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What are we doing when we are training?

Amateur and professional sportspersons, Bernard Suits proposed, are differentiated by their attitude towards their sport. For the amateur, competition is a game done for its own sake; while for the professional, it is a game, but it is one that is done for a further reason. It follows that in competing, amateurs are playing, while professionals are working. But what should one say about the training that both amateur and professional do in preparation for competition? Competition is an athletic game which can be engaged in as play or work, but is training a game, play or work? This paper hopes to offer starting answers to these questions.

Keywords: Suits; sport; games; play; training.

Amateur and professional sportspersons, Bernard Suits proposed, are differentiated by their attitude towards their sport. For the amateur, competition is a game done for its own sake; while for the professional, it is a game, but it is one that is done for a further reason. This proposal captures the ordinary extension of these terms: professionals compete for money and status. Their sport is their livelihood, playing the game is their profession. But the proposal is technical: Percy, who joins the football team just because Gwendolyn fancies football players, is a professional on this definition (Suits 2014, 155). Amateurs, by contrast, compete solely, or overridingly, “for the love of the game” (Suits 2014, 155). It follows, Suits argues, that there is clear cut difference in attitude when it comes to playing the game — that is, competing in the sport. Amateurs and professionals do the same sport, they play the same athletic games. But one is playing, while the other is working.

Allow this clear-cut attitudinal difference to be the taken for granted starting point. The question this paper pursues is then: what should one say about the training that both amateur and professional do in preparation for competition? And, in particular, what should Suits say? Is the clear-cut attitudinal divide found in competition equally found in training? And what is the status of training? Competition is an athletic game which can be engaged in as play or work, but is training a game, play or work? This paper hopes to offer starting answers to these questions. The next section begins by proposing that amateurs and professionals are as divided in their attitude towards training as they are in their attitude towards competition. After rejecting this proposal, subsequent sections consider how there might be an overlap in attitude towards training that is nevertheless consistent with a divergent attitude towards competition.

Professional and Amateur Training are Different

In his later work, Suits (1988) differentiated between sports that are performances — such as diving and gymnastics — and sports that are games — such as athletic events, football and hockey. Training for these different categories of sport is different; "Performances require rehearsal, games require practice" (Suits 1988, 2). The focus here is sports that are games, and thereby the practice that is training for these competitive games.[1] This practice is something that both amateurs and professionals do. The question is how it should be conceived, and one proposal is that there is a fundamental difference in the attitudes of amateurs and professionals to training.

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[1] Compare Meier (1988) who holds that all sports are games, including those Suits's classes as performances.

On this proposal, this difference in attitude follows from the different attitudes amateurs and professionals have to competition. For the professional, competition is not play insofar as it serves an instrumental purpose, which paradigmatically is generating income. Insofar as training is something done for the purpose of success in competition, it is equally an instrumental activity. And these end purposes collapse: ultimately, the point of training is whatever goal competition has, which, again, is paradigmatically the generation of income. Without this instrumental reason to enter competition, if the amateur does compete, they do so for the love of the game. For the amateur, competition is an end in itself; it is what Suits (1988, 8) calls an *autotelic* activity. And training likewise inherits this rationale. That is, while both amateur and professional train in order to be able to compete, the amateur also competes in order to train. While competition is not necessary for training, it is sufficient for it, which is to say that competition serves the further purpose of initiating practice for competition or training. Thus the amateur puts, what Suits (2014, 101) calls, a *reverse English* spin on the professional's attitude to training. This Suits's illustrates thus: a non-game playing imposter would behave like a Russian Princess in order to be taken for Anastasia, but the player of make-believe chooses to be Anastasia in order to behave like a Russian Princess. Similarly, the purpose of a professional in training is to be able to compete, while an amateur enters competitions in order to be able to train. For the amateur, training is then another autotelic activity. One directed towards competition but done for its own sake.

Three worries might be raised about this proposal: two can be answered, but one is genuine.[2] Taking these in order, first, it might seem contradictory to say, as just said

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[2] A further worry is that the distinction between amateur and professional is so historically unhappy that it should be jettisoned completely. Thus Papineau (2017, 265) writes, "I won't

of amateurs, that training is both for the purpose of competition and is an end in itself. Or equally that competition is both for the purpose of training and is an end in itself. The worry here is that if one does some activity X in order to do another activity Y, then one is thereby not doing X as an end in itself. This worry might be forceful in some cases, but it is not when X and Y are equally valued goods, and where X is done, only in part, because it makes Y possible. That X is done for the love of it is compatible with X also being done because it makes Y possible; it is incompatible only with X being done principally as means to Y, where this naturally follows when Y is valued more than X. Thus, on the present proposal, the amateur equally values both training and racing, and each is done for the love of it and done, in part, because it makes the other possible.

