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Good-enough Principles for Welfare

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ABSTRACT
The aim of this article is to widen the grounds of the debate on the relationship between values, social change and welfare reform. In the public debate on welfare reform and the Third Way the significance of the welfare politics and campaigns of civil society in challenging the old welfare order has received little acknowledgement. The article argues that these politics and campaigns have, along with both the New Right and New Labour, attempted to construct a new vision of an ‘active welfare subject’. In the process they have also expanded the moral repertoire for understanding people’s engagement with welfare beyond the self-interest/altruism dichotomy. The article uses this new repertoire to propose seven key principles for a reordering of the social relations of welfare.

INTRODUCTION
Welfare states in the industrialised West are in transition. The social, economic, political and cultural conditions which sustained a post-war welfare settlement in many Western countries have changed. In Britain, the contours of a new welfare order are being shaped by new political discourses and by competing interpretations of the social and economic risks we face and how we defend ourselves against them. New definitions of the rights and responsibilities of citizenship and of the rights and wrongs of egalitarianism are emerging.

In addition, the imbrication of academic and political debates on welfare in Britain is more marked than it has been for three decades (Giddens, 1994, 1998a, b; Etzioni, 1997; Franklin, 1997; Le Grand, 1998). Underlying different contributions to the debate is an attempt to etch out the principles or values which would both underpin, and be reinforced by, a new welfare settlement. In this way, welfare resettlement and moral reordering can be seen to be proceeding hand-in-hand. Before

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being elected in January 1997, Tony Blair made this connection clear by insisting that the key question was not ‘whether the welfare state is reformed’ but ‘by whom and with what values the new settlement on welfare is underpinned’ (quoted in Deacon, 1998, p. 307). This statement directly echoes questions raised by Tony Giddens some three years earlier: ‘If it is to be agreed that there is still an agenda for radical politics, who is to implement it? Seemingly even more difficult: what values might provide guidance for such an agenda?’ (Giddens, 1994, p. 20).

In answering these questions about who should lead the welfare settlement, and with which and whose values should it be informed, it has become commonplace in the debate to identify three key political actors and their sets of values (see Giddens, 1998b; HMSO, 1998a, pp. 2, 19–22): (1) social democracy (Old Labour/Old Left); (2) neo-liberalism (New Right); and (3) the Third Way (centre-left/ New Labour). However, the representation of the post-1960s politics of welfare in these terms is circumscribed and tends to eclipse the diverse and complex ways in which the post-war welfare settlement was destabilised. Also, by distilling the challenges to the ancien welfare regime down to the New Right and New Labour, it tends to cast as unreconstructed ‘Old Labour’ those who might seek to support or, at least to make more transparent, issues of redistribution and universalism. Because it limits an understanding of ‘the political’ to formal party politics it only tacitly acknowledges the significance of those political energies in civil society which have centred upon forms of welfare activity or activism since the late 1960s. These refer not only to ‘new social movements’ (around gender, race and ethnicity, sexuality, disability and age) but also to the plethora of campaigning organisations and self-help groups which developed to stake claims for welfare (around, for example health needs, care needs and responsibilities), as claimants of benefits (e.g., carers, pensioners), as users of particular services – (for example, psychiatric services, maternity services, and so on) or as providers of alternative services (refuges, support systems for people with AIDS) (Williams, 1989; Taylor, 1993; Oliver, 1996; Beresford and Turner, 1997; NCVO, 1997, Hoggett, 1997). In this article I argue that while these political and ‘subpolitical’ activities do not and have not constituted a homogeneous movement, nevertheless, together they contributed as profound a political critique of the post-war welfare state as those from the New Right and New Labour. They have put on the agenda needs to do with personhood and well-being which have expanded the moral repertoire for understanding people’s engagement with welfare, and have widened the meanings of redistribution, equality, universalism and justice (Williams, 1989; Lister, 1997). Their claims have also highlighted a
cultural political problem, that is, whether it is possible to combine a commitment to universalism in policies whilst respecting a diversity of identities, practices and beliefs. And, if so, on what basis can solidarities of support for a new welfare order be built from claims of difference?

I begin by contextualising these campaigns and activities within competing and overlapping contestations of the post-war settlement which has emerged in Britain over the last twenty years. Three main discourses are identified: the New Right, New Labour and the new social and welfare movements. These are analysed in terms of their common concern to create, albeit in different ways, an active welfare subject within new organisational relations of welfare, and their different constructions of the moral motivations of this welfare subject – self-interest, altruism and the recognition of equal moral worth. The last of these is used to develop a tentative framework of principles for the social relations of welfare.¹

CHANGING THE WELFARE SUBJECT

The challenges to the so-called consensus supporting the post-war Keynesian welfare settlement came thick and fast in a variety of forms: economic recession, the ‘unfixing’ of gender and ethnic relations, changes in the organisation and provision of employment, demographic shifts, challenges to the sovereignty of the nation-state. They fed into political challenges to the welfare state which emerged during the 1970s and which focused upon the nature of its key organisational characteristics – mass/universal, state provided, bureaucratically run and professionally-delivered. The challenges came from both neoliberal critiques of the welfare state’s efficiency and from progressive critiques of its universalism and accountability developed from the new forms of political collectivities on the left – originally from the social movements based in inequalities of gender, race, disability and sexuality, but later also from groups organised around specific welfare rights and needs.

