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The Kant-Hegel relation has a continuing fascination for commentators on Hegel, and understandably so: for, taking this route into the Hegelian jungle can promise many advantages. First, it can set Hegel’s thought against a background with which we are fairly familiar, and in a way that makes its relevance clearly apparent; second, it can help us locate Hegel in the broader philosophical tradition, making us see that the traditional ‘analytic’ jump from Kant to Frege leaves out a crucial period in post-Kantian thought; third, it can show Hegel in a progressive light, as attempting to take that tradition further forward; fourth, it can help us locate familiar philosophical issues in Hegelian thought that otherwise can appear wholly *sui generis*; and finally, and perhaps most importantly of all, focusing on this relation can help raise and crystallise some of the fascinating ambiguities concerning Hegel’s outlook, regarding whether Hegel’s response to Kant shows him to have been a reactionary, Romantic, pre-critical thinker, who sought to turn the philosophical clock back to a time before Kant had written, or a modernist, Enlightened and essentially critical one, who remained true to the spirit if not the letter of Kant’s philosophy.

This strategy of assessing Hegel via his relation to Kant has long been used in connection with his ethics and social thought; and it has more recently been used to good effect in connection with his epistemology and idealist metaphysics. The current consensus in both cases seems to be that it is misguided to set Hegel too rigidly against Kant in these areas, and that instead Hegel should be seen as a figure who seeks to overcome what is problematic in the Kantian project, but nonetheless who aims to take it further forward, to ‘go beyond it’, as Hegel himself put it.1 Thus, in ethics and social philosophy, Hegel is no longer seen as the reactionary and conservative defender of *Sittlichkeit* in opposition to Kant’s liberal ideal of *Moralität*, but as simply trying to complement the abstract universalism of the latter with a more socially situated and historically realistic conception of the subject; whilst in epistemology and metaphysics Hegel is no longer seen as impervious to Kant’s modernising project, but rather as trying to save that project from certain debilitating *aporiai*, in a way that will make it safe against sceptical objections. Thus, on this approach, Hegel’s importance, and to some degree that of his contemporaries, lies in the fact that they attempted to overcome a certain one-sidedness in Kant’s thought which they believed meant that he
ended up giving back the ground he had won (against anti-rationalism in reli-
gion, nihilism in ethics, scepticism in epistemology, crude naturalism in meta-
physics), all in a way that was designed not to compromise the essential ‘modernity’ of Kant’s project, and his Enlightenment emphasis on freedom, the
authority of science, and the emptiness of traditional metaphysics.

In this paper, I want to focus on the epistemological side of this story, and to
explore whether it is correct to see Hegel’s work as an attempt to ‘go beyond’
Kant in a way that we can readily understand and endorse. A recent reading of
Hegel in these terms – one that is surely destined to influence others – is
presented in John McDowell’s *Mind and World*. McDowell’s book is of course not
a scholarly treatment or a textual commentary, but it nonetheless presents a
powerful sketch of how the Kant-Hegel relation should be seen, free of many of
the traditional prejudices against Hegel, and with a keen eye for his contempo-
rary relevance and importance: McDowell’s reading therefore provides a signifi-
cant ‘test case’ for how far Hegel can be understood as pointing the way to the
sort of ‘completion’ of the Kantian project that is engaged in by McDowell
himself, where this means finally setting aside philosophical concerns about the
relation between mind and world, which Kant (despite his best efforts) left alive,
but in a way that does not do violence to Kant’s modernising contribution to
philosophy. Is McDowell right to think that in seeking to ‘complete’ the Kantian
project, the outlook and approach to be found in Hegel are ultimately no more
anti-Kantian or pre-critical than McDowell’s own?

II

Let me begin by outlining the way in which McDowell presents the Kant-Hegel
relation, and how this favours the critical, modernist reading of Hegel and his
thought.

According to McDowell, Kant had a crucial insight that could have put an
immediate end to the to-ing and fro-ing between realism and idealism, empiri-
cism and scepticism that is a mark of the philosophical tradition up to the present,
but that he could not articulate this insight fully from within his overall concep-
tion, in which certain residual dualisms remained; it took Hegel as Kant’s succes-
sor to overcome these dualisms, and so to see Kant’s insight for what it was and
to develop it properly. McDowell’s suggestion is that Kant held the key for tran-
scending the tradition in his recognition of the shared role of intuition and
thought, receptivity and spontaneity in experience, which should have led him to
see that no space exists for a pure, unconceptualised Given between our concep-
tual powers and the external world, and thus that the world is present to us in
experience, and not hidden from us behind any veil of perception; however,
whilst Kant does not conceive of any separation between intuition and thought,
experience and judgement at the empirical level, he nonetheless makes just such
a separation again at the transcendental one, so that at this level Kant re-intro-
duces precisely the kind of concerns that he had earlier dispelled. McDowell
diagnoses Kant’s failure here as resting on a deeper dualism, between reason and nature, one which he traces back to the origins of the modern naturalistic world-picture, and its separation of norms and facts, freedom and law, meaning and brute contingency. Hegel’s contribution to this story is thus two-fold: first, whilst building on Kant’s original insight, he is a more thoroughgoing opponent of the Myth of the Given as for him there is no ‘boundary’ to the conceptual, no intuition without concepts, no content without form; and second (although McDowell is less explicit about this), Hegel’s critical attitude to ‘bald naturalism’ liberated him from the underlying dualism between reason and nature that led Kant to reintroduce a purely causal role to experience, depriving it of the conceptual content needed to overcome the apparent gap between mind and world. Hegel’s contribution is decisive and yet conditional: with his contribution, we can see how liberating Kant’s central insight can be, in ways that became distorted by the framework in which Kant himself was operating, and which Hegel was able to discard.

One way in which McDowell brings out the double-edged nature of Kant’s achievement, and Hegel’s significance in rescuing its true potential, is in relation to the issue of scepticism and our knowledge of the external world. McDowell’s attitude to scepticism is therapeutic, and he takes Kant’s basic picture to provide just the therapy that is needed, in allowing us to return to a form of direct realism that enables us to place sceptical worries in a proper and diminished perspective. McDowell takes Kant’s conception of experience as conceptualised to show that experience puts us in direct, immediate contact with the world, so that we can reject the ‘predicament of traditional philosophy…in which we are supposed to start from some anyway available data of consciousness, and work up to certifying that they actually yield knowledge of the objective world’. Once we see that there is nothing unintelligible in the idea of experience giving us ‘openness to facts’, we will see that ‘the sceptical questions lack a kind of urgency that is essential to their troubling us … The aim here is not to answer sceptical questions, but to begin to see how it might be intellectually respectable to ignore them, to treat them as unreal, in the way that common sense has always wanted to’. McDowell clearly offers this therapeutic result as one important way in which Kant’s insight can be of value; but of course (on McDowell’s view) its value was obscured in Kant’s own work, by the fact that sceptical issues return to haunt the Kantian system, in the form of his appearance/reality distinction, and the separation between things as they appear to us and the way things are in themselves. It is thus only once Hegel has dropped Kant’s remaining dualisms that the spectre of scepticism can be banished once and for all, after the terms of the epistemological tradition have been superseded.

