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## **Provider or Father?**

# British Men's Work Hours and Work Hour Preferences after the Birth of a Child

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## Abstract

This study uses data from the British Household Panel Survey and Understanding Society to analyse the effect of fatherhood on men's work hours and work hour preferences. Past research indicates that British men follow the traditional male provider model by either not changing or increasing their working hours when they have fathered a child, but these previous findings are primarily based on descriptive or cross-sectional analyses. Longitudinal analysis of men in the UK (1991 to 2013) shows a significant positive effect of fatherhood on men's work hours. However, this effect is mainly limited to the fathers of children between one and five whose partner is not employed. If the female partner is employed (especially part-time) fatherhood leads the male partner to reduce his work hours. Analysis of men's work hour preferences did not find significant links with the number and age of children.

## Keywords

fatherhood, working hours, work hour preferences

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#### Introduction

The birth of a first child constitutes a turning point in a couple's life course. The negative consequences of this for women's careers opportunities and wages are well researched (Budig et al., 2012; Gangl and Ziefle, 2009) and parenthood has been shown to create gender inequalities in the division of labour, irrespective of parental differences in relative economic resources (Schober, 2013b; Kühhirt, 2012). In contrast to mothers, fathers' careers seem largely unaffected by the event of childbirth. This could be one reason for the relatively limited research into fatherhood, something that has only begun to grow in recent years (e.g. Barber and Wolfe, 2012; McGill, 2014; Pollmann-Schult and Reynolds, 2017). The purpose of this study is to acquire new insights into the work hours of men in the United Kingdom, while primarily focusing on changes associated with the life event of childbirth.

The UK is a particularly relevant country to study as the working hours of British fathers are among the longest in Europe. Devlin and Shirvani (2014) report that 19 per cent of all men regularly work for more than 48 hours per week, but even among fathers with children under five it is 20 per cent. The culture of very long working hours is likely to affect fathers' flexibility to change their involvement in the domestic or work spheres after a child is born. Another central aspect is the relatively high rate of women in part-time work, which is often of inferior quality to full-time work (i.e. in terms of wages, access to employer-provided training, or job autonomy), especially in the UK (Warren and Lyonette, 2018). This keeps the responsibility to secure the family income mainly with men.

Moreover, men's involvement is strongly influenced by the institutional setting of the respective country (e.g. Bünning and Pollmann-Schult, 2015), and social policies in the

UK favour a traditional division of labour for new parents. One important factor here is the very high childcare costs in the UK compared with other European countries, which often exceed the benefits from an additional income for low-income households (Rutter, 2015). Furthermore, until recently, the institutional context in Britain provided incentives for mothers to be the main carer and effectively restricted fathers to being the main provider for the family. Parental leave for fathers was, until 2011, limited to two weeks and was unpaid. Fathers were not allowed to take over the parental leave rights from their female partners even where this would have been financially beneficial for the family. Thus, if fatherhood does appear to affect men's work hours in the UK despite these obstacles, it will give us a better idea whether children are an important factor in men's career decisions in general. Previous studies in the UK have relied on cross-sectional analyses that cannot establish causal pathways over time. In contrast, we apply longitudinal methods more suited to the complex process of the transition to fatherhood; they also control for confounding factors that might influence the relationship between fatherhood and working hours. In addition, we investigate how some key moderating variables – the age of the child and the partner's work status - affect the impact of fatherhood on hours. To our knowledge, ours is the first study to examine all of these factors longitudinally within the specific institutional context of the UK.

#### **Literature Review and Research Questions**

The existing evidence on fathers' work hours in the UK is limited and mixed. Some descriptive studies find work hours in Britain to be higher for fathers than for men without children (O'Brien and Shemilt, 2003), but Dermott (2006), after controlling for income, employment status of the partner and other relevant factors, finds no effect of

fatherhood on men's work hours. Studies from other counties also prevent us from drawing a unified picture of men's work hour changes after childbirth. One comparative study of European countries finds that men's working hours do not appear to be associated with parental status (Koslowski, 2010), while another comparative study shows it is important to assess the female partner's labour market involvement as fathers work significantly more than childless men if their partner is not employed (Bünning and Pollmann-Schult, 2015). While men in the US increase their annual hours of work after becoming fathers (Glauber and Gozjolko, 2011; Lundberg and Rose, 2002), for German men this is only true when they are born in 1960 or earlier and their partner is not employed (Pollmann-Schult and Reynolds, 2017). This leads to our first research questions (RQ1a): *How does fatherhood affect men's work hours and their work hour preferences?* (RQ1b): *Do these effects depend on the employment status of the mother?* 

Why should the partner's employment play an important role for fathers' work hour changes? On the one hand, mothers' contributions to the household income could partly free fathers from their responsibility to be the main financial provider. This suggests that men are able to reduce their hours the more their partner is involved in employed work and contributing to the household income. It is therefore important to lay special emphasis on the financial constraints faced by new fathers when analysing their involvement in the labour market. This leads to our second research question (RQ2): *Are men with lower wages more affected by the mother's income loss due to parenthood than fathers who earn enough to support the family alone*?

On the other hand, men might make up for mothers' absences by taking on some housework and childcare tasks usually undertaken by mothers, and in response reduce their own labour involvement, increasing equality between partners. However, existing research does not provide a clear picture of this relationship. For instance, some research shows that women's uptake of employment after childbirth, especially fulltime employment, increases men's shares of domestic work (e.g. Schober, 2013a). Other results indicate that the positive relationship between fathers' contributions to domestic work and mothers' labour force participation is far from proportional (Hook 2006, Crompton and Lyonette, 2007). Indeed, an early study by Presser (1994) shows that men only take on household tasks when the employment schedules of dual earner couples do not overlap and thus the female partner is less available to do certain tasks. She also posits that women reduce their domestic work in part because more domestic services are purchased. This is in line with a more recent Norwegian study on the effect of mothers' working hours for fathers' contributions to housework and childcare (Kitterød and Pettersen, 2006). Fathers only participate more in the domestic sphere when their partner works short hours. Full-time employment of the mother has no impact on men's involvement in any type of domestic work. The authors conclude that these parents perhaps rely on external childcare to substitute for mothers' absences, as well as buying more prepared goods, or perhaps these mothers become more efficient in domestic work. A similar result is found in a descriptive study looking at how much time per day fathers in the UK, Norway and Sweden spend on childcare (Sullivan et al., 2009). Both Norwegian and British fathers spend more time in this activity when their partner is part-time employed than full-time employed, while for Swedish fathers it is the opposite. The authors explain this surprising result for Norway and the UK through the extensive use of childcare when both partners are full-time employed. However, while public provision of childcare in Norway is very generous, in the UK this is mostly achieved through privately organised childcare. These results suggest that men will not reduce their working hours when their partner is full-time employed.

Other studies on the Norwegian context are also relevant. Norwegian fathers often work long hours, while part-time work is mainly an option for mothers, despite 'active fathering' being highly encouraged by policy interventions. Dommermuth and Kitterød (2009) find that men reduce their hours when they have small children, likely due to the generous parental leave rights offered to fathers. However, those with children of school age work even longer hours than childless men. This highlights that the level of care a child needs, a factor found in numerous studies on mothers' labour participation (e.g. Schober, 2013b), also plays a role for fathers' employment decisions. It suggests that the effect of having a child in the household on fathers' working hours decreases with child's age, leading to our third research question (RQ3): *Do both factors – the child's age and the partner's employment – work together and have negative effects on the time the father has available to invest in the labour market*?