What began to emerge were new contesting discourses of welfare which, in very different ways, focused upon the reconstitution of the welfare subject as an active element in the social relations of welfare, rather than the passive recipient of (benevolent or controlling) welfare. This shift from passive to active welfare subject has been observed by others in different terms (Titterton, 1992; Deacon, 1993; LeGrand, 1997; Leisering and Walker, 1998; Williams et al., 1999). Le Grand (1997), for example, ties it into an analysis of different views of the motivations of welfare subjects and notes a distinction in the consensus period between the passive recipients of welfare (the ‘pawns’) and active welfare subjects
in the shape of altruistic taxpayers, administrators and professionals (‘knights’ as Le Grand calls them). Le Grand describes how policy changes in the 1980s, especially in quasi-markets, reconstituted fiscal and other welfare providers and users as active in the pursuit of their individual self-interest (the ‘knaves’). He acknowledges that motivations may be more complex than those of either ‘knight’ or ‘knave’ (see also Edwards and Duncan, 1997; Taylor-Gooby, 1998), however, the point I explore later is whether this dichotomy of altruism/self-interest provides a broad enough moral grammar to understand (collective) agency and action around welfare.

The New Right

Much has been already documented on the way neoliberalism constructed and implemented a shift from a bureaucratic-professional welfare regime to a managerialist one tightly controlled by the centralised state, but organisationally dispersed through the creation of the three Ms – markets, managers and mixed economies (see Hills, 1990; Clarke and Newman, 1997). This shift was not unique to Britain, but has taken place in many Western industrialised welfare states albeit coloured in different political hues. The hue of neoliberal politics within Britain constructed major risks most centrally in terms of the accumulation needs of capital (a shift to flexible labour and a low wage economy) and the moral risks to the nation. It did this through a populist political programme which redefined the welfare state, not as a source of protection from risk, but as itself a major generator of risks – of disincentives to initiative, of welfare dependency, of an underclass, of inefficiency and expense in the public sector, and, thereby, of loss of economic competitiveness in the outside world. Through neo-conservatism it sought to protect the nation from these risks by asserting a moral and social order that reinforced traditional social relations of family and nation in the pursuit of individual self-interest, family self-reliance, discipline and the transmission of ‘British’ cultural values. In terms of the social relations of welfare, its version of markets, managers and mixed economies reconstituted the welfare subjects into two main opposing categories: the taxpayer/consumer and the welfare dependant. The taxpayer/consumer subject was constructed as responsible but overburdened, straining to exercise choice in the welfare market. These new dividing lines resonated with gendered, racialised, aged and able-bodied divisions, but in common with New Labour and the new social movements discussed below, one of the fundamental breaks it made was to recreate the valid welfare subject as active, as possessing self-interested agency and autonomy in relation to the market.
New Labour’s New Contract for Welfare

This focus upon the active welfare citizen as against the passive welfare beneficiary of Beveridge’s day is one of the central ways in which New Labour inscribes the welfare subject a place in the New Contract for Welfare, its Green Paper on welfare reform (HMSO, 1998a). The new active welfare subject is described variously as being a ‘citizen’, a ‘customer’, a ‘self-supporting person’, a ‘stakeholder’, a ‘consumer’, a ‘voter’ and ‘an individual with duties’. These last three are rolled into the ‘demanding, sceptical citizen-consumer’ (ibid., p.16). This slippage in terms partly signifies the attempt to draw on different discourses in order to mark out a new way. It also represents a ‘tiering’ of welfare subjects – a far more subtle and less fixed approach compared with the New Right’s consumer-taxpayer versus welfare dependant – and consisting of one central subject and two types of decentred subject. In the centre is the sceptical citizen-consumer who acts in the pursuit of ‘enlightened self-interest’ (Deacon, 1998, p. 311), expecting value for money and quality services tailored to individual needs. To either side of the sceptical consumer are, first, the dutiless and, second, the dutiful and vulnerable with a line around the second group being more tightly drawn – no longer to include, for example, lone parents or all disabled people. Each group has different objectives: ‘Work for those who can: security for those who cannot’ (HMSOa, 1998 p. iii). Paid work will enable – or empower – the dutiless to enact the duties at the heart of the contract – to be in paid work, to be independent, to support the family, to save for retirement and not to defraud the taxpayer (ibid., p. 80). The third tier of welfare subjects consists of those for whom paid work as the means of escaping poverty and dependence is not an option: ‘those who are retired or so sick or disabled, or so heavily engaged in caring activities, that they cannot realistically support themselves (ibid., p. 23, my emphasis). For them ‘dignity and security’ is promised (ibid., p. 19).