Now, for anyone interested in Hegel and his work, it is hard not to be seduced by the reading of Hegel that McDowell offers us here, as a way in which one could ‘start to domesticate the rhetoric of that philosophy’, as McDowell puts it. First, it presents us with an account of Hegel that is essentially progressive, where this means treating Hegel as a follower of Kant, in respecting the strictures of the Critical Philosophy against abstract metaphysics and speculative theorizing.
Thus, in contrast to many traditional readings – which present Hegel as either a spirit monist or quasi-Platonist, and so as seeking to go back to the kind of high rationalist tradition which Kant overturned – McDowell’s account presents us with a Hegel that was no intellectual reactionary in this way. McDowell’s picture of Hegel is therefore in accord with the general interpretative sentiment that has recently been expressed by Robert Pippin, a sentiment that is hard to resist if one wants to avoid treating Hegel as a philosophical anachronism, both in his time and in ours:

much of the standard view of how Hegel passes beyond Kant into speculative philosophy makes very puzzling, to the point of unintelligibility, how Hegel could have been the post-Kantian philosopher he understood himself to be; that is, how he could have accepted, as he did, Kant’s revelations about the fundamental inadequacies of the metaphysical tradition, could have enthusiastically agreed with Kant that the metaphysics of the ‘beyond,’ of substance, and of traditional views of God and infinity were forever discredited, and then could have promptly created a systematic metaphysics as if he had never heard of Kant’s critical epistemology. Just attributing moderate philosophic intelligence to Hegel should at least make one hesitate before construing him as a post-Kantian philosopher with a precritical metaphysics.5

In this sense, McDowell’s conception of Hegel is compelling. Secondly, and relatedly, McDowell’s reading shows how one might go about defending and supporting some of Hegel’s characteristic claims and attitudes, but in ways that show them to be more defensible and attractive than they have appeared hitherto. Thus, in particular, McDowell’s own defense of a ‘relaxed naturalism’ or ‘naturalised platonism’, and his associated idea of a ‘second nature’, offers us a way out of an overly Romanticised view of Hegel’s attitude to nature, science and the scientific revolution, placing Hegel’s evident anti-naturalism within sensible bounds. Thirdly, McDowell’s account sounds the right notes, ones that have an authentically Hegelian ring: the need to transcend dualisms, to complete Kant’s project, to set scepticism on one side, even the importance McDowell gives (which I have not gone in to) to traditions and cultures.6 This is a Hegel it is easy and tempting to live with: domesticated, indeed.

However, before accepting that McDowell succeeds in bringing out what lies at the heart of the Hegelian project, and that he places it in a context that makes good sense of that project philosophically, historically and interpretatively, there are certain worries that need to be addressed. These worries can be expressed as a set of questions, which will be dealt with in the following sections: First, can Hegel’s epistemological position be assimilated to the kind of direct realism McDowell defends, and is McDowell right to think this position can prevent sceptical concerns being raised? Second, in giving Hegel credit for overcoming a certain tension in the Kantian position, has McDowell succumbed to a historical myth regarding the nature of that position, leading him to credit Hegel with a

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significance he does not deserve? And thirdly, how far is McDowell’s conception of the Kant-Hegel relation accurate from the Hegelian point of view; that is, how far does it relate to what Hegel himself was really trying to do in ‘going beyond’ Kant, and thus how far does it capture the true significance of the Hegelian turn? I now offer a treatment of each of these questions, against which McDowell’s account of Hegel needs to be measured. I will offer a defense of McDowell’s reading of Hegel in relation to the first two questions, but a critique of it in relation to the third.

III

In presenting his case that passive experiences belong to the conceptual sphere, in so far as they possess conceptual content, and thus in arguing that the conceptual is ‘unbounded’, McDowell goes out of his way to emphasise two points: first, that this contrasts with a kind of anti-foundationalist coherentism (which McDowell attributes to Davidson) which sees no way to accommodate experience within the space of reasons; and second, that the thesis of ‘unboundedness’ in no way commits his position to idealism. In making these points, McDowell might be read by many as making a break with Hegel; is he therefore right to insist that (on the contrary) these points mark his continuity with the Hegelian outlook? This question arises, because if anyone is held to be a coherentist within the tradition, it is usually Hegel; and if anyone is held to embrace idealism without reserve, it is also Hegel: so how can McDowell be right to claim any sort of grounds for allegiance on these matters?

On the coherentism issue, a Kantian critic of McDowell who has claimed that McDowell is confused here, and that he is mistaken in taking Hegel or any of the post-Kantian idealists as an ally, is Michael Friedman. Friedman has argued that these post-Kantians end up abandoning Kant’s insistence on the two-fold dependence of intuitions on concepts and concepts on intuitions (a two-fold dependence McDowell wants to retain), and so slip into a kind of coherentism inimical to McDowell’s (right-minded) commitment to the authority of experience. Friedman writes as follows:

It is characteristic of post-Kantian absolute idealism (and, indeed, of virtually all post-Kantian philosophy) to reject Kant’s dualistic conception of our rational faculties as divided between pure sensibility on the one side and pure understanding on the other. And this means, accordingly, that Kant’s way of drawing a distinction between the faculties of reason and understanding must also be rejected, since, as we have just seen, the difference between these two faculties, for Kant, is simply that the latter must operate in cooperation with sensibility (on pain of emptiness) whereas the former can operate entirely independently of sensibility. Moreover, it is also characteristic of post-Kantian absolute idealism to take the Kantian faculty of reason rather than the Kantian faculty of
understanding as the model for rationality as such – and, indeed, to take the rational freedom required by morality as the model for all rationality. The combined effect of these two moves, then, is a tendency to distance rational thought from sensible experience and to minimize the empiricist elements in Kant’s own conception. For, on the one hand, the Kantian bridge between rational thought and sensory perception – pure intuition and its schematism by the understanding – has now been self-consciously rejected. And, on the other hand, our new conception of rational thought is now modelled on the Kantian faculty of reason – a faculty requiring no cooperation from an independent faculty of pure sensibility. So it is not surprising, then, when post-Kantian idealism eventually leads to explicitly Coherentist conceptions of the objects of rational knowledge…

On this reading, the transition from Kant to Hegel is more like a revolution than a natural progression, in which just the kind of common-sense realism McDowell seeks to defend is a casualty, not a survivor.