Brandth and Kavande (2001) analyse how the expansion of the parental leave scheme in Norway affected men's uptake. The reform was intended to strengthen father-child relationships and increase equality between mothers and fathers by providing, first, an obligatory 'paternity quota', and second, an optional 'time-account' scheme. While the first option was highly successful and used by the majority of fathers, the more flexible option was hardly used. Particularly interesting is not that the option to take leave affected Norwegian men's behaviour, but that the intervention from the state establishing a norm provided the necessary legitimacy for fathers to make use of the scheme. The flexible option was resisted due to men fearing a negative impact on their careers, leading to only moderate changes in men's behaviour in the labour market despite the substantial attitudinal change. This indicates that simply giving men the option to reduce hours, without providing further incentives to do so, might only have a small effect on fathers' behaviour. After the birth of a child most couples change their egalitarian model towards a traditional division of labour (Bianchi and Milkie, 2010; Hook 2006). While one explanation is that women still earn less than men and the gender wage gap is accentuated after parenthood (e.g. Gangl and Ziefle, 2009), an alternative explanation for the persistence of the traditional model is the socialization approach. This explains the division of labour with respect to gender role attitudes and ideologies, which suggest that women's and men's behaviour has to follow socially prescribed roles (e.g. Levant and Rankin, 2014; Stockard, 2006). These attitudes are internalized through socialisation during childhood and are perceived as relatively stable. Men are socialized into and prepared for their role as breadwinner, and are thus in charge of providing for the family financially. Building on these assumptions, 'doing gender' theory suggests that women and men perform different tasks to affirm and reproduce their gender identity (West and Zimmerman, 1987). Cultural expectations become more dominant with the life event of parenthood, as the cultural understandings of men's and women's roles change to those of breadwinner and caregiver, respectively.

The share of men who agree with egalitarian attitudes and the importance of involved fatherhood has increased considerably over cohorts (e.g. Gerson, 2009) with a positive impact on their engagement and responsibility in childcare (McGill, 2014). However, we cannot conclude that egalitarian men will also change their involvement in the labour market as their provider role remains unaltered. Real or perceived barriers may exist that prevent men from cutting back on work hours or overtime. To capture these effects, we put particular emphasis on the analysis of work hour preferences, economic inequalities between fathers and, in additional tests, the availability of flexible work arrangements and gender role attitudes.

#### **Data and Methods**

#### Datasets

For the empirical analyses we combined data from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) with data from UK Household Longitudinal Study (UKHLS). The BHPS is an annual longitudinal survey that began in 1991 with about 5,500 households, later boosted by extension samples (1,500 households in each of Scotland and Wales in 1999, and 2,000 households in Northern Ireland in 2001). The BHPS came to an end in 2008 and was replaced by the UKHLS. UKHLS is a longitudinal survey of a nationally representative sample of approximately 40,000 households in the UK and includes a subsample of former BHPS participants (63 per cent of BHPS participants continued into UKHLS, entering in 'wave 2'). Our sample comprised waves 1-18 from BHPS (1991-2008) and waves 1-4 from UKHLS (2010-2013).

#### Sample Selection

The sample was limited to married and cohabiting men of working age (20-65 years) and employed. We excluded the self-employed as they may have had greater flexibility in their labour supply, which could have distorted the results. The panel was unbalanced; our longitudinal models only required men to have participated at least in two years. Additionally, we only considered own children who remained in the household; children who had left were excluded, as were step-children since step-fathers may have been less involved as parents (McGill, 2014).

We concentrated on men who were living with not more than one child, as we expected their work hours to change more than after subsequent births where the division of labour between partners was likely already negotiated. The resulting dataset comprised 5,653 men in relationships of which 2,374 were fathers with own children in the household and 3,279 were childless men. Other studies have found non-linear effects of the number of children on fathers' working hours and income (Lundberg and Rose, 2002), indicating that it is important to keep the first and subsequent transitions separate for analysing men's behaviour.<sup>1</sup>

#### **Dependent Variables**

We distinguished four models with different dependent variables: men's total working hours (including overtime); working more than 48 hours (yes/no); prefer to work less (yes/no); and prefer to work more (yes/no). Unfortunately, the question about work hour preferences was not maintained in UKHLS. Our analyses of work hour preferences were therefore limited to the years between 1991 and 2008.

## - Table 1 about here -

On average, men without children worked fewer hours per week than fathers. Fathers with a child between one and five worked the longest hours, and more frequently worked 48 hours or more. Not all men in our dataset worked their desired number of hours. **Table 1** shows responses to this question by full-time employed fathers (>38 total working hours) differentiated by age of the youngest child. Overall, only 61 per cent of all men were happy with the hours they worked, and childless men were slightly less likely to be over-employed and more likely to be under-employed than fathers.

These first descriptive results indicated a mismatch of time resources between the labour market and family for fathers in the UK. This outcome was examined in more detail within our multivariate analyses.

#### **Explanatory Factors for Father's Work Hours**

The main variable of interest was child's age, which was divided into: up to and including one year old; older than one and up to five; and older than five years.<sup>2</sup> We focused on the transition to fatherhood and the age of the child rather than, as in previous studies, on the number of children. This was to identify any changes based on fatherhood status and to capture the distinct changes in childcare demands. Additionally, we interacted the child's age with female partner's employment status, and with men's wage groups.

We distinguished between female partners who were not employed, full-time employed or part-time employed. As men were usually the main earner after a child was born, their incentives to work more or fewer hours were measured in terms of the log of their gross hourly wage. A man's usual weekly earnings were divided by his total working hours including overtime (assuming an average overtime premium of 1.5 in the calculation), and adjusted for inflation using the retail price index. Low wage was defined as less than 60 per cent of the median hourly wage in this year, on condition that his partner's wage did not exceed the average wage of women. In this case, her wage would have removed the financial constraints of the father being the main family provider.

All models included a variety of covariates which were based on previous research and also asked continuously in both datasets (see Table A1, Appendix).

#### **Methods**

In our main analysis we used longitudinal models to examine changes in men's working hours and preferences over time, and estimated how much of these changes were due to the birth of the child and the child's age, net of the factors we controlled for and unobserved heterogeneity. Men's likelihood to become fathers, as well as their work hour preferences and actual work hours, were likely affected by factors which could not be adequately observed with our data. Hausman tests, applied to all models, indicated that unobserved heterogeneity was correlated with the explanatory variables. To control for this we used linear and logit fixed effects models.

However, working hours were likely also related to the specific job a man held and he may have changed jobs shortly before or after becoming a father. Focusing only on men's changes in their fatherhood status would have missed transitions into new jobs and might have confounded the effects of the child (and related work hour changes) with those of the job change. Therefore, we wanted to address possible unobserved effects of the specific job a father held on his working hours by estimating regression models with job-specific fixed effects (Green & Heywood, 2015). We repeated all main analyses for person-specific fixed effects, which showed similar statistically significant effects to our main models and can be found in our Online Appendix (Table A4, A5, A6).<sup>3</sup>

## Results

The following section discusses the results of our multivariate analyses. Each of the four tables consists of four models with different dependent variables which captured the changes in fathers' work hours in the labour market, depending on their children's age. The models analysed: the father's total work hours (**Model 1**), the probability that he worked more than 48 hours (**Model 2**), his wish to increase work hours (**Model 3**), and his wish to reduce work hours (**Model 4**). In order to make the models comparable we controlled for the same independent variables in each table, where possible.

In a first step (**Table 2**) we analysed the effect of child's age on father's working hours and work hour preferences (the full table with all control variables can be found in the Online Appendix Table A2). None of the models showed significant differences between fathers and childless men once job characteristics were accounted for (the only exception, in Model 4, is that new fathers were less likely to wish to increase work hours). This first result corresponded with the results of a study for the UK by Dermott (2006), which analysed fathers' work hours in a cross-sectional design.

- Table 2 about here -

## Family Context

To get a deeper insight in the dynamics of the partner's allocation of work, we included interactions between the child's age and the employment status of the female partner in our four models in **Table 3**.

First, we looked at the effect of fatherhood on men's working hours in households where the female partner was not employed. We found a positive effect of fatherhood on men's working hours (**Model 1**) and his likelihood to have worked more than 48 hours (**Model 2**).

- Table 3 about here -

However, the association in our analysis was not linear. The effect of fatherhood was only significantly different for fathers with a child between one and five. These fathers spent 1.81 hours more in the labour market in households where the female partner was not employed (**Model 1**).

Second, looking at the effect of becoming a father for men with a partner employed part-time we found a significant reduction in his labour work. For fathers with a child between one and five we saw working hours decrease by 0.26 hours (adding the interaction effect of -2.07 to the main effect of 1.81) which was statistically significant in households with a part-time employed partner. For men with a full-time employed partner, the effect of becoming a father was positive but smaller as these fathers worked 0.11 hours more when the child was between one and five (adding the main effect of 1.81 to the interaction effect of -1.70).