The social relations of the new welfare programme adds a further ‘M’ to (quasi) markets, managers and mixed economies and this is ‘modern’. A modern service, like its customers (who are at the centre – not the end – of service delivery) is active in its efficiency, its support, its transparency, in tailoring its service to individual needs, in its use of information technology to co-ordinate the different sectors; it will also reclaim and reshape an ethos of public service (ibid., pp. 6, 71–78, 81).

New Labour aims to tackle three central problems or risks: inequality and social exclusion; welfare dependency and disincentives to paid work; and benefit fraud. These are relatively low-level risks compared with the post-war and New Right projects, but where the Green Paper is quiet on risks it is much more assertive in terms of morality and values, and in the
creation of a new moral order. Moral imperatives are tied into financial imperatives through the central ethic of *paid work*. Where the principle of the market was central to the New Right’s agenda, the principle of paid work articulates New Labour’s agenda. It is the first duty of citizenship, rather than one of its central rights (with the exception of disabled people for whom it is both a duty and a right). Parents in paid work (both mothers and fathers) provide a good role model for their children and social networks for themselves (HMSOa, 1998, p. 58). Paid work, then, is what we owe our government, our country, our families, our communities and ourselves. ‘Community’ here signifies the ‘social’: that which connects the individual and his/her family to the nation-state and work. It is the vehicle for greater opportunities in the pursuit of both self-interest and altruism, and the glue which binds an inclusive society together. In this way welfare subjects are seen as both self-interested and altruistic.\(^3\)

This view of human agency remains confined within social democratic and liberal paradigms rather than seeking to go beyond them. At the same time, however, some of the issues around equality and citizenship raised by, amongst others, new social movements and user groups (Beresford and Turner, 1997), and discussed in the following section, do find some reflection in the Green Paper – for example, that welfare should support independence, that disabled people should have civil rights; that a minimum wage should act as a barrier against the poverty trap; that services should be flexible, accessible, transparent and universally of high quality; and that users should be consulted. However, much of the gist of what has constituted an ‘alternative’ discourse on universalism and equality finds little reflection in policy documents. Similarly, Tony Blair’s Fabian pamphlet on *The Third Way* (Blair, 1998) reiterates the view that ‘Human nature is co-operative as well as competitive, selfless as well as self-interested’ (*ibid.*, p. 4) whilst also promoting ‘equal worth’ as one of four key values for a strong society. Equal worth is defined as the need for anti-discriminatory policies, the value of a multiracial society, and the significance of rights-based campaigns, yet these are scarcely elaborated in any of the priorities in the rest of the pamphlet. If it is only at a rhetorical level that New Labour recognises the equal worth of all citizens, then what does the principle of equal worth mean in relation to welfare? And is the conception of the welfare subject as both knightish and knavish a sufficient moral basis for understanding the pursuit of equal worth?

The new politics of welfare
Since the 1970s campaigns by new social movements and by welfare users exposed, first, the limitations of a ‘false’ universalism, a limited
egalitarianism and an exclusive rather than inclusive citizenship inherent in the post-war welfare state (Williams, 1989; Hughes and Lewis, 1998). In doing this they also highlighted new social risks – for example, domestic violence, racial violence, forms of discrimination, child sexual abuse, lack of autonomy, rights circumscribed according to sexual preference, environmental risks from pollution. The identification of these risks emerged from claims against cultural and social injustices caught up in unequal relations of power in society. These relations were refracted in welfare through the hierarchical relations between providers and users, through the constitution of moral categories of desert and medical categories of physical, mental and sexual invalidity, and through forms of restricted access to resources by marginalised social groups. Thus, central to many of their demands has been the reconstitution of the welfare subject as an active citizen participating in the democratic organisation of welfare services.

It is important to acknowledge the diversity of the sorts of campaigns and groups identified at the beginning of this article (see, for example, Oliver, 1990 for a typology of disability action groups). While their politics have been particularist in the sense of staking out specific needs, they are nevertheless marked by a generality which is about more than the redistribution of goods. This centres upon claims for the realisation of personhood, for cultural respect, autonomy and dignity. Furthermore, neither altruism nor self-interest can capture the mainspring behind demands that welfare services respect identity and autonomy and treat people with ‘equal worth’ (see, for example, the ‘charters’ from groups involved in community care in Bornat et al., 1997, pp. 266–97).

A more fruitful approach is provided by the philosophical theories and discussions of what has been termed ‘the politics of recognition’ by Axel Honneth (1996), Charles Taylor (1994) and Nancy Fraser (1995). All three note that struggles to assert their equal moral worth by subaltern, marginalised and excluded groups increasingly characterise the politics of identity and new social movements and signify an attempt to reject the systematic disrespecting or misrecognition of a group’s ‘culture or way of life, the dignity of their status as persons, and the inviolability of their physical integrity’ (Anderson, 1996, p. x). According to Taylor, ‘Due recognition is not just a courtesy we owe people. It is a vital human need’ (1994, p. 26).