Indirect confirmation for Friedman’s misgivings here, concerning Hegel’s suitability as an ally for McDowell, may seem to come from a recent essay by Richard Rorty, where he criticises McDowell for his residual empiricist leanings, and invokes Hegel in support of that criticism, aligning Hegel with a more thoroughgoing anti-foundationalism. Rorty writes: ‘From a Sellarsian, Davidsonian, Brandonian, or Hegelian viewpoint, there is no clear need for what McDowell describes as a ’’minimal empiricism’: the idea that experience must constitute a tribunal mediating the way our thinking is answerable to how things are, as it must be if we are to make sense of it as thinking at all’’. In support of his anti-empiricist reading of Hegel, Rorty quotes Sellars’ well-known description of Hegel as ‘the great foe of immediacy’.

Although Friedman’s misgivings would therefore seem to conform to the sort of picture of Hegel presented by Rorty, it is not clear that they can be textually supported, however: for, like McDowell, Hegel often writes as if it is just obvious that our basic and fundamental access to the empirical world is experiential, and as such must be seen to be unproblematic, if scepticism is to be avoided. No more than McDowell, of course, does Hegel take this to be an endorsement of empiricism as philosophically conceived: for, like McDowell, Hegel sees empiricism as putting just this source of knowledge at jeopardy. Nonetheless, as he says in the Encyclopaedia Logic, at the root of empiricism likes the ‘great principle that what is true must be in actuality and must be there for our perception’, while he remarks of the ‘old saying’ that ‘Nihil est in intellectu quod non fuerit in sensu’ (‘There is nothing in the intellect that has not been in sense experience’) that ‘if speculative philosophy refused to admit this principle, it can only have done so from a misunderstanding’. In the Lectures on the History of Philosophy, in the section on Locke, he states his commitment to the role of experience at greater length:

As to the question in point we must in the first place say that it is true that man commences with experience if he desires to arrive at thought.
Everything is experienced, not merely what is sensuous, but also what excites and stimulates my mind. Consciousness thus undoubtedly obtains all conceptions and Notions from experience and in experience; the only question is what we understand by experience. In a usual way when this is spoken of the idea of nothing particular is conveyed; we speak of it as of something quite well known. But experience is nothing more than the form of objectivity; to say that it is something which is in consciousness means that it has objective form for consciousness or that consciousness experiences it, it sees it as an objective. Experience thus signifies immediate knowledge, perception, i.e. I myself must have and be something, and the consciousness of what I have and am is experience. Now there is no question as to this, that whatever we know, of whatever kind it may be, must be experienced, that rests in the conception of the thing. It is absurd to say that one knows anything which is not in experience. 12

It is hard to see, in the face of these passages and others, how Friedman can be justified in warning McDowell to steer clear of Hegel, if he wants to preserve his foundationalist respect for experience as a source of knowledge. Moreover, if we align Hegel with McDowell’s form of empiricism (rather than setting them in opposition, as Rorty urges) it seems to me to open up a more fruitful way of understanding important aspects of Hegel’s position and approach. So, for example, whilst it is traditional to read the opening arguments of the Phenomenology in an anti-empiricist manner, I believe they are better read as an analysis or reconstruction of what the content of experience must be, what ‘the shape of the world [is] as we find it’ (as McDowell puts it), 13 and thus of how beliefs about the world relate directly to our experience of it in this way: that is, by showing that no awareness at the level of sense-certainty is possible, consciousness is forced to recognise that it has a more complex experience of the world, of the sort that comes with perception, and so is forced to alter its conception of what there is accordingly. This does not mean, however, that McDowell need deny Sellars’ description of Hegel as ‘the great foe of immediacy’: for, I take it, McDowell would himself accept that when he talks of ‘experience’ and its content, he certainly does not think of this content as a pure, unconceptualised (and hence immediate) ‘given’. We may now then turn to a parallel worry that might be raised regarding the issue of how McDowell’s championing of Hegel can be squared with his (McDowell’s) commitment to realism, and his insistence that the ‘unboundedness’ thesis is in no sense objectionably idealistic in its implications. 14 First, how can McDowell claim allegiance to Hegel, when the latter is self-evidently an idealist – indeed, perhaps the most thoroughgoing idealist there ever was? And, given their shared outlook, how can McDowell prevent his own position from becoming as idealistic as Hegel’s own?

Now, again, it seems to me that McDowell can hold the line here. It is of course true, as before, that the traditional picture of Hegel takes his idealism to be thoroughgoing: 15 but it has been argued recently that it is by no means clear that

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when Hegel characterised his outlook in these terms, he meant what we now mean by them. To put the point schematically: whereas for us, idealism is to be opposed to realism or objectivism (the thesis that reality is mind-independent), for Hegel idealism was opposed to materialism or nominalism (the thesis that our only theoretical commitment need be to individual, material entities). Thus, in calling himself an idealist, Hegel intended to signal his allegiance to a certain conceptual realism, rather than to the dependence of the external world on a constructive mind: hence the epithet *objective* idealism, as against the *subjective* idealism of Kant. There is therefore no need to take McDowell’s position here to be at odds with Hegel’s.

However, even if it is accepted that both McDowell and Hegel share a similar stance, in attempting to hold to realism whilst occupying a middle ground between coherentism on the one hand and the Myth of the Given on the other, it is still possible to argue that this middle ground is unstable, and must collapse back into just the sort of idealism which (it is now accepted) both McDowell and Hegel want to avoid. This point is argued by Friedman, who suggests that McDowell’s realism rests merely on his insistence that experience is passive, in a way that can reassure us that here we have some sort of ‘friction’ with the outside world; but, Friedman argues (much as Hume did against Descartes), such passivity is a feature of our inner experience too, so that (as Friedman puts it)

> the distinction between passive experience (concerning which we are simply ‘struck’ one way or another, as it were) and active judgement (concerning which we have free choice) is not at all the same as the distinction between that which expresses constraint by an independent objective world and that which does not. The crucial question, in this regard, concerns rather how we distinguish between ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ sense.

Friedman then suggests that McDowell’s only response here is to appeal to the kind of coherence we can give to certain impressions, as the ‘understanding integrates such [outer] impressions into an evolving world-conception’; but, he then objects, McDowell has failed to escape from the kind of coherentist idealism he sought to avoid.