The important result is that we saw statistically significant effects of fatherhood on men's working hours, mainly for those with a child between one and five (**Model 1 and Model 2**). This might be connected to the care requirements for this age group which are relatively high. The children had not reached a certain level of independence in comparison to older children who go to school, and most mothers start returning to work from maternity leave after one year. The results of the interaction effects for fathers' probability of 'working 48 hours or more' (**Model 2**) were similar to the analyses of total work hours (**Model 1**). Again, fatherhood mainly affected the work hours of those with a child between one and five: they were more likely to work 48+ hours when the female partner was not employed, but were less likely to work long hours in households with a part-time employed female partner. For those fathers with a full-time employed partner the effect of having a child between one and five was also negative, but smaller than for those with a part-time employed partner.

With respect to our first two research questions (RQ1a, RQ1b), this result showed that children, only in combination with mothers' employment, reduced fathers' time investments in the labour market. However, with respect to our third research question, we found this effect was mainly limited to fathers of children of a certain age (RQ3). Non-working female partners may have freed fathers to focus on employment, while fathers with an employed partner may have had to take a greater share of domestic work responsibilities. The smaller effect of mothers' full-time work, in comparison to part-time work, on fathers' working hours was surprising as one might think that mothers' greater contributions to household income would mitigate the need for fathers to provide financially for the family. This result differs from a German study on fathers, which finds that those born after 1960 reduce their working hours most when their partner worked full-time (Pollmann-Schult and Reynolds, 2017). A possible explanation for our result could be that couples with two full-time careers were better able to pay for the relatively expensive formal childcare in the UK or found an informal arrangement with help from family or friends. This is also in line with research that finds that men participate most in domestic work when their partner works part-time, while her full-time employment has no impact (Kitterød and Pettersen, 2006; Sullivan et al., 2009). An arrangement where mothers work part-time is often chosen in order to be able to combine labour work with childcare, especially when the child is not yet at school. This arrangement leaves the main care responsibilities within the household and both partners are thus expected to take their share. This is also supported by qualitative studies finding that fairness in the parents' contribution to childcare is a central factor for fathers' involvement (O'Brien and Twamley, 2017; Henwood and Procter, 2003).

In contrast to the effects of children between one and five, children less than one year old, who need the most care, showed either no or only very small effects on the father's working hours and his likelihood to work long hours. An explanation could be that most mothers have not returned to work when the child is very young. The few families where mothers returned to work early probably found strategies such as help outside the household to combine labour and domestic work, which left the father's work hours unaffected. Surprisingly, the age of the child did not affect the father's preferences for more or fewer work hours, independent of mother's employment, with one exception (**Table 3**, **Model 4 and 5**). For men with a partner employed part-time, having schoolchildren made them more likely to prefer shorter working hours. The result is partly opposed to our expectations, as we expected fathers' desires to work less should decrease with a child's age (RQ3). However, the main effect of the child's age was not statistically significant and thus should be interpreted with caution.

### Financial Constraints

Raising a child is expensive, not only due to the cost of raising the child itself, but additionally due to the loss of one full income, at least for a certain amount of time. We therefore explored the financial resources of the household as a potentially important determinant of fathers' flexibility in preferred and actual work hours. We divided men's wages into three groups: (a) low wages, defined as less than 60 per cent of the median wage; (b) medium wages, between 60 and 140 per cent the median wage; and (c) high wages, more than 140 per cent of the median wage, on condition that the female partner's wage did not exceed the average wage of women (because a woman's high wage would remove the father's role as the main provider and distort the results).

In an analysis with interaction effects between the child's age and the three wage groups we found that children alone had little impact on fathers' work hours or their likelihood to work very long hours across the three wage groups (see the Online Appendix which includes Table A3 and a more detailed discussion). However, we know from our analyses in **Table 3** that the female partner's employment status was one of the main explanatory factors for men's work

hour changes after childbirth. The exit of the female partner after childbirth, and thus the loss of one income, may affect men with lower wages more than men who earn enough to support the family alone. To be able to see whether fathers with lower wages were more affected by the mother's income loss, with respect to our second research question (RQ2), in **Table 4** we estimated separate models for the three wage groups and focused on men's total working hour changes.

#### - Table 4 about here -

We distinguished between fathers versus non-fathers and between employed versus nonemployed partners, which left us enough observations within each group to be able to include interactions between both variables. Since we had three separate models, the results may be imprecise and should be interpreted with caution.

Nevertheless, our analysis indicated that fathers with a low hourly wage (60 per cent or less than the median) and a not employed partner were more affected by the birth of a child than fathers who earned more. Men in the lower wage groups increased their working hours by over three hours when they became fathers and their partner was not employed. The employment of their partners reduced the difference significantly. We found no significant differences for men with medium or high wages. An explanation could be that these households were less dependent on the female partner's additional income than households with a main earner who had a relatively low wage.

## Additional Analyses

Another important factor that might affect men's working hours in the transition to fatherhood is the availability of flexible work arrangements. Two different approaches were possible using

our data. The first approach concerned new legislation introduced in 2003, providing a formal right to request changes in the amount, schedule and location of working-time for employees with children under school age. We included a dummy variable covering the period up to the reform (1991-2002) and the period after (2003-2013) and interacted it with women's employment as well as the child's age. Interestingly, we found no significant effect on men's working hour changes due to the reform, even for fathers with an employed partner and young children. One reason why men might not have made use of the regulation is that it was still mainly the mother who arranged her employment around childcare. Another explanation could be that, in male-dominated workplaces, flexible work was less often available, men were less likely to be successful with their requests for flexible work, or were worried about the stigma attached to this (Chung, 2018). In a second approach, we included whether certain flexible arrangements were available at the workplace and interacted this variable with women's employment as well as the child's age. However, again, availability of flexible work arrangements had no effect on men's hours, and also reduced our observation numbers considerably;<sup>4</sup> thus it was not included in our main analysis, but is available from the authors upon request.

To analyse the potential impact of cultural norms regarding fathers' roles on their work hours we also examined the effect of interactions between child's age and gender role attitudes (available from the authors). Agreement to particular gender role attitude statements in combination with fatherhood did not show the expected results. It cannot be conclusively established if this was due to deficiencies of our operationalisation of men's attitudes or men's restricted possibilities to implement their beliefs about the equal division of labour in their own lives.

#### **Discussion and Conclusion**

In this study we analyse how British men's working hours and work hour preferences change with the life event of childbirth. This research extends previous studies for the UK, which look at fathers' working hours in a cross-sectional design, not taking into account that men might have unobserved attributes that make them simultaneously more likely to become fathers and invest more time in work. Furthermore, most previous studies on men's work hour changes neglect that the necessary level of childcare and the gender division of labour changes with children's ages; our research provides new insights into this.

The main result of this study is that fatherhood does have an effect on men's working hours, although the effect is small, at just under 2 hours per week. However, it is also clear that it is not so much the child alone, but rather the time restrictions on the household where both partners pursue a career and need to combine their jobs with childcare and housework responsibilities. It is mainly children of a certain age group which affect fathers' behaviour. In particular, fathers with children between one and five work more hours if they are the main earner in the household, but work fewer hours if the mother of the child is part-time employed, while her full-time employment only leads to small changes. This is the age when mothers' returns to employment increase (mostly into part-time work), while at the same time children have not reached a certain level of independence and are going to school or kindergarten.

It is known that men in the UK increase their share of housework and childcare when their partner is employed, and more so if their partner works part-time instead of full-time (e.g. Sullivan et al., 2009). Although we do not know their motivation, this increased share of housework could be one explanation for fathers reducing their work hours. Another possibility is that women's contributions to household income give men the flexibility to cut back on their own labour supply. However, British couples with two full-time employed partners rely mostly

on 'expensive' privately organised childcare which may also explain the small effects of mothers' full-time employment on men's working hours. While women's earnings may ease household financial constraint in most cases, this may not apply to low income households. We find some evidence that low wage men, who are more likely to be constrained by financial necessity, tend to increase their work hours even if their partner is employed.

Additionally, we investigate fathers' flexibility in their labour supply by looking at whether men wish to change their working hours after childbirth and with a child's growing age, but we find few effects of childbirth and child's age on fathers' work hour preferences. This supports the results of a recent study on German fathers (Pollmann-Schult and Reynolds, 2017). On the one hand, it could be that the preference for more or fewer working hours is not connected to fatherhood and fathers' self-perceptions as main breadwinner or involved father. Perhaps these decisions are already made long before the child is born and men adjust their career at a much earlier life stage. On the other hand, men could be answering the question on how many hours they would like to work while anticipating what is actually possible in specific circumstances due to the increased financial constraints which come with children. The same might be true for our finding of there being no effect of the right-to-request flexible working, introduced in 2003, or the availability of flexible working at the workplace, on men's work hour decisions. Even fathers with small children and employed partners do not often make use of flexible working arrangements when they are available.