In different ways Taylor and Honneth trace historically the material and philosophical development of struggles for recognition. Honneth’s exposition, which draws on Hegel and Mead, proposes that the preconditions for self-realisation are rooted in the struggle to establish mutual
recognition (rather than in the struggle for existence). Crucially, however, mutual recognition is relational, or dialogic; personal identity depends upon social relationships to develop and sustain it. Honneth identifies three modes which make this possible: close relationships of love and friendship which grant self-confidence; legally institutionalised relations for the development of rights, granting self-respect; and, third, networks or communities of shared values which provide an individual with a sense of worth and self-esteem. In terms of the political, his theory takes us beyond rights as the basis for self-realisation and into the moral landscape of social conflicts over worth, and also beyond the idea that ‘interests’ alone fuel collective action:

The motives for rebellion, protest and resistance have generally been transformed into categories of ‘interest’ and these interests are supposed to emerge from the objective inequalities in the distribution of material opportunities, without ever being linked, in any way, to the everyday web of moral feelings. (Honneth, 1996, p. 161)

Taylor (1994) also provides a historical analysis of the significance of recognition struggles for contemporary politics and the dilemmas they pose. Briefly, he describes how, from the eighteenth century, the collapse of social hierarchies with fixed statuses derived from the ‘natural’ order and its replacement with a democratic ideal led, on the one hand, to universalist politics which emphasised the equal dignity of all, and, on the other, to the development of a modern notion of identity. Furthermore, the greater the questioning of the preordained, the more numerous the struggles for the recognition of previously excluded identities/groups (for example, women, minorities). However, the universalising logic of the first process pulls against the particularising logic of the second. The attempt to resolve this tension requires, in Taylor’s terms, a continual reassessment of our horizons of taken-for-grantedness; and, in Honneth’s, an examination of the moral grammar of social conflicts. In this way Honneth and Taylor provide a further understanding for human action rooted in the need for the mutual recognition of one’s own or one’s group’s moral worth.

What follows is a tentative attempt to outline a framework of principles, drawing upon welfare struggles and campaigns, which extends the moral vocabulary of the social relations of welfare beyond the self-interest/altruism dichotomy. It is intended as the basis for discussion, amendment and empirical investigation, and also to put flesh on the bony rhetoric of ‘equal worth’ in the Third Way debate. It follows a mode of ‘thought-experiment’ used in other disciplines (Held, 1995; Fraser, 1997).
First, two points should be made. Nancy Fraser’s contribution to the debate on recognition struggles (1995) insists on the importance of acknowledging issues of redistribution. She therefore talks about the politics of redistribution and recognition, saying an egalitarian society cannot have one without the other. I agree with this position. Indeed, welfare struggles in Britain demonstrate par excellence that struggles for recognition almost inevitably involve some aspect of redistribution. This applies to the principles that follow. They have to be seen as part of, not an alternative to, a commitment to meeting people’s needs for a basic income, employment, health care, housing and education. As such they address the social, cultural and political elements of the settlement, but this does not mean that they are separate from the issues of how to pay for welfare (see Hills, 1993). They should also be seen as reflective of the claims emerging within a specific time and place – they lay no claim to be universal.

The second point is that I have suggested in my title that these are ‘good-enough’ principles. The term is drawn from the psychoanalyst Donald Winnicott’s attempt to explore the good-enough conditions of intersubjectivity for the socialisation of young children. Honneth uses Winnicott’s (amongst others’) findings for developing his theory of the struggle for recognition at the level of love and friendship (see earlier). My use of ‘good-enough’ indicates a morality grounded in the relational conditions of everyday life sufficient for the recognition of moral worth (cf. Smart and Neale, 1997). I have transposed both ‘good-enough’ and ‘recognition’ to the sphere of welfare politics in order to identify a moral grammar of welfare ‘from below’. I am also proposing that we need to understand welfare systems not only as the institutionalisation of social rights but as part of the ‘networks and communities of value’ which we inhabit, through which some of our needs for ‘due recognition’ might be met.

GOOD-ENOUGH PRINCIPLES FOR WELFARE

Interdependence

The discourse of dependency has become the focus for both resistance and disapprobation. An example of dependency as resistance discourse is the 1970s Campaign for the Legal and Financial Independence for Women which was established to challenge women’s dependent status in relation to social security rights, taxation, tenancies, mortgages, bank accounts and so on (McIntosh, 1981). Another example is the Independent Living Movement developed from local campaigns by disabled people in the 1980s (Morris, 1993). Central to both these campaigns was a challenge
to the way welfare institutions, policies and professionals construct certain social groups as dependent – that is, unable to exercise autonomy in certain areas of their lives. The construction of women as financially dependent on their husbands not only limited their access to certain benefits it also captured their assumed subordinacy to their husbands in relation to other areas of personal relationships – in decision-making, in relation to sexual relationships or spending power. For disabled people, their dependency was constructed as a grateful passivity upon those relatives or professionals who ‘looked after’ them. Their institutionalisation often represented, as it did for older people, the stripping of autonomy and privacy and an exclusion from social life. In contrast, the Independent Living Movement seeks independence for disabled people in daily lives, in achieving mobility, in parenting, in pursuing paid work, in living in places and with others of their own choice (Priestley, 1999).