It seems to me that Friedman underestimates McDowell’s resources here, however. There are two issues that need to be distinguished: on what grounds can we hold that the object of my experience is part of the external, objective world; and on what grounds can we hold that our judgements have any claim to be true, rather than mere ‘fabrications’. Now, I take it, the receptivity point is meant to answer the latter concern: because our judgements involve a passive element, there is a ‘reassurance’ here that thought is constrained by the world (this is the intuition behind the Myth of the Given which McDowell wishes to accommodate). However, McDowell does not need to use this point to answer the former concern: for this can surely be answered by appeal to the content of the experience itself, namely whether the experience is as of something in space.
outside us (a chair, a house, a rainbow), or something in inner space (a pain, a sensation). It is precisely because McDowell acknowledges that experience comes with this degree of articulation, that he can appeal to experience to distinguish between inner and outer sense: he does not need receptivity to act as a kind of criterion, in the way that Friedman takes it to be used. Thus, the fact that both inner and outer sense involve receptivity does not mean we have no grounds for distinguishing between them; whilst at the same time, he can argue that in both cases our perceptual judgements involve ‘friction’, and so can claim to put us in touch with something that is not itself a construction of thought.  

IV

Having shown how McDowell’s stance on the issues of idealism/realism and coherentism/foundationalism can rightly be said to resemble Hegel’s, I now turn to the second question I presented for consideration: namely, in suggesting that Hegel enables us to see Kant’s achievement for what it is, is McDowell distorting the significance of Hegel’s contribution, and uncritically following a mistaken picture of the Kant-Hegel relation originally painted by Hegel himself, as part of his own misguided and self-aggrandising account of his historical place and significance? Thus, where McDowell claims that Kant was unable to give his ‘liberating thought … proper shape’ and that a Hegelian move was required before it could be made to realize its true philosophical potential, is McDowell merely succumbing to Hegelian propaganda, and failing to recognise that Kant never needed ‘completing’ in this way?  

This is certainly how McDowell’s position looks to many contemporary Kantians, who argue that McDowell is simply wrong to suggest that Kant’s ‘liberating thought’ ever suffered any distortion or diminution within Kant’s own picture, so the transition from Kant to Hegel is superfluous and philosophically unmotivated. These Kantians (such as Graham Bird, Michael Friedman and Henry Allison) all make essentially the same point: that where McDowell sees such distortion taking place, this is because he has a simplistic and wrongheaded conception of what Kant was doing, and that in fact his original achievement is never really compromised; moreover, McDowell shares this simplistic and wrong-headed conception with Hegel, so both see a role for themselves in ‘saving’ Kant from himself, when he was never really ‘lost’ in the first place. McDowell has misperceived the situation here, these Kantians claim, because he has uncritically accepted a conception of Kant’s transcendental idealism that can be found in Hegel and is echoed in Strawson and others, to the effect that there remained in Kant’s work a commitment to an unknowable or supersensible realm of ‘things-in-themselves’; as a result, McDowell is mistakenly led to the conclusion that it is Hegel (along with the other post-Kantian idealists) who ‘frees Kant’s insight so that it can protect a commonsense respect for the independence of the ordinary world’.  

Now, in my view McDowell (like Hegel) rather invites a certain degree of
well-taken criticism from Kantians here, when he makes it appear that Hegel’s advance over Kant was simply to dispense with the supersensuous thing-in-itself, which had served to compromise the realism to which Kant’s conception of experience should have led him. Thus, McDowell writes as follows:

At the end my second lecture ... I said that if we take Kant’s conception of experience out of the frame he puts it in, a story about a transcendental affection of receptivity by a supersensible reality, it becomes just what we need. Outside that frame, Kant’s conception is a satisfactory way to avoid our dilemma, the apparently forced choice between the Myth of the Given and a coherentism that renounces external constraints on thinking. But the frame spoils the insight, because the radical mind-independence of the supersensible comes to seem exemplary of what any genuine mind-independence would be, and then when Kant purports to attribute mind-independence to the ordinary empirical world, as it figures in his thinking, that looks merely disingenuous.25

Put like this, it is perhaps understandable why many Kantians think that those (like McDowell) who give Hegel such a vital role in ‘protecting a commonsense respect for the independence of the ordinary world’ do so because they have a simplistic view of Kant’s position, and in particular of his conception of the distinction between appearances and things-in-themselves. On this view, McDowell and Hegel are mistaken in adopting what has become known as a ‘two-worlds’ account of this distinction, rather than a weaker ‘two-aspect’ account;26 and they have therefore failed to see how nothing in Kant’s position in any way compromises Kant’s realism, or implies that he took the ontological status of the empirical world to be ‘second-rate’. Thus, Bird and others argue that there is nothing in Kant’s talk of things-in-themselves that should frighten McDowell, or make him think that the realist insights he finds in Kant need to be transplanted to Hegelian soil in order to grow.

I take it, however, that McDowell’s misgivings go deeper than this, and that if he fears any lack of realism in Kant, it is not just because he believes (rightly or wrongly) that for Kant ‘mind-independence’ comes in two forms (empirical and transcendental). Rather, as McDowell makes clear in other passages, Kant’s realism is compromised not by the appearances/things-in-themselves distinction as such (however this is to be understood), but by the way in which at some level, Kant is prepared to see receptivity and spontaneity, intuitions and concepts, as separable, and thus to see the latter as operating on the former, in a way that gives content to the idea that conceptual structure is imposed on an intrinsically unstructured Given. It is this dualism of form and content, rather than dualism of appearance and things-in-themselves, that McDowell thinks Kant failed to escape completely, by failing to go as far as Hegel, and allow that ‘conceptual capacities are drawn on in receptivity, not exercised on some supposedly prior deliverances of receptivity’27 all the way down. Hegel himself puts this worry as follows:
From this exposition we may gather briefly what transcendental knowledge is in this [Kantian] philosophy. The deduction of the categories, setting out from the organic idea of productive imagination, loses itself in the mechanical relation of a unity of self-consciousness which stands in antithesis to the empirical manifold, either determining it or reflecting on it. Thus transcendental knowledge transforms itself into formal knowledge. The unity of self-consciousness is at the same time objective unity, category, formal identity. However, something that is not determined by this identity must supervene to it in an incomprehensible fashion; there must be an addition, a plus, of something empirical, something alien. This supervening of B to the pure Ego-concept [which is A] is called experience, while the supervening of A to B, when B is posited first, is called rational action, [and the formula for both is] A: A + B. The A in A + B is the objective unity of self-consciousness, B is the empirical, the content of experience, a manifold bound together through the unity A. But B is something foreign to A, something not contained in it. And the plus itself, i.e., the bond between the binding activity and the manifold, is what is incomprehensible.28

If this is the essence of the Hegelian critique of Kant, what are the implications he takes from it? Kantians characteristically assume that Hegel’s conclusion here was that Kant was a phenomenalistic idealist, to which they reply that Kant was an empirical realist, and that (as Allison puts it), ‘when Kant claims that he is an empirical realist and denies that he is a transcendental realist, he is really affirming that our experience is not limited to the private domain of our own representations, but includes an encounter with “empirically real” spatio-temporal objects’.29 What can a Hegelian like McDowell find to object to here? Isn’t this just the kind of direct realism and ‘openness’ to the world that McDowell himself champions? Doesn’t this show that there is nothing in Kant’s talk of ‘appearances’ that should lead us to think that he leaves room for scepticism, and that his commitment to common-sense realism is merely half-hearted?

