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広島平和研究

第7号 目次

平和研究の窓

- 負の遺産の保存と継承……………（藤本黎時） … 5

特集論文：アジアの安全保障

- The Emerging Security Landscape in Southeast Asia
……………（Narayanan GANESAN） … 25
- The Regional Security System in East Asia
—The Dilemma of the US-Japan Security Alliance—……………（吉川 元） … 43

独立論文

- 残留日本兵とメディア
——小野田寛郎元少尉の帰還をめぐる……（永井 均） … 61
- 戦後日本における「平和国家」・「平和憲法」論の形成
——戦後直後における知識人の平和論を中心に——……………（河上暁弘） … 93

特別報告

- Martin Niemöller and the History of Anti-Nuclear Pacifism
in the Federal Republic of Germany, 1950–1984…（Benjamin ZIEMANN） … 117
- 日朝学生交流にみる北朝鮮の学生たちの変化
「南北코리아と日本のともだち展」の取材ノートより ……（渡辺夏目） … 133

書評

- 山崎雅弘著『歴史戦と思想戦——歴史問題の読み解き方』
集英社新書、2019年……………（上村英明） … 159
- マーク・カプリオ著『植民地朝鮮における日本の同化政策 1910～1945年』
クオン、2019年……………（高橋優子） … 165

- 投稿規程および審査規程…………… 170

編集後記

Hiroshima Peace Research Journal

Volume 7 Table of Contents

A Window into Peace Studies

Preservation and Progression of the Unfavorable Legacy of Past Deeds	(FUJIMOTO Reiji) ... 5
---	------------------------

Special Feature: Security in Asia

The Emerging Security Landscape in Southeast Asia	(Narayanan GANESAN) ... 25
The Regional Security System in East Asia —The Dilemma of the US-Japan Security Alliance— ...	(KIKKAWA Gen) ... 43

Research Article

Japanese Army Stragglers and the Media: The Return of Former Lieutenant Hiroo Onoda from the Philippines ...	(NAGAI Hitoshi) ... 61
Formation of “Peace Nation” and “Peace Constitution” Theories in the Post-War Japan	(KAWAKAMI Akihiro) ... 93

Special Report

Martin Niemöller and the History of Anti-Nuclear Pacifism in the Federal Republic of Germany, 1950–1984 ...	(Benjamin ZIEMANN) ... 117
Changes of Attitudes of North Korean Students in the Students Exchange Program between Japan and North Korea	(WATANABE Natsume) ... 133

Book Review

Masahiro Yamazaki <i>War of History and War of Thought</i>	(UEMURA Hideaki) ... 159
Mark Caprio <i>Japanese Assimilation Policies in Colonial Korea, 1910-1945</i>	(TAKAHASHI Yuko) ... 165

Author Guidelines	170
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The Editor's Notes

Special Report

Martin Niemöller and the History of Anti-Nuclear Pacifism in the Federal Republic of Germany, 1950–1984

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The main focus of this paper, Martin Niemöller (1892–1984), is at first sight a rather unlikely candidate to discuss anti-nuclear pacifism. Niemöller's father was a Lutheran pastor, and as many other young men from middle-class families in Wilhelmine Germany, he had joined the Imperial Navy in 1910 as a sea cadet to train for a career as a naval officer. Promoted to lieutenant in 1913, he served during the full four years of the First World War, switching to the submarine force in 1916 and finishing the war as a U-boat commander on UC 67 in 1918. Disillusioned and embarrassed by German defeat in November 1918 and outraged by the revolution and the founding of the Weimar Republic, he left the Navy in 1919. Subsequently, Niemöller started to study Protestant theology, and after seven years working in the so-called Inner Mission, he obtained the post of third parish priest in the affluent Berlin suburb of Dahlem.¹

After the Nazi seizure of power in 1933, Dahlem quickly became the epicentre of what is usually called the Church Struggle: the fight over the hegemony in the Protestant Church between the members of the 'German Christians' – Nazis who wanted to shape the church in line with National Socialist ideology – and the Pastor Emergency League, founded and led by Niemöller, which defended the rights of those pastors who were of Jewish descent. The Pastor Emergency League was the core of what became in May 1934, after the synod of Barmen, the Confessing Church. The Confessing Church insisted that the church should follow Jesus Christ and the word of the Gospel alone. Thus, it reinstated the fundamental principles of the sixteenth century Reformation.²

Yet only five months after the synod of Barmen in May 1934, which is one of the landmark events not only in German, but also in European church history, Niemöller published his book *From U-Boat to Pulpit*.³ And he included a photo of himself as the frontispiece, which shows him, confident and proud, in the uniform of an officer of the Imperial Germany Navy in 1917. The aim of the book, a partial autobiography which takes the reader from his service on various U-boats during the war to his studies in theology, was to demonstrate that Niemöller, as any other member of the Confessing Church, was at

least as nationalistic as the Nazis always claimed they would be. And it did not stop here. As the Church Struggle escalated, Niemöller became the most outspoken critic of any interference of the Nazi state in the church, and did not shy away from criticising leading representatives of the Nazi state such as Joseph Goebbels and the Church Minister Hanns Kerrl. The state responded by detaining him in July 1937. And when the verdict in his trial in March 1938 was tantamount to an acquittal, he was, on Hitler's direct order, brought to the Sachsenhausen Concentration Camp north of Berlin as 'Hitler's personal prisoner.' Niemöller spent the next seven years, until liberation in 1945, first in Sachsenhausen and then in Dachau Concentration Camp, to which he was transferred in 1941.⁴ Yet once Nazi Germany started the Second World War in Europe with the attack against Poland in September 1939, it took Niemöller no longer than seven days to decide that he would volunteer, from his solitary confinement in the Concentration Camp, for combat service in the German Navy. And when his offer had been turned down four weeks later, he was seriously disappointed.⁵ The news of Niemöller volunteering quickly made international headline news, and so he had some explaining to do when he first appeared in front of the international media after liberation in June 1945. Not least because the public in the Western world, mainly in the UK and in the US, had come to see Niemöller as a hero of resistance against the Nazis. But his excuse that he had sought to join the resistance movement in the Wehrmacht was flawed, as he could not have known of the attempts of those who plotted against Hitler on 20 July 1944, as these circles only came together after Niemöller had been detained in 1937. The main motive for him volunteering in 1939 is plain and simply because he wanted to return to his duty as a professional officer and serve his country in the Second World War.⁶

Against this biographical backdrop, the question is obvious: how was it possible that Niemöller would become the most prominent German pacifist in the post-war period, the chair of the most venerable pacifist organization in German history and the public face of the campaign against the deployment of US nuclear intermediate missiles in Germany in the wake of the NATO Dual Track solution in late 1979? And, related to that: which perceptions and assumptions were driving Niemöller's pacifism, and in particular: how did he perceive the dangers emanating from nuclear weapons?