Dependency, as constructed through the institutions of welfare, affects different groups in different ways, but ‘dependency’ also has different political constructions (Drover and Kerans, 1993, ch. 1; Fraser and Gordon, 1995; Leonard, 1997, pp. 50–4). Over the last ten years forms of moral disapprobation have developed attached to the notion of ‘welfare dependency’ – an imagined culture that has developed into a deviant underclass (Murray, 1990). In this scenario dependency is seen as a condition resulting from the receipt of benefits and is, in New Labour’s version, counterposed to empowerment and independence through paid work in the market. This narrowing of the notion of independence as market-based, and of the notion of dependency as behavioural rather than enforced or resisted, has served to obscure the struggles against dependency of those whose routes to labour market freedom, or economic independence, are more risky and tortuous – women with children, disabled people, chronically ill, and older people. Indeed, welfare benefits and services have provided for women, disabled and older people the means of escape from the undesirable dependency upon oppressive relationships.

Furthermore, it is ironic that those who are claiming welfare are seen as dependent, no matter how fully engaged or responsible for others they may be, whilst those who are market dependent are seen as independent. Contemporary discourse also labels lone mothers who prefer to stay at home to look after their children as welfare dependants whereas their married counterparts are seen as exercising choice. But this dichotomy which contrasts the extra-market dependant on the one side and the fully integrated paid worker on the other fails to recognise that this worker’s independence is achieved through hidden systems of support upon those who care for that worker’s children, clean his/her house, buy and cook
his/her food, and so on. Personal autonomy is only achieved through collective effort.

Rather than promoting the dependency/independence dichotomy, we could propose interdependence as the principle which brings into play all those emotional, material, physical networks of unequal reciprocity, and creates the basis for autonomy. We need to accept that we are all necessarily dependent on others, but at the same time challenge the institutions, structures and social relations which render some groups unnecessarily dependent. This connects to the second principle: that of care.

**Care**

One important way in which welfare states construct a boundary between public rights and responsibilities and private duties is the extent to which they recognise, remunerate or socialise the work involved in caring for and/or supporting children, older frail or sick people, people who are disabled and require support, for, on the whole, this has been assumed to be the unpaid responsibility of women in the home. In the 1960s and 1970s women’s demands focused upon improving child-care support facilities for women to enable them to work and this was followed by an attempt to get women’s caring of older and/or sick and/or disabled family members recognised. All of this was a radical departure from the post-war welfare settlement in which informal care was an invisible and taken-for-granted area of welfare (Land and Rose, 1985).

Local carers’ groups and carers’ organisations, and later a National Carers’ Organisation, campaigned over the rights for women to benefits for caring responsibilities, especially for married women who had been denied (until 1986 when it was challenged by the European Court) a care allowance on the basis of it being part of a married women’s natural duty. More research revealed the extent to which caring responsibilities involve financial, emotional and physical costs to women (Finch and Groves, 1983). And, as more claims were made, women had to confront the difficult issue of whether by demanding a wage for carers they would simply reinforce the idea that caring is a woman’s work. Alternative – or concomitant – strategies have included demanding, or creating, the conditions for men to share caring responsibilities (indeed, many men do take on caring responsibilities for their disabled wives – Parker, 1993).

Another solution is what has been called the ‘residential route’ (Finch, 1984). However, this strategy has been profoundly problematic for people requiring support. Care may assume duty and responsibility, it may involve love and commitment, but, as disabled people have pointed out, the focus upon care and the notion of care as unvalued and oppressive...
labour obscures the fact that caring is also a relationship which may involve unequal relations of power between the carer and the cared-for person. The principle of care requires us not only to heed the needs and interests of the carer but also the needs and interests of the cared-for person. People who require support have demanded the choice as to who cares for them, where and how. For many disabled people, the very concept of ‘care’ cannot be disentangled from a notion of dependency; it sits uneasily with a view of empowerment which leads to choice and control (Morris, 1993). One of the strategies to enable disabled people to pursue independent lives has been the demand for direct payments – that is, for disabled people to receive cash payments in order to employ carers of their own choice and to determine the type of support and assistance they require.

‘Care’ then requires recognition but also careful negotiation of the different interests caught up in its discourse and practice. Care suggests duty, responsibility, obligation, power, control, oppression, conflict, altruism, love, solidarity and reciprocity. We all at some time care and are cared for. Importantly, the attention to care that different groups and campaigns have brought provides us with a grounded set of ethics with which to balance the twentieth-century preoccupation with the ethic of paid work at the centre of our values, duties and rights. The ethic of care assumes relationships which are bound by mutual interdependence. Its practice involves the values of attentiveness, responsiveness, competence and responsibility, negotiation and mutual recognition. This means that it is through caring and being cared for that we take account of the needs of others, not in an abstract way but in terms of their specific contexts, and this provides a grounding for the civic virtues of responsibility, tolerance and an awareness of ‘otherness’, of diversity and competing claims. For this reason, the values of care need to inform concepts of citizenship: they involve concepts to do with responsibilities and relationships and they can engender practices of moral deliberation and dialogue grounded in everyday activities (see Tronto, 1993; Sevenhuijsen, 1998). It is the boundaries of these concepts of care to which we turn next: intimacy