Second, actual amateurs, that is those who compete but don't earn their livelihood from competition, might train, just as they compete, for all sorts of purposes. They might train and compete to raise money for charity, to lose weight, to lower their blood pressure, to impress Gwendolyn and so on. So it seems idealised to say that amateurs do train and compete 'for the love' of it. This is undoubtedly so: people's actual motivations for training and competing will be complex and various. But, first, I am working with Suits's understanding of 'amateur' and 'professional', which only imperfectly tracks everyday use (and where every day use might not itself be entirely consistent). And if it is preferred, I could follow Suits's (1988, 8) suggestion and ditch

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go so far as to say I reach for my gun whenever I heard the word 'amateur'. But give me a crusade to keep sport pure in the name of amateur values, and I will show you a hypocritical campaign designed to further some selfish interest." While I share Papineau's sentiment, given that we make this distinction in practice, it needs to be philosophically explored, and this paper does that.

both terms, replacing them respectively with 'autotelic event or activity' and 'instrumental event or activity' as and when appropriate. For simplicity, I prefer to just understand 'amateur' and 'professional' in these ways. And, second, the proposal concerns *essential* reasons, so the person who signs up to a marathon *primarily* in order to raise money, and trains for this purpose is thereby a 'professional' in their attitude. (This is a point that I will return to in the concluding section.)

Third, a more serious objection is that on the proposal that amateurs put a *reverse English* spin on professionals' attitude to training, amateurs and professionals thereby differ in their attitude towards training in the same way that imposters and players of games of make-believe differ in their attitude towards role play. But this difference is too big a difference. Thus, it is a sentiment frequently heard expressed by actual professional sportspersons that they cannot believe that they are paid to do something they love and would do anyway. And while actual professionals have been put to one side, the fact that this sentiment is expressed still needs to be credited. For what it suggests is that the attitudes of professionals and amateurs converge when it comes to training. They might have different ends in competition, but they have the same end in training, *which is preparation for competition that is at the same time something that is done simply 'for the love of it'*.

The question, then, is whether this is a consistent pairing. How is it that there can be divergence when it comes to the game and convergence when it comes to practising for the game? In the next five sections, I consider five different ways of answering this question. The following explanations of this convergence are tendered: (i) training is a game; (ii) training is play; (iii) training is work; (iv) training is a utopian activity; and (v) training is a practice. Explanations (i) to (iv) are Suitian, while explanation (v) comes from Alastair MacIntyre. I reject (i) to (iii) for various connected

reasons, argue that (iv) is the basis of a good explanation, but then claim that this explanation is better delivered by (v).

Training is a Game

There are, Suits argued, four elements to a game. There is the *goal*, the *means*, the *rules* and the attitude needed to be a game player, which he called the *lusory attitude*. These elements Suits (1988, 11) assembles into the following definition.

> To play a game is to attempt to achieve a specific state of affairs (*pre-lusory goal*), using only means permitted by rules (*lusory means*), where the rules prohibit use of more efficient in favour of less efficient means (*constitutive rules*), and where such rules are accepted just because they make possible such activity (*lusory attitude*).

And offers the following “more portable version”: “playing a game is the voluntary attempt to overcome unnecessary obstacles” (Suits 2014, 43). The first proposal, then, is that there is a commonality to professional and amateur attitudes to training because training is itself a game; and playing the training game requires both amateur and professional to have the same lusory attitude towards it.

To elaborate this idea, consider the elements of a game. The goal in training will vary depending on what competition the training is practice for. The end goal for an amateur might be merely completing a marathon without walking, while for a professional it might be running an Olympic, or Olympic trials, qualifying time. These end goals would then structure a series of intermediate training goals — say running a short distance without walking or a shorter distance at this pace — where in each case this goal would be a specific achievable state of affairs. Following Suits, the means to this specific achievable state of affairs might first be identified broadly. One could, say, achieve the goal of covering a certain distance without walking simply by driving this

distance, or achieve the goal of covering a certain distance at a certain pace by riding a bicycle. But adopting these means would defeat the purpose of training. So, the idea runs, these means are not permitted by the rules of the training game. To employ such means would thereby be to cheat at training, and so fail to train. The lusory attitude is then what explains the game players' willingness to abide by these restrictions. Why accept limitations on means for achieving one's goal? Answer: because only by following these rules does one play the game. So only by forgoing the car or bike and attempting to cover the distance on foot does one actually train for a marathon. This lusory attitude is what is common to amateurs and professionals even if their approach to the games they are training for ends up being quite different.