When Niemöller returned to liberty in 1945, he still retained some elements of the political world-view that he had developed during the 1920s and 1930s. One crucial element of continuity was his Protestant nationalism, the idea that the unity of the German people had to be retained against any policies that would divide them up in the impending Cold War. It was for this nationalist reason that he opposed the politics of Western integration that Chancellor Konrad Adenauer pursued since the founding of the Federal Republic

in 1949, and it was for the same reason that Niemöller opposed Adenauer's attempts to build up an armed contingent of the Federal Republic in the context of first a European army, and then, with the founding of the Bundeswehr in 1955, in the context of West German NATO-membership. On both occasions, Niemöller did not intervene on the grounds of pacifist arguments, but because he understood that West German rearmament would cement the partition of Germany into two states.⁷

However, it also became obvious shortly after his liberation that Niemöller had said farewell to his former militaristic values and to the glorification of military service. Under the impression of German defeat and the devastation of many German cities, he declared in 1945 that German militarism would not reappear.⁸ When the Federation of Protestant Churches in Germany, the EKD (Evangelical Church in Germany) issued repeated appeals for peace in 1948 and 1949, stating that war was not in accordance with God's will, Niemöller supported these declarations wholeheartedly, even though he remained sceptical about the effectiveness of such rather lofty statements. When the Korean War raged in 1951, he stated publicly that the use of weaponry and armed forces could only be detrimental and had to be avoided. Yet in the same speech he also stated: 'I am not a principled pacifist', an assertion that he repeated in November 1952 during a speech in Switzerland.⁹ But only five years later, in October 1957, Niemöller was elected as the president of the German Peace Society (DFG). The DFG was the oldest and most venerable pacifist organization in Germany, founded in 1892 by Bertha von Suttner and Alfred Hermann Fried, both later recipients of the Nobel Peace Prize, and disbanded by the Nazis in 1933, with most of their leading members driven into exile.¹⁰ How could this rapid transformation of Niemöller into a supporter of the pacifist cause happen?

Several factors come into play here. The first influence surely came from his wife Else. Niemöller had married Else Bremer, the sister of his old childhood friend Hermann Bremer, in 1919, and she remained the most important person in his life through all the trials and tribulations of the years from 1937 to 1945 and beyond her tragic death in 1961. As her husband had languished in the Concentration Camps, Else Niemöller had grown into a confident and self-assured woman, battling illness, raising her seven children and taking part in the campaign to release her husband from detention. After the war Niemöller started to speak in public on behalf of peace, starting in 1950 with a speech in Wiesbaden in Hesse, where she lived with her husband. Else Niemöller's pacifism was fairly conventional, based on the notion of maternalism, implying that women as mothers had to support peace in order to protect their own creation.¹¹

A second influence came from Niemöller's ecumenical contacts.¹² In 1950, he took part in a meeting of the executive board of the World Council of Churches in Canada, the

main body of Christian ecumenical work which had been founded in Amsterdam in 1948. After that meeting, he was contacted by Abraham J. Muste (1885-1967), a reformed (Calvinist) Christian who was a leading member of the Fellowship of Reconciliation, a group of Protestant pacifists that operated in many countries and counted in the US, among many others, Martin Luther King Jr. among its members. Muste met Niemöller in New York and convinced him to acknowledge that the churches could not condone war under any circumstances. They continued the conversation in writing, and Niemöller insisted that he understood 'pacifism' as an abstract principle that would not allow him to react to any specific political situation. But then Friedrich Siegmund-Schultze entered the conversation, a close friend of Muste and the leader of the League for International Reconciliation (Internationaler Versöhnungsbund), the German branch of the Fellowship of Reconciliation. Siegmund-Schultze explained that he never used the term pacifism, and that the real challenge was to confront the Cold War arms race. Would Niemöller join him in that endeavour? And he would. Over Easter 1952, Niemöller spoke at the annual meeting of the League for International Reconciliation and mentioned the need to turn the angst of the people about nuclear armaments into a force for peace.¹³

Yet a third influence was needed to turn Niemöller into a nuclear pacifist, which means into someone who rejected nuclear weapons as a matter of principle. And this moment came in March 1954 in the wake of Castle, the US military codename for the detonation of six Hydrogen Bombs at the Bikini Atoll in the Marshall Islands. Castle became a global scandal when news about the Japanese fishermen of the Lucky Dragon (Daigo Fukuryu Maru) appeared in the world media, who showed serious symptoms of radiation disease upon return from a trip in which they had stayed well outside the designated exclusion zone that the US military had flagged beforehand. As in many other places of the world, a large section of the German public immediately understood the dangers of the radiation from nuclear testing.¹⁴ The Council of the EKD, of which Niemöller had been a member since 1945, responded immediately and issued an appeal on 21 May 1954 which highlighted the dramatic dangers of nuclear weapons. But Niemöller was not satisfied, as the appeal amounted to nothing more than an abstract call on the conscience of every Christian, and provided no real measure for the assessment of the situation and any viable solutions.¹⁵