**Intimacy**
The care relationship is often but not always an intimate one; the intimate relationship is usually, but not always, a relationship of care. The intimate sphere covers relationships based upon mutual exchange of love based upon family ties (parenting, marriage, kinship), friendship, sexual relationships, as well as paid care relationships, and it is undergoing significant change. A number of key shifts have been identified in the ways
we understand intimate relationships: they are less about duty and more about mutually agreed commitment; they are less about achieving status and more about negotiating an identity; they are less about authority and obedience and more about consent; they are less about tradition and more about trust; they are less about honour and more about respect (Giddens, 1992; Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 1995). However, to identify these shifts in emphasis is not the same as saying that this is what characterises intimate relationships (Jamieson, 1998; Smart and Neale, 1999). Nevertheless, the aspiration that relationships can and should be more democratic reflects a response to the questioning of unequal gender relations which emerged from the women’s movement. The pursuit of claims for women’s autonomy in terms of rights to earn a wage, to expect help with household duties, to claim fair shares on divorce, to leave relationships where power was abused, have all influenced the democratisation of relationships both between men and women and between mothers and fathers and children. Women’s debunking of patriarchal authority has also partly contributed to a greater understanding of children as active subjects.

It is not simply a detraditionalisation and democratisation of gender and parent-child relations which has influenced these shifts. The greater concern for the mutuality of relationships rather than their conventionality reflects the campaigns by gay and lesbian movements to gain recognition, rights and respect. The freedom to chose one’s sexual partner, to have that relationship respected and to have access to the rights of heterosexual couples (joint tenancies, pensions, custody, parenting and so on) have been part of these movements’ claims (Carabine, 1996).

Whilst on the one hand there has been pressure on the state to recognise diversity of form in intimate relationships, there has also been pressure on the state to intervene to protect the vulnerable who are victims of violence and abuse in intimate relationships. Campaigns against child sexual abuse, domestic violence and sexual abuse of disabled children and adults and older people in institutional and residential care has characterised an approach to intimacy which places much higher value upon the quality of personal relationships and personal autonomy and empowerment within relationships, and which recognises the potential for the abuse of power in unequal relationships. Connected to these issues is the fourth principle: that of bodily integrity.

**Bodily Integrity**
The history of welfare interventions is, in part, the history of the identification and classification of healthy/productive and unhealthy/unpro-
ductive bodies and fit and unfit minds (Foucault, 1965, 1973). The power of the professions of medicine, social work and education to observe and assess the body and the mind required the physical surrendering by patients of their bodies as well as the surrendering of their own knowledge about their bodies. However, from the 1960s a wide range of campaigns began to resist this.

Campaigns by women for reproductive rights – over contraception, abortion, infertility treatment, medical treatment in childbirth; campaigns against ECT treatment; campaigns by older people in residential homes for the right to look after their own medications; campaigns against racial violence and abuse on housing associations, in communities by the police; campaigns against rape, sexual violence and abuse; campaigns against corporal punishment in schools and homes; campaigns against the rise of ‘virginity tests’ by immigration officials on young Asian women migrants; campaigns to grant the right of asylum to rape victims; campaigns against sex trafficking and sex tourism and child prostitution; campaigns to ‘normalise’ disabled and different bodies – all of these centre upon the right of the individual to protect his/her body against external or internal risk. The body is a site of control, resistance and pleasure; it is inscribed with the social relations of power in which it exists. The title of the famous health care manual ‘Our Bodies, Ourselves’ (Phillips and Rakusen, 1978) reflects the way in which our bodies mark the physical boundaries of our sense of self, our own dignity and self-respect. In these terms, respect for the integrity of the body is fundamental to the maintenance of the autonomy of the welfare citizen. With the demystification of professional knowledge and techniques, this is also the prerequisite of any policy which encourages people to maintain their own bodies as healthy.

Identity

Earlier I suggested that due recognition of identity, as both a sense of self and a sense of belonging, offered a vital way for understanding individual struggles for self-realisation and collective struggles by subaltern groups against disrespect. David Taylor has outlined the significance of these two aspects of identity – which he calls ontological (sense of self) and categorical (sense of belonging) – for the social relations of welfare (Taylor, 1998). He argues that by exploring how ‘individuals build up a sense of coherence through their multiple identifications’ we can ‘understand the way in which individuals form attachments to social movements and enter into political agency – in this case around struggles for welfare’ (p. 341). At the same time, ‘categories of identity act back upon their incumbents,
often inscribing ontological characteristics to their members’ and in this way ‘identity categories become inscribed in welfare discourse, positioning their subjects with ascribed characteristics.’ (pp. 341–2). It is possible to see these processes at work in the recent history of welfare, each demonstrating the significance of a proper respect for identity in the practice of welfare.