Thus the proposal. Consider it now in more detail. The goals of training will be various; so much is true because the competitions people train for will be various, and people can have different goals in competition. One might enter a race to win it, or be the first across the line, while another might enter simply to participate. And there are different races and different games. But cutting across this variety is one training goal that is fixed, which is *to be capable of achieving one's competitive goals* — or *to be capable of achieving competitive success*. Variety then enters because people's competitive goals vary — what constitutes competitive success varies. Again, one might enter a race to win it, or merely participate etc.

Two points then follow given this general cross-cutting goal of training. First, there will be many intermediary training goals that do not involve physical preparation. A Tour de France rider, for example, might want to familiarise himself with the roads on an Alpine stage, and there are no restrictions as to how he might do this — riding the course on a motorbike, viewing it from a helicopter or a virtual-reality presentation are all fine, for instance. So the claim that there is a restriction in means focuses on only one aspect of training: *physical preparation* for competition. Second, by and large the

restrictions imposed then take the form of, what Suits (2014, 94) calls, a *limitation in principle*. Suits's example of a limitation in principle is that of choosing to climb the more difficult Mount Impossible over Mount Invincible or Mount Everest. As he imagines things, it is not possible to land a helicopter on top of Mount Impossible, so in choosing to climb Mount Impossible there need be no rule proscribing the more efficient use of a helicopter to reach the summit. Choosing to climb Mount Impossible is thereby comparable to choosing to be bound by certain restrictions; the goal is chosen just because it forces a limitation on means, where this limitation is equivalent to a rule-based restriction because it is equally arbitrary or *artificial*, given that the goal itself need not be chosen. Similarly, taking a car or bike is not a more efficient means for achieving the training goal of running a certain distance without walking or running at a certain pace because taking the car or bike is not any means of achieving these goals given that these intermediary training goals are subsumed under the general cross-cutting goal of training. It follows that there is no need for any rule to proscribe taking the car or bike, just as there need be no rule proscribing the use of a helicopter in summiting Mount Impossible. The difference between these cases, however, is that there is no artificiality in the training case. While the goal of climbing Mount Impossible need not be chosen, the general cross-cutting goal of training follows from choosing any particular training goal; that is, the restrictions naturally follow from the basic or fundamental goal of all training which is achieving capacity for competitive success.

Nevertheless, even if the restrictions on training are largely a non-artificial consequence of the general goal of training, this is not yet to say that there are no proscriptive rules. Thus, and for instance, a more efficient means of achieving capacity for competitive success would be to use performance enhancing drugs (hereafter PEDs). PEDs would mark an increase in efficiency because they would make it easier to

achieve the intermediary training goals — covering the distance without walking or at a certain pace, say — and so make it easier for achieving the end training goal which is the achievement of capacity: the putting the sportsperson in a position to successfully compete. However, PEDs are proscribed and it is the presence of this rule, and any like it prohibiting more efficient means, that arguably makes training into a game.

The problem with this defence of the proposal that training is a game is that the rule prohibiting the use of PEDs is arguable not a constitutive rule of the 'training game'. Rather, it is arguably what Suits (1988, 5) calls a *pre-event rule* of whatever competitive game that the training is for.[3] That is, PEDs are ruled out not by the rules of the 'training game' but by the goal that training has. This goal — capacity for competitive success — refers to success in a competitive *game*, and success in a game does not come by way of cheating. It follows that insofar as the pre-event rule proscribing PEDs is a pre-existing rule of the competitive game, then success at this game, which is the goal of training, requires the recognition of this rule. As such, it is not an 'unnecessary obstacle' to achieving the goal of training, erected in order to make a game of training. Rather, it is a necessary restriction given the goal of training.

However, if this restriction is not imposed by a rule of training, this suggests, that training is not rule-bound, and so it not a game at all. This is to say that training rather involves, within circumstantial constraints, the selection of the *most efficient* means. Thus the logic of training would endorse the use of PEDs (and any marginal gain) *where there is no prohibition by a pre-event rule*, just as it endorses reconnaissance of Alpine stages in the Tour. This same point — that training involves the selection of the most efficient means — might then be made by reference to a doped Tour rider who takes the pre-lusory goal of crossing the finish line first so seriously that

[3] Meier (1985), 70 calls these *auxiliary rules*.

he does not recognize pre-event rules. In not recognizing these rules of competition, the cheat would happily use PEDs in training *just because* they offer more efficient means to the goal of training, which is the capacity for success in competition — now understood by the cheat's excess of zeal as no more than crossing the finish line first.