Thus, Niemöller decided to do something that demonstrated his determination to get to the bottom of the dangers of nuclear weapons. He invited three leading German nuclear physicists to a meeting. They were Otto Hahn – who had discovered the process of nuclear fission jointly with Lise Meitner in 1938 –, Werner Heisenberg and Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker. Accompanied by his close friend Helmut Gollwitzer and by Otto Dibelius, the Bishop of Berlin and head of the council of the EKD, these three experts explained

to him the current state and future destructive potential of nuclear weapons. The meeting took place on 9 June 1954, and two different accounts exist. Gollwitzer noted afterwards, that all three physicists had rejected the claim by another physicist, Pascual Jordan, who had reported earlier to the EKD and played down the fate of the Lucky Dragon as kind of a shop-floor accident, a tragic but isolated incident. Hahn, Heisenberg and von Weizsäcker argued that this might be correct for the current generation of Hydrogen bombs, but that it would be superseded in the near future by much more destructive types of this device. What Niemöller concluded after the meeting was that nuclear weapons did not only have the potential for mass destruction, but for a self-destruction of human life altogether.¹⁶ When he later returned to this theme in his speeches and publications, he referred to a thought experiment that the US nuclear physicist Leo Szilard had first developed in 1950. A Hydrogen bomb coated in Cobalt would release huge amounts of radiation into the atmosphere and could thus make large territories, if not the earth altogether, permanently uninhabitable. What Szilard had envisaged was a tool for the self-destruction of humankind, which in English has been called 'Doomsday Device' ever since.¹⁷

Niemöller left the meeting in June 1954 with a clear understanding of the massive dangers of nuclear armaments, and this was the third, and most important push that turned him into a nuclear pacifist. It was not theological reflection that turned him into a pacifist – although theological reflection followed later. It was the insight into the possibility of wholesale destruction not only of cities or countries, but of mankind altogether.

What did Niemöller do with these newly acquired insights? First, he tried to stir up trouble in the council of the EKD, a role which he had relished ever since he had joined the council in 1945. At a meeting on 24 June 1954, the council discussed a critical letter that Niemöller had written to the physicist Pascual Jordan. The bishop Martin Haug from Stuttgart was so outraged about the aggressive tone of that letter that he banged his fist on the table and shouted 'the council of the EKD is fed up' with Niemöller's behaviour.¹⁸ In the churches of the EKD, Niemöller's political views represented only a minority opinion and there was no chance that more than very few Protestants would embrace his critique of nuclear weapons. Thus, he needed other, secular partners for a political alliance, and these he found among the Social Democratic Party (SPD), the main opposition party in the Federal Republic during the 1950s and 1960s. The SPD was still reeling from the results of the September 1957 Federal Election, in which the Christian Democratic Party under Chancellor Adenauer had achieved an absolute majority of the popular vote – until today unique in German parliamentary history – while the SPD trailed at a mere 30 per cent. However, Adenauer had made a serious tactical error when he suggested that the Bundeswehr, the army of the Federal Republic, should be equipped with tactical nuclear weapons, for

instance rockets of the type called Honest John which could be deployed from a mobile launch-pad and had a destructive capacity of between one and four kilotons. In discussing these plans, he suggested in April 1957 that these weapons would be nothing more than a 'mere further developed artillery'. But the West German public knew at this point that their own country would be the target of these tactical nuclear weapons, which would be used by NATO troops to stop a conventional Soviet attack into the Federal Republic, and that their use would produce hundreds of thousands, if not millions of deaths within days.¹⁹

Opposition against Adenauer's rhetoric followed promptly, in the form of the Göttingen Manifesto, released on 12 April 1957 by 18 leading German nuclear physicists, including Otto Hahn and von Weizsäcker. Adenauer managed to defuse the situation somehow by inviting five of the Göttingen 18, as they became known, to the chancellery.²⁰ But then Albert Schweitzer, the renowned humanitarian and theologian, stepped up in a public appeal on 23 April 1957, broadcast in many countries around the globe, in which he warned against the danger of nuclear weapons. In opinion polls conducted in 1958 among a sample of West German citizens, more than 80 per cent stated that they did not want the Bundeswehr equipped with nuclear warheads.²¹ Given this state of public opinion, the Social Democrats decided that they wanted to take advantage by orchestrating public protests against nuclear armaments. The SPD leadership invited trade union representatives, politicians from other opposition parties, members of the Göttingen 18 and leading Protestants, among them Martin Niemöller, to a meeting in Bonn, the West German capital city, on 22 February 1958. It was agreed to launch a campaign of public protests under the heading 'Fight against atomic death'. In the meeting, Niemöller insisted that the campaign should deploy a tactic of dramatization to mobilise wider public. To this end, he reiterated his warnings about the Cobalt bomb that could annihilate mankind. When 'Fight against Atomic Death' launched its public appeal in May 1958, they used a phrase that Niemöller had coined in the meeting in February: 'We will not rest as long as atomic death is threatening our people.'²²

Throughout the spring and summer of 1958, more than 300,000 people in West Germany took part in demonstrations of the campaign, and this figure does not include those who took part in the 1 May demonstrations organised by the trade unions on Labour Day.²³ In Hamburg, Quakers around the couple Hans-Konrad Tempel and Helga Tempel staged a silent vigil and thus introduced a new performative form of demonstration to the repertoire of German protest movements.²⁴ Niemöller himself quickly adopted the new form for his own work in 'Fight against Atomic Death'. He took part in a torchlight vigil that the local group of the 'United War Resisters' (Vereinigte Kriegsdienstgegner, VK), an organization that campaigned for the refusal of military service – the draft had been intro-

duced in 1955 – organised in Cologne over six days in August 1958. This group had been inventive in using spectacular forms of protest before, such as a car procession through Cologne in protest against the drafting of all males born in 1922 for the Bundeswehr, the West German army. During these six days in August 1958, the VK-group collected 15,000 signatures for a petition to the Federal Parliament against the use of nuclear weapons by the Bundeswehr.²⁵

'Fight against Nuclear Death' was seconded at the level of parliamentary politics. Both in state parliaments (Bavaria, Hesse, etc.) as well as at the Federal level, the SPD launched bills that would support the holding of a popular referendum on the issue of nuclear weapons in the Bundeswehr. But the government under Adenauer launched an appeal at the Federal Constitutional Court, and not surprisingly, as the German Federal Law of 1949 has no stipulations in regard to referenda, the court ruled against a referendum. As the verdict from the Federal Constitutional Court came at the end of July 1958, the campaign 'Fight against Atomic Death' quickly lost momentum.²⁶ But there were at least three lasting consequences and resonances of the campaign, both for Niemöller and for the anti-nuclear movement in West Germany more widely.