In relation to ethnicity, the migrants who came to Britain after the Second World War were mainly Commonwealth citizens who, formally at least, had access to the social rights of welfare. However, restrictive criteria of eligibility, such as length of residence, prevented access to public housing, and lack of information, language barriers, lack of respect for different cultural practices led to a denial of their rights. The assumption was that those of different ethnic backgrounds would assimilate. In practice, the material conditions of these groups’ existence, such as mothers engaged in paid employment or restricted residential areas, were fed back as negative culturally ascribed characteristics. The subsequent struggles around health care, education, community and social care, were about both claiming cultural respect as well as the redistribution of rights and goods. Ultimately they were challenging Britain to come to terms with itself as a culturally and racially diverse society.

However, there are problems with notions of cultural and ethnic diversity. First, a notion of diversity can obscure the fact that ethnic groups may be hierarchically positioned and not simply living in harmony together. Campaigns by black mental health groups to challenge the incarceration of disproportionate numbers of young men in prisons and mental hospitals were a challenge to racist stereotyping of Afro-Caribbean cultures rather than simply a demand for cultural diversity. The very fact that the word ‘ethnic’ commonly refers to minority ethnic groups suggests that those of white English ethnicity can take their ethnicity so much for granted that they do not have to reflect upon or define their own ethnicity. Second, tolerance of cultural diversity may ignore differences within those ethnic groups – of class, gender, sexuality or age. Third, cultural/ethnic categories may be imposed upon groups in static or essentialist ways that ignore the fact that time and place reconfigure and hybridise cultural/ethnic identities. Indeed, this kind of essentialism can give rise to a justification for separatism – they have their schools, we have ours – but without shifting the relations of domination and subordination between different ethnic groups.

Welfare systems also create identity categories for their subjects and these too have become the focus for resistance. For example, disabled people have grasped hold of the administrative/medical category of
‘disabled’ and turned it into a political identity of enactment and empowerment.

Given this history, New Labour’s appeal to family, community and nation as the bases of solidarity and support may be insufficient. The identities which create forms of belonging, solidarity, resistance and support for groups may be multiple, may cut across, indeed, may reconstitute the very meanings of, family, community and nation.

Transnational Welfare

If multiculturalism disrupts the homogeneity of national identity, then the redrawing of nation-state boundaries disrupts nationality – the principle at the very heart of eligibility to welfare – and creates one of the biggest challenges to twenty-first-century welfare societies. The assumption of the twentieth century has been that our access to civil and social rights is bounded by national/territorial/geographical boundaries. What we have seen over the last ten years is the redrawing of national and administrative boundaries, processes of devolution as well as the creation of supranational boundaries such as the EU, and the increase in people, especially women, crossing those boundaries as migrants, refugees and asylum seekers. In many European countries migrants have limited access to social, civil and political rights yet they are part of a political economy which depends upon their labour. Furthermore, in those welfare systems which perpetuate the use of nationality as one of the criteria of eligibility to social rights, their denial of social rights to those racialised ‘others’ who are not nationals, is commonplace, as is the scapegoating of those groups as ‘scroungers’. The racialisation of welfare politics has become more pronounced in many Western and Eastern European countries in recent years (Faist, 1995). One of the areas in which this has manifest itself in Britain is in the withdrawal of rights to cash benefits and social housing to asylum seekers.

However, the transnationalism in markets, corporations, agencies and political institutions has also been matched by transnationalism in social movements, especially in their capacity to forge international links at grass-roots levels. This is also reflected in the growth of global conferences, (such as women’s conference in Beijing in 1994), the growing significance of NGOs as political actors and mediators, and the internationalisation of anti-poverty strategies of organisations such as Oxfam, which now focuses on strategic alliances between poor communities in the North and the South (Bronstein 1998). One example at the EU level is an organisation of ‘Black and Migrant Women’ which has been campaigning within the European Women’s Lobby since 1992 for, amongst
other things, independent legal status for black and migrant women, distinct from their partners and fathers; emergency provisions for women who are subject to domestic and other violence, and a recognition of the specific discriminations and abuses experienced by women applying in asylum legislation (EWL, 1995, pp. 255–57; Williams, 1997). How far the EU reinforces nationalisms by conflating citizenship with white Europeanness or moves towards a multiethnic, post-national citizenship (Delanty, 1995) will affect the possibilities for meeting the welfare needs of those most affected by changing boundaries and globalisation.

Voice
This final principle runs through each of the other principles discussed. Underpinning the challenge to users as dependent subjects, the interrogation of the care relationship, the assertion of diverse and democratic forms of intimacy, the recognition and respect of bodily identity and cultural diversity and the questioning of nationality as a basis to rights, is an assertion that the experience of the users of welfare services and their own definition of their needs is central to the organisation and delivery of welfare services. At the same time, the proliferation of self-help groups is testimony to the claim that people themselves can develop and share their own forms of knowledge and care. What this challenges is the power of expert knowledge to monopolise the definition of what is wrong with us and what we need to right it. It demands a democratising of the relationship between users and providers both collectively and individually and a sharing of expert and lay knowledges.