In sum, while competition is a game, training is not. It is not a game because it involves the selection of the most efficient means, given the circumstances, for the achievement of its end, which is the possession of the capacity for competitive success, however this itself be understood. Some other account is thereby needed of what is common to the training of amateur and professional.[4]

Training is Play

The second proposal is that for both amateur and professional, training is play, where play according to Suits (1977, 124) involves the "temporary reallocation to autotelic activities of resources primarily committed to instrumental purposes".[5] For present purposes, the key claim here is that play is an autotelic activity, or something that is done simply for the love of it, so the proposal is that training *qua* play is an autotelic activity. This proposal might be supported by two considerations.

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[4] It should be noted that, as quoted, "games require practice" (Suits 1988, 2). So training will involve playing games. But this is a case of a game being training, rather than training being a game.

[5] Compare Meier ibid. who holds that in the context of sport and games, it is sufficient for play, and not merely necessary for it, that an activity be autotelic. And Feezell (2004) who makes play those autotelic activities that are voluntary and separate from ordinary life. For an account of autotelicity, see Schmid (2009).

First, competitive athletic games — that is, on Suits's view, sports that are not performances — are a species of game. What identifies these games as sport, Suits (1988) argues is that they are games of physical skill with a wide following and a certain level of stability. But these elaborations aside (and I'll come back to them later), competitive athletic games as *games of physical skill*. And such games are valuable, Suits (1988, 12) proposes because in playing them people "can realise in themselves capacities not realizable (or not readily so) in the pursuit of their ordinary activities." He gives the example of running: one has few opportunities to run competitively. The odd occasion when one has "the good fortune to arrive tardily at a bus stop" (Suits 1988, 12). But if one seeks this opportunity by deliberately leaving late, then one makes a game of it. And running is the exception: life offers no opportunities for anything like, say, football or golf. So competitive games are valued because they allow us to realize our capacities, and the first consideration is then the claim that training, which is practice for these games, inherits this valuation. Training, like competition, allows us to realize in ourselves capacities not realized in ordinary activities. Though this is not to say that training is an autotelic activity (or play on a Suitian account), it defines a constant or a general reason for training that bridges the many different particular reasons that people might have. Moreover, this is a reason for training that is intrinsic to the activity of training itself; otherwise put: it identifies an intrinsic reason for training. That there is an intrinsic reason for training then makes training comparable to an autotelic activity, or play.[6]

The second supporting consideration is that the difference between amateur and professional with respect to competitive athletic games does not carry over to training. This difference, recall, can be put simply: while both play competitive games, only

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[6] And it makes it play according to Schmid (2011).

amateurs are playing when they do so. Professionals are those “who have in view some further purpose which is achievable by playing the game” (Suits 2014, 154). Paradigmatically this is money but, as noted, it could be the affections of Gwendolyn, and this is what makes ‘professional’ a technical term. Professionalism also creeps in, Suits (1988, 9) notes, when the desire to win becomes over-riding. When it does the game is no longer played for the love of it, it is played for this further purpose, which is victory and the associated glory. So this compulsion can turn a game from play into something that is not play, which in Suits’s schema is work — work being activity that is done for a further end. Thus professionals work in playing competitive athletic games, while amateurs play in doing so. But, so the second consideration runs, this transformation of something that is by nature play into work, which marks the difference between amateur and professional, is not something that happens when it comes training. There is not the compulsion to win since training is not a game (and the person who ‘races’ every repetition just needs to be reminded of this). And it is performance in the game that is monetized, using this term broadly, not practice for it. So the further ends that corrupt play, as it were, are not present.

Putting these two considerations together gives the result that both amateurs and professionals are playing when they train, and this is what accounts for the similarity in their attitudes.

The problem with this proposal is straightforward. Even if there might be an element of play in training, and even if training is done, in part, simply for the love of it, training is nonetheless an end directed activity. Its purpose is to establish the capacity for successful competition, however success is understood. As such, training arguably falls into the category of work; it is an activity that is done for a further reason. It follows that its value is instrumental, measured by competitive success, or by the more nuanced measure of capacity for competition, that is competitiveness. This feature of

training makes it implausible to conceive of it simply as play even allowing the truth of the two supporting considerations. Training is a kind of work, and at times certainly feels as such, so some other account of the similarity in attitude between amateur and professional is needed.

Training is work.

Following on from the conclusion of the last section, the obvious third proposal is that for both amateur and professional, training is work. Their shared attitude towards training then follows from the facts that both do it for a further end, and in both cases this end is broadly the same. That is, both are motivated by future competitive athletic games and the desire to put themselves in a position to achieve competitive success, however this is conceived. This is work, as Suits understands it, because it is instrumental activity, or activity done for an end. The case of conceiving of training in this way has been largely made already, so I will not rehearse it.