The first was the transnational component. Right at the beginning of the German campaign, on 7 April 1958, Niemöller had boarded a plane to London and travelled to the town of Aldermaston in Berkshire county. In front of the gates of the nuclear research facility at Aldermaston, the final gathering of the first British Easter March took place, which was led by protesters who demanded the unilateral disarmament of the UK nuclear weapons from the British government. The Easter March had been organised by the radical pacifist Direct Action Committee and by CND, Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, a coalition of Protestant clergy, members of the Labour Party and radical intellectuals that very much resembled the German 'Fight against Atomic Death'. At Aldermaston, Niemöller gave a short speech, commended the excellent organization of the gathering, but also noted that 'no acquaintances' of him were around. Nevertheless, a first start was made. The German campaign against nuclear weapons was part of a wider, transnational movement of anti-nuclear activists.²⁷ And it continued to do so throughout the 1960s to the 1980s.

The second lasting consequence was the transformation of German pacifism. Up until then, pacifist organisations had been dominated by middle-class males who contemplated wide-ranging plans for a better, non-violent future, but had no mass appeal. Even at its height in the mid-1920s, the DFG had never had more than 30.000 members. The campaign 'Fight against Atomic Death' was the first example of single-issue peace campaign that would quickly lose momentum once the opportunity that had triggered its emergence had disappeared, but would be able to mobilise larger sections of the German population

and get them thinking about issues of peace and non-violence.

The third lasting consequence of Fight against Atomic Death was that Niemöller had to reconsider his theological thinking about war, peace and non-violence. His engagement with these issues was triggered by events in the synod of the Evangelical Church of Hesse and Nassau. This was his home church, for which he served as the Church President – carefully avoiding the term bishop – since 1947 for no less than 18 years. But the synod did not condone his political activism, and the controversy was triggered after he stated in 1958 that everybody who would be involved in nuclear armaments would be ‘in practice an atheist.’ At the synod, when these remarks were discussed, Niemöller stated that he had re-read the New Testament in the light of the insights the nuclear physicists had given him in 1954. And he had not found a single line in the scripture that would support the use of violence, but to the contrary many warnings against the use of force, not least in the Sermon on the Mount.²⁸

But whether nuclear weapons could be legitimised theologically or not, he argued in several talks, that was not the real problem. It was rather necessary, he insisted, to ponder the question whether nuclear weapons, and especially the Hydrogen-bomb, could be considered to be weapons in a regular sense. Were they simply instruments that served a specific purpose – to defeat the enemy in war – or were these traditional notions insufficient to understand the changes in technology? As nuclear weapons erased the traditional difference between civilians and combatants in war, they were more than just an instrument of war, they were an instrument for the self-destruction of human beings and all other life on earth. But was mankind entitled, he asked, to wrestle his foremost privilege from the hands of God, the creation of life, and destroy ‘life altogether’?²⁹ His answer was negative. In another talk he continued his critique of the inversion of concepts that the atomic bomb had produced. The distinction between war and peace would collapse, as well as the distinction between friend and foe, victor and vanquished. A device that would turn all human beings into the victims of its destructive power would render these traditional distinctions meaningless. But the most important point was the capacity not only to destroy towns and cities or specific groups of people, but ‘the people’ altogether.³⁰

Niemöller’s nuclear pacifism, his outright rejection of ‘any production, storage, use and even threat’ of nuclear weapons – as he defined it – had a clear theological profile.³¹ His main drive was to preserve God’s creation, life on earth. What is striking, however, is how close Niemöller got to the radical critique of the atomic bomb that the German-born émigré-philosopher Günther Anders (1902-1992) developed around the same time, for instance in his ‘Theses for the Atomic Age’, a paper he had discussed with students in Berlin and published in 1959, and then his main publication, the first volume on *The*

Outdatedness of Man, published in 1956.³² Anders is today largely forgotten, even though he was one of the intellectually sharpest minds of the post-war era. But his insistence that the fundamental categories of human existence had to be reconsidered after the dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima, the 'day zero' of a new age as he used to call it, did not make him many friends in the intellectual circles in the European capitals and in the US, where he had emigrated (returning to Vienna in 1950). Anders developed ideas that are very similar to those of Niemöller, mainly the idea that the atomic bomb is more than just a weapon, an instrument, as it consumes the very distinction between means and ends in the process of wholesale, mass destruction. Anders also insisted that the distinction between war and peace had become meaningless in the shadow of the bomb. But the most striking similarity in their thinking was the insistence that nuclear weapons marked a new threshold in the capacity for destruction. Now, it was not only possible to annihilate complete ethnic groups or nations – as in the genocides of the first half of the twentieth century – but to annihilate humankind in what Günther Anders called an 'omnicide' or a 'globocide'.³³

With his active engagement in the campaign 'Fight against Atomic Death' in 1957/58, Niemöller had catapulted himself to the forefront of the peace movement in West Germany. At this point, not only those who were instrumental in bringing this coalition of different social movements together, but also the protagonists of the traditional pacifist organization needed him. They needed him as traditional pacifism faced a difficult situation in the Federal Republic. The German Peace Society (DFG) had been re-established in 1946, as had been other associations such as the German branch of War Resisters International, a radical pacifist group that mobilised against compulsory military service, or the International of Resisters against Wartime Service (Internationale der Kriegsdienstgegner, IdK). The DFG, however, was running the danger of vanishing in the maelstrom of the Cold War, in which every pacifist organisation in the Federal Republic was considered either to be Communist – as the GDR and its state party, the SED, constantly claimed that socialism would equal peace – or, even worse, suspected to be remote-controlled by the regime in East Berlin. By 1949, the DFG had only 4,400 fee-paying members, many of whom were of retirement age.³⁴ The first post-1945 President was the same as during the final years of the Weimar Republic: retired Major-General Paul Baron von Schoenaich (1866-1954). Like many other leading German pacifists of the Weimar Republic, he had served in a distinguished career in the Imperial German Army, including service in the First World War, before the reactionary politics of the Reichswehr in the 1920s drove him to embrace pacifism.³⁵ When Schoenaich stepped down as President of the DFG in 1951, he was succeeded by Fritz Wenzel, an unimpressive person, a Protestant minister who also served as a member of parliament for the SPD. But when Wenzel lost his mandate in 1957, he also stepped down as President