Fathers work hour changes are relatively small and limited to fathers with younger children. Despite the additional role as involved fathers, qualitative studies show that it is providing financially for the family which continues to be integral to their self-image of being a 'good father' (e.g. Dermott, 2005). Nevertheless, recent research also shows that fathers report tensions satisfying both roles (Elliot et al., 2018). Couples have to find the best work-life strategy under the economic and institutional constraints within society, and thus the British

context is an interesting case to analyse. Men seem to be more restricted in their flexibility to choose a different model from the traditional one, visible for example in the long working hour culture and that men were not able to choose to take parental leave until 2011, as well as institutional settings providing clear incentives for mothers to be the main carer. Despite this, we do see changes in responses to family events and the partner's labour participation for British men, giving some indication of how fathers in societies supporting a more gender egalitarian division of labour might behave. Our study shows that men's working hour changes need to be analysed in a family context, and this article helps to better understand the causes of gender inequality in the labour market while contributing to existing international research on fathers' work and family involvement.

Our results suggest several areas where more research is needed. Incorporating the work schedules of each partner, or their autonomy over working hours, would help to better understand the interplay of workplace constraints, financial restrictions and time conflicts for fathers' employment and family decisions. Qualitative studies could give better insights into the motivation of fathers changing their hours based on their partners' labour involvement, as well as on their work hour preferences. Unfortunately, the scope of this article did not allow us to analyse in sufficient detail the effects of fatherhood for men with more than one child. Finally, with our data it is not possible to incorporate the purchase of domestic services such as external childcare into this study, something which might explain the small impact of the partner's full-time employment.

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## Notes

<sup>1</sup> In an additional analysis, we include fathers with more than one child, controlling for the number of children and the youngest child's age. Comparing the analyses of fathers with one child to the analyses with all fathers, we see less strong and significant effects in general (analyses available from the authors). One reason might be the additional financial demands on men as family provider. Another possible reason is that the main changes in the division of labour occur when the first child is born, but do not vary with any subsequent child and thus have less impact on fathers' working hours. Additionally, it might be necessary to distinguish between each child's age and the age gap between children in interaction with the mother's employment status. Unfortunately, this detailed analysis of household composition is beyond the scope of this article. Dommermuth and Kitterød (2009) find a similar result for Norwegian fathers and add that men might be more excited about the first child and want to spend more time with it as a potential reason.

<sup>2</sup> A more detailed differentiation distinguishing the child's age between one and three, and three and five, showed very similar results and thus we combined both categories.

<sup>3</sup> In a test to see whether men who become fathers already have higher slopes of increased working hours than men who do not become fathers, we use fixed effects models allowing age to have an individual-specific slope (FEIS, Ludwig and Brüderl (2018)). The results are similar to our main specifications (available upon request). However, we believe that there is a danger that we would 'over-control' in the model and absorb some of the effects of parenthood in the age slopes (particularly as people tend to have their children at similar ages) and therefore do not include these models as part of our main analysis.

<sup>4</sup> Questions on flexible work arrangements are only available for wave 'b' and 'd' in the UKHLS, also allowing the additional inclusion of wave 'a' and 'c' in this analysis if there was no job change.

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## Tables

Age of first child	Weekly working hours, mean	Men who work >48 hours per week, in %	Total in % (N)	Men who want to work less, in %	Men who want to work more, in %	Total in % (N)
Men without children	43.3	26%	58% (3279)	32%	7%	59% (1713)
Fathers: < 1 year old	43.7	28%	8% (466)	33%	6%	9% (266)
1-5 years old	44.9	29%	10%	33%	6%	12%
5 + years old	44.3	27%	19% (1049)	36%	6%	17% (494)
Total	43.6	27%	100% (5653)	34%	6%	100% (2822)
Sample	BHPS + UKH	HLS (1991- 2013	)	BHPS only (1	991-2008)	. ,

Table 1: Employed men's working hours, work hour preferences by parenthood status and age of child for men in partnerships with not more than one child.

Own calculations, weighted, fathers with children outside the household excluded.

Men between 20 & 65, employed, self-employed excluded.

	Linear FE			
	Model		FE Logit Model	S
	Total working	Work more	Wish to	Wish to
	hours	than 48 hours	reduce work	increase work
	(+overtime)	(yes/no)	hours	hours
(A) Family Context	M1	M2	M3	M4
Age of first child				
No child in HH (ref.)				
Up to and including one year old	-0.03	0.16	0.07	-1.03**
	(0.322)	(0.206)	(0.184)	(0.409)
Between one and five	0.27	0.13	0.03	-0.79+
	(0.358)	(0.238)	(0.224)	(0.472)
Five and older	-0.28	0.12	-0.02	-0.96
	(0.541)	(0.375)	(0.334)	(0.651)
Employment status woman				
Not employed (ref.)				
Part-time employed	-0.09	-0.08	-0.08	0.01
	(0.317)	(0.202)	(0.186)	(0.321)
Full-time employed	0.05	-0.13	-0.03	-0.18
	(0.309)	(0.208)	(0.193)	(0.337)
Observations:	20568	4110	4269	1046
Couples	5653	1029	941	273
Number of jobs held by men	10368	1132	1131	294
Dataset:	BHPS+ UKHLS	BHPS+ UKHLS	BHPS only	BHPS only
Source: BHPS 1991-2008+ UKHL	S 2010-2013,	+ p<0.10, *	p<0.05, ** p<0.0	01, *** p<0.001
Standard errors in parentheses. Mo	dels include men's:	age, female partne	r's employment	status, real hourly

 Table 2: Effects of First Child's Birth (Child's Age) on Actual Working Hours and Work Hour

 Preferences of Men in the UK. – Job-specific FE Models –

Source: BHPS 1991-2008+ UKHLS 2010-2013, + p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001Standard errors in parentheses. Models include men's: age, female partner's employment status, real hourly wage, education, number of employees at workplace, permanent job, overtime, time travel to work, wave. Households with children that have left the household are excluded. Table 3: Interaction Effect of First Child's Birth (Child's Age) and Employment Status of the Partner on Actual Working Hours and Work Hour Preferences of Men in the UK. – Job-specific FE Models –

