Bradley, D (2021) Uniqueness and Modesty: How Permissivists can live on the edge. Mind, 130 (520). pp. 1087-1098. ISSN 0026-4423
Abstract
There is a divide in epistemology between those who think that, for any hypothesis and set of total evidence, there is a unique rational credence in that hypothesis (Uniqueness), and those who think that there can be many rational credences (Permissivism). Schultheis (2018) offers a novel and potentially devastating objection to Permissivism, on the grounds that Permissivism permits dominated credences. I will argue that Permissivists can plausibly block Schultheis argument. The issue turns on getting clear about whether we should be certain whether our credences are rational.
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Copyright, Publisher and Additional Information: | © Bradley 2020. This is an author produced version of an article, published in Mind. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy. | ||||
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Institution: | The University of Leeds | ||||
Academic Units: | The University of Leeds > Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Cultures (Leeds) > School of Philosophy, Religion and History of Science (Leeds) > School of Philosophy (Leeds) | ||||
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Depositing User: | Symplectic Publications | ||||
Date Deposited: | 09 Sep 2020 12:53 | ||||
Last Modified: | 08 Oct 2023 00:13 | ||||
Status: | Published | ||||
Publisher: | Oxford University Press | ||||
Identification Number: | https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzaa036 |