of the DFG. When the delegates of the DFG gathered in October 1957, they were at a loss how to replace Wenzel. But then they decided to ring Niemöller, who was already a member of the DFG but traveling at the time, because that is what he did most of the time, and asked him whether he would accept to be elected as DFG-President. And he did, much to the delight of the delegates.³⁶ Niemöller reinjected some energy into the remaining core of traditional pacifists. Whenever he spoke for the DFG, he attracted an audience of at least 1,000 people, whereas hardly anybody had turned up when Wenzel made public appearances. And Niemöller was, as the DFG-leadership noted, also judicious in dealing with the paperwork and correspondence that needed attention. And with Niemöller at the helm of the DFG, there was also a fundamental change in tone and presentation. As one of the veterans of the DFG recalled, Baron von Schoenaich had never missed to mention when he spoke during the 1920s that he had always done the right thing in his time as a general in the Prussian army, and that he would still be proud to have served in the military. In the post-war period, this long-standing DFG-member opined, any former officer who would say something similar in a pacifist meeting would be laughed at.³⁷

But bragging about his time in the Imperial German navy was not Niemöller's style. To the contrary, he rarely missed an opportunity for self-critique and mentioned that he had not drawn the right inferences much earlier, already after the First World War. He often cited the example of his friend Heinz Kraschutski (1891-1982). Like Niemöller, Kraschutski had entered the Imperial German Navy as an officer candidate in 1910, so they were both members of the Crew 1910. But Kraschutski had distanced himself from the group culture of the officer corps early on, in the first instance by becoming a teetotaler, which would exclude him from the heavy drinking that was part of the group culture of the officers. In the early 1920s, Kraschutski then became a pacifist and member of the DFG.³⁸ Niemöller's election as President of the DFG in 1958 thus marked a sea-change in the history of German pacifism. Former professional officers had a prominent presence among the DFG-leadership during the 1920s. But with Niemöller at the helm, the DFG was represented by a former officer who emphasised the learning curve that was needed to fully embrace pacifism and to leave the professional ethos of the officer behind.

The 1960s were a quiet decade for anti-nuclear pacifism in the Federal Republic. One reason was that the Social Democratic Party and the Social Democrat trade unions, that had supported Fight against Atomic Death for their own mobilization purposes, turned to other topics and were not heavily invested in pacifist politics throughout the 1960s. The other reason was the missing opportunity structure. The USSR had announced a voluntary moratorium on above the ground nuclear tests, and the Limited Test Ban Treaty which all nuclear powers except for France and China signed in 1963, causes such as the fallout in

the wake of Castle Bravo disappeared. Still, the first Honest John tactical missiles were delivered to the Bundeswehr in late 1959. This prompted members of the IdK, the association that promoted agitation against compulsory military service and was headed by Kraschutski, to protest against the deployment of missiles that can carry tactical nuclear warheads with a torchlight vigil at a British air force base in Dortmund, 13 March 1959. Earlier, members of the group had staged the first non-violent obstruction in the history of the Federal Republic.³⁹

Another group of activists who promoted non-violence and members of the IdK organised a march during Good Friday 1960, with a turnout of a few hundred activists. Thus, German pacifists had adopted the model of the Easter Marches that the British CND had pioneered. Starting in 1961, Easter Marches against nuclear armaments were organised in cities across the Federal Republic, and already in 1964, 100,000 people took part.⁴⁰ Participating every year, starting in 1961, and usually as the main speaker of the concluding event in a major city, was Martin Niemöller. At this point in the eighth decade of his life, he was an almost omnipresent driving force behind the Easter March movement, more relevant than the associations that organised and facilitated the marches.⁴¹

In the process, Niemöller also adapted the core message of his nuclear pacifism. In 1957/58, during the campaign 'Fight against Atomic Death', his emphasis had always been on the Germans as the victims of nuclear destruction. Hydrogen bombs could destroy all life. But the reason why the Germans should protest was because they would be the first to die, as the border between West and East Germany was the foremost hotspot of the Cold War. During the 1960s, he changed his rhetoric. Niemöller now acknowledged that the 'atomic clouds' full of radiation would transcend the borders between East and West and would threaten people on both sides of the Iron Curtain. He later expanded this to the notion of a 'family of mankind' that peace activism should serve. Not only weapons, but the global inequality between the North and the South more generally was a major obstacle towards a lasting peace. This was a remarkable shift away from the traditional concepts of pacifism, for instance in the DFG, which had always conceived of the nation as the core unit of negotiating and achieving peace, and had seen the European nations as the main drivers of war as well as the main harbingers of peace. During the 1960s, Niemöller gradually overcame the traditional Eurocentrism of the German peace movement, and in line with this shift also engaged a solidarity campaign with North Vietnam during the late 1960s. While he demanded an end to US aerial bombings of the Vietnamese people and the Vietcong, he implicitly acknowledged the right of the Vietcong to defend themselves in armed conflict.⁴² Thus, Niemöller's pacifism was never a principled pacifism that rejected any kind of weaponry and any use of them as a matter of principle.

These debates over the legitimacy of armed resistance against Western or, more precisely, US imperialism brought Niemöller, and the remaining core of pacifists in the DFG with him, closer to positions that the hard core of GDR-affiliated Communists in the Federal Republic represented. The Communist Party had been banned by the Federal Constitutional Court in 1956 as it was deemed to be in fundamental contradiction to the political system that the Basic Law of 1949 had established. But the party was re-established under a different name as the German Communist Party (DKP) in 1968, and DKP members quickly tried to gain influence in the DFG and other pacifist groups.⁴³ In 1974, DKP-functionaries founded a committee for peace and disarmament with the acronym KOFAZ. This was basically a shop-front for a politics that was masterminded in East Berlin, and so it found little to no appeal in the West German public, as it was widely known that the GDR influenced this group. But this did not stop Niemöller from supporting KOFAZ from the start.⁴⁴ The situation changed, however, with the NATO Dual Track solution in December 1979. NATO decided to deploy US Cruise Missiles and Pershing intermediate nuclear weapons in Germany, Italy and Belgium unless arms limitations talks with the USSR – the second track – were successful.