This conception of training as work speaks directly to one of the puzzles of sport, if it can be called that. This puzzle starts from the fact that training can be hard work, in the sense that it can be something that is difficult or arduous. Given that it can be this, it can then seem mysterious why anyone would do it. Why, for example, would you get up early, when it is still dark, put on your running gear and go out into the wet and cold Winter morning? The answer ‘for the love of it’ does not seem adequate because there is no obvious pleasure in getting out in the wet and cold and then exerting yourself. If this is a pleasure at all, it is not a pleasure like rolling over and enjoying the soft, warm duvet (or basking in the sun, or eating grapes). And any pleasure in going out into the frigid morning would seem less than the pleasure of simply staying in bed. So our reason for training seems to call for explanation in a way that our reason for

staying in bed, or basking in the sun, does not. One response is that of Mill to Bentham. Bentham observed that push-pin might be the equal of poetry in terms of the pleasure it gives.[7] And Mill responded that we should consider the *quality* of the pleasure as well as its *quantity*.[8] There are simple pleasures — like staying in a warm bed — and complex pleasures — like going running on wet, cold mornings — and the quality of a complex pleasure can carry more weight than its simple quantity. A problem with this response arises to the extent that citing a more complex pleasure can fail to capture our motivations. For example, take Suits's proposal that people play games because ordinary life does not provide sufficient opportunities for realizing their capacities. The satisfaction of your desire to realize your capacities names a complex pleasure. But if one were to ask the imagined runner why she got out of bed to run on such a dark Winter's morning, one would not get the answer because she wanted to realize her capacities. This is not to say that this answer is false, or that it cannot form part of an explanation at some level, but it is to say that it would not ordinarily form part of an explanation that picks up on the agent's reasons in a way that makes sense of her actions. The kind of reason that our imagined runner might give would be that she was training for X — where 'X', as was said before, might be as various as her first marathon, which she hopes to complete without walking, or the Olympic trials marathon. And the point here is just that her going out into the cold morning is *for*

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[7] "Prejudice apart, the game of push-pin is of equal value with the arts and sciences of music and poetry. If the game of push-pin furnish more pleasure, it is more valuable than either" (Bentham 1825, 206).

[8] "It would be absurd that while, in estimating all other things, quality is considered as well as quantity, the estimation of pleasures should be supposed to depend on quantity alone" (Mill 2014, 11-12).

something; that is, it is an instrumental activity, or work in Suits's sense. Her end goal supplies her reason, and this reason is of a kind that makes it non-mysterious why she got out of bed. It might be that in training for her marathon she is also realizing capacities that she does not otherwise have a chance to realize, but the explanation that this reference provides is not of the ordinary action-explanation sort. By contrast, conceiving of training as work is explanatory, and it makes it non-mysterious why people train.

The problem with the proposal that training is work is that it does not fit with the other data point, which is that the amateur puts a *reverse English* spin on the professional attitude towards training. That is, the amateur competes in order to train. So while it is true that our imagined runner leaves her house on that cold, wet and dark morning — and one could add windy too — because she is training for a marathon; it is also true, if she is an amateur, that she is training for a marathon just so that she can get out of bed on mornings like this one. So the appropriate level of action explanation has to dig a little deeper than the reason that she is training for a marathon because there is no reason for doing this. The marathon is, as it were, an 'unnecessary obstacle', a barrier put in place just for the pleasure of surmounting it. It is not, as it is with the professional, that she can offer a further reason, which is paradigmatically financial. Rather, the marathon is done simply for its own sake, and by the logic of reverse English, training inherits this rationale. So 'for the love of it' must name a complex pleasure, something like that of realizing one's capacities, and the action explanation must proceed beyond what is voiced. This is not to give to no credit to the reasons that are voiced, it is just to say that training cannot be merely work. It might be work in the sense of hard graft; and it might be work in Suits's sense that it is goal directed. But it still remains true, for the amateur, that it is something that ultimately is done *for its own*

sake.[9] The starting point of this paper was then that there is a substantial overlap here in the attitudes of amateur and professional. Professionals, all be it actual, express their love for their sporting activity, which is a love of training. So some other explanation is needed of this convergence.

Training is a Utopian Activity

Suits (2014) aims to do at least two things. It aims to provide a conceptual analysis of games, or an account of the necessary and sufficient conditions for playing a game. And it aims to change how we think about games. Thus, Suits (1988, 14) observes that we tend to think of games as "non-serious", which is to say as frivolous. But Suits (2014, 182) contends that games play a crucial role in delineating the *ideal of existence*, "a role which cannot be performed by any other activity, and without which an account of the ideal is either incomplete or impossible." Suits makes this argument by appeal to an idea of Utopia.