Total working hours (+overtime)Work more than 48 hours (yes/no)Wish to reduce work hoursWish to increase work hours $(+overtime)$ M1M2M4M5Age of first child No child in HH (ref.)M2M4M5Up to and including one year old (0.630)1.03 (0.630)0.23 (0.431)-0.22 (0.378)-0.25 (0.652)Between one and five1.81* (0.737)1.01* (0.463)0.37 (0.405)-0.98 (0.748)Five and older0.76 (0.870)0.43 (0.534)-0.60 (0.496)-1.64+ (0.980)Employment status woman: Not employed (ref.)0.86+ (0.477)0.46 (0.295)-0.30 (0.288)0.09 (0.463)Full-time employed0.86+ (0.435)0.07 (0.277)-0.13 (0.271)-0.16 (0.466)		Linear FE Model	FE Logit Models		
working hours         than 48 hours (yes/no)         work hours hours         increase work hours           hours         (yes/no)         work hours         increase work hours           M1         M2         M4         M5           Age of first child		Total	Work more	Wish to reduce	Wish to
nours (+overtime)(yes/no)nours (ves/no)M1M2M4M5Age of first child No child in HH (ref.) $V23$ -0.22-0.25Up to and including one year old1.030.23-0.22-0.25 $(0.630)$ $(0.431)$ $(0.378)$ $(0.652)$ Between one and five $1.81^*$ $1.01^*$ $0.37$ -0.98 $(0.737)$ $(0.463)$ $(0.405)$ $(0.748)$ Five and older $0.76$ $0.43$ -0.60-1.64+ $(0.870)$ $(0.534)$ $(0.496)$ $(0.980)$ Employment status woman: Not employed (ref.) $V466$ -0.30 $0.09$ Full-time employed $0.86+$ $0.46$ -0.30 $0.09$ Full-time employed $0.72+$ $0.07$ -0.13-0.16 $(0.435)$ $(0.277)$ $(0.271)$ $(0.466)$		working	than 48 hours	work hours	increase work
M1         M2         M4         M5           Age of first child         No child in HH (ref.)		nours (+overtime)	(yes/no)		nours
Age of first child No child in HH (ref.) $(1.03)$ $(0.23)$ $(0.22)$ $(0.25)$ Up to and including one year old $1.03$ $(0.23)$ $(0.378)$ $(0.652)$ Between one and five $1.81^*$ $1.01^*$ $0.37$ $(0.98)$ Five and older $(0.737)$ $(0.463)$ $(0.405)$ $(0.748)$ Five and older $0.76$ $0.43$ $-0.60$ $-1.64+$ $(0.870)$ $(0.534)$ $(0.496)$ $(0.980)$ Employment status woman: Not employed (ref.) $V$ $V$ $V$ Part-time employed $0.86+$ $0.46$ $-0.30$ $0.09$ Full-time employed $0.72+$ $0.07$ $-0.13$ $-0.16$ $(0.435)$ $(0.277)$ $(0.271)$ $(0.466)$		M1	M2	M4	M5
No child in HH (ref.)Up to and including one year old $1.03$ $0.23$ $-0.22$ $-0.25$ $(0.630)$ $(0.431)$ $(0.378)$ $(0.652)$ Between one and five $1.81^*$ $1.01^*$ $0.37$ $-0.98$ $(0.737)$ $(0.463)$ $(0.405)$ $(0.748)$ Five and older $0.76$ $0.43$ $-0.60$ $-1.64+$ $(0.870)$ $(0.534)$ $(0.496)$ $(0.980)$ Employment status woman:Not employed (ref.)Part-time employed $0.86+$ $0.46$ $-0.30$ $0.09$ $(0.477)$ $(0.295)$ $(0.288)$ $(0.463)$ Full-time employed $0.72+$ $0.07$ $-0.13$ $-0.16$ $(0.435)$ $(0.277)$ $(0.271)$ $(0.466)$	Age of first child				
Up to and including one year old $1.03$ $0.23$ $-0.22$ $-0.25$ $(0.630)$ $(0.431)$ $(0.378)$ $(0.652)$ Between one and five $1.81^*$ $1.01^*$ $0.37$ $-0.98$ $(0.737)$ $(0.463)$ $(0.405)$ $(0.748)$ Five and older $0.76$ $0.43$ $-0.60$ $-1.64+$ $(0.870)$ $(0.534)$ $(0.496)$ $(0.980)$ Employment status woman:Not employed (ref.)Part-time employed $0.86+$ $0.46$ $-0.30$ $0.09$ $(0.477)$ $(0.295)$ $(0.288)$ $(0.463)$ Full-time employed $0.72+$ $0.07$ $-0.13$ $-0.16$ $(0.435)$ $(0.277)$ $(0.271)$ $(0.466)$	No child in HH (ref.)				
Image: Note of the symplect o	Up to and including one year old	1.03	0.23	-0.22	-0.25
Between one and five $1.81^*$ $1.01^*$ $0.37$ $-0.98$ (0.737)(0.463)(0.405)(0.748)Five and older $0.76$ $0.43$ $-0.60$ $-1.64+$ (0.870)(0.534)(0.496)(0.980)Employment status woman:Not employed (ref.)Part-time employed $0.86+$ $0.46$ $-0.30$ $0.09$ (0.477)(0.295)(0.288)(0.463)Full-time employed $0.72+$ $0.07$ $-0.13$ $-0.16$ (0.435)(0.277)(0.271)(0.466)	1 0 1	(0.630)	(0.431)	(0.378)	(0.652)
Five and older $(0.737)$ $(0.463)$ $(0.405)$ $(0.748)$ Five and older $0.76$ $0.43$ $-0.60$ $-1.64+$ $(0.870)$ $(0.534)$ $(0.496)$ $(0.980)$ Employment status woman:Not employed (ref.)Part-time employed $0.86+$ $0.46$ $-0.30$ $0.09$ $(0.477)$ $(0.295)$ $(0.288)$ $(0.463)$ Full-time employed $0.72+$ $0.07$ $-0.13$ $-0.16$ $(0.435)$ $(0.277)$ $(0.271)$ $(0.466)$	Between one and five	1.81*	1.01*	0.37	-0.98
Five and older $0.76$ $0.43$ $-0.60$ $-1.64+$ (0.870)(0.534)(0.496)(0.980)Employment status woman: $(0.496)$ $(0.980)$ Not employed (ref.) $0.86+$ $0.46$ $-0.30$ $0.09$ Part-time employed $0.86+$ $0.46$ $-0.30$ $0.09$ (0.477)(0.295)(0.288)(0.463)Full-time employed $0.72+$ $0.07$ $-0.13$ $-0.16$ (0.435)(0.277)(0.271)(0.466)		(0.737)	(0.463)	(0.405)	(0.748)
(0.870)       (0.534)       (0.496)       (0.980)         Employment status woman:	Five and older	0.76	0.43	-0.60	-1.64+
Employment status woman:         0.100 - 0.000 - 0.000 - 0.00000 - 0.0		(0.870)	(0.534)	(0.496)	(0.980)
Not employed (ref.) $0.86+$ $0.46$ $-0.30$ $0.09$ Part-time employed $(0.477)$ $(0.295)$ $(0.288)$ $(0.463)$ Full-time employed $0.72+$ $0.07$ $-0.13$ $-0.16$ $(0.435)$ $(0.277)$ $(0.271)$ $(0.466)$	Employment status woman:				
Part-time employed $0.86+$ $0.46$ $-0.30$ $0.09$ $(0.477)$ $(0.295)$ $(0.288)$ $(0.463)$ Full-time employed $0.72+$ $0.07$ $-0.13$ $-0.16$ $(0.435)$ $(0.277)$ $(0.271)$ $(0.466)$	Not employed (ref.)				
Full-time employed $(0.477)$ $(0.295)$ $(0.288)$ $(0.463)$ Full-time employed $0.72+$ $0.07$ $-0.13$ $-0.16$ $(0.435)$ $(0.277)$ $(0.271)$ $(0.466)$	Part-time employed	0.86+	0.46	-0.30	0.09
Full-time employed $0.72+$ $0.07$ $-0.13$ $-0.16$ $(0.435)$ $(0.277)$ $(0.271)$ $(0.466)$		(0.477)	(0.295)	(0.288)	(0.463)
(0.435)  (0.277)  (0.271)  (0.466)	Full-time employed	0.72+	0.07	-0.13	-0.16
Interestions and shild * memory		(0.435)	(0.277)	(0.271)	(0.466)
Interaction: age child * woman	Interaction: age child * woman				
employed	employed				
Not empl OR no child (ref.)	Not empl OR no child (ref.)				
<=1 year * part-employed -1.34+ -0.76 0.53 -0.15	<=1 year * part-employed	-1.34+	-0.76	0.53	-0.15
(0.775) $(0.515)$ $(0.458)$ $(0.965)$		(0.775)	(0.515)	(0.458)	(0.965)
1-5 years * part-employed -2.07** -1.34** -0.31 - 0.21	1-5 years * part-employed	-2.07**	-1.34**	-0.31	- 0.21
(0.739)  (0.477)  (0.422)  (0.759)		(0.739)	(0.477)	(0.422)	(0.759)
>=5 years * part-employed -1.56+ -0.73 0.96* 0.77	>=5 years * part-employed	-1.56+	-0.73	0.96*	0.77
(0.858)  (0.499)  (0.465)  (0.998)		(0.858)	(0.499)	(0.465)	(0.998)
<=1 year * full-employed -1.25+ 0.22 0.29 -1.49+	<=1 year * full-employed	-1.25+	0.22	0.29	-1.49+
$(0.690) \qquad (0.473) \qquad (0.422) \qquad (0.881)$		(0.690)	(0.473)	(0.422)	(0.881)
1-5 years * full-employed -1.70* -1.05* -0.43 0.83	1-5 years * full-employed	-1.70*	-1.05*	-0.43	0.83
(0.760)  (0.503)  (0.460)  (1.013)		(0.760)	(0.503)	(0.460)	(1.013)
>=5 years * full-employed -0.88 -0.17 0.545 0.059	>=5 years * full-employed	-0.88	-0.17	0.545	0.059
(0.860)  (0.557)  (0.507)  (0.948)		(0.860)	(0.557)	(0.507)	(0.948)
Observations: 20568 4110 4269 1046	Observations:	20568	4110	4269	1046
Couples 5653 1029 941 273	Couples	5653	1029	941	273
Number of jobs held by men 10368 1132 1131 294	Number of jobs held by men	10368	1132	1131	294
Dataset: BHPS+ UKHLS BHPS+ UKHLS BHPS only BHPS only	Dataset:	BHPS+ UKHLS	BHPS+ UKHLS	BHPS only	BHPS only

Source: BHPS 1991-2008+ UKHLS 2010-2013, + p < 0.10, \* p < 0.05, \*\* p < 0.01, \*\*\* p < 0.001Standard errors in parentheses. Models include same controls listed in Table 2.