The NATO Dual Track decision was a watershed moment in the history of antinuclear activism in the Federal Republic.⁴⁵ A coalition of dignitaries from the emerging Green Party, of Social Democrats, radical lefties and leftist intellectuals were the first signatories of the Krefeld Appeal launched in November 1980. The key formulation of the appeal, which demanded to halt the deployment of US missiles, was: 'Atomic death threatens us all – no new atomic missiles in Europe.' The key term, 'atomic death', deliberately tapped into a notion that Niemöller had developed in the context of the 1957 campaign 'Fight against Atomic Death'. Niemöller was, of course, among the primary signatories of the Krefeld Appeal and became the public face of the campaign against the Euromissiles, as they were called.⁴⁶ By 1983, more than four million people in West Germany signed the Krefeld Appeal. With a series of mass demonstrations, the protests against the deployment of Cruise Missiles and Pershings became the single-biggest mass mobilisation in German history since the revolution in 1918/19. At this point, Niemöller was no longer in good health, and when 300,000 people turned up for the first big mass rally of the movement on 10 October 1981 in Bonn, a speech that he had prepared had to be read out by someone else. Six weeks after his 92nd birthday, on 6 March 1984, Niemöller died in his home in Wiesbaden.

Right after his death, KOFAZ issued a poster that was widely circulated at the time, and still is one of the most widely known images of Niemöller. 'Those who want peace have to live jointly with the enemy. We must dare to show trust. An end to armaments.'⁴⁷ With this quote emblazoned on the poster, Niemöller was admitted into the pantheon of

German pacifism. The fact that he had served his country as a Navy officer in the First World War, and wanted to do the same in the Second, was at this point forgotten. With this poster, Niemöller became enshrined as the figurehead of the anti-nuclear peace movement, and a site of remembrance for anti-nuclear mobilization in his own right.

I conclude with a few remarks on the general significance of Niemöller's anti-nuclear pacifism. That a former professional officer became the most important representative of the West German peace movement in the decades from 1945 to 1985 is not that surprising, given the fact that former officers had already been prominent in the pacifist movement during the 1920s. The key difference is that with Niemöller a former officer who rose to prominence presented his pacifist activism as a conversion, as a turning away from the violent past that he and Germany represented. Niemöllers anti-nuclear pacifism is – second – remarkable in the way in which he embraced a strategy of dramatization. Once he had turned the fight against weapons into his main political cause, he did not shy away from building coalitions between different political groups, from the Social Democratic left to later embracing Communists and other radical lefties, and was happy to lend his face and his fame to the staging of new performative acts of civil disobedience. Finally, it should be noted that Niemöller was among the first prominent pacifists in Germany who identified the new destructive potential of nuclear weapons, and of the Hydrogen bomb particularly, and never tired, right up to his death, to warn the public about their dangers.

NOTES

¹ For details see Benjamin Ziemann, *Martin Niemöller: Ein Leben in Opposition*, Munich: DVA, 2019, 21–168. For a brief English-language account see Matthew Hockenos, *Then They Came for Me: Martin Niemöller, the Pastor Who Defied the Nazis*, New York: Basic Books, 2018. – I would like to thank Professor Makiko Takemoto for the invitation to Hiroshima and for hosting my talk at the Hiroshima Peace Institute on this topic on 4 July 2019, and to express my gratitude to all those who asked pertinent questions on this occasion. I would also like to thank Professor Akiyoshi Nishiyama for making my stay in Japan possible.

² Ziemann, *Martin Niemöller*, 171–256.

³ Martin Niemöller, *Vom U-Boot zur Kanzel*, Berlin: Martin Warneck, 1934; an English translation appeared as: Martin Niemöller, *From U-Boat to Pulpit*, London. Glasgow, Edinburgh: Hodge & Co, 1936. On the publication history of the book see Benjamin Ziemann, 'Schiffe versenken. Martin Niemöllers Bericht über die deutsche U-Bootflotte im Ersten Weltkrieg', *Krieg und Literatur/War and Literature* 28 (2017), 21–46.

⁴ Ziemann, *Martin Niemöller*, 257–356.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 323–330.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 360–368.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 426–446.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 447.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 448f.