In Utopia, there are no economic needs; "the condition of man is a South Sea island paradise, where yachts, diamonds, racing cars, symphonic performances, mansions and trips around the world are as easily plucked from the environment as breadfruit is in Tahiti" (Suits 2014, 183). Economic work is fully automated. All knowledge is possessed, and developments in pharmacology mean there are "cures for all psychic disturbances" (Suits 2014, 183). And one should add to this characterisation that there is a magic bean that delivers all the health and competitive benefits of training without the work. The problem with Utopia is then that there is nothing that needs to be

[9] For a different account of what this amounts to than Suits's realizing capacities, see Russell (2005).

done; and one can only bask in the sun eating grapes for so long. What is then needed to make life interesting is some activity that is not done for some further end, and, Suits (2014, 189) suggests, games fit this bill "[f]or in games we must have obstacles which we can strive to overcome *just so that* we can possess the activity as a whole, namely, playing the game. Game playing [then] makes it possible to retain enough effort in Utopia to make life worth living."

An immediate worry is that games are hereby being put to an end, and the most demanding end that there can be: to justify, or make meaningful, existence. Suits response to this worry is to introduce the idea of what might be called a *utopian activity*. Such an activity may have an instrumental value but it is also valued instrinsically as an end in itself. Here Suits (2014, 193) gives the example of John Striver who, bored with Utopia, decides to become a carpenter and build his own house. There is no need for him to do this, or any need in Utopia for house builders, so what house should Striver attempt to build? Given his aim is the alleviation of his boredom, one that is difficult enough to make the activity interesting without being so difficult as to be impossible.[10] Engaging in just this house building activity is then to play a game. It is to choose inefficient means to an end solely to be engaged in the activity. Thus, while game playing in the narrow 'frivolous' sense need not be the sole occupation in Utopia, game playing "is the essence, the 'without which not' of Utopia" (Suits 2014, 194).

Utopian activities, as such, might then be characterised as those activities that have instrumental value, but which are valued intrinsically. Striver's efforts result in a house, but he engages in house building just for the sake of it. Or to give Suits (2014, 189) example from our sub-lunar world, a scientific researcher might value the pursuit

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[10] Compare the life project of Percival Bartlebooth in Perec (1978). (For a short description of this see Auster (1987)).

of her research as a good in itself even when the results of this research are instrumentally valuable. Moreover, this conjunction is fairly prosaic: anyone that loves their job (such as actual professional athletes) will value it in this conjunctive way. And, so the fourth proposal goes, this is the case with training. Training is not just work, it is also something that is done for the love of it. So in Utopia, people would make a game out of training by forgoing the magic bean in the same way that Striver forgoes automated-house-building-services. Training is thereby a utopian activity, the kind of thing that would give existence a purpose in Utopia. On this proposal, the objections to previous proposals make good sense. For each previous proposal focussed on one aspect of training — they focussed either on its instrumental value, or its being valued in itself — when in fact the activity of training has both aspects or can be valued in both ways. This follows from its being a utopian activity. (Hence Suits (1977, 127) observes that the tennis player Tommy More "a visitor to our world from Utopia … was neither a professional nor an amateur, since in Utopia the distinction between the two has no application.")

This proposal is good as far as it goes. However, all it does is argue for a possibility. What is further needed is some account of how training exemplifies this possibility. Such an account can be provided, I think, by considering the social institution of the sport in which the training is embedded. I attempt to do this in the next section through appealing to Alasdair MacIntyre's idea of a practice.

Training is Part of a Practice

Training can be, at once, both an instrumental and an autotelic activity. This possibility can be identified through conceiving of training as a utopian activity. But it

is better developed, I hope to show in this section, by situating both training and the competition that training is preparation for, within the sport that is being practised.

A sport, according to Suits (1988), is a game of physical skill with a wide following and a certain level of stability. What is required for stability is not just that the sport be long-lived — Hula-hoop would be a craze even if it were long-lived — but that there be social institutions that sustain the sport and ensure that it is long-lived. These institutions have the function, Suits (1988, 13) suggests, of "teaching and training, coaching, research and development ... criticism ... and archivism (the compilation and preservation of individual performances and their statistical treatment)." None of these functions are strictly necessary, in the philosophical sense, but that there be some such sustaining social institutions is. I do not dispute the necessity of such sustaining social institutions but would suggest that such social institutions are necessary for precisely this: *sustaining the sport*. The sport itself, whatever it might be, should not be identified with these institutions, but might rather be conceived as the practice that these institutions sustain. The appeal here is to Alasdair MacIntyre who, just as Suits contrasts Hula-hoop with a sport, contrasts Tic-tac-toe with a practice; stating, "Tic-tac-toe is not an example of a practice … nor is throwing a football with skill; but the game of football is, and so is chess." (MacIntyre 2007, 187). And MacIntyre (2007, 194) agrees that while "no practices can survive for any length of time unsustained by institutions", such that "institutions and practices characteristically form a single causal order", nevertheless institutions are not practices, "[c]hess, physics and medicine are practices; chess clubs, laboratories, universities and hospitals are institutions".