Groups (real hoursy wage ( 100 % of	average mage		average m	$-m_{\rm S}m_{\rm S$	
	All men	All men	Low	Medium	High
		interaction	wage	wage	wage
			0	0	0
One child in HH (yes)	-0.01	0.42	4.87*	-0.10	0.219
	(0.301)	(0.466)	(2.452)	(0.483)	(0.669)
Employment status (woman)					
Employed	-0.06	0.31	1.30	-0.11	-0.06
	(0.292)	(0.355)	(1.892)	(0.355)	(0.578)
Interaction between child (yes) * woman's employment status					
Child (ves) * employed mother	_	-0.01	-0.14*	0.004	-0.02
		(0.012)	(0.069)	(0.778)	(0.017)
Observations	20145	20145	1809	11844	6429
Number of jobs held by men BHPS+ UKHLS	10201	10201	1408	6501	3485

Table 4: Job-specific FE Models for Men's Total Working Hours (+overtime) for Different Wage Groups (real hourly wage (<60% of average wage =low) (>60% of average wage =high)

Source: BHPS 1991-2008+ UKHLS 2010-2013, + p<0.10, \* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001Standard errors in parentheses. Models include same controls listed in Table 2.

Observation numbers differ to the analyses in Table 2 & 3 (Model1) as we exclude men's wage groups where the female partner has a relatively high income and thus might distort the results (125 couples, 2%). Households with children that have left the household are excluded.

**Provider or Father?** 

British Men's Work Hours and Work Hour Preferences after the Birth of a Child

**Online Appendix** 

## **Online Appendix:**

## Table A1: Descriptive Statistics

Table A1. Descriptive Statist	105	C( 1 1	<b>X7 • 11</b>	24	G( 1 1
variables	Mean	Sta.aev	variables	Mean	Sta.dev
	1 %			1 %	<u> </u>
Dependent Variables	12 (	11 10	Job characteristics		
Total work hours	43.6	11.19	Social Class: present job		
(+overtime)				• •	
			Managerial and technical occ.	38	
Work more than 48 hours			Professional occupation	8	
Yes	27		Skilled non-man	13	
No	73		Skilled manual	26	
			Partly skilled/unskilled	14	
Total housework hours	5.7	5.4			
			Sector		
Work hour preferences			Local government/ town hall	10	
Wish to reduce work hours	34		Private firm/company	75	
Wish to increase work hours	6		Civil service/central government	4	
Continue the same	60		NHS or higher education	5	
			Non-profit organisation	2	
Family Context			Other sector	3	
Age of first child					
No child	58		No of employees at workplace		
1 to 12 months old	8		<25 employees	29	
1 to under 5 years old	10		25-99 employees	26	
5 years and older	19		100-500 employees	25	
			>500 employees	20	
Employment status woman			1 2		
Not employed	23		Overtime		
Part-time employed	27		ves	55	
Full-time employed	50		no	45	
Individual Characteristics					
			Fixed-term contract		
Age			ves	4	
20-30 years old	25		permanent job	96	
30-40 years old	29		permanent joo	20	
$40 \pm \text{vears old}$	46		Time spent travel to work	28	25
for years old	40		(minutos)	20	25
Family Status			(minutes)		
Cohabiting	30				
Married	50 70				
Warred	70				
Man's hourby waga (log)	8.4	67			
men's nourly wage (log)	0.4	0.7			
Education					
Luiversity degree	24				
Further aducation	24 24				
	∠4 12				
	12				
U-level	19				
No educ. qualification	21				

Total working hours (+overtime)Work more than 48 hours (yes/no)Wish to reduce work hours (yes/no)Wish to increase work hours(A) Family ContextM1M2M3M4Age of first child No child in HH (ref.) Up to and including one year old $0.322$ )0.160.07 (0.322)-1.03** (0.206)Between one and five years old (0.358)0.27 (0.238)0.13 (0.224)0.03 (0.472)Five years old and older-0.28 (0.541)0.12 (0.375)-0.02 (0.334)-0.96 (0.651)
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$\begin{tabular}{ c c c c c } \hline (yes/no) \hline \hline (A) Family Context & M1 & M2 & M3 & M4 \\ \hline \hline Age of first child & & & & \\ \hline Age of first child & & & & \\ \hline No child in HH (ref.) & & & & & \\ Up to and including one year old & -0.03 & 0.16 & 0.07 & -1.03** & \\ & & & & & & & \\ & & & & & & & \\ & & & & & & & \\ & & & & & & & \\ & & & & & & & \\ & & & & & & & \\ & & & & & & & \\ & & & & & & & \\ & & & & & & & \\ & & & & & & & \\ & & & & & & & \\ & & & & & & & \\ & & & & & & & \\ & & & & & & & \\ & & & & & & & \\ & & & & & & & \\ & & & & & & & \\ & & & & & & & \\ & & & & & & & \\ & & & & & & & \\ & & & & & & \\ & & & & & & \\ & & & & & & \\ $
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Age of first child         No child in HH (ref.)         Up to and including one year old $-0.03$ $0.16$ $0.07$ $-1.03^{**}$ $(0.322)$ $(0.206)$ $(0.184)$ $(0.409)$ Between one and five years old $0.27$ $0.13$ $0.03$ $-0.79+$ $(0.358)$ $(0.238)$ $(0.224)$ $(0.472)$ Five years old and older $-0.28$ $0.12$ $-0.02$ $-0.96$ $(0.541)$ $(0.375)$ $(0.334)$ $(0.651)$
No child in HH (ref.)Up to and including one year old $-0.03$ $0.16$ $0.07$ $-1.03^{**}$ $(0.322)$ $(0.206)$ $(0.184)$ $(0.409)$ Between one and five years old $0.27$ $0.13$ $0.03$ $-0.79+$ $(0.358)$ $(0.238)$ $(0.224)$ $(0.472)$ Five years old and older $-0.28$ $0.12$ $-0.02$ $-0.96$ $(0.541)$ $(0.375)$ $(0.334)$ $(0.651)$
Up to and including one year old $(0.322)$ -0.03 $(0.322)$ 0.16 $(0.206)$ 0.07 $(0.184)$ -1.03** $(0.409)$ Between one and five years old0.27 $(0.358)$ 0.13 $(0.238)$ 0.03 $(0.224)$ -0.79+ $(0.472)$ Five years old and older-0.28 $(0.541)$ 0.12 $(0.375)$ -0.02 $(0.334)$ -0.96 $(0.651)$
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Between one and five years old $0.27$ $0.13$ $0.03$ $-0.79+$ $(0.358)$ $(0.238)$ $(0.224)$ $(0.472)$ Five years old and older $-0.28$ $0.12$ $-0.02$ $-0.96$ $(0.541)$ $(0.375)$ $(0.334)$ $(0.651)$
(0.358) $(0.238)$ $(0.224)$ $(0.472)$ Five years old and older $-0.28$ $0.12$ $-0.02$ $-0.96$ $(0.541)$ $(0.375)$ $(0.334)$ $(0.651)$
Five years old and older-0.280.12-0.02-0.96(0.541)(0.375)(0.334)(0.651)
(0.541) $(0.375)$ $(0.334)$ $(0.651)$
Employment status woman
Not employed (ref.)
Part-time employed -0.09 -0.08 -0.08 0.01
(0.317)  (0.202)  (0.186)  (0.321)
Full-time employed 0.05 -0.13 -0.03 -0.18
(0.309)  (0.208)  (0.193)  (0.337)
(B) Individual Characteristics
Age
20-30 years old (ref.)
30-40 years old 0.23 0.14 0.12 -0.46
(0.291)  (0.186)  (0.175)  (0.373)
40+ years old 0.18 -0.34 0.00 -0.33
(0.483)  (0.33)  (0.322)  (0.751)
Family Status
Cohabiting (ref.)
Married -0.08 0.21 0.17 0.36
(0.25)  (0.181)  (0.181)  (0.325)
Education
University degree (ref.)
Further education         -2.63         -2.17**         0.17         13.3
(1.935)  (0.671)  (0.716)  (1074.25)
A-level -4.15* -2.17* 0.23 13.31
(2.024)  (0.929)  (0.822)  (1074.25)
O-level -4.20* -3.64*** 0.29 13.84
(2.142)  (0.989)  (0.837)  (1074.25)
No educational qualification -1.93 -1.79* -1.4 14.04
(2.591)  (0.84)  (0.875)  (1074.25)
(C) Job characteristics
Men's log hourly wage
Real hourly wage -1.25*** -0.52*** -0.18*** -0.16
(0.098)  (0.058)  (0.053)  (0.108)
Real hourly wage ^2         0.01***         0.00*         0.00
(0.002)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.004)