- ¹⁰ On Fried and the founding of the DFG see Petra Schönnemann-Behrens, *Alfred H. Fried. Friedensaktivist – Nobelpreisträger*. Zürich: Römerhof Verlag 2011. The best brief survey on German pacifism remains Karl Holl, *Pazifismus in Deutschland*, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1988.
- ¹¹ Ziemann, Martin Niemöller, 450; on the biography of Else Niemöller see Edita Sterik (ed.), *Else Niemöller. Geborene Bremer 1890-1990. Die Frau eines bedeutenden Mannes*, Darmstadt: Zentralarchiv der EKH, 1990.
- ¹² This is rightly emphasised by Matthew D. Hockenos, 'Martin Niemöller, the Cold War, and his Embrace of Pacifism, 1945–1955', *Kirchliche Zeitgeschichte* 27 (2014), 87–101.
- ¹³ Ziemann, *Martin Niemöller*, 451f. On Siegmund-Schultze see Christoph Demke, Friedrich Siegmund-Schultze als christlicher Pazifist, in: Heinz-Elmar Tenorth, Rolf Lindner, Frank Fechner and Jens Wietschorke (eds.), *Friedrich Siegmund-Schultze (1885–1969). Ein Leben für Kirche, Wissenschaft und soziale Arbeit*, Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2007, 103–117.
- ¹⁴ See Lawrence S. Wittner, *Resisting the Bomb. A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement, 1954–1970*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997, 146–148, 153f. On reactions in Germany see Ilona Stölken-Fitschen, *Atombombe und Geistesgeschichte. Eine Studie der fünfziger Jahre aus deutscher Sicht*, Baden-Baden: Nomos 1995, 91–95.
- ¹⁵ See Ziemann, Martin Niemöller, 453f.
- ¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 454.
- ¹⁷ Eva Horn, 'The apocalyptic fiction: shaping the future in the Cold War', in: Matthew Grant/Benjamin Ziemann (eds.), *Understanding the Imaginary War. Culture, Thought and Nuclear Conflict 1945–90*, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2016, 30–50, here 40–42.
- ¹⁸ Ziemann, *Martin Niemöller*, 455.
- ¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 455.
- ²⁰ See Robert Lorenz, *Protest der Physiker. Die Göttinger Erklärung von 1957*, Bielefeld: Transkript, 2011.
- ²¹ Ziemann, *Martin Niemöller*, 456.
- ²² Heinz Kloppenburg, Minutes of the meeting on 22 February 1958 at the hotel Schaumburger Hof, Bad Godesberg: Evangelisches Zentralarchiv Berlin (EZA), 613/84. For context see Hans Karl Rupp, *Außerparlamentarische Opposition in der Ära Adenauer: Der Kampf gegen die Atombewaffnung in den fünfziger Jahren. Eine Studie zur innenpolitischen Entwicklung der BRD*, Cologne: Pahl Rugenstein, 1970, 120–133.
- ²³ See Rupp, *Außerparlamentarische Opposition in der Ära Adenauer*, 162–193.
- ²⁴ Axel Schildt, 'Atomzeitalter' – Gründe und Hintergründe der Proteste gegen die atomare Bewaffnung der Bundeswehr Ende der fünfziger Jahre', in: „Kampf dem Atomtod!“ *Die Protestbewegung 1957/58 in zeithistorischer und gegenwärtiger Perspektive*, Munich. Hamburg: Dölling und Galitz, 2009, 39–56, 47f.
- ²⁵ For these details see <https://www.friedenkoeln.de/?page_id=11242> (accessed 29 December 2019). For the wider background of pacifism in postwar Cologne see Guido Grünewald, 'Die Friedensbewegung in Köln nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg', in: Reinhold Billstein (ed.), *Das andere Köln. Demokratische Traditionen seit der Französischen Revolution*, Cologne: Pahl Rugenstein, 1979, 446–485.
- ²⁶ Rupp, *Außerparlamentarische Opposition in der Ära Adenauer*, 194–202.
- ²⁷ Ziemann, Martin Niemöller, 459f. On context, see Holger Nehring, *Politics of Security. British and West German Protest Movements and the Early Cold War, 1945–1970*, Oxford: Oxford University

Press, 2013.

²⁸ Ziemann, Martin Niemöller, 461f.

²⁹ Martin Niemöller, *Gottes Gebot im Atomzeitalter. Rede auf der Synode der Evangelischen Kirche in Hessen und Nassau im Dezember 1958*, Darmstadt 1959, 6f.

³⁰ Ziemann, Martin Niemöller, 461f.

³¹ Quote: Martin Niemöller zur atomaren Rüstung. *Zwei Reden*, Darmstadt: Stimme-Verlag, 1959, 18.

³² Günther Anders, 'Theses for the Atomic Age', *The Massachusetts Review* 3 (1962), 493–505 (first published in German in 1959); idem, *Die Antiquiertheit des Menschen*, vol. 1: *Über die Seele im Zeitalter der zweiten industriellen Revolution*, Munich: C.H. Beck, 1956.

³³ On Anders see the brilliant chapter by Jason Dawsey, 'After Hiroshima: Günther Anders and the History of Anti-Nuclear Critique', in: Matthew Grant/Benjamin Ziemann (eds.), *Understanding the Imaginary War. Culture, Thought and Nuclear Conflict, 1945–90*, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2016, 140–164.

³⁴ Holl, *Pazifismus*, 138–158. For the figure see Stefan Appelius, *Pazifismus in Westdeutschland. Die Deutsche Friedensgesellschaft 1945–1968*, 2 vols., Aachen: Mainz, 1999, vol. 1, 405.

³⁵ Friederike Gräper, 'Die Deutsche Friedensgesellschaft und ihr General. Generalmajor a.D. Paul Freiherr von Schoenaich (1866–1954)', in: Wolfram Wette/Helmut Donat (eds.), *Pazifistische Offiziere in Deutschland 1871–1933*, Bremen: Donat Verlag, 1999, 201–217.

³⁶ Ziemann, Martin Niemöller, 463f.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 474.

³⁸ Ziemann, Martin Niemöller, 474; on Kraschutzki see Helmut Donat, 'Kapitänleutnant a.D. Heinz Kraschutzki (1891–1982). Ein Offizier im Kampf für ein 'anderes' Deutschland', in: Wette/Donat (eds.), *Pazifistische Offiziere in Deutschland*, 338–362.

³⁹ See <<http://castor.divergences.be/spip.php?article618>> (accessed 29 December 2019).

⁴⁰ Nehring, *Politics of Security*, 67, 120f., 203.

⁴¹ Ziemann, Martin Niemöller, 468f.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 469f.

⁴³ Appelius, *Friedensgesellschaft*, vol. 2, 452f., 560f., 664–667.

⁴⁴ Helge Heidemeyer, 'NATO-Doppelbeschluss, westdeutsche Friedensbewegung und der Einfluss der DDR', in: Philipp Gassert/Tim Geiger/Hermann Wentker (eds.), *Zweiter Kalter Krieg und Friedensbewegung. Der NATO-Doppelbeschluss in deutsch-deutscher und internationaler Perspektive*, München: R. Oldenbourg, 2011, 247–267.

⁴⁵ See, also for the following: Christoph Becker-Schaum/Philipp Gassert/Martin Klimke/Wilfried Mausbach/Marianne Zepp (eds.), *„Entrüstet Euch!“ Nuklearkrise, NATO-Doppelbeschluss und Friedensbewegung*, Paderborn: Ferdinand Schoeningh, 2012.

⁴⁶ Ziemann, Martin Niemöller, 473.