On this proposal, sport is a game of physical skill that is embedded in society in a way that makes it into a practice. For MacIntyre the range of practices is wide — from chess to football to physics and much else besides — but a practice can be defined as "any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative activity through

which good internal to that form of activity are realized in the course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of activity" (MacIntyre 2007, 187). The key feature of this definition, both for MacIntyre and current purposes, is the distinction between *internal* and *external* goods. This distinction largely, but importantly not exactly, maps onto Suits's distinction between autotelic and instrumental activities. MacIntyre illustrates it with the case of teaching chess to a highly intelligent seven year who agrees to learn for the reward of sweets; some for playing, and some more for winning.

> Thus motivated the child plays and plays to win. Notice, however, that, so long as it is the candy alone which provides the child with a good reason for playing chess, the child has no reason not to cheat and every reason to cheat, provided he or she can do so successfully. But, so we may hope, there will come a time when the child will find in those goods specific to chess, in the achievement of a certain highly particular kind of analytical skill, strategic imagination and competitive intensity, a new set of reasons, reasons now not just for winning on a particular occasion, but for trying to excel in whatever way the game of chess demands. (MacIntyre 2007, 188)

In this case, sweets are the external good. And when the child plays chess in order to get this reward, playing chess is an instrumental activity; and, in Suits's terms, the child is a professional player. The goods internal to the practice are those that cannot be had in any other way than by participating in the practice, (and the claim here is metaphysical and not refuted if playing chess is the child's only source of sweets). These are the goods that the child comes to enjoy when she comes to play chess "for the love of the game" (Suits 2014, 155); when playing chess becomes an autotelic activity, and the child, in Suits's terms is an amateur player. Internal goods are then *internal* for three reasons. Because they can only be specified by reference to a practice. Because they can only be recognized by those with the experience of participating in the practice. And because they are the product of trying to excel at the practice.

The achievement of these internal goods — a result of excelling to whatever degree — is then *pleasurable*. “Someone who achieves excellence in a practice, who plays chess or football well … characteristically enjoys his achievement and his activity in achieving” (MacIntyre 2007, 197). This is not to identify a further good, which would then threaten to make excelling at the practice instrumental, or valued to the extent that it resulted in pleasure. Rather, MacIntyre proposes an “Aristotelian view of pleasure”: “the enjoyment of the activity and the enjoyment of achievement are not the ends at which the agent aims, but the enjoyment supervenes upon the successful activity in such a way that the activity achieved and the activity enjoyed are one and the same state” (MacIntyre 2007, 197). So there is a pleasure associated with doing something for the love of it, but one doesn’t do that thing for this pleasure, one does it for the love of it and the pleasure lies in doing that.

This conception of practices and the goods internal to them, can then explain the common attitude of amateurs and professionals to training. Their training might serve different ends but in training they are practising the same sport and so both enjoy the goods internal to this sport as practice. The enjoyment of these internal goods is that associated with training being, in Suits’s terms, an autotelic activity. And this remains the case even if the purpose of training is for some further, instrumental, end. At this juncture a couple of clarifications are needed. First, excelling at a practice does not mean being excellent at it. A poor chess player and slow runner can still take pleasure in chess and running. Rather excelling at a practice means having an excellent grasp of the goods internal to the practice. Excellence in a practice is ordinarily sufficient for such a grasp, but it is not necessary for it. Second, this will mean that there will be some learning period when a grasp of the goods internal to the practice is still emerging and the balance of reasons for training are instrumental, and training is thereby work. But once training is viewed as part of a practice it can never merely be work, and there will

always be some further (internal or autotelic) value to it, even if this is imperfectly grasped. Moreover, any instrumental balance of reasons will only characterize an occasion of training, but practices need to be viewed holistically. One occasion of training needs to be set alongside others, the end goal and much else besides. To grasp the practice is then to see the pleasure in the round.[11]