 Table A2: Effects of First Child's Birth (Child's Age) on Actual Working Hours and Work Hour

 Preferences of Men in the UK. – Job-specific Fixed Effects Models –

	Linear FE		FE Logit Model		
	Model				
Table A2 continued	Total working	Work more	Wish to	Wish to	
	hours	than 48	reduce work	increase work	
	(+overtime)	hours	hours	hours	
		(yes/no)			
	M1	M2	M3	M4	
Number of employees at					
workplace					
>500 employees (ref.)					
<25 employees	-0.52	-0.06	-0.52*	0.72+	
	(0.465)	(0.25)	(0.203)	(0.425)	
25-99 employees	-0.21	-0.06	-0.09	-0.08	
	(0.374)	(0.218)	(0.183)	(0.32)	
100-500 employees	-0.73	-0.19	-0.36+	0.41	
	(0.496)	(0.286)	(0.215)	(0.455)	
Fixed term contract					
yes (ref.)					
permanent job	2.61***	0.04	-0.24	-0.79	
	(0.587)	(0.315)	(0.351)	(0.484)	
Time spent travel to work					
minutes	0.01*	0.00	0.00	0.01	
	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.006)	
Overtime					
Yes	-	-	0.32**	-0.41*	
			(0.108)	(0.203)	
				· · ·	
Observations:	20568	4110	4269	1046	
Couples	5653	1029	941	273	
Number of jobs held by men	10368	1132	1131	294	
Dataset:	BHPS+	BHPS+	BHPS only	BHPS only	
	UKHLS	UKHLS	•	-	

Source: BHPS 1991-2008+ UKHLS 2010-2013, + p<0.10, \* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001Standard errors in parentheses. Households with children that have left the household are excluded.

#### Financial Constraints

It could be expected that low-waged men who become fathers would increase their work hours, or at least wish to do so, to compensate for income losses in the household. A medium wage makes it possible to provide financially for a whole family, despite mothers' reduced labour work; it should lead to reduced work hours to give the father more time to raise the child. A relatively high wage could have contradictory effects. On the one hand, it enables him to provide for the family even when he reduces working hours to spend more time with them. On the other hand, it may be decided that he should maintain his hours to support the family with his income alone, while the mother focuses on childcare. The results of the analysis for different wage groups (**Table A3**) did not generally support the explanation provided above. Children did not have significantly different impacts on fathers' work hours (**Model 1**) or their likelihood to work very long hours (**Model 2**) across the three wage groups. One exception is fathers of the lower wage group who increased their working hours and were more likely to work 48+ hours when the child was more than five years old, (although it should be mentioned that the main effect of child's age is not statistically significant).

While fatherhood had no effect on the hours of fathers in the medium wage group, those with a child under one were less likely to want more hours. Fathers in the lower wage group wanted to work more when their child was less than one year old, perhaps to cover increasing household costs. These effects on preferences, but not hours, could be connected to greater rigidities in low-wage jobs which made changes in working hours less likely and thus affected his available time to spend with his family. However, fathers in the higher wage group also experienced an increased mismatch between their desired and actual hours, even though they might be able to react to a mismatch between working hours and increased domestic work duties by buying external childcare and household work. One explanation could be that these

men were also in positions that required longer hours and came with greater responsibilities that limited their flexibility in cutting back.

	Linear FE		FE Logit Models	
	Model			
	Total working	Work more	Wish to	Wish to
	hours	than 48 hours	reduce work	increase work
	(+overtime)	(yes/no)	hours	hours
	MI	M2	M3	M4
Age of first child				
No child in HH (ref.)	0.02	0.02	0.40.	0.00*
Up to and incl. one year old	0.03	0.02	0.40+	-0.89*
	(0.400)	(0.247)	(0.219)	(0.442)
Between one and five	0.14	0.04	0.29	-0.59
	(0.433)	(0.265)	(0.255)	(0.558)
Five and older	-0.18	-0.05	0.16	-0.69
	(0.316)	(0.418)	(0.350)	(0.809)
Men's hourly wage				
Medium wage group (>60%				
<140% of median, ref)				
Low wage group	4.27***	1.37***	0.49*	0.33
(<60%  of median)	(0.547)	(0.238)	(0.222)	(0.385)
High wage group	-3.04***	-0.99***	-0.26	0.08
(>140% of median)	(0.377)	(0.201)	(0.189)	(0.389)
Interaction: age child*				
men's wage				
medium wage OR no child				
(ref.)				
<=1 year * low wage	-1.70	0.30	-1.29	14.68***
	(1.469)	(0.606)	(0.814)	(0.841)
1-5 years* low wage	0.57	0.90+	-0.18	1.19
	(1.249)	(0.508)	(0.500)	(0.955)
>=5 years * low wage	2.72*	1.48*	0.12	0.056
	(1.352)	(0.619)	(0.637)	(0.680)
<=1 year * high wage	-0.05	0.16	-0.75*	-0.69
	(0.523)	(0.348)	(0.335)	(0.881)
1-5 years* high wage	0.00	-0.15	-0.56+	0.54
	(0.538)	(0.314)	(0.324)	(0.757)
>=5 years * high wage	-1.11	-0.44	-0.27	-0.22
	(0.893)	(0.377)	(0.361)	(0.738)
<b>Observations:</b>	20568	4269	4069	1046
Couples	5653	1029	941	273
Number of jobs held by men	10368	1132	1131	294
Dataset:	BHPS+ UKHLS	BHPS+ UKHLS	BHPS only	BHPS only

Table A3: Interaction Effect of First Child's Birth (Child's Age) and Wage Groups on Actual Working Hours and Work Hour Preferences of Men in the UK. – Job-specific Fixed Effects Models -

Source: BHPS 1991-2008 + UKHLS 2010-2013 +p<0.10, \*p<0.05, \*\*p<0.01, \*\*\*p<0.001Standard errors in parentheses. Models include same controls listed in Table 2.

## Person-specific Fixed Effects Models

All analyses from the main text were replicated with person-specific fixed effects models listed here (Table A4 – Table A6) as there was the possibility that one way fathers change working hours was to change jobs. We found that controlling for person-specific fixed effects led to similar statistically significant effects as we showed in our models controlling for job-specific fixed effects, but as expected with stronger estimates. Again we see it is not fatherhood alone that had an effect on men's working hours but a combination of the child's age and their partner's employment behaviour.