⁴⁷ Archiv der sozialen Demokratie Bonn, 6/PLKA014071.

『広島平和研究』掲載原稿に係る審査規程

第1条 目的

『広島平和研究』に投稿される原稿に関する審査の公平性及び透明性を確保し、並びに査読手続を明確にするため、この規程を定める。

第2条 原稿の種類と審査対象

- (1) この規程に基づく審査の対象は、「論文」、「研究ノート」、「書評」に該当する原稿とする。
- (2) 「巻頭言」、「活動報告」及びその他原稿については、この規程に基づく審査の対象としないものの、編集委員会の裁量により編集上の修正を行うことができる。

第3条 審査及び掲載

- (1) 前条第1項に掲げる審査は、原則として、2名の匿名査読者による査読により行い、その結果に基づき、編集委員会が原稿の掲載の可否を決定する。
- (2) 査読者による査読の依頼に際しては、以下の点を考慮した上で査読者を選定する。
なお、外部査読者については、依頼条件を満たす場合には謝金を支払うこととする。
 - (a) 当該分野の専門乃至その分野に近い人を査読者候補とする。
 - (b) 原則として1名は学内から、他の1名は学外から選定する。
 - (c) 投稿者を指導した経験のある者は、原則として除外する。
- (3) 査読手続のための評価方法（評価シートの書式を含む）については別途編集委員会にて定める。

第4条 編集委員会による依頼原稿の審査

編集委員会が依頼する原稿については、査読者による査読を省略することができる。

第5条 改正

この規程の改正については、編集委員会が発議し、教授会による承認により決定する。

附則

この規程は、教授会の承認を得た日から起算して1箇月を経過した時点から施行する。
なお、同規程が施行されるまでの期間は、これまでの編集において確立された慣行に則った査読手続を適用する。

(2016年9月29日教授会承認。同年10月29日施行)

Regulation for Evaluating the Manuscripts Submitted for Publication in Hiroshima Peace Research Journal

I. Objectives

Article 1. This Regulation provides for the purpose of ensuring fairness and transparency in evaluating the articles submitted to the Hiroshima Peace Research Journal (HPRJ), as well as to clarify the peer review procedures.

II. Article Types and Areas of Evaluation

Article 2.

- (1) Types of articles to be evaluated based on the Regulation shall be “research paper”, “research note” and “book review.”
- (2) “Foreword”, “activity report” and other types of manuscripts are not subject to review based on the Regulation, but they can be edited at the discretion of the HPI Editorial Committee.

III. Evaluation and Publication

Article 3.

- (1) When carrying out evaluations mentioned in paragraph 1 of the preceding Article, the submitted articles are normally peer-reviewed by two anonymous reviewers, and the Editorial Committee shall decide if the articles should be accepted in accordance with the peer review results.
- (2) Upon request of peer review, reviewers shall be selected in consideration of the following criteria:
 - (a) Experts in the concerned field and/or reviewers whose area of expertise is close to the field.
 - (b) As a general rule, one reviewer will be selected from Hiroshima City University, and the other from outside the University.
 - (c) In principle, those who have taught the author shall be excluded.
It is to be noted that the honorarium will be paid to the external reviewers, in the case that the request condition is satisfied.
- (3) The Editorial Committee shall decide the evaluation method for the peer review procedures including the form of the evaluation sheet.

IV. Exemption from Evaluation

Article 4. Articles that the HPI Editorial Committee request to submit shall not be subject to peer review by reviewers.

V. Amendments

Article 5. Amendments of this Regulation shall be proposed by the Editorial Committee and be approved by the HPI Research Staff Meeting (RSM).

Supplementary Rule This Regulation is deemed to be in effect from the time that has elapsed one month from the date of the approval of the RSM. It should be noted that the peer review procedures in line with the established practice in the editing shall be applied until the Regulation enters into force.

(Approved by the Research Staff Meeting on the 29 September 2016 and in effect 29 October 2016)

編集後記

『広島平和研究』の発行も7回目です。

巻頭の「平和研究の窓」は、広島市立大学の藤本黎明・元学長にお願いしました。広島平和研究所（HPI）の設立（1998年4月）当時、本学の国際学部長として設立に貢献された藤本先生は、創世期の興味深いエピソードも紹介されています。

前回発行した第6号はHPIからの寄稿がゼロでしたが、今回は掲載した9本の論考のうち4本がHPI研究員からの投稿です。特集論文「アジアの安全保障」の2本はナラヤナン・ガネサン、吉川元、両研究員による英語の論考で、独立論文の2本も永井均、河上暁弘、両研究員の力のこもった投稿論文です。

特別報告も興味深い内容です。1本はベンヤミン・ツィーマン英国シェフィールド大学歴史学教授による論考「マルティン・ニーメラーと西ドイツ反核平和主義の歴史：1950年～1984年」で、ツィーマン教授が昨年7月に来広しHPI研究フォーラムで講演した内容を論文にしたものです。もう1本は、2012年から続く日本と北朝鮮の大学生交流事業の貴重な報告です。日本のNGOの主催で毎夏、日本から学生訪朝団が派遣され、平壤の学生との交流を行って来ましたが、最近、平壤の学生の側に大きな変化が見られます。ほぼ毎年、現地で同行取材をさせた渡辺夏目・共同通信記者による渾身のレポートです。

書評の1本目は『歴史戦と思想戦』です。この中で著者の山崎雅弘氏は、いわゆる「歴史戦」を戦う論客らのロジックやトリックを明らかにしており、それは戦前の旧日本軍の「思想戦」の手法と酷似しています。評者は上村英明・恵泉女学園大学教授。もう1本はマーク・カプリオ立教大学教授の著書『植民地朝鮮における日本の同化政策 1910～1945年』。日本の朝鮮半島統治および同化政策を、欧米諸国の植民地統治および同化政策と比較し、日本の政策の特徴の解明を試みています。評者は昨年九州大学から博士号を取得した高橋優子・島根県立大学市民研究員です。

世の中は新型コロナウイルスの感染問題がまだ尾を引いていますが、引き続きご支援をよろしくお願いいたします。（水本和実）

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