The Kantians arguably make things too easy for themselves here, however: for it is clear in Hegel that his diagnosis of an unresolved dualism in Kant does not arise because he thinks Kant just slips back into the kind of idealism to be found in his empiricist predecessors like Berkeley and Hume; the Kantians are therefore wrong to think that they can deflect Hegelian concerns, merely by emphasising the gap between Kant and the phenomenalists (as Kant himself had done in the Refutation of Idealism). For these concerns relate not to Kant qua phenomenalist, but to Kant qua relativist, who writes concerning space (for example) that

It is, therefore, solely from the human standpoint that we can speak of space, of extended things, etc... If we depart from the subjective condition under which alone we can have outer intuition, the representation of space stands for nothing whatsoever.30

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It is Kant’s claim regarding the relativity of our knowledge that Hegel traces back to the form/content distinction, and which for Hegel is the primary implication of Kant’s doctrine of synthesis, where it becomes possible to treat our conception of the world as perspectival, as not conforming to how things would look from the standpoint of an absolute intellect. Thus, in opposition to the view just cited from Kant, when Hegel comes talk about space and spatial perception for example, he uses the form/content debate to distance himself from any kind of Kantian relativism on this matter (as he does elsewhere concerning the categories themselves).  

But when we said that what is sensed receives from the intuiting mind the form of the spatial and temporal, this statement must not be understood to mean that space and time are only subjective forms. This is what Kant wanted to make them. But things are in truth themselves spatial and temporal; this double form of asunderness is not one-sidedly given to them by our own intuition, but has been originally imparted to them by the intrinsically infinite mind, by the creative eternal Idea. Since, therefore, our intuitive mind honours the determinations of sensation by giving them the abstract form of space and time, thereby making them into real objects as well as assimilating them to itself, the supposition of subjective idealism that we receive only the subjective results of our determining activity and not the object’s own determinations is completely refuted.  

The issue between Hegel and Kant is therefore not primarily a phenomenalistic one, in the sense that Hegel took Kant to be claiming that nothing except knowledge of our mental states is possible for us: rather, Hegel’s concern was a relativist one, that in coming to know about things outside us in space and time, we do not – for Kant – really gain any insight into how reality is intrinsically, as it is only valid to refer to the spatial and temporal characteristics of things from within our conceptual framework.  

Now, whilst a revisionary Kantian like Bird is strenuous in his efforts to defend Kant against the charge of phenomenalism, he seems happy to accept the implication of relativism, which (I claim) is the real focus of Hegel’s concern. Thus, commenting on the passage from Kant I have just cited, Bird writes:  

... the reference to the ‘human standpoint’ can now be understood not as a commitment to the traditional dualism of subjective representation and objective world, but to that developed human experience and the project of mapping it. The passage shows too how we can understand in a non-traditional way the claim that space and time are nothing apart from our representations (e.g. B44). For it can be understood to claim not that space and time are constructed from our sensations, nor that they belong to the category of sensations, both of which Kant in any case explicitly denies, but that they have a role only within the scope of our human experience.
From a Hegelian perspective, it seems to me that Bird’s Kantian picture still retains those elements which Hegel wanted to overcome, elements he took to be unavoidable once anything like a form/content distinction is at work: in accepting those elements, I do not see how Bird’s Kantianism can avoid succumbing to this Hegelian diagnosis, even put in a ‘two-aspects’, non-phenomenalist form.

I am unsure, however, how much of this McDowell would also want to take on board, as part of his Hegelianism. On the one hand, McDowell objects (as I have done on Hegel’s behalf) that his reservations about Kant are not based on a phenomenalistic reading, so, he presumably does not see Kant’s separation of spontaneity and receptivity as operating at anything like the level it does in Berkeley or Hume. On the other hand, I am not sure whether he would be willing to go as far as (I claim) Hegel himself does, in tracing back the ‘dark side’ of Kant to his apparent ‘humility’, regarding the merely perspectival nature of human knowledge. For, on my view, Hegel takes it that the only way out of Kant’s perspectivalism here is to endorse a kind of conceptual or Aristotelian realism, whereby the world has a certain structure of its own, that can be articulated by us in thought; the epistemological realism McDowell admires in Hegel is thus tied up with an essentialist realism, in a way that I am not sure McDowell recognises or would endorse. On the one hand, McDowell has been consistently critical of a crude primary/secondary quality distinction which would seem to make much of our conception of the world merely relativistic; but on the other hand, I have been unable to find in McDowell any real engagement with the Putnamian ‘internal realist’, who takes it that there is no one, ‘fixed’ description of reality to which we should aspire, a conception that Hegel himself would seem to need to make sense of his notion of absolute knowledge as a determinate standpoint.

Nonetheless, we have found no reason thus far to conclude either that McDowell’s project is at odds with Hegel’s own, or that this shared outlook is rendered redundant by the sort of revisionary Kantianism defended by Bird et al. In both respects, the outcome of our investigations has been positive. In the final section of this paper, however, we will find reason to take a more critical stance to McDowell’s reading of Hegel.