	Linear FE Model		FE Logit Model		
	Total working	Work more	Wish to	Wish to	
	hours	than 48	reduce work	increase work	
	(+overtime)	hours	hours	hours	
		(yes/no)			
(A) Family Context	M1	M2	M3	M4	
Age of first child					
No child in HH (ref.)					
Up to and including one year old	-0.23	-0.05	0.13	-0.60*	
	(0.261)	(0.129)	(0.128)	(0.269)	
Between one and five years old	0.10	-0.01	-0.02	-0.09	
	(0.274)	(0.135)	(0.132)	(0.254)	
Five years old and older	-0.19	-0.11	-0.11	-0.28	
•	(0.402)	(0.192)	(0.187)	(0.366)	
Employment status woman					
Not employed (ref.)					
Part-time employed	-0.10	0.04	-0.02	-0.02	
	(0.256)	(0.124)	(0.123)	(0.229)	
Full-time employed	-0.10	0.05	0.03	-0.19	
	(0.256)	(0.125)	(0.124)	(0.225)	
(B) Individual Characteristics			× /	× •	
Age					
20-30 years old (ref.)					
30-40 years old	0.11	-0.01	-0.00	-0.26	
,	(0.240)	(0.115)	(0.114)	(0.230)	
40+ years old	-0.29	-0.29	-0.22	-0.19	
5	(0.413)	(0.201)	(0.199)	(0.460)	
Family Status				× /	
Cohabiting (ref.)					
Married	0.75***	0.21*	0.08	0.11	
	(0.224)	(0.104)	(0.107)	(0.207)	
Education				× /	
University degree (ref.)					
Further education	-1.56	-0.45	-0.27	-2.33	
	(0.976)	(0.448)	(0.395)	(1.416)	
A-level	-3.39**	-0.91+	-0.24	-2.26	
	(1.073)	(0.491)	(0.435)	(1.466)	
O-level	-2.01+	-0.43	-0.01	-2.34	
	(1.099)	(0.502)	(0.456)	(1.510)	
No educational qualification	-1.82	-0.35	-0.85+	-02.26	
-	(1.160)	(0.517)	(0.480)	(1.486)	
(C) Job characteristics			× /	× •	
Men's log hourly wage					
Real hourly wage	-0.82***	-0.26***	-0.02	-0.07	
	(0.040)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.085)	
Real hourly wage ^2	0.01***	0.00***	0.00	-0.00	
	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.004)	
Social Class: present job	. ,	. /	. /		
Managerial/ technical occ. (ref.)					
professional occupation	-0.68*	-0.60***	0.01	-0.07	
	(0.325)	(0.170)	(0.139)	(0.312)	
skilled non-man	-2.24***	-0.73***	-0.21	0.17	
	(0.280)	(0.146)	(0.128)	(0.276)	

Table A4:	Effects of First Child's Birth (Child's Age) on Actual	Working 1	Hours and	Work Hour
Preferences	of Men in the UK Person-specific Fixed Effects Mode	els –		

	Linear FE		FE Logit Mode	2
Table A4 continued	Model Total working	Work more	Wish to	Wish to
	hours	than 48	reduce work	increase work
	(+overtime)	hours	hours	hours
	(	(yes/no)		
	M1	M2	M3	M4
skilled manual	-0.69*	-0.25+	-0.07	0.21
	(0.297)	(0.134)	(0.131)	(0.256)
partly skilled/unskilled	-1.82***	-0.41**	-0.33*	0.05
	(0.340)	(0.154)	(0.158)	(0.291)
Sector				
Local government/ town hall (ref.)				
private firm/company	0.51	0.45+	0.45*	-0.47
	(0.442)	(0.234)	(0.245)	(0.409)
Civil service/central government	1.19*	0.57+	0.76*	-1.94**
	(0.577)	(0.337)	(0.326)	(0.721)
NHS or higher education	-0.46	-0.14	0.01	-0.78
	(0.594)	(0.331)	(0.326)	(0.564)
Non-profit organisation	-0.40	0.31	0.24	-0.49
	(0.692)	(0.354)	(0.357)	(0.681)
Other sector	1.14+	0.014	0.77*	-0.38
	(0.597)	(0.309)	(0.329)	(0.587)
Number of employees at				
workplace				
>500 employees (ref.)				
<25 employees	-0.07	0.15	0.28*	-0.03
	(0.277)	(0.129)	(0.132)	(0.259)
25-99 employees	-0.35	0.05	0.09	0.20
	(0.257)	(0.122)	(0.124)	(0.236)
100-500 employees	-0.48	0.13	0.32**	-0.30
	(0.292)	(0.138)	(0.115)	(0.218)
Fixed term contract				
yes (ref.)				
permanent job	3.37***	0.35*	0.57**	-0.87***
	(0.349)	(0.174)	(0.193)	(0.267)
Time spent travel to work				
minutes	0.02***	0.00+	0.00	-0.00
	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)
Overtime				
Yes	-	-	0.48***	-0.63***
			(0.070)	(0.136)
Observations:	20147	7709	7403	2320
Couples	5653	1387	1192	376
Dataset:	BHPS+ UKHLS	BHPS+ UKHLS	BHPS only	BHPS only

Source: BHPS 1991-2008+ UKHLS 2010-2013,+ p<0.10, \* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001Standard errors in parentheses. Households with children that have left the household are excluded.

	Linear FE Model		FE Logit Models	
	Total working hours (+overtime)	Work more than 48 hours (yes/no)	Wish to reduce work hours	Wish to increase work hours
	M1	M2	M4	M5
<b>Age of first child</b> No child in HH (ref.)				
Up to and including one year old	0.71	-0.03	0.29	-0.56
	(0.555)	(0.273)	(0.266)	(0.455)
Between one and five	1.76***	0.62*	0.23	-0.19
	(0.517)	(0.257)	(0.253)	(0.432)
Five and older	0.69	0.24	-0.31	-0.99
	(0.693)	(0.332)	(0.317)	(0.619)
Employment status woman:				
Not employed (ref.)				
Part-time employed	0.91*	0.47*	0.04	-0.25
	(0.371)	(0.182)	(0.183)	(0.332)
Full-time employed	0.52	0.20	0.07	-0.28
	(0.334)	(0.164)	(0.161)	(0.282)
Interaction: age child * woman employed				
Not empl OR no child (ref.)				
<=1 year * part-employed	-1.29+	-0.41	-0.36	0.19
	(0.708)	(0.347)	(0.341)	(0.644)
1-5 years * part-employed	-2.44***	-1.10***	-0.38	0.09
	(0.588)	(0.292)	(0.290)	(0.514)
>=5 years * part-employed	-1.45*	-0.68*	0.35	1.23+
	(0.702)	(0.341)	(0.325)	(0.562)
<=1 year * full-employed	-1.09+	-0.16	-0.09	-0.24
	(0.631)	(0.310)	(0.310)	(0.590)
1-5 years * full-employed	-1.74**	-0.58+	-0.20	0.31
	(0.608)	(0.302)	(0.299)	(0.521)
>=5 years * full-employed	-0.76	-0.31	0.03	0.054
· · · ·	(0.734)	(0.352)	(0.343)	(0.696)
Observations:	20147	7709	7403	2320
Couples	5653	1387	1192	376
Dataset	RHPS+ UKHI S	BHPS+ UKHLS	BHPS only	BHPS only

Table A5: Interaction Effect of First Child's Birth (Child's Age) and Employment Status of the Partner on Actual Working Hours and Work Hour Preferences of Men in the UK. – Person-specific Fixed Effects Models –

Source: BHPS 1991-2008+ UKHLS 2010-2013, + p < 0.10, \* p < 0.05, \*\* p < 0.01, \*\*\* p < 0.001Standard errors in parentheses. Models include same controls listed in Table A7.

	All men	All men interaction	Low wage	Medium wage	High wage
One child in HH (yes)	-0.12 (0.223)	0.13 (0.333)	3.78* (1.953)	-0.40 (0.427)	0.19 (0.521)
Employment status (woman)	0.10	0.04	2 38	0.37	0.02
Employed	(0.232)	(0.270)	(1.500)	(0.345)	(0.413)
Interaction between child (yes) * woman's employment status				· · ·	× ,
Child (yes) * employed mother	-	-0.01 (0.010)	-0.19** (0.062)	-0.01 (0.012)	-0.01 (0.014)
Observations Couples BHPS+ UKHLS	19656 5528	19656 5528	1767 1094	11569 3972	6320 2116

Table A6: Person-specific Fixed Effects Models for Men's Total Working Hours (+overtime) for Different Wage Groups (real hourly wage (<60% of average wage=low) (>60% of average wage =high)

Source: BHPS 1991-2008+ UKHLS 2010-2013, + p<0.10, \* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001Standard errors in parentheses. Models include same controls listed in Table 2.

Observation numbers differ to the analyses in Table A4 and A5 (Model1) as we exclude men's wage groups where the female partner has a relatively high income and thus might distort the results (125 couples, 2%).

Households with children that have left the household are excluded.