Moreover, conceiving of training as (an essential part of) a practice allows an explanation of how there can be an overlap in sport-specific attitudes that is more substantial than amateurs and professionals merely sharing a view of training. MacIntyre uses the idea of a practice to define what virtues are: "[a] virtue is an acquired human quality the possession and exercise of which tends to enable us to achieve those goods which are internal to practices and the lack of which effectively prevents us from achieving any such goods" (MacIntyre 2007, 191). Given this characterisation, he identifies certain core virtues necessary for any practice. For example, any practice will involve standards of excellence, and to enter into the practice is to accept these standards; "[i]f, on starting to play baseball, I do not accept that others know better than I when to throw a fast ball and when not, I will never learn to appreciate good pitching let alone to pitch" (MacIntyre 2007, 190). Recognizing these standards of excellence then requires that one give credit where credit is due. Thus justice is a core virtue. But in addition to these core virtues, specific practices will require, and so cultivate, specific virtues. And this is to return to the subject who goes

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[11] For such an apprentice practitioner, training (or chess for MacIntyre's intelligent seven year old), might then be classified as *enjoyable work*, "[They] enter the work activity primarily for the external objective, but something else that is good (or even better) also comes along. Therefore, the doing, the pursuing, the process, turns out to be enjoyable as well". (Kretchmar, Dyreson, Llewellyn and Gleaves 2017, 32).

out into the cold wet morning. Excelling at the practice that is running can require that human quality — perhaps *resolve* — that enables this. Thus training will cultivate certain virtues, which might include resolve (getting out in the cold wet morning); perseverance (finishing something that is physically demanding); good judgement (knowing when to stop), and so on. Moreover, insofar as the practice involves physical games, some of these virtues should be physical virtues or virtues anchored in this physicality. This set of virtues, whatever it might be and here the specifics do not matter, will be constant across the amateur and professional for it will be part of the identity of the practice that both participate in. That there should then be a substantial overlap in sport-specific attitudes also follows from this.

Revisiting the Amateur-Professional Distinction

This paper started from Suits's distinction between amateur and professional attitudes to competition. The professional, Suits proposes, competes — that is, plays athletic games — for a further reason, which is paradigmatically money and status; whereas the amateur competes for the love of the game. Accepting this distinction, the paper then focused on professional and amateur attitudes towards training, which is preparation for competition. The obvious initial thought is that the divergence in attitude to competition carries over and sustains a divergence in attitude towards training. That is, the professional trains simply to compete successfully, so training is simply a further instrumental activity. Whereas the amateur puts a reverse English spin on this and enters competition in order to enjoy training, so both are done as autotelic activities. However, this simple extension doesn't chime with the attitudes that actual professionals express: while it is true that these train to be successful in competition, they also train — that is, practice the game — for the love of it. The question is then

how to make sense of this conjunction; that is, how to accept that professionals and amateurs differ in their attitudes towards competition but allow that they can have similar attitudes towards training for competition.

In trying to answer this question, the paper then investigated various explanatory strategies for showing consistency before settling on the proposal that training should be conceived not merely as practice for competition but as part of the practice that is the sport competitively engaged in. Appeal to the idea of a practice also shows that there is something uncomfortably technical about Suits's understanding of 'amateur' and 'professional' (and here I return to a worry raised in section one). According to Suits's definition, a professional is someone who competes for a further reason. So Percy, who signs up to run a marathon in order to impress Gwendolyn, is a professional. More realistically those who sign up to run a marathon in order to lose weight, to lower their blood pressure, or raise money for charity are equally professionals. Of the tens of thousands of people who fill the mass starts at big city marathons many of these are running for such further reasons, making this mass of runners professionals. That there is something wrong here might then be shown by considering three archetype entrants to such a big city marathon. The first is Wilson Kipchoge, a Kenyan elite who competes for the prize money. The second is Alf Tupper an amateur club runner who has run numerous marathons before but never this big city marathon and is here for the love of the game. The third is Charity Blossom who has never run prior to signing up for this marathon in order to raise money for charity.[12] On Suits's proposal Charity Blossom should be grouped with Wilson Kipchoge as a professional and opposed to Alf Tupper who is the only amateur in the group. Appeal to the idea of sport as a practice allows, I suggest, a more natural grouping, which is to pair Kipchoge with Tupper: both have

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[12] See Pike (2013).

their personal histories and attitudes shaped by this practice that is training for and competing in running events. By contrast, Charity Blossom, to the extent that she is new to running and is doing the marathon only to raise money, is like MacIntyre's chess pupil: she has not yet been initiated into the practice, and so is motivated by external goods, rather than the goods internal to the practice. This is not to make an invidious contrast — that would require a further step: a contrastive justification of the goodness of the practice — it is rather to suggest a different definition of the amateur and professional. On this definition, a professional is simply someone who makes a profession out of a practice. This entails a concern with external goods but does not entail a neglect of internal ones. By contrast, an amateur is a non-professional practitioner; and Suits's pseudo-professionals — Percy and Charity Blossom — are either amateurs or novitiates.[13]

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