V

In this final section of the paper, I wish to consider how far McDowell’s attempt to ‘domesticate’ Hegel can really help us to come to terms with the Hegelian perspective as a whole, and how much of Hegel’s distinctive vision can be ‘redeemed’ thereby. I have already said that McDowell’s picture is certainly an attractive one: but how far is McDowell right to read Hegel in the spirit he does? I do not intend to review Hegel’s outlook in its entirety, but to concentrate on the focus of McDowell’s account – the Kant-Hegel relation and Hegel’s completion of the Kantian project – and to assess how far it fits the way in which Hegel himself saw the issues that separated him from his great predecessor.
In his account, as we have seen, McDowell takes it that it is Kant’s inability to fully set aside scepticism, in favour of ‘common sense’ realism, that Hegel saw as the limitation in Kant’s outlook, and in seeking to return us to this common-sense realism, McDowell takes Hegel as his ally. Now, I certainly see nothing wrong in this as far as it goes (pace Friedman and others), in so far as I see nothing in Hegel that is at odds with this realism at an epistemological level, in the sense that Hegel had no sceptical doubts concerning such realism, and no epistemological machinery (coherentism, constructivism, relativism or whatever) that should lead one to think his answer to such doubts was qualified in some way. My worry, however, is that in presenting this issue as the focus of the Kant-Hegel debate, we have a picture of that debate that is curiously truncated, where the questions that seem to have mattered most to Hegel in his encounter with Kant get left out. To put the contrast simplistically: while McDowell wants to vindicate common sense, to put us back in touch with tables, cats and other people, and while Hegel is certainly no sceptic on this score, Hegel wants much more – to vindicate a kind of conception of philosophy that Kant had thought was impossible, and which would also appear to have no place in McDowell’s therapeutic, late-Wittgensteinian outlook. I will first illustrate this gulf in philosophical temperament and ambition, and then consider how far this gulf stands in the way of McDowell’s attempt to appropriate and ‘domesticate’ Hegel in the way he does.

The gulf is at its clearest in those passages in Hegel where he discusses Kant explicitly, and sets out where he sees himself at odds with the Kantian outlook. Whereas McDowell takes it that Hegel’s primary concern is to close off the space in Kant which leaves room for scepticism regarding our knowledge of the external world, many of his best-known arguments against Kant (for example, his criticism of Kant’s reflective stance, taking our faculties to be instruments) are directed at his metaphysical modesty, not at any tendency in Kant towards scepticism regarding the external world. In the following passage, Hegel makes clear that he sees such metaphysical modesty as culturally and intellectually disastrous:

The fact is that there no longer exists any interest either in the form or the content of metaphysics or in both together. If it is remarkable when a nation has become indifferent to its constitutional theory, to its national sentiments, its ethical customs and virtues, it is certainly no less remarkable when a nation loses its metaphysics, when the spirit which contemplates its own pure essence is no longer a present reality in the life of the nation.

The esoteric teaching of the Kantian philosophy – that the understanding ought not to go beyond experience, else the cognitive faculty will become a theoretical reason which by itself generates nothing but fancies of the brain – this was a justification from a philosophical quarter for the renunciation of speculative thought. In support of this popular teaching came the cry of modern educationists that the needs of the time
demanded attention to immediate requirements, that just as experience was the primary factor for knowledge, so for skill in public and private life, practice and practical training generally were essential and alone necessary, theoretical insight being harmful even. Philosophy and ordinary common sense thus co-operating to bring about the downfall of metaphysics, there was seen the strange spectacle of a cultured nation without a metaphysics – like a temple richly ornamented in other respects but without a holy of holies. 39

In passages such as these, it is plain that Hegel does not see Kantianism as incomplete because it fails to uphold common-sense realism, but rather because it fails to uphold philosophy in general and metaphysics in particular, in a way that is needed (Hegel thinks) to prevent a more culturally significant ‘see-saw’, between crude materialism, eudaimonism and radicalism on the one hand, and empty fideism, pietism and conservatism on the other. It is plain that for Hegel, completing the Kantian project has a much broader agenda than that represented by McDowell, or put forward by him as the central issue.

Now, in claiming that Hegel’s ultimate concern in getting beyond Kant was to ‘give the nation back its metaphysics’, and that the error of Kantianism was to play into the hands of those forces that had sought to take it away, it may be thought that I am making the mistake that Pippin and others have recently urged Hegelians to avoid: namely, presenting Hegel as a throw-back to a pre-Critical age, as a nostalgic Hellenist ultimately out of step with the direction of progressive philosophical thinking. More particularly: if this is Hegel’s goal, hasn’t he fallen into the trap he himself identified, of ‘going further’ than Kant by going backwards, not forwards, by repudiating the Kantian project, not ‘completing it’?

In response, there are three points to be made here. First, in taking the central issue to be about the role and status of metaphysics as a subject, there is no reason to think Hegel was addressing an issue of no concern to Kant himself. In the Preface to the second edition of the first Critique, Kant famously presents himself as the saviour of metaphysics, putting it at last on the ‘sure road to science’, 40 where this is put forward as the ultimate goal and rationale for the Copernican revolution brought about by transcendental idealism. To Hegel, however, this promise was unfulfilled, as it seemed to him that Kant did not solve the problems of metaphysics in this way, but rather put their resolution beyond the limits of human understanding, in a Lockean manner. 41 For Hegel, therefore, this promise was unfulfilled, as it seemed to him that Kant did not solve the problems of metaphysics in this way, but rather put their resolution beyond the limits of human understanding, in a Lockean manner. 41 For Hegel, therefore, Kant went back on his word, when he claimed in the Preface to the first edition of the Critique that ‘I have not evaded its [i.e. metaphysics’] questions by pleading the insufficiency of human reason’. 42 Hegel argued that by holding that reason was operative only within certain limits, this was precisely what Kant had done.

In response to this first point, it may be said that it does Hegel few favours: for it just shows how far he misunderstood Kant’s essentially therapeutic attitude to the traditional problems of metaphysics, where his aim was not to settle metaphysical questions by declaring them unanswerable, but by showing that they should never have been asked. This response would seem justified; but behind
the first point lies a second, perhaps deeper one: namely, that in setting out to save philosophy from the emptiness of traditional metaphysics, Kant had promised to give philosophy a new and more fruitful role, particularly in relation to the sciences, by giving it the function of grounding the latter. For Hegel, however, this way of renewing philosophy was essentially misconceived, and took away from philosophical enquiry its proper significance, as going beyond and standing above the empirical sciences.\textsuperscript{43}

In making his case here, it is striking how far Hegel’s argument has a cultural and ethical dimension (in the broad sense): that is, it clearly appeared to him that Kant’s critical philosophy could not sustain itself in cultural terms, in relation to the sciences, arts and religious thought, whilst a culture that lacked philosophy as the highest intellectual expression of its values and world-view would deprive individuals of a vital element in human self-realisation and well-being. Hegel’s outlook here is profoundly Aristotelian, as can be seen from the following passage from his introduction to the Lectures on the History of Philosophy, given in the 1820s:

