused, involving a mix of Bismarkian, self-management socialism and state bureaucratic collectivism, for example.

FUTURE RESEARCH AGENDAS

Finally, we make a few suggestions about the implications of this study for the design of future research into the role of international influences on national, regional and global social policy-making. First, it should be clear that the comparative case study method used here is a useful tool in enabling us to understand the making of social policies in bounded territories but that this needs to be complemented by more multi-level, multi-sited studies of transnational actors, organizations and processes themselves. In this book we have hinted at these processes but have not always understood them completely, precisely because our case studies have focused on national processes and not on the role of organizations such as the Stability Pact, or the advice of the same agencies or consultants across different countries. Similarly, while the study recognizes that cross-boundary solidarities, migrations and diasporas matter, they are also are not well covered by the comparative case study method. This book is unable to tell some of this story, precisely because of the difficulty of what might be termed ‘fixed spatial methodologies’ to grasp the movements which are so important in this region.

To conclude, a future research agenda could well be complemented by transnational ethnographic approaches exploring the role of policy translators and intermediaries operating in the new breed of flexible, hybrid, fluid and less predictable organizations, temporary coalitions and informal policy networks. This book has also contributed to an approach which
renders problematic the idea of universalizing neo-liberalism. The neo-liberal project is by no means as unchanging, all-powerful and universal as some of the critics of neo-liberalism suggest. On these lines, John Clarke has argued that, while ‘neo-liberal globalization’ is the dominant form of contemporary globalization, any attempt to understand it as ‘a hegemonic project’ has to address ‘both the logics and limits of neo-liberalism, and the different ways in which people and places live with/in – and against – neo-liberalism’ (Clarke, 2004: 89). He is profoundly interested, therefore, in ‘uneven neo-liberalisms’, varying in space and time, and able to enter ‘national-popular formations’ only in and through alliances, ‘assemblages of political discourses’ which inevitably change, shape and produce ‘hybrids, paradoxes, tensions and incompatibilities’ rather than ‘coherent implementations of a unified discourse and plan’ (ibid.: 94). Global policy ideas are always articulated in specific places and times, or as Collier and Ong would have it, ‘territorialised in assemblages’ which ‘define new material, cultural and discursive relationships’ (Collier and Ong, 2005: 4). It is ethnographic studies which can draw attention to the work of ‘translators’, ‘brokers’, ‘mediators’ or ‘those translocal agents who mediate languages, contexts, sites and levels’ (Clarke, 2005b: 8) which could complement the studies offered here.

NOTE

1. The authors are grateful to Laurie Joshua for clarification of this point.

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