This suggests a different interpretation of the active welfare subject. The New Right envisaged a new power to welfare users as consumers in the welfare market exercising their choice. But this offered the power largely through exit. It left untouched the relations between the providers and users of welfare. However, the new managerialism ushered in by the New Right brought with it a commitment to consult with user groups, which, in areas in which those groups are strong, provided a space for collective voices to be heard. New Labour has reinforced this managerialist approach to the assessment of a diversity of individualised needs, whilst also, in places, acknowledging the importance of users to have access to expert knowledges (see Our Healthier Nation, HMSO, 1998b). However, where citizens/consumers become active and empowered is less in the articulation of these needs, than in the exercising of duties and responsibilities to themselves, family, community, taxpayer and state. The social movements have focused more directly upon the democratisation of provider-user relations as the site for the pursuit of active citizenship.
In this situation needs are individual, but, in so far as they result from forms of social differentiation that are shared, they are also collective needs. It is on this basis that users may collectively have more say and thereby influence the relations of power between individual providers and users.

This version of active citizenship depends upon a radical and pluralist notion of democracy which can both account for and address the competing claims from different groups. Some have called this ‘the politics of a differentiated universalism’ in which universalism is the commitment to an equal moral value of all and inclusion of all, and its differentiation reflects people’s own definitions of their diversity, but challenges the structured differentiation which renders some groups unequal and/or excluded (Young, 1990; Mouffe, 1992; Lister, 1997). The political strategies for pursuing this depend upon developing solidarities based upon the respect of difference: not the solidarity of the lowest common denominator, nor the solidarity that presumes all will forgo their particularities in a common goal, rather it is the pursuit of unity in dialogues of difference. Such a politics also has to involve both the redistribution of goods and the mutual recognition of worth. If groups simply pursue the politics of recognition without addressing socioeconomic inequalities, then they will win social justice for some in their group, but not for others. On the other hand, the singular pursuit of issues of economic inequality can render invisible cultural injustices which render some groups more vulnerable to economic exploitation (Fraser, 1995).

CONCLUSION

We are caught up in major social, economic and political transformations in which a new welfare order is emerging. But what values will inform this new order? I have argued that a common theme in the debate is that of the active welfare subject, and suggested that there are three competing, but overlapping, claims to this from the New Right, New Labour and the new social welfare movements. Each invokes different meanings of ‘active’, from exercising choice in the welfare market, the pursuit of paid work with responsibilities to family and community, to the active articulation of welfare needs. In addition, the moral motivations ascribed to these activities vary. While the first two are largely confined to the self-interest/altruism dichotomy, the third goes beyond this to identify the pursuit of the recognition of equal moral worth which, I suggested, characterises welfare campaigns by new social movements and user groups. Developing from this I proposed a framework of ‘equal worth’ principles for the reordering of the social relations of welfare. These constitute the welfare subject a little differently from the actor in pursuit of enlightened
self-interest whose moral frailties are constrained by duties, incentives or penalties, or else enhanced by altruistic acts. Here is a welfare subject whose identities are sustained through interdependence, through striving for the mutual recognition of worth and a tolerance of diversity, and whose capacity for self-interested action is mediated through bonds of belonging and meanings of identity and structured by local, national and international relations of power and inequality. This welfare subject is motivated to articulate and redefine their welfare needs by the expectation that welfare can provide some of the conditions for the realisation of mutual security, dignity and respect. These include counterbalancing the ethic of paid work with a commitment to the ethics of care, interdependence as a more collective basis to risk-sharing, more democratic forms of representation and dialogue with users, a respect for, and recognition of, changing forms of identity, intimacy and bodily integrity, and commitment to a multi-racial society within the context of supranational developments.

NOTES
1 These principles are necessarily speculative at this point, although they are drawn from an intellectual and often active engagement with movements and campaigns since the 1970s (represented, e.g., in Williams, 1989, 1992, 1996). In addition, they form part of the backcloth to a larger ESRC research programme on Care, Values and the Future of Welfare at Leeds University (1999–2004) and will be empirically tested in one of the research strands which examines the values to emerge from social and welfare movements in the areas of parenting and partnering.
2 I focus here only on the Green Paper for Welfare Reform for reasons of space and because this spells out most clearly forms of welfare subjectivity. A not dissimilar analysis of New Labour’s health care reforms is provided by Driver and Martell (1998).
4 See note 1.
5 The ways in which these principles inform issues of redistribution will be elaborated in Williams (in preparation).
6 Debates on the ‘ethics of care’ tend to privilege the virtues brought to caring by the carer; I have tried to shift the balance here.
7 Some have used the concept of ‘transversal politics’ to signify a politics which is neither only universalist nor only based upon diversity, recognising different perspectives but sharing a common vocabulary of values (Yuval-Davis, 1997). Such ideas have been put into practice in Northern Ireland – see, for example, the report of Unison/Impact Conference on Social Care held in Belfast in 1997 (Pillinger, 1997).

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