The history of philosophy displays to us the achievements of reason in thinking. Political- or world-history deals with the achievements of reason in willing, achievements of great men and of states. We learn from it how this reason reveals itself in the origin, growth, and downfall of states. The history of art deals with Ideas in the form of imagination which brings Ideas before our perception. The history of philosophy deals with the Ideas in the form of thinking. It presents conscious thinking, puts before us the heroes of thinking, of pure thinking, for our consideration of their achievements. The achievement is the more excellent the less the particular character of its author has imposed his seal on it. It is in philosophy that the particular (i.e. the particular or private activity of the philosopher) disappears, and all that remains is the field of pure thought. Compare this field with others and you have to regard it as the noblest and most excellent, since thinking is the activity which signalizes man. Man is thoughtful in everything, but in feeling, e.g., in perceiving, willing, imagining, he is not purely thinking, in philosophy alone is pure thinking possible; there, therefore, thinking is free from all natural determinants, from all particularities. This is the fundamental thing which we will consider in its movement.\textsuperscript{44}

Hegel consistently criticises Kant for putting this cultural pre-eminence of philosophy in jeopardy, by no longer allowing it to be an activity of ‘pure thought’, with important consequences for the intellectual and spiritual life of mankind.

The third point, then, concerns how Hegel believed this renewal of philosophy could be achieved, and what kind of return to metaphysics was required in order to bring it about. Hegel himself presents his Logic as the centre piece of this renewed philosophical culture; but many interpreters consciously down-play its metaphysical pretensions, and its apparently Platonic aspects, where one motivation for
doing so is (again) to prevent Hegel from looking too out of step with Kant’s Critical Philosophy, according to which (as Pippin has it) ‘the metaphysics of the “beyond”... were forever discredited’. However, it could be argued that this humanistic, ‘finitist’ account, as an interpretation of Kant’s own position, is in fact mistaken and anachronistic: thus, as Ameriks has noted against Pippin, ‘it really is not clear, or even a clearly traditional view, that Kant jettisoned the metaphysics of the traditional past, for on his ultimate ontology, as filled out by pure practical reason, God and the moral self, for example, remain standing as substances “beyond” space and time and its finite limitations’.  

Now, the irony here is that once this aspect of Hegel’s critique of Kant is taken seriously, it can be seen that McDowell’s appropriation of Hegel in defence of ‘common-sense realism’ is seriously one-sided and off-key: for, as Hegel himself repeatedly makes plain, it is just such realism that is the enemy of the exalted conception of philosophy he wishes to champion, where the understanding is transfigured by reason, the finite by the infinite, correctness by Truth. At bottom, therefore, Hegel’s critique of Kant is not that he transgresses common-sense realism as such, to which he must be brought back, but rather that Kant does so in a wholly negative way; in seeking to overcome Kant’s scepticism, therefore, Hegel is still no more a friend of ‘common-sense realism’ than was Kant himself, but for positive reasons, connected not with epistemology and scepticism and the attempt by philosophy to ground the sciences, but with metaphysics and the attempt by philosophy to stand above them. The following passage brings out clearly, I think, how it is that McDowell’s ‘domesticated’ reading of Hegel gets the Kant-Hegel critique inside out: for, while it is indeed anti-sceptical, it is a critique not in the service of common-sense realism (aimed at returning us to the ‘ordinary’, in a Wittgensteinian manner), but of philosophy, where in Hegel’s mind these two outlooks are not the same, but are clearly distinguished:

As for the interpretation of the objects of our immediate consciousness, which form the content of empirical cognition, as mere appearances, this anyway must be regarded as a very important result of the Kantian philosophy. For our ordinary consciousness (i.e., the consciousness as the level of sense-perception and understanding) the objects that it knows count as self-standing and self-founded in their isolation from one another, their mutual dependence on one another is regarded as something external to the object, and not as belonging to their nature. It must certainly be maintained against this that the objects of which we have immediate knowledge are mere appearances, i.e., they do not have the ground of their being within themselves, but within something else. The further question, then, is how this other is determined. According to the Kantian philosophy, the things that we know about are only appearances for us, and what they are in themselves remains for us an inaccessible beyond.

The naive consciousness has rightly taken exception to this subjective idealism, according to which the content of our consciousness is something that is only ours, something posited only through us. In fact, the
true situation is that the things of which we have immediate knowledge are mere appearances, not only for us, but also in themselves, and that the proper determination of these things, which are in this sense ‘finite’, consists in having the ground of their being not within themselves but in the universal divine Idea. This interpretation must also be called idealism, but, as distinct from the subjective idealism of the Critical Philosophy, it is absolute idealism. Although it transcends the ordinary realistic consciousness, still, this absolute idealism can hardly be regarded as the private property of philosophy in actual fact, because, on the contrary, it forms the basis of all religious consciousness. This is because religion, too, regards the sum total of everything that is there, in short, the world before us, as created and governed by God.⁴⁶

Taking passages such as these seriously, it is hard to see how Hegel’s greatest concern in criticising Kant was to bring off a therapeutic escape from philosophy, and not rather to find a deepening role for philosophic thought in a culture for which anything other than common sense is increasingly unthinkable.⁴⁷ It is ironic, therefore, that McDowell (and, in a different way, Rorty)⁴⁸ should take themselves to be representing an authentically Hegelian outlook, when they argue for greater philosophical quietism and modesty in the face of this culture, rather than less:⁴⁹ for, in his critique of Kant, it appears that Hegel was insisting that we see things the other way round.

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NOTES

¹ cf. Hegel 1991: §41 Addition 1, p. 82: Nowadays we have gone beyond the Kantian philosophy, and everyone wants to go further. There are two ways of going further, however: one can go forward or backward. Looked at in the clear light of day, many of our philosophical endeavours are nothing but the (mistaken) procedure of the older metaphysics, an uncritical thinking on and on [Dahindenken], of the kind that anyone can do.

² McDowell 1994: 112.

³ ibid., p. 113.

⁴ ibid., p. 44. In general, McDowell’s contribution has been warmly welcomed by Hegel scholars: see, for example, Sedgwick 1997 and forthcoming.


⁶ The latter is presented in Gadamerian terms: but given the continuities that exist

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between Gadamer and Hegel, McDowell's thoughts here could be related to the latter also.


Rorty 1988b: 140. The citation from McDowell comes from McDowell 1996: xii.

8 Sellars 1997: §1, p.13.


10 ibid., §8, p. 32 (translation modified). It is striking that Hegel's attitude to this principle differs widely from Rorty's: 'Sellars and Davidson can both be read as saying that Aristotle's slogan, “Nothing in the intellect which was not previously in the senses”, was a wildly misleading way of describing the relation between the objects of knowledge and our knowledge of them' (Rorty 1998a: 123).


14 For a recent presentation of this 'textbook' view, cf. Skorupski 1993: 2:

Kant opened the door to nineteenth-century idealism, and it rushed uncерemoniously past him, agreeing with him that mind was not a part of nature, but pressing on boldly to the even more liberating doctrine that nature itself was an externalization, or self-objectification, of Mind. These ideas developed in German philosophy from Kant to Hegel.

15 Accounts of Hegel that oppose the traditional view, and so defend a realist interpretation, can be found in Westphal 1989, Wartenberg 1993 and Stern 1990.


We must add a remark about the explanation of the origin and formation of concepts that is usually given in the logic of the understanding. It is not we who 'form' concepts, and in general the Concept should not be considered as something that has come to be at all. Certainly the Concept is not just Being or what is immediate; because, of course, it involves mediation too. But mediation lies in the Concept itself, and the Concept is what is mediated by and with itself. It is a mistake to assume that, first of all, there are objects which form the content of our representations, and then our subjective activity comes in afterwards to form concepts of them, through the operation of abstracting that we spoke of earlier, and by summarising what the objects have in common. Instead, the Concept is what truly comes first, and things are what they are through the activity of the Concept that dwells in them and reveals itself in them. This comes up in our religious consciousness when we say that God created the world out of nothing or, in other words, that all finite things have emerged from the fullness of God's thoughts and from his divine decrees. This involves the recognition that thought, and, more precisely, the Concept, is the infinite form, or the free, creative activity that does not need a material at hand in order to realise itself.


18 Friedman 1996: 443.

19 ibid.

20 A similar point about the significance of receptivity has been made recently by Susan Haack: see Haack 1996: 308–9:

The point is not that perception does not involve conceptualisation, but that it also involves something else, something with the potential to surprise us. True, our perceptual judgments are conceptualized, interpretative; but what testifies that in perception we are in contact with something real, independent of our...
interpretations, of how anyone thinks it to be, is exactly that potential for surprise. (As Peirce once put it: ‘A man cannot startle himself by jumping up with an exclamation of “Boo!”.’)

22 McDowell 1994: 42.
24 McDowell 1994: 44.
25 ibid., p. 96
30 Kant 1933: A26/B42–3.

Transcendental Idealism offers in its transcendental distinction between appearances and intelligible objects a contrast not between a private, eventually solipsistic, experience and a public experience of outer objects, for that contrast is already an empirical internal part of our framework. Instead it offers a contrast between the revisable beliefs which we accept as that framework and some ultimate form of knowledge in which no revision or change is possible. Kant has, of course, two qualifications to make to this contrast. First he argues that such an absolute system of knowledge is beyond our reach, and perhaps has a function only in its heuristic guidance towards improving our system of beliefs. Second he is also often thought to hold that certain aspects of our framework, for example those associated with Aristotelian logic and Euclidean geometry, are strictly unrevisable. If indeed he does hold this latter view, then we have no need to follow him there. But the basic notion of a relativism which is for us unavoidable is a fruitful idea with strong echoes in post-Kantian Idealism and in very recent philosophy.

The reference to post-Kantian Idealism in Bird’s last sentence seems to me evidence enough that he has misunderstood this aspect of Hegel’s critique of Kant, which is precisely to arrive at the ‘ultimate form of knowledge’ which Bird is happy to accept as unattainable.

35 The need for this two-fold commitment, in this case in relation to Putnam’s return to epistemological realism, has been argued recently by John Haldane, in defence of the basically Aristotelian outlook I have here identified in Hegel: see Haldane 1996. I have argued that this essentialist realism underpins Hegel’s critique of Kant’s epistemology in Stern 1990.
36 cf. Hegel 1985: 119: ‘Of course philosophy does not restrict itself to things in our minds but extends also over everything in the external world and so concerns itself with earthly and finite things.’
37 Thus, the quotation given in the previous note continues: ‘On the other hand, neither does [philosophy] restrict itself to the mundane; it has also the same aim as religion. And its mundane subject-matter remains as a determinateness of the divine Idea.’
40 Kant 1933: Bxv.
For Hegel’s comparison of Kant and Locke, which I think is important for understanding Hegel’s whole attitude to Kant, see Hegel 1977: 68–9.

Kant 1933: Axii.

This contrast between the Kantian and Hegelian accounts of philosophy and its standing is noted by Rorty: see Rorty 1980: 132–5:

Kant … managed to transform the old notion of philosophy – metaphysics as ‘queen of the sciences’ because of its concern with what was most universal and least material – into the notion of a ‘most basic’ discipline – a foundational discipline. Philosophy became ‘primary’ no longer in the sense of ‘highest’ but in the sense of ‘underlying’ … This Kantian picture of philosophy as centred in epistemology, however, won general acceptance only after Hegel and speculative idealism had ceased to dominate the intellectual scene in Germany … Hegelianism produced an image of philosophy as a discipline which somehow both completed and swallowed up the other disciplines, rather than grounding them.


cf. Rorty 1996: 36:

The various contemporary contributors to the pragmatist tradition are not much inclined to insist either on the distinctive nature of philosophy or on the preeminent place of philosophy within culture as a whole. None of them believe that philosophers think, or should think, in ways dramatically different from the ways in which physicists or politicians think.

Whilst McDowell may wish to distance himself from Rorty’s conception of how the pragmatist tradition should make this case (cf. McDowell 1994: 154–5), he nowhere questions the tradition itself, accepting that ‘what I recommend could be represented as pragmatism in Rorty’s sense’ (ibid., p. 155).

See Rorty 1982, where Rorty takes Hegel (of all people!) as a spokesman for the kind of post-Philosophical culture that would dispense with any Platonic self-image (though Rorty does admit that ‘Hegel himself, to be sure, had his Philosophical moments’ (p. xli)).

cf. McDowell 1994: 111:

In that recapitulation of something I said in my last lecture, I have described a philosophical project: to stand on the shoulders of the giant, Kant, and see our way to the supersession of traditional philosophy that he almost managed, though not quite. The philosopher whose achievement that description best fits is someone we take almost no notice of, in the philosophical tradition I was brought up in, although I have mentioned him a couple of times before: namely, Hegel. Of course, much will depend here on what exactly McDowell means by ‘supersession’ and ‘traditional philosophy’: for if the former means ‘Aufhebung’ and if ‘traditional philosophy’ is a certain sort of post-Cartesian problematic, then Hegel can indeed be appropriated in this way; but if ‘supersession’ is taken more negatively, and the tradition is taken to include all of philosophical thought (as McDowell’s Wittgensteinian project would seem to suggest), then I believe he